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Introduction 
'Cynicism' is probably the best way to describe my reaction to 
the use of metaphors in ecclesiology: everything seems possible 
and everything seems permissible. And judging from comments 
made by other people in recent years during discussions of my 
work, I am not the only one to experience such a reaction. 
Although a touch of cynicism prevents a theologian from 
acclaiming the kingdom of heaven too quickly and from 
forgetting the difference between the task of the magisterium 
and that of the theologian, too much of it kills any zest or zeal 
and thus theology itself, an indispensable critical function 
within the whole of the church. The argument I present in the 
following chapters will show, I hope, that there is an escape 
from this paralysing situation in ecclesiology, and that there is 
an approach and an opening to a truly theological treatment of 
the church. 
I have decided to concentrate within the field of ecclesiology 
on Lumen Gentium, the dogmatic constitution on the church 
issued by the Second Vatican Council, and on Roman Catholic 
ecclesiology after the council, and I have made this decision on 
several grounds. In the first place some practical arguments 
dominated my choice: I had done some work previously in 
modern ecclesiology, and, by concentrating upon Lumen 
Gentium and on the reaction of theologians to it, I could narrow 
down the dangerously broad perspective and could reduce the 
abundant material to manageable proportions. But there was 
also an intuition that Lumen Gentium, by acknowledging and 
employing so many images and metaphors for the church, has 
created a new situation to which theologians have to find an 
adequate response. In the course of my analysis, this intuition 
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was confirmed and deepened: Lumen Gentium has created a new 
situation, which must be viewed as a breakthrough and a 
fundamental change in reflection on the church. 
The church occupies a central place in the documents of 
Vatican II and that is, compared to the documents of other 
councils, a new and important feature. But the way the church 
is seen forms an even more important point of difference 
with recent and not so recent official teachings. The self-
understanding of the church expressed in these official 
pronouncements shows the influence of a way of thinking, 
whose origins can be traced back to the first separate treatises 
on the church in western theology that appeared around 1300.' 
This relatively late appearance of separate ecclesiological 
treatises was provoked not so much by inner logic or theological 
development, but more or even exclusively by political 
circumstances. The defensive attitude and the rather narrow 
focus on the jurisdiction and power of pope and hierarchy, 
which characterize these early ecclesiological works, was 
reinforced by the reaction to the Reformation. A more open 
and more theological approach to the church, never completely 
forgotten, gained influence in the 19th century and is linked to 
the names of J . A. Möhler and J. H. Newman.2 At the First 
Vatican Council an attempt to combine the two approaches 
was not received favourably, and the revised schema, which 
shows predominantly the traces of the narrow approach, was 
never put to a vote, since the council was adjourned indefinitely 
due to the political situation.3 The theological developments 
between the two world wars resulted in another attempt at 
integration: the encyclical Mystia Corporis. The subsequent 
history and theological discussions make it clear that it did not 
prove to be a successful attempt.4 Certain key-terms figured in 
these approaches and integration-attempts: societas (or coetus) 
in the narrow approach, and corpus mysticum in the other 
approach and in the integration-attempts, although in different 
interpretations. Lumen Gentium can be seen as another attempt 
to face the problems raised by these two, rather different ways 
of thinking about the church. But compared with the schema 
of the First Vatican Council and the encyclical Mystici Corporis 
there is a major point of difference, for the transition from 
schema and encyclical to constitution is not a further develop-
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ment along the lines set out by these first attempts. In the first 
two texts the narrow approach dominates the reflection; in 
Lumen Gentium the open approach is fundamental. This change 
is echoed in the decision to quote a number of biblical images 
and metaphors for the church and in the way these are under­
stood; the implications of the change are unfolded in (e.g.) 
that other important document of Vatican и, Gaudium et Spes. 
The genesis of the text of Lumen Gentium gives a dramatically 
compressed picture of this transition, with its fundamental 
turning-point: the first proposal follows Mystid Corporis closely, 
while in the subsequent schemata the other approach slowly 
gains dominance. But although the change is crucially 
important, it would be a simplification to suggest that Lumen 
Gentium has created an unambiguous situation. Like the 
previous texts, it is an attempt to integrate what cannot and 
should not be integrated, and consequently it does not present 
a coherent and consistent view of the church. 
It is precisely this new and ambivalent situation which 
provides the theologian with opportunities and problems, with 
the possibility of developing systematically the fundamental 
insights of Vatican и and so of treating the church in a truly 
theological way, and with the necessity of deciding which term 
should be central to such a treatment. It is understandable 
that in previous periods the choice of a central term did not 
present itself as a special problem, since it was more or less 
obvious given the official teaching. Consequently, methodo­
logical considerations of this kind have not been at the centre 
of discussions about the church. But given the indecisiveness 
oí Lumen Gentium, and given that reflection about the question 
as to which term is to be central has therefore become necessary 
for the stabilization of the breakthrough and the further 
development of the insights of Vatican II, these methodological 
considerations can no longer be avoided or taken for granted. 
In a first reading of the post-conciliar ecclesiology, though, I 
did not discover any growing awareness of this aspect of the 
changes; and a further analysis even revealed a disturbing 
confusion among theologians on this point, which, given the 
vital place of these considerations, must exercise a frustrating 
influence on the way they develop the insights of Vatican n. 
And so, in the course of my study, the wish to deal with this 
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situation created by Lumen Gentium, and the hope that a 
discussion of the possible role of metaphor in theology might 
contribute to the advancement of a truly theological treatment 
of the church, became more and more important. And since I 
cannot deny my impression that the lack of clarity with regard 
to the central term has played a role in the rather rapid 
disappearance of the euphoria of the immediate post-conciliar 
period, I thought too that the choice of this particular problem 
might have some useful consequences for pastoral work, even 
if only indirectly. 
As my reasons for starting this research were not completely 
clear at the beginning, my way of approaching the problems 
was not well defined. Looking back, I can see various sugges-
tions that proved to be unhelpful and my relatively slow 
realisation of what now seems to be the best approach. In 
previous years I had come across I. Ramsey's way of considering 
metaphors in theology, which appealed to me and which 
seemed helpful in explaining and elucidating certain 
theological procedures. Ramsey develops Black's metaphor 
and model theory and adapts this for religious and theological 
language; his reflections on the use of models seemed at first to 
contain the key to the solution. But when I started to work 
along these lines all kinds of questions arose which made the 
usefulness of his understanding of model less obvious, and I 
was driven back to the metaphor-theory. At that stage P. 
Ricoeur's masterly book on metaphors, then recently published, 
provided considerable help in exploring the various approaches 
to metaphor and metaphor-theory. It has influenced my own 
thinking on this topic profoundly. On the basis of his analyses 
and arguments, especially his argument that a metaphor is a 
sentence, a predication, I have tried to develop a metaphor-
theory as a preliminary to the discussion of the role of 
metaphors in theology. 
Right from the beginning I have made the distinction 
between religious and theological language, between the 
language of scripture, preaching and prayer on the one hand, 
and the language of technical theological discourse on the 
other, and I have limited myself to an investigation of the role 
of metaphors in theological language. Although the importance 
and the implications of this distinction became clear when I 
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was dealing with models and the relation between models and 
metaphors, the distinction itself proved to be at stake in some 
of the present criticism of academic theology. And so the 
problem of metaphors in ecclesiology appeared as an aspect of 
a much wider problem: the necessity, possibility and desirability 
of theology as distinct from preaching, of theology as 'science', 
as 'Wissenschaft'. A complicated problem. It seemed to me 
best to remain within my original scope and to present any 
possible contribution to that larger discussion from this 
perspective. 
The absence of any distinction between religious language 
and theological language, or the refusal to acknowledge it, 
leads and has led to frustrating and dangerous demands. The 
eclipse of theological language leads, at worst, to a kind of 
blind, chaotic frenzy, and, at best, to a pious, irrelevant and 
watered-down Christianity. The eclipse of religious language 
results only too easily in an overcharge of theological language, 
in an employment for which it is not designed. Highly abstract 
words and technical terms do not provoke and are not meant 
to provoke the response of faith, should not be expected to do 
so, and so should not be criticized for failing to do precisely 
that. Only by investigating and determining the proper task of 
both types of language can these two deadly extremes be 
avoided. Since the emphasis in what follows is on the role of 
metaphors in theological language, the relation between religious 
and theological language is considered mainly from the per-
spective of theological language and of the tasks of this 
language; the role of metaphors in religious language is not 
thematized explicitly. My argument against allowing 
metaphors to play a crucial role in theological language is a 
specification of the task of theological language, but is not 
intended as a plea for a return to the dominance of theological 
language in sermons and catechesis, with the argument that 
metaphors are merely ornaments. On the contrary, my 
argument is an attempt to respond to the contemporary 
insights which stress - in addition to the emotional, aesthetic 
and didactic elements - the cognitive element in metaphors. 
This cognitive element is central to the determination of the 
task of theological language vis-à-vis religious metaphors: the 
theologian should not try to replace the metaphors with his or 
6 The Concept of Church 
her kind of technical language, but should try to elicit and 
develop with the help of that language the richness buried in 
the metaphors. 
My argument is divided into four chapters representing four 
consecutive steps. In the first chapter I trace the genesis of the 
text of Lumen Gentium and indicate at each stage which term is 
the central one, which term determines the view of the church. 
The overall conclusion is that Lumen Gentium does not have one 
central term, but two, namely 'mystical body of Christ' and 
'people of God', and that their relation is not clear. In the 
second section I analyze the arguments of the theologians 
concerning the central term in the ecclesiology after Vatican 
II. There appear to be two kinds of arguments: arguments 
related to the content of'mystical body of Christ' and 'people 
of God', and arguments about the status of these terms. In 
view of the new situation these last arguments are important, 
especially since presuppositions and conclusions seem likely to 
prevent any systematic theological development. The situation 
in ecclesiology created by Vatican II, and the insufficient and 
contradictory responses of the theologians to it, require a 
clarification of the role of metaphors in theology and, 
preliminary to that, a clarification of the meaning-mechanism 
and the function of metaphors in general. 
In the second chapter, I state the requirements of a metaphor-
theory, propose one, and compare it with some other theories. 
Here the arguments are directed at finding the required 
essential notions for a metaphor-theory. 
In the third chapter I examine arguments for and against 
the central role of metaphors in theology: the arguments of 
narrative theology in favour of metaphors, the arguments of 
some philosophers of religion in favour of models, and the 
arguments of Aquinas against metaphors in theology. Since 
these arguments often rest upon an inadequate metaphor-
theory, I restate and reconstrue the various positions on the 
basis of the theory proposed in the second chapter. 
In the final chapter the conclusions of the two middle 
chapters are related to the problems discovered in the first 
chapter. In the first section I try to develop a view of the 
relation between metaphorical language and theological 
language using insights and arguments borrowed from the 
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authors discussed in the third chapter. This general view does 
not lead to immediate conclusions with regard to ecclesiology, 
for there are two types of problems that have to be solved first: 
the question of definition which serves as a focus for the various 
arguments about the status of the terms 'people of God' and 
'body of Christ' given by the theologians, and the discrepancy 
between their theory and their practice. In the final section I 
propose 'the church is the communio of the faithful' as the 
basic statement in ecclesiology. I have limited myself to 
outlining a rather formal structure indicating what kind of 
questions can and have to be asked and what kind not. Any 
further filling in requires biblical and historical studies and 
sociological, psychological, economical, political and cultural 
analyses of the contemporary situation — requires, in other 
words a type of reflection which is different from the introduc-
tory methodological considerations developed here. 
My title, finally, is an expression of my conviction that it is 
possible to talk in a truly theological way about the church. 
I have been so fortunate to spend three years at Oxford for 
my post-doctoral studies, thanks to 'Het deken Scholtenfonds' 
(Oldenzaal) and the N.K.O.V. who provided money for the first 
year, to the z.w.o., and to the Provost and Fellows of The 
Queen's College who elected me to a Florey Studentship. Dr J. 
Annas spent much time and energy in critically reading and 
discussing the papers and drafts that have resulted in the 
second chapter, and Mr R. Harré has helped me in various 
ways to understand the role of models in science and has 
kindly read my account and application of his theory. I am 
very grateful to these people and institutions. And I am 
very grateful to those who have made these years not only 
academically fruitful but also thoroughly enjoyable in all those 
other areas of life. This study was concluded in December 
1979. 
HERWI RIKHOF 
February 1981 
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Chapter 1 
The Church, Lumen Gentium and the 
Theologians 
This chapter contains two analyses both dealing with a 
problem fundamental to a systematic treatment of the church: 
the choice of the central term. The first analysis is concerned 
with Lumen Gentium. The Second Vatican Council has created 
a new situation and a new starting-point for theological reflec-
tion by issuing this dogmatic constitution on the church, which 
compared to previous teachings manifests a different approach 
to the church — to its nature, its tasks, its structure. Since part 
of the new situation is that Lumen Gentium does not itself provide 
a clear indication of the term it favours, the reaction of theolo-
gians to it and the answers they give to the question which 
term should be central become crucial to the theological 
development of the insights of Lumen Gentium. The second 
analysis concentrates on these reactions and answers. 
1. The analysis o/Xumen Gentium 
Lumen Gentium is one of the central documents of the Second 
Vatican Council. Like other documents, the dogmatic consti-
tution on the church was the result of a long and turbulent 
process.1 The original schema was introduced by Cardinal 
Ottaviani, the chairman of the doctrinal committee, on 
1 December 1962. He qualified it as a pastoral, biblical and 
accessible document, but expressed at the same time his fears 
that it would be received with the by-then customary criticism 
of prepared documents: viz, that it was not pastoral enough, 
not ecumenical, too scholastic, too negative.2 The schema was 
discussed briefly during the last week of the first session and 
the criticism voiced was fundamental and devastating. The 
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schema was sent back to the committee to be rewritten. Before 
the second session the council fathers received a new text 
which was based upon a schema written by G. Philips and 
which in its original form had circulated among the fathers 
near the end of the first session. This second schema was 
accepted by the council fathers in principal as the basis for 
further discussion on 1 November 1963. The discussion in the 
aula was long and at times stormy. These speeches, together 
with the written comments submitted at various times, were 
used for the redaction of the third schema. This was discussed 
and accepted during the third session. On 21 November 1964 
the final text was promulgated. 
The first proposal and the final text express two rather 
difFerent views of the church: the first describes the church in 
apologetica! and juridical terms, while the other places the 
church in the context of the history of salvation. A quick first 
reading of the two texts reveals also a difference in what seems 
to be the central image or concept in the two schemata: 
'mystical body of Christ' in the first, and 'people of God' in the 
second. A connection between the difference in view and the 
difference in central concept suggests itself with an apparent 
consequence, among other consequences, that an ecclesiology 
developing the insights of Vatican и must take 'people of 
God' as its central term. But a more careful second reading 
discloses a much more complex relationship. Only if the first 
proposal and the final text are seen as the beginning and the 
end of a development, while the various versions of the second 
schema are treated as transitory phases of this development, 
can the complexity of the whole process be grasped. For, apart 
from the apparent discontinuity, there is also an element of 
continuity in all the texts. The decision of the committee which 
had to rewrite the first schema, that it should not rearrange 
the acceptable material from that first proposal but rather 
adopt Philips' schema as a starting-point, does not contradict 
this observation, since Philips used much material and even 
complete chapters from the first proposal.3 The features of 
continuity and discontinuity expressing the old and the new 
cannot immediately be discovered in the final text: an analysis 
of the text at its various stages can reveal the different layers, 
the transpositions and the constant elements. 
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The basic outline of the view of the church which provides 
the framework for the discussion of issues like the relation of 
church and state, the collegiality of bishops, the place of 
religious, the connection between the church on earth and the 
church in heaven, etc., is given in the first part of the different 
texts. For the present discussion, dealing with the view of the 
church and with the role of terms like 'mystical body of Christ' 
and 'people of God', these first parts are most relevant; the rest 
of the text is only referred to as an illustration of, or support for, 
the conclusion reached in the analysis of those first chapters. 
The analysis proceeds first by summarizing the main ideas in a 
paraphrase which mirrors as much as possible the original and 
sometimes abrupt connections, and secondly by pointing to 
important structuring elements, by answering the question 
which term is central, and by comparing the different texts.4 
1.1 The first schema: Aeternus Unigeniti Pater 
The first schema was handed out on 13 November 1962. The 
work on it was started some two years earlier when the 
theological committee instituted a subcommittee with the task 
of writing a constitution on the church based upon an outline 
accepted by the central preparatory committee. In frequent 
meetings and in contact with the theological committee the 
work was done. By March 1962 the schema was ready for 
inspection by the central committee which asked for some 
changes. It has been a complaint that the composition of the 
various committees did not sufficiently reflect the diversity of 
theological schools.' 
The first proposal consists of 11 chapters and an appendix 
on the Virgin. The first chapter determines the nature of the 
church militant, while the second declares the church necessary 
for salvation and defines the conditions of membership. 
Chapters three and four deal with issues concerning bishops 
and priests, chapter five with religious, and chapter six with 
the laity. Chapters seven and eight are concerned with the 
magisterium and with authority and obedience in the church. 
The final three chapters discuss the relation between church 
and state, the need to preach the gospel to all people, and the 
ecumenical movement. Of these the first chapter is most 
relevant to the present discussion.2 
14 The Concept of Church 
The chapter on the nature of the church militant starts with 
a section on the plan of the Father to redeem mankind and to 
bring it into his kingdom by sending his Son. The Son will 
acquire through his death a people, for the Father does not 
want the redeemed to be separate individuals, but wants them 
to form a people, a new Israel under Christ the head (section 
1). This plan is executed by his Son. Christ himself leads the 
people of God to eternal salvation in his capacity as teacher, 
priest and king. But he leads it via the leaders appointed by 
him; he entrusted to them the tasks, to be performed under 
Peter, of being teachers, priests and kings. This new people, 
this Israel of God, does not march like a confused mass, but 
like a column in close order, invincible, towards the end of 
time (section 2). 
The next three sections deal with biblical names for this 
Israel of God. Like Moses, who called Israel in the desert 'the 
church of God', so Jesus calls the new Israel 'church'. And he 
calls it his church, not only because he acquired it through his 
blood, but also because he founded it upon Peter and his 
successors. To express more clearly the nature of the church 
Jesus has used, directly or indirectly via the apostles, different 
names and images that describe the mystical and social aspects: 
kingdom, house, temple, body, flock, bride, column and 
foundation of truth (section 3). But among these, 'body' 
occupies the first place. Inspired by Christ, Paul uses 'body' to 
state that Christ is the head of his body and that those who are 
baptized and take part in the eucharist are made into one body 
(section 4). 
This is further developed in a long section in which five 
elements can be discerned. First, that the body is visible: 
because the church is a body, it can be seen. Secondly, that it 
is an organism with many members; these members are not at 
all equals, for some are superior to others. Thirdly, that apart 
from the social, juridical and ministerial relations, there is also 
an intimate relationship with Christ, which Christ has 
illustrated by means of the comparison with the vine. Fourthly, 
that the Spirit is the soul of the body. He gives graces and 
charismas and he constitutes the unity of the body. Fifthly, 
that some of the members are sick. Not all members are 
healthy in holiness; their sinfulness offends the church but 
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does not affect the essential holiness of the church. The church 
is holy, because as bride of Christ it is constituted in holiness. 
As a mother the church cares for its members and helps them 
with its sacraments (section 5). 
On the basis of this view the final two sections present two 
main conclusions. First, the hierarchical church-organisation 
and the charismatic church of love are one and the same. This 
is explained via the analogy with the mystery of the incarna-
tion: as the human nature serves the divine, so the organisation 
serves the development of the mystical body. Secondly, the 
Roman Catholic Church and the mystical body of Christ are 
identical. There is one, holy catholic and apostolic church, 
and that is the Roman Catholic Church. 
The question about the central term is not difficult to 
answer: the central term in this schema is 'mystical body of 
Christ'. The reason why biblical images are mentioned can 
further clarify this position of'mystical body'. The images are 
introduced in contrast with the word ecclesia, 'church'. They 
reveal in a clearer and more precise way the nature of the 
church because they describe the social and mystical aspect of 
the church. This betrays one of the central concerns of the 
text: to acknowledge both aspects and to show their 
inseparable relationship.3 'Body' receives here a preferential 
treatment, since it expresses most clearly this inseparable 
connection. This concern to show both the mystical and the 
social aspect of the church determines, at least partly, the way 
'body' or 'mystical body of Christ' is understood and 
explained. On the one hand, the text refers to Christ's 
relationship and intimate connection with the body, and to the 
role of the Spirit; on the other hand, the text mentíons the 
visibility of the body, the social and juridical relations between 
the members. The analogy with the mystery of the incarnation 
is also used to emphasize the inseparable connection between 
the domain of the organisation and the domain of grace. The 
use of the analogy is also a sign of the 'Christus-prolongatus' 
view: the church is seen as a continuation of the incarnation of 
Christ, as Christ living on.4 
But this concern explains neither the structure of sub-
ordination among the members nor the hierarchical inter-
pretation of the gifts of the Spirit. These elements are 
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determined by another concern, namely, that of identifying 
the Roman Catholic Church with the mystical body of Christ. 
The whole chapter leads up to this identification and its 
importance is indicated by introducing it as a solemn declara-
tion of the sacred synod. The Roman Catholic Church is 
understood in a certain way, however: it is understood as 
consisting of unequal members (as a sodetas inaequalis). There 
exists a fundamental dichotomy between clergy and laity, 
between leaders and subordinates, between teachers and 
disciples. Related to this is the way the threefold function of 
Christ is employed: the function of priest, king and teacher is 
attributed to the hierarchy only, which implies a narrow 
interpretation of the church as the continuation of Christ. In 
the context of the analogy with the incarnation this leads to 
the statement that only the hierarchy is instrumental in the 
development of the body. Another element that is crucial to 
the understanding of this view of the Roman Catholic Church 
is the relation between the health or holiness of the body and 
the illness or sinfulness of its members. Their illness does not 
really damage or affect the health of the body. This pre-
supposes at least a one-way dependance and some kind of 
hypostatization of the body. 
The important role of'mystical body of Christ' in this view 
of the church is also revealed in the rest of the schema.5 In the 
discussion of issues like the necessity of the church for 
salvation, the conditions of membership and the union with 
other Christians, 'mystical body' or related terms like 'incor-
poration' and 'member' occur several times. The chapter on 
the laity contains an introduction which states explicitly the 
constitution and the aim of the church, and as in the first 
chapter, 'mystical body of Christ' is here the central term. 
Besides, no other term is a serious candidate, certainly not 
'people' or 'people of God'. It is used in the first chapter, but it 
is not mentioned among the biblical names and apparently 
does not express the mystical and social aspect. Despite the 
reference to 1 Pet 2:9 - in turn a quotation from Ex 19:6 -
'people' is not used here in its biblical sense: it is neither used 
as a salvation-historical term, nor understood in a maximal 
way. The first two sections do not present the plan of the 
Father in terms of the history of salvation, and Jesus' execution 
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of the plan is not placed in a historical context, but introduced 
abruptly. There are more or less implicit allusions to a history 
of salvation - the comparison between Israel in the desert and 
the church — but these allusions are not fundamental and they 
do not indicate a continuity with Israel, but, on the contrary, a 
rupture. This is shown by the addition of'new' to 'people' and 
'Israel', a combination which does not occur in Scripture. 
'People' is used, moreover, in a minimal way, for it is intro-
duced to reject the suggestion of a solitary redemption: it refers 
to a multitude under leaders.6 
The way the schema sees the Roman Catholic Church leads 
to internal tensions in the use of'body'. The emphasis on the 
inequality of the members is not an obvious point in the under-
standing of the image, and there is certainly a contrast between 
this interpretation and that of Paul, whose uses of 'body' are 
referred to. Paul stresses the unity of the members despite their 
variety and emphasizes the equal importance and significance 
of all members (1 Cor 12:12-27; Rom 12:4-5). Moreover, the 
way the relations between body and member is seen with 
regard to health and illness is puzzling. It is difficult to 
maintain, certainly as a general principle, that the illness of 
one member does not harm the health of the body, though it 
would make sense to argue that the illness of one member does 
not imply the illness of other members as well. Yet the text 
states the improbable proposition. In addition, the problem 
arises how on this view the whole that is not affected by its 
members nevertheless affects those members. The hypostatiza-
tion of the body leads to such a tension in the image that it 
destroys the image and renders it unintelligible. 
Another point of tension is the use of other images at crucial 
moments: the image of the vine to indicate the intimate 
relationship between Christ and the church, the image of the 
bride to express the sanctity of the church, and the image of 
mother to specify the sacramental activities. The employment 
of this last image leads to the strange vision of the body con-
ceiving its own members.7 A final point of tension in the 
understanding of 'mystical body of Christ' is revealed by the 
analogy with the incarnation. Although 'body' and 'mystical 
body of Christ' are introduced to show that the social and the 
mystical aspect belong together, the use of the analogy shows a 
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somewhat difTcrent understanding. The point incarnation and 
church have in common according to the analogy between 
them is that in both cases one nature or aspect serves the other 
nature or aspect. But if the social aspect of the church, the 
church as societas, serves the development of the mystical body 
of Christ, 'mystical body of Christ' must refer to the mystical 
aspect only and does not any longer include both aspects." 
1.2 The second schema in its various forms 
There are three versions of the second schema. Of these the 
first one is Philips' original schema that was circulated during 
the first session. The second version is an amplification ofthat 
original schema; this amplification was accepted by the sub-
committee as the starting-point for the new schema. The third 
version is the text that was sent to the council-fathers in two 
instalments before the second session. 
1.2.1 The first version: Concilium duce Spiritu Sancto 
Apart from an introduction which states the aim of the con-
stitution, the text consists of four major sections. The first 
section 'What is the church?' comprises a chapter on the 
mystery of the church and a chapter on the necessity of the 
church for salvation and on the conditions of membership. 
The second section 'In whom does the church consist?' 
contains chapters on the hierarchy, the laity and the religious. 
The third section 'How does the church live?' is divided into 
chapters on the doctrinal life of the church, authority and 
obedience, and the spreading of the gospel, and the final 
section 'relationships in the church' consists of a chapter on 
the unity of all Christians and one on the relations between 
church and state. In these four major sections much of the 
material from the first proposal is used, rearranged or 
expanded. For the last two sections, this version corresponds 
very closely to the text of the first schema.' But there are also 
signs of a different approach. An indication of change is given 
in the introduction, where the aim of the constitution is stated 
to be that of enabling the church to announce the gospel in a 
better way, not just to the believers, but to all men living in the 
modern world. Instead of a defensive, apologetic stance a more 
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pastoral and open attitude is adopted. Another indication is 
the title of the first chapter: instead of'the nature of the church 
militant', the caption 'the mystery of the church' is now used. 
A closer look at the first chapter will reveal whether this 
different approach has influenced the text. 
The chapter contains six sections, which can be grouped in 
three clusters: 1-3, 4—5 and 6. The first sections cover the plan 
of the Father concerning the universal church. He created the 
world and wanted people to participate in the divine life. He 
decided to redeem men fallen in Adam through the death of 
his Son and to gather an acceptable people to himself. 
Accordingly Jesus, after his resurrection, sent the apostles out 
to the whole world to be his witnesses. Those who are baptized 
enter into the church founded by the Lord and, united in faith 
and love, become witnesses of Christ. The church extends over 
all the regions of the earth till the end of time. The second 
section, on the people of God, qualifies the church further as 
Christ 's church, as the people acquired by him, on pilgrimage 
towards the Fatherland. The next section describes Christ's 
presence in his church via the gifts of his Spirit, via his 
inhabitation of the hearts of believers, and via the eucharist 
and the other sacraments. The two following sections discuss 
biblical names and images. Section four mentions the image of 
the temple of the Spirit and discusses briefly that of the body of 
Christ. The life of the risen Christ is diffused in the members of 
the church so that those who partake of the one bread form 
one body with Christ. Therefore, the church is in a mystical 
way the body of Christ. Christ is the head and together with 
him we form a society constituted by visible connections. 
Section five continues by declaring that the church is also 
described as the bride of Christ or as the bride of the Lamb. 
The nature of the church is revealed by other images as well: it 
is the true spiritual creation of God, existing in heaven and on 
earth: the kingdom of God, the New Jerusalem, God's 
dwelling-place among men. The final section deals with the 
church in its terrestrial condition. There is only one holy, 
catholic and apostolic church, given to Peter and the apostles 
and their successors to tend; upon them Christ has built as a 
living instrument and sacrament of salvation the column and 
foundation of truth. This heavenly church, the community of 
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grace and love, exists on earth as an organic society and is the 
Roman Catholic Church. 
There are several differences between this first chapter and 
that of the first schema. A first point of note is the broad 
perspective within which the exposition of the mystery starts: 
the creation of the world and the connection between creation 
and redemption. One finds an echo of this in the description of 
the church as the new creation and in the mission of the 
church to the whole world, and in the observation that the 
church extends itself to all the regions of the earth. Another 
point revealing a broader perspective is the formulation that 
the church exists in heaven and on earth. The focus of attention 
is on the whole church. A second remarkable point is the way 
the relationship between Christ and his church is discussed. 
There is more interest in the relations of faith and less in 
organisational ties as the basis for calling the church Christ's 
own. Related to this is the difference in the treatment of the 
biblical images. The emphasis is on the mystery. 'Mystical 
body of Christ' is not discussed at length, while 'people of God' 
is given a separate section. There are no traces of the 
triumphalistic military language of the first schema. The 
sacraments and the Holy Spirit are mentioned in the context 
of both 'mystical body' and 'people of God' (cf the use of 
temple). 
Despite these differences the new perspective is not fully 
developed, and, apart from the jerky organization of the 
material (see especially section 1), there are ambivalent 
features in the text which are signs of a superficial integration 
of old and new. The distinction between the church in heaven 
and the church on earth is not clear and not thematized. While 
the church is connected to creation, creation is understood 
more in spatial terms than in temporal categories. The lack of 
historical interest is especially clear in the way Jesus' role is 
introduced. Jesus does not appear in a historical context nor 
does his life seem to be important: it is only the risen Christ 
that appears in this version. A similar observation can be 
made about the treatment of 'people of God', for there is no 
reference to the Old Testament. 
This insufficient integration and this incomplete develop-
ment of an individual and new view is also clear in the rest of 
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the schema. The other chapter of the first part follows more or 
less the order and the text of the second chapter of the first 
schema: the need of the church for salvation, the determination 
of kinds of relations, the conditions of membership, and unity 
with separated brethren. A new part is added about the non-
Christians and the need to incorporate them into the Body of 
Christ. By this addition the structure of the chapter has 
become more coherent, but it shows also that it remains in line 
with the first schema. With regard to the hierarchical organi-
zation part II offers a more comprehensive text, developing 
and quoting old material and adding new, and instead of 
discussions of separate problems the result is a more coherent 
treatment. An introduction and chapters on the election of the 
apostles and on the bishops as successors of the apostles are 
added, and their threefold task of priest, prophet and king is 
developed in three chapters. With regard to the laity and 
religious this version offers only titles and refers to the text of 
the first schema, because, as the note states, it was well 
received by many council-fathers.2 The chapter on the laity is 
placed before that on religious with the argument that first 
the whole populus fidelis should be considered. The new title 
indicates this: 'On the faithful, especially on the laity'. 
This relation between the first version of the second schema 
and the first proposal can also be seen in the choice and treat-
ment of the central term: this version uses 'mystical body of 
Christ' as its central term, but in an interpretation that is 
somewhat different from that of the first schema. It is not 
understood in such an elaborate organizational way, although 
the interpretation of body as society is clearly present as is also 
shown by the other parts. The importance of'mystical body of 
Christ' in the rest of this version is revealed both in the quota-
tions from the first schema and in the new parts in which 
'mystical body' or related terms are introduced.3 Moreover, 
there is no serious other candidate. 'People of God', although 
mentioned in a new short section, is not frequently used either 
in the first chapter or in the rest, and the way it is used may 
explain why it cannot function as a central term. It still refers 
to a part of the whole church, i.e., to those who do not belong 
to the hierarchy. The broad biblical understanding that could 
be discovered in the short separate section is not developed. 
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1.2.2 The second version: Lumen Gentium 
The second version of Philips' scheme is an amplification of 
the first version and presented as such. It was written and 
circulated after the first session; in that period other schemata 
and proposals were circulated as well. The sub-committee 'de 
ecclesia' decided to take this amplification as the basis of its 
work (26 February 1963) and the doctrinal committee ratified 
this decision (6 March).1 It consists of two chapters: one on 
the mystery of the church, and one on the hierarchical consti-
tution of the church.2 
This is the first time the programmatic title Lumen Gentium 
appears in the preface. Originally used by Pope John to refer 
to the church, it is used now to refer to Christ. He is the light of 
all nations and with his light the church hopes to illuminate all 
men. Together with the introduction of the term sacramentum in 
the preface, it shows that the focus of attention is no longer the 
church on its own but the church as pointing to Christ and to 
the unity of all men and their unity with God. There are also 
changes in the first chapter: a new section on the Spirit is 
added, so that the mystery of the church appears in relation to 
that of the Trinity. This is expressed in the final sentence of 
the third section, a quotation from Cyprian: 'a people brought 
into unity from the unity of the Father, the Son and the Holy 
Spirit'.3 
As in the previous version, the first section tells of the Father, 
who created the world and who did not abandon men after the 
fall, but who gave them help in anticipation of Christ, the 
first-born of the new creation. He destined his Son, born out of 
the chosen people, to redeem all men through his death and to 
make his brothers sons of the Father; he was not to sanctify 
them in an individual way, but to make them into the people 
under one head. This holy church, started from the beginning 
of mankind and prefigured in the election of the old people and 
the old covenant, is manifested in the fullness of time (section 
1). Sent by the Father to gather the sons of God, the Son 
founded a new covenant and began the new creation, the new 
people of God. As Israel in the desert was called the church of 
God, so this new Israel is called the church of Christ: he has 
acquired it with his blood, has filled it with his Spirit and has 
built it upon Peter and the apostles with visible means of 
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unity. The congregation of those who believe in Jesus, the 
author of redemption and the beginning of peace and unity, 
form the church, the visible sacrament ofthat redemptive unity 
which extends itself over all the regions of the earth (section 2). 
The Spirit of life, through whom we have access to the Father, 
is sent by God into our hearts. The Spirit who lives in the 
faithful and in the church as in a temple, so that all are endowed 
with his gifts, renews the church constantly and leads it to unity 
with Christ the Bridegroom. Spirit and Bride say to Jesus: 
'Come' (section 3). 
The next three sections deal with various biblical images 
that describe the relationship between Christ and his church. 
Christ the priest, prophet and king has not abandoned his 
people after his resurrection, but has given it his Spirit and 
refreshes his people with the bread of the eucharist and of 
doctrine (section 4). The section on the mystical body, section 
5, contains some new material; the variety of members and of 
ministries is mentioned, and there is a greater emphasis on 
Christ the head. In the sixth section 'kingdom' is replaced by 
'house and family of God'. The final section, 'the church on 
pilgrimage on earth' states that the community of faith, love 
and grace, the mystical body of Christ and the visible society, 
are not two different things, but one. The analogy with the 
incarnation is mentioned: as the human nature served the 
divine, so the church-society serves the Spirit of Christ in 
building up the body. To the identification between the one, 
holy, apostolic and catholic church and the Roman Catholic 
Church under the direction of the Roman pontiff and the 
bishops in communion with him, is added that outside the 
Roman Catholic Church elements full of sanctity can be found. 
The section concludes with the remark that the church as 
sacrament of Christ is a sign for all nations of the evangelical 
poverty of Jesus. Three sections on membership conclude this 
chapter. 
The expansion of the first version is done in two different 
and diverging ways. First, the view maintained in the first 
schema is strengthened, and, secondly, the new commencement 
of the first version is further developed. The first way is visible 
in the introduction of elements derived from the first schema 
and expressing the concern ofthat schema: the church is again 
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called Christ's own because he built it upon Peter and the 
apostles and equipped it with the visible means of unity. The 
analogy with the incarnation is introduced again to clarify the 
relation between the domain of organization and the domain 
of love. And with the quotation of the analogy the problems 
already mentioned are introduced as well. The introduction of 
historical and eschatological elements reveal the other way. 
The time before Jesus is important and recognized as a part of 
the history of salvation, for help is given right from the 
beginning and because election and covenant are préfigura-
tions of what is now manifested clearly. Moreover, Jesus is 
born out of the chosen people. The eschatological element is 
present in the image of the New Jerusalem and in the section 
on the Spirit, who with the Bride calls to Jesus: 'come', and in 
the title of the sixth section: 'The church on pilgrimage on 
earth'. The development is also apparent in the introduction 
of a separate section on the Holy Spirit: the history of salvation 
is seen now as the consecutive activity of Father, Son and Spirit. 
Because of these diverging developments and trends the text 
of the second version does not present an integrated view. The 
role of the Spirit is only partly related to the church: he is in 
the first place sent 'into our hearts'. This one-sided emphasis is 
related to the division of the history of salvation into two parts: 
preparation and fulfilment. The eschatological elements 
present in the section on the Spirit and in the section on the 
pilgrim church are not fully integrated in the history of 
salvation. The lack of integration can also be seen in the 
organization of the text. Section 1 does introduce historical 
notions but does not present them in an orderly way, which 
results in an unnecessary repetition of the theme of the church 
existing right from the beginning of creation. Section 2 
abruptly connects the broad perspective with the visible 
means of unity. Section 4 has in fact become superfluous 
because of the introduction of section 3 on the Holy Spirit, but 
is nevertheless maintained. The solution of introducing it in 
connection with the biblical images is clearly inadequate since 
no biblical image is discussed in that section. The threefold 
function of Christ remains a strange and alien element. There 
is also some tension between, on the one side, the insistence 
upon the fact that Jesus equipped his church with visible 
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means of unity, which is related to the thesis of identification 
and the declaration that there is only one church, and, on the 
other side, the recognition of elements full of sanctification 
outside the church. 
Given this situation a clear change of central image or concept 
cannot be expected: 'mystical body of Christ' is still the most 
important term for describing the church. Compared with the 
first version it receives even more attention, and it is introduced 
again in the crucial part on identification. While in the first 
version the heavenly church, the community of love and grace, 
was said to exist on earth as an organic society, now the 
identification between the visible society and the mystical body 
is added.4 Moreover, the issues in the sections on membership, 
now part of the chapter on the mystery of the church, are 
discussed in terms of incorporation. 'People of God' is used in 
the first part of this chapter, i.e., in the context of the history of 
salvation, and it is used in combination with either 'old' and 
'new', or with 'elected', and on one occasion Christ is 
mentioned as the head of the people. Of these the last and the 
combination 'people' and 'new' refers to the church. 'People of 
God' is only used in this part, and its occurrence in the section 
of Christ's presence in the church is, as noted earlier, not very 
influential, and its place is not strengthened by the fact that it 
is used in a superfluous section. 'People of God' does not 
return in the rest of the chapter, either in the sections on the 
biblical names or in the section on the pilgrim church: in those 
sections 'mystical body' is used. In the rest of the schema 
'people of God' is only used a few times, and, when it is used, it 
is used in a material and general way.5 'Mystical body' on the 
other hand is used several times.6 
1.2.3 The third version: Lumen Gentium 
The text of the third version is the text that was sent to the 
council fathers in two instalments during the summer of 1963. 
It was only after the four chapters had been approved by the 
committee and the pope, and after the first two chapters had 
been sent to the council fathers, that the committee accepted 
the suggestion that chapter 3 should be split into a chapter on 
the people of God and a chapter on the laity, and that the new 
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chapter on the people of God should be inserted between the 
chapter on the mystery of the church and the chapter on the 
hierarchy. Neither the decision nor its implications influenced 
the text at this stage.' 
Compared with the first chapter of the second version this 
first chapter contains one major structural alteration: the 
section on the presence of Christ has disappeared, although 
parts of it reappear in the section on biblical images. The 
structure of the chapter had been improved by this change, 
showing a straight line of argument: first the mystery of the 
church is related to that of the Trinity, next the biblical images 
ibr the church are mentioned, then the Roman Catholic 
Church is discussed, and finally the membership conditions of 
that church and its relation to other Christians and non-
Christians are outlined.2 The main difierence with the previous 
version can be noticed in the treatment of the biblical images. 
The section on the mystical body can now be divided into 
three parts: an introduction, a part on the inner life and a part 
on the ministries/ The introduction contrasts 'people of God' 
with ' the mystical body of Christ'. Christ has raised the people 
of God to a new and higher state by conquering death. He not 
only gathers the faithful into one people, but unites his brothers 
called from all nations in himself and constitutes in a mystical 
way his body. The relation between Christ and the church is 
such that the life of the risen Christ is difiused in the members 
of the church: they form in and with him one body. For all we 
believers in Christ are baptized in one body and partake in 
this one body as in the one bread. We are united so that not 
only our bodies are joined to Christ via the sacraments, but so 
that we also form one body of faithful equipped with various 
organs and endowed with different gifts. Christ is the head and 
his fulness fills all. Due to his task, perfection and virtue Christ 
stands out above all members and organs that he directs. 
The final part of this section turns towards the mystical 
body on earth: Christ distributed gifts of ministries to build up 
his body on earth. In different functions, especially in those of 
the hierarchy, the Lord himself acts as teacher, priest and 
king. The Spirit, one and the same in head and body, vivifies, 
unites and moves the body and is rightly called the soul of the 
church. The body on earth is connected with the head in 
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heaven and the body truly represents Christ on earth and 
constitutes the beginning of the kingdom of heaven. The section 
on the other images mentions several new ones, giving the 
following list: flock, vine, field, family, temple and house of 
God, dwelling-place of the Holy Spirit, holy city, new Jerusalem, 
bride of the Lamb, new Eve. 
The changes made in the first chapter reveal the same 
tendencies as those of the previous version: a strengthening of 
the older view and at the same time a further development of 
the salvation-historical approach. And, as in the previous 
version, there are signs of an insufficient integration. The 
introduction of the notion ecclesia ab Abel in the first section 
does clarify problems raised by the second version, but its 
place in the whole amounts to a repetition. The changes in the 
section on the mystical body result in a more orderly organiza-
tion of the material, but in the mostly new final part the 
concern of the first schema returns. The statements that Christ 
acts through the hierarchy and that the heavenly Christ is 
represented on earth by the church reveal the influence of the 
Chnsttis-prolongatus view. At the same time, the phrase 'germ 
and beginning' does not fit well into this way of thinking, 
because it belongs to the context of the history of salvation. 
The first part of the section on the mystical body of Christ 
gives a clear indication of what is considered to be the central 
term of this schema. Christ has raised the people of God to a 
higher condition, namely, that of being his body: the people of 
God becomes the mystical body of Christ.4 This difTerence 
between people of God and body of Christ implies that 'people 
of God' is understood either materially or as the people of the 
old testament. The formulation 'new people' is, on the argu-
ment given in the text, not an apt and adequate term for the 
church, but it is nevertheless used in this chapter.5 If it is 
correct that Christ has raised the people of God to a new 
condition, it is not clear why the term should be used after this 
statement at all, but 'people of God' is nevertheless used, 
sometimes referring to the whole of the church, sometimes 
referring to the subjects, to the non-hierarchy.6 Nor is it clear 
why in the outline of the plan of the Father his decision not to 
redeem men and women separately but united in a people is 
mentioned. One would expect 'body' here too. These tensions 
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reveal that the place and the understanding of'people of God' 
is ambivalent. 
1.2.4 The development in the three versions 
Taking these three versions of the second schema together and 
comparing them with the first schema, the following differences 
and developments can be noticed. 
The official commentary, sent to the council fathers together 
with the text of the schema, notes that the church is presented 
as the object of faith and that more than just its external 
manifestation is described.' The primary interest is not the 
organization but the mystery of the church. This is the most 
salient point of diiference between the first schema and all the 
three versions of the second schema. 'Mystery' is here not 
understood in the sense of 'puzzling' or 'obscure', but in the 
biblical sense of God's plan of salvation as disclosed in the 
history of salvation. The first schema does mention God's plan, 
but does not understand it in terms of the history of salvation. 
In the three versions one can discern a growing realization of 
what the implications of this difference in interest are. The 
relation between the church and the workings of the Trinity, 
the introduction of historical notions like the period between 
creation and Jesus ' lifetime, the introduction of eschatological 
notions like the pilgrim church are signs of this growing 
awareness. Related to this is the change in focus, or the 
emergence of the 'transparency-view' of the church. While the 
first schema focuses upon the church itself in its current 
appearance, a change is noticeable when in the course of the 
development within the three versions the church is seen as a 
sacrament, as an instrument and sign, directing the attention 
to that of which it is a sign: the unity of men and their union 
with God. 
But this point of difference is not fully developed. The history 
of salvation consists only of two phases. The activity of the 
Spirit, whose role has become more important, is not related to 
the church in the first place, but to the faithful. Furthermore, 
the texts do not make the most of the eschatological elements 
already present, like the church being the germ and the 
beginning of the kingdom of heaven, the church being on 
pilgrimage and the church calling, with the Spirit, to Christ: 
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'Come'. The transparency of the church is therefore not 
complete. The triumphalistic language has disappeared, but 
the view underlying this type of language is still influential, as 
can be seen in the Chrìstus-prolongatus view, the analogy with 
the incarnation, and the identification of the mystical body 
with the Roman Catholic Church. It is impossible to talk 
about a straight development on this point, since at least two 
of these elements did not occur in the first version but were 
introduced later. 
There are also differences in the role and the use of biblical 
images. While in the first proposal images other than 'mystical 
body' were hardly mentioned, in the versions of the second 
schema other biblical images are allotted more space and 
importance. However, this does not result in a replacement of 
'mystical body' as the central term, even though fluctuation in 
the interpretation of that central term can be noticed. In the 
first schema, 'body' was emphatically interpreted in the 
organizational sense; in the final version of the second schema, 
there is more attention for the inner life. But here again one 
cannot talk about a linear development, for the first version 
does use 'society' in relation to 'mystical body' but with less 
emphasis, while in the later versions more elements from the 
first schema return and in the final version with even greater 
emphasis than in the second one. A similar development can 
be noticed in the use of'people of God'. In the first proposal it 
hardly occurs and is understood in a general way indicating 
the communal aspect of salvation. In the three versions of the 
second schema elements revealing a different understanding 
can be discerned, but this interpretation is not the prominent 
one. The first version dedicates a separate section to 'people of 
God', but the title has disappeared in the following versions. 
1.3 The third version: the constitution Lumen Gentium 
The third schema has taken into account all the spoken and 
written comments and reactions to the second schema. It 
consists now of eight chapters. During the discussions of the 
second session the four chapters of the previous schema were 
transformed into six, and since the council fathers also decided 
not to issue a separate constitution on the Virgin, but to 
dedicate a chapter to her in the constitution on the church, the 
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last chapter was added. The seventh chapter on the eschato-
logical nature of the church is a new one. It was discussed and 
rewritten during the third session.' The first six chapters were 
not discussed again but only voted upon.2 Of this third schema 
there are again three versions, but since the changes in the 
relevant chapters are only small ones, mostly concerned with 
formulations, section-headings and references to scripture and 
notes, the final text suffices. Apart from the first chapter, the 
second chapter on the people of God is also relevant for the 
discussion. All elements related to 'people of God' and 
originally occurring in the first chapter are now combined with 
those elements concerning the church as a whole that appeared 
mostly in the chapter on the laity.1 
In its final phase the text of the first chapter contains eight 
sections. After an introduction and three sections in which the 
mystery of the church is related to the mystery of the Trinity, a 
new section is inserted on the kingdom of God. The order of 
the two sections dealing with biblical images is reversed and 
the final section deals with the church 'at the same time visible 
and spiritual'. The sections on membership and on the relations 
to other Christians and to non-Christians are moved to the 
new second chapter on the people of God. Several sections of 
the first chapter have been extensively rewritten. 
In the first section on the Father's plan of salvation two 
main elements can be discovered in the one line of thought: the 
universal church reaching from creation to the eschaton and 
the five phases in the history of salvation - the church is 
prefigured from the beginning, prepared in the history of 
Israel, constituted by Christ, made manifest by the Spirit and 
to be fulfilled at the end of time. The section on the mission of 
the Son is largely rewritten. An important new element is that 
the Son inaugurates the kingdom of heaven on earth. The 
kingdom of Christ is, in a mystical way, already present in the 
church that grows in the world. Another, and related clement, 
is the unity with Christ to which all men are called and which 
is represented and effected in the eucharist. In the section on 
the Spirit a new emphasis on the role of the Spirit in the 
church can be seen. The Spirit is sent on Pentecost, leads the 
church towards the truth, unites it in community and ministry, 
organizes and directs it through different hierarchical and 
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charismatic gifts, renews it permanently and leads it to its final 
union with Christ, the Bridegroom. 
These three sections are again summarized in Cyprian's 
saying 'a people brought into unity from the unity of the Father, 
the Son and the Holy Spirit'. The theme of the kingdom of 
God is further developed in a new section. The mystery of the 
church appears in its foundation. Jesus started the church by 
preaching the good news, that is, the arrival of the kingdom of 
God. This kingdom shines through in his deeds, words and 
person. After Christ's death and resurrection the task to preach 
and establish the kingdom of Christ and of God is received by 
the church: the church is the germ and the beginning of the 
kingdom. The next two sections deal with biblical images. In a 
much expanded sixth section images from both the Old and 
the New Testament derived from pastoral and agricultural 
life, from building construction and from family and marriage 
are presented in an order of increasing importance. This 
progress culminates in the section on the mystical body, which 
can be divided into three parts. The introduction states that 
Christ has redeemed and recreated man by his death and 
resurrection, for by communicating his Spirit he constitutes in 
a mystical way his brothers as his body. The difference in 
treatment of 'body' in the Pauline letters is acknowledged for 
the second part refers Romans and Corinthians, while the 
third part uses Colossians and Ephesians. In the second part 
the emphasis is put on the community of the members, in the 
third on Christ the head. The community of members is first 
determined with regard to baptism and eucharist. Through 
baptism and the eucharist we become members of the body of 
Christ. The variety of members and functions is mentioned. 
The Spirit distributes different gifts. Charismas, though, are 
subjected to the authority of the apostles, for the grace given to 
them stands out above these charismas. The theme of Christ 
the head is developed under several heads: Christ's primacy in 
the church and in creation, the resemblance between head and 
members in death and resurrection, the influence of the head 
on the growth of the body via the distribution of gifts of 
ministries, the activity of the Spirit, the soul, who is one and 
the same in body and head, and the fulness of Christ filling the 
church. 
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The final section on the church 'at the same time visible and 
spiritual' sets out to show that Christ's church can be found 
here on earth in the Roman Catholic Church, albeit not yet in 
its final glorious state and not without ambiguities. The section 
proceeds by stating first that Christ has established his church, 
the community of faith, hope and love, as a visible structure. 
The society furnished with hierarchical organs, the visible 
gathering, the terrestrial church on the one hand and the 
mystical body, the spiritual community and the church 
endowed with heavenly gifts on the other hand, are not two 
different things but one complex reality. This is explained by 
means of the analogy with the incarnation. Then it is remarked 
that the church is one. Christ gave it to Peter to tend and to 
him and the other apostles to govern. This church constituted 
and organized as a society 'subsists' in the Roman Catholic 
Church, although outside this church elements of church can 
be found. The rest of the section is concerned with the 
ambiguity, by developing the theme of poverty and sinfulness 
and by ending with expressing the conviction that by the 
power of the risen Lord the church will be able to pursue its 
pilgrimage till the mystery of Christ is revealed at the end of 
time. 
Chapter 2, 'The People of God', starts with a section on the 
New Covenant and the new people using material which 
previously appeared in the first sections of the first chapter. 
The following three sections give an exposition of participation 
by the people of God in the threefold function of Christ, 
although the full exposition of the participation in the kingship 
takes place in the next two chapters. In this chapter participa-
tion in the priesthood, i.e., the common priesthood of all the 
faithful and the ministerial priesthood, and participation in 
the prophetic function, i.e., the sensusfidei, and the charismas 
are outlined. After a section on the catholicity or universality 
of the church three sections are dedicated to membership and 
the relations to other Christians and to non-Christians. The 
final section discusses the missionary task of the church. Of 
these sections the first one is important for the present discus-
sion, since it contains an outline of how the church is seen and 
reveals how 'people of God' is used. 
The first section can be divided into three parts. First, 
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the realization of God's wish not to save men and women 
individually but gathered in a people is pointed out in the 
history of salvation. He has chosen Israel and made his 
covenant with it. It was a preparation for the new covenant 
that would include all men. This new covenant was instituted 
by Christ who called together a new people of God. Those who 
believe in Christ form, reborn not from flesh but from water 
and the Spirit, 'a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy 
nation, a purchased people' (1 Pet 2:9). Secondly, the special 
character of this messianic people is outlined in the following 
points: its head is Christ, its status the freedom of the children 
of God, its law love, and its goal the kingdom of God. Thirdly, 
this new Israel is called the church of Christ as Israel in the 
desert was called the church of God. Christ acquired it with 
his blood, filled it with his Spirit and equipped it with visible 
and social means of unity. God has called together those who 
believe in Christ as the source of unity and peace and made 
them into the church so that it is the visible sacrament of that 
redemptive unity. 
Compared with the versions of the second schema, the final 
text represents an improvement in several respects. Inconsis-
tencies have been removed between the trinitarian structure of 
the history of salvation, the eschatological elements and the 
elements of church outside the church on the one hand, and 
the underdeveloped link between the Spirit and the church, 
the division of the history of salvation into two phases and the 
identification of the one, holy, catholic and apostolic church 
with the Roman Catholic Church on the other hand. With 
these elements connected the result is a much more coherent 
view. The role of the Spirit is not limited to an internal principle 
in the heart of the individual believer, but is connected with 
the history of the church, for he is sent on Pentecost and he is 
connected with the whole of the church, since he distributes 
charismas and hierarchical gifts. The history of salvation as 
sketched in this text does justice to that role of the Spirit by 
acknowledging the difference between constitution, manifesta-
tion and fulfilment of the church. It also includes the eschato-
logical elements. The eschatological nature of the church is 
developed by relating the church to the kingdom of God as 
germ and beginning of that kingdom. This in turn leads to the 
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replacement of the identification by the phrase 'subsists in' 
and to the recognition not just of possible elements of church, 
but of actual elements of church, outside the Roman Catholic 
Church. 
With regard to the biblical images, it is clear that the trend 
of the three versions of the second schema, namely, to pay 
more attention to these images, is continued and carried 
further: a great number of images is mentioned, and in a 
systematic way. The treatment of'mystical body of Christ' is 
better structured. Although in the final version of the second 
schema and in the final text the external and the internal 
elements are discussed, the way they are discussed diiTers. 
While in the second schema the threefold function of Christ 
was introduced and related to the hierarchy, and while the 
church was said to represent Christ the heavenly head on 
earth, these references have disappeared; a relation of 
subordination, though, between the different gifts and functions 
is still present. This leads again to some tension when in the 
final section 'mystical body' is contrasted with the hierarchical 
society in order to say that they are not two différent things. 
Here the relation is not formulated by saying that they are the 
same but by stating that they form one complex reality. This 
formulation presupposes, even more than in the previous 
versions, that 'mystical body of Christ' is understood as 
referring to the spiritual aspect only. This occurrence of 
'mystical body' in the final section shows that 'mystical body' 
still occupies a central place. The expansion of the section on 
the other images does not imply that 'mystical body' has 
become less important. On the contrary, the role and place of 
'mystical body' have been strengthened by the reversal of the 
sections. The change was undertaken with the argument that 
'mystical body of Christ' is more than an image and that in a 
more profound way it leads into the mystery of the church.4 
But before a definitive conclusion can be reached with regard 
to which image is central in the final text, the relation between 
the first and the second chapter has to be clarified. The 
disappearance of 'people of God' from the first chapter does 
not necessarily mean that it has lost all influence. The reasons 
which led the committee to write a new chapter and to place it 
between the chapter on the mystery of the church and that on 
The Church, Lumen Gentium and the Theologians 35 
the hierarchy can be found in a commentary attached to the 
text in which decisions and changes are explained.3 There are 
two fundamental considerations: 'people of God' is understood 
to include pastors and faithful, and an exposition of the church 
as the people of God concerns the very nature and mystery of 
the church. To maintain the original order - first mystery, 
then hierarchy, then 'people of God' - would mean to destroy 
the unity in the treatment of the mystery of the church. The 
new order facilitates, moreover, the discussion of the role and 
place of hierarchy and laity within the whole and the discussion 
of other issues as well. So, chapters 1 and 2 form a unity. The 
argument for dividing the material over two chapters is a 
practical one, for to treat everything in one chapter would 
have made that chapter too long.0 The division is not arbitrary, 
though: the exposition of the nature and the mystery of the 
church is so structured that in the first chapter the church is 
presented in all its amplitude, from the beginning of creation 
till completion at the end of time in heaven, while in the 
second the church-in-the-meantime, i.e., the church between 
the ascension of the Lord and his glorious return, is treated.7 
But this last argument about the relation between chapters 
1 and 2 is not convincing and raises questions about the precise 
meaning of 'people of God'. First of all, one cannot maintain 
that the first chapter presents only the church in its amplitude 
and that it does not discuss the church-in-the-meantime 
without doing injustice to the content and the concern. The 
church as germ and beginning of the kingdom of Jesus and 
God, the hierarchical gifts of the Spirit, Pentecost as the date 
on which the Spirit was sent, the organizational elements in 
the section on the mystical body, the concern not only to 
establish the church as an organization but also to relate the 
church to the Roman Catholic Church - these are all elements 
which become unintelligible if the chapter is not dealing with 
the church-in-the-meantime as well. Moreover, one would not 
expect terms like 'body', 'incorporation', etc to occur in the 
second chapter nor in the other chapters dealing with the 
church-in-the-meantime. But these terms are used. In the 
sections on Catholics, on other Christians and on non-Christians 
'incorporation' is introduced, while 'members' and 'mystical 
body' are retained in other chapters.8 
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Remarkable in this context is Chapter 7, the new chapter on 
the eschatological nature of the pilgrim church. The first draft, 
which is part of the first version of the third schema, is mainly 
concerned with the connection between the church on earth 
and the church in heaven; in it, 'people of God' does not 
appear, while 'mystical body' plays an important role. In the 
final version, 'people of God' is mentioned once in a minor 
place, while 'mystical body' is still used several times.9 The 
possible argument that 'mystical body' captures the whole 
church and is therefore apt in this context does not explain all 
occurrences of that term and does certainly not explain the 
absence of'people of God' in this chapter on the eschatological 
character of the pilgrim church. The division as indicated in 
the note does also cause some problems with regard to the 
understanding of'people of God'. If it is true that 'people of 
God' is only used to describe the church-in-the-meantime the 
term loses much of its biblical meaning; it is no longer used to 
refer to the continuity with Israel and no longer locates the 
church in the whole of the history of salvation.10 Strictly 
speaking, the ascension of Christ would be the beginning of 
the people of God, which is in fact the way 'people of God' is 
used in the first schema. The link between the new approach 
and the change of terms would be questioned as well. If'people 
of God' is used in its full biblical sense and if the first section of 
the second section, in which an outline of the history of 
salvation is given, is taken seriously, the division cannot be 
maintained. The remaining argument that can answer the 
question why 'people of God' is not used in the first chapter is 
a pragmatic one: the chapter would become too long. This 
seems neither a strong argument for such an important 
decision nor a completely correct one. One could argue that if 
the exposition of the church as the people of God had been 
integrated in the first chapter, repetitions could have been 
avoided in the two chapters and a much more unified picture 
could have been presented. In the end this integrated chapter 
would not have been much longer than the one on the 
hierarchy. 
'People of God' is clearly an important term in the constitu-
tion on the church, but given the influence of 'mystical body' 
in the first chapter (and in the rest of the schema) and given 
The Church, Lumen Gentium and the Theologians 37 
this unsatisfactory answer to the question about the relation 
between the first and second chapters, one cannot maintain 
that 'people of God' has replaced 'mystical body of Christ' as 
the central term. The answer to the question: 'Which is the 
central term?', must therefore be: there are two terms that 
occupy a central place, 'mystical body of Christ' and 'people of 
God', and their relation is not decisively indicated in the text." 
This conclusion is not surprising if one sees the final text 
against the background of its history and genesis, both textual 
and non-textual, and if one acknowledges that the text is that 
kind of compromise which does not resolve all the tensions. 
This may be more obvious in the chapters on the bishops and 
in what happened in connection with the nota praevia, or in the 
chapter on the Virgin, but even in the first chapter this 
compromise character can be seen as shown earlier. The 
clearest example is the last section in the first chapter: the 
societas concept of the church and the Chnstus-prolongatus view, 
so prominent in preconciliar ecclesiology and in the first 
schema, are still present when the mystical body and the 
hierarchical organization are said to be one complex reality, 
and when an analogy is drawn between this complex reality 
and the mystery of the incarnation.12 Nor is this conclusion 
surprising when one recognizes that the final text does not 
coherently present or thoroughly develop the new ideas and 
insights which were introduced in an ambivalent way by the 
first version of the second schema. The possibility of opposing 
interpretations and the ambiguity of structure of the final text, 
both on the level of the overall organization of the material and 
on the lower level of the sections, are signs of an unfinished 
process. The question of the nature of the church, for example, 
is again discussed in the chapter on the eschatological nature 
of the church, and the full impact of the eschatological 
perspective for the understanding of the history of salvation is 
not realized, for this history is still depicted as a process of 
continuous and organic growth without enough attention to 
moments of failure or even complete failure. This means that 
moments and possibilities of disobedience are not taken into 
account for the understanding of 'people of God'. And this 
view of history also influences the way in which the relation is 
seen between the church and the kingdom of God.13 
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Despite these shortcomings, Lumen Gentium has created a 
situation in which the development of a truly theological 
treatment of the church becomes possible. Although previously 
several attempts were made to realize such a theological treat-
ment, the tendency to treat the church in a narrow apologetic 
way remained prevalent in official magisterial pronounce-
ments. Lumen Gentium is the first magisterial document that, at 
least in the sections on the nature of the church, in principle 
breaks through the limitations of that mainly juridical and 
organizational view. The question now is whether theologians 
have taken advantage of this new situation and have stabilized 
this breakthrough by developing an ecclesiology, i.e., a truly 
theological treatment of the church. And since, in the develop-
ment of any theory, a crucial element is the place and the role 
of the central term, and since too Lumen Gentium does not 
clearly propose such a term, the fundamental problem is what 
term theologians choose and with what kind of reasons when 
they reflect on the church in the light oí Lumen Gentium. 
2. The theologians 
In the ecclesiological debates immediately before, during, and 
after the Second Vatican Council the methodological question 
which term should be taken as central had not yet assumed the 
most important role: issues like membership, collegiality, 
infallibility, and ecumenism received much more attention. 
But a number of theologians discussed this question, and in 
the discussion three types of answer were given: a majority 
argued for a combination of 'people of God' and 'mystical 
body of Christ', some for 'people of God', and others for the 
selection of a different term altogether.' The arguments they 
gave for these positions can be classified in three groups: argu-
ments from content, arguments from the linguistic status of 
the term, and arguments on practical grounds. This last type 
of argument will not be treated separately in the following 
analysis, but will be included in the discussion of the other two 
types. 
The analysis of the arguments from content will attempt to 
show that the arguments put forward by the theologians either 
in defence of the synthesis-view or in support of the view that 
'people of God' on its own should be the central term, exhibit 
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internal tensions or are incorrect, not so much on the basis of a 
detailed exegesis of the relevant passages from Scripture, but 
on the basis of very general considerations and presuppositions. 
The analysis of the arguments concerning the linguistic status 
of the terms will attempt to locate the underlying presuppositions 
about the nature and role of metaphor. These presuppositions 
will be seen to influence decisively final judgements about the 
solution to the problem of the central term. 
2.1 The arguments from content 
2.1.1 The synthesis-view 
Of the theologians arguing for a synthesis between 'people of 
God' and 'body of Christ' several — namely, Congar, Schmaus, 
Philips, Ratzinger, and Kiing - were involved in an official 
way with the work of the council. The general structure of the 
argument they put forward in favour of a synthesis is as follows: 
the analysis of the notions 'people of God' and 'mystical body 
of Christ ' reveals that both have advantages and disadvantages 
when applied to the church, but by using these notions as 
complementary the advantages are kept while the disadvantages 
disappear. This procedure is necessary since the disadvantages 
attached to each makes an exclusive use of either term 
impossible. Congar's article on the church as people of God, 
written not long after the promulgation of the text of Lumen 
Gentium, forms a good example of this kind of argumentation, 
and since it contains those elements mentioned by most 
theologians and has influenced the position of other theologians 
it can serve well as the frame for our analysis.1 
Congar's article is a kind of assessment oí Lumen Gentium. In 
his opinion not all the intentions that led the committee to 
insert a new chapter on the people of God were fully realized 
in the final text, and not all the implications of the rediscovery 
of the biblical concept of people of God were integrated. He 
lists the following five points in order to show how important 
and useful the biblical concept of people of God is in talking 
about the church. First, by indicating the continuity between 
Israel and the church, 'people of God' locates the church in 
God's plan of salvation and in the history of salvation. The 
ideas closely related to this notion thus become available for 
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the reflection on the church: the ideas of election, of service, of 
calling, of covenant, of promises and eschatology, the idea of a 
people belonging to God, i.e., called into existence to serve and 
praise the Lord, the idea of a messianic people that is the 
bearer of hope. By placing the church in the history of salvation 
a dynamic element is introduced, for it is a people on the way 
to the aim set by God. Moreover, from this perspective a 
correct approach to consideration of the relation of the church 
to the Jewish people is possible. Schmaus, too, sees it as one of 
the main advantages that the continuity in the history of 
salvation is expressed, and that central notions such as God's 
initiative in the constitution of his people can be used. Kiing 
mentions these central ideas, with an emphasis on God's call 
as the decisive initiative for man's salvation: the church is 
neither a free association, nor does it come forth from the 
individual, nor does it have its origin simply in the common 
will. Kiing also develops the relation to the Jewish people from 
this perspective. Beumer thinks it understandable that people 
want to introduce salvation-historical and eschatological 
elements into ecclesiology and thinks that 'people of God' 
elucidates that aspect of the history of salvation. McNamara 
remarks that the insights provided by 'people of God' prevent 
future interpretations of'mystical body of Christ' in a salvation-
biological way, and Harvey sees the connection with the history 
of salvation as one of the reasons for the growing importance 
and popularity of'people of God'.2 
Secondly, according to Congar the use of 'people of God' 
emphasizes that the church consists of people who respond to 
a call. Biblical figures like Abraham or Mary who respond to 
God's call can be seen as a type of the church. Although the 
view which presents the church only as a mediating structure 
over and against people is correct in a certain way, it is 
adjusted by this emphasis. Schmaus, Ratzinger, and 
McNamara articulate this point in terms of 'responsibility' 
and 'individuality': the church as people of God underlines the 
fact that those who belong to it are independent persons who 
do not lose their identity and creativity. Like Congar, Kiing 
mentions the importance of the human decision to answer 
God's call, and he too points to Mary and Abraham as types of 
the church, but, unlike Congar, he does not want to leave any 
The Church, Lumen Gentium and the Theologians 41 
room for a supra-personal mediating institution. Schmaus 
maintains that 'people of God' indicates that the church is not 
just the sum of those who belong to it, but that it is a supra-
personal entity.3 
Thirdly, because 'people of God' connotes a people on the 
way towards the Kingdom, elements of failure and sin as well 
as the need of constant reform are introduced. The church as 
an institution does not, according to Congar, need to repent, 
but the people do. For Kiing this connotation makes it 
impossible to idealize the church in any way: the church is not 
perfect but in constant need of reform. Harvey notes as one of 
the advantages of'people of God' over 'mystical body of Christ' 
that 'people of God' enables one to mention both the holiness 
and the sinfulness of the church, which is an essential require-
ment for a true theological definition of the church.4 
Fourthly, 'people of God' can express both the equality of 
believers as far as their Christian existence is concerned, and 
their inequality as far as function and organization is concerned. 
This point of equality is also mentioned by Ratzinger, Kiing, 
and Schmaus. Congar mentions the equality on a par with the 
inequality, while Schmaus thinks that'people of God'indicates 
some order, but not the hierarchical order instituted by Christ; 
Kiing acknowledges some differences but regards these as 
secondary compared with the fundamental equality. 
McNamara notes as one of the first results of using 'people of 
God' for the church that it leads to an ecclesiology in which 
the visibility and the structures have a place.5 
Fifthly, since 'people' often refers to the local community in 
liturgical and patristic texts, Congar thinks 'people of God' 
can also be used for the discussion of the relationship between 
the local churches and the universal church. Congar mentions 
this point in the context of 'people of God', while Kiing, 
McNamara, and Ratzinger discuss these issues with the help 
of'body of Christ'.6 
In addition to these points concerned with content, some 
theologians notice that 'people of God' facilitates ecumenical 
dialogue, for it is a term known to Protestant theologians (so 
Beumer, Congar and Harvey) or see good possibilities for 
catechesis and pastoral work (so Congar). Schmaus thinks 
'people of God' important because it corresponds well to the 
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values so highly esteemed in our present democratic culture, 
while Ratzinger argues that an easy assimilation to democracy, 
as occurs in the discussion about democracy in the church, 
overlooks the spiritual transpositions and the difFerence 
between 'people of God' and 'people'.' 
As has become clear, not all the theologians who defend the 
synthesis view recognize the same advantages in 'people of 
God' or draw the same consequences from these points. The 
advantages imply partly disadvantages on the side of'mystical 
body of Christ'. But not all agree on these points either. Some 
remark that notions like history of salvation and eschatology 
do not belong to 'body of Christ' (Schmaus, cf. McNamara), 
but Beumer asks whether the historical and eschatological 
elements are not already present in 'body of Christ' via the 
idea of 'salvation-collectivism'.8 Some remark that 'body of 
Christ' suggests the loss of personal identity, suggests that 
people are cells in an organism (McNamara, Schmaus, 
Beumer), but Congar adds to this point - that it is 'people of 
God' which most clearly expresses the people's response - that 
'body of Christ' is equally well capable of accommodating 
these values. He adds also that 'body of Christ' expresses 
equally well the basic equality of the members and the 
functional and organizational differences. Schmaus sees here a 
difference of degree, since 'people of God' expresses this 
element best.9 
Apart from the positive points in the notion 'people of God', 
all theologians mention elements which they think crucial to 
the understanding of the church but which in their opinion are 
lacking in that notion. Because of this deficiency, the argument 
runs, 'people of God' on its own cannot serve as a description 
or definition of the church. Congar mentions three major short-
comings, which are all related to the fundamental difference 
between Israel and the church. 
First, Jesus is not just the Messiah but the incarnate son of 
God. Congar's central theme in the development of this point 
is that of heir and heritage. Only by becoming incorporate in 
Christ can we become co-heirs to the heavenly and eschatolo-
gical possessions. The minor theme is that of God's promise to 
dwell among his people now realized, for he dwells in Jesus' 
sacrificed and resurrected body and in the community. 
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Secondly, while under the old dispensation the Holy Spirit 
was only revealed as a power active in certain persons at a 
certain time, under the new dispensation the Spirit is revealed 
as a person and as constantly present in the whole church: he 
is given to the whole church as the principle of life, he is the 
soul of the church-body. Sent on Pentecost, the Spirit is a gift 
to the apostles personally and to the church as far as it is not 
just the people of God, but the body of Christ. 
Thirdly, while the people of the old covenant formed one 
people in the sense of an ethnic and social unity, the people of 
God of the new covenant form a spiritual unity constituted by 
faith and consisting of many peoples that keep their own 
cultures and identities. They form the tertium genus, the corpus 
Chnstianorum, a corporatio sui juris. This all leads Congar to the 
conclusion that under the new dispensation the people of God 
receive a status that can only be described adequately in 
categories of the theology of the body of Christ.10 Similar points 
are mentioned by other theologians, but again with differences. 
According to Ratzinger, 'body of Christ' indicates the differentia 
speeißca by which the people of God of the New Testament is 
distinguished from that of the Old Testament and all other 
peoples: the church is the people of God that lives from the 
body of Christ and becomes the body of Christ. This means 
that the notion 'people' receives a different meaning: its 
principle of unity is no longer blood but faith and baptism, its 
existence is no longer aimed at self-preservation, but at 
service." Schmaus sees the differences in the arrival of the 
Messiah and in the fulfilment of the promises, although 
complete fulfilment has to wait till Christ returns. Schmaus 
differs here from Congar, who says it is not enough to see Jesus 
as the Messiah. The people of God of the New Testament 
distinguishes itself from that of the Old by its fraternal unity 
founded in Christ and in the intimate relationship with Christ, 
who is the way to the Father. This intimate relationship can 
only be expressed by 'body of Christ'. The church is the people 
of God because it is, and as far as it is, the body of Christ — 
this is the formulation Schmaus uses. It has consequences for 
the understanding of 'people', for ties of blood are no longer 
decisive, as only faith and baptism are important. This 
spiritual people consisting of many peoples should not be con-
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nected or contrasted with 'people' in its ordinary sense, but 
only with the people of God of the old covenant.12 
Philips remarks, like Schmaus, that 'people', although 
referring to a structured whole, is not an adequate term for 
expressing the intimate character of the real community under 
the new dispensation: this community must be called 'body of 
Christ'.13 But Küng thinks that 'people of God' and 'body of 
Christ' express both the unity of Christians among each other 
and their unity with Christ; at the same time he maintains that 
'the concept "body of Christ" describes very fittingly the new 
and unique nature of this new people of God'.14 McNamara 
writes that the new spiritual existence of Christians is realized 
by their incorporation into Christ; by entering into the body of 
Christ Christians become the people of God. But, unlike 
Congar, he does not think that the articulation of the role of 
the Holy Spirit calls for 'body of Christ'; on the contrary, he 
thinks that the role of the Spirit within the notion 'people of 
God' has been deepened and made more dynamic compared 
with the theory of the Spirit as the soul of the body.15 Beumer 
qualifies it as a decisive disadvantage for 'people of God' that 
it leaves out an essential characteristic of the church as it exists 
— namely, its relation to Christ — and that the term itself does 
not mention Christ's name. He thinks, moreover, that the 
eschatological element is not clearly indicated in 'people of 
God', but that it is not obvious in 'mystical body of Christ' 
either.16 Harvey, who quotes Beumer, apparently does not 
think that the meaning of 'people of God' changes, for he 
maintains that the people of God of the Old Testament and 
that of the New Testament are the same people." 
Of the theologians mentioned, Philips, Schmaus, and 
Congar discuss the issue of the central term with explicit 
reference to the text of Lumen Gentium. Philips states that the 
suggestion made by some commentators that 'people of God' 
replaces 'body of Christ' as the central term in the constitution 
is incorrect, and supports his interpretation - the synthesis 
view - with an appeal to Congar's article. But for Congar and 
Schmaus, the issue does not arise out of the history of Lumen 
Gentium or out of the inconsistencies between the two streams 
present in the text: they defend the synthesis view on grounds 
of principle. Congar criticizes Lumen Gentium for not utilizing 
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the biblical notion fully, but his arguments show that even if 
this had been done, the most important points would still have 
been missing. 
Schmaus starts from the difference in central term between 
Mystici Corporis and Lumen Gentium. He assumes that 'people of 
God' functions as the leading image of Vatican и. Lumen 
Gentium devotes a whole chapter to 'people of God' while 'body 
of Christ' is only an image among other images, albeit an 
important one. This leads to a conflict with, and at first sight a 
repudiation of, Mystici Corporis, which contains the solemn 
declaration that 'to describe and to define the church of Christ 
. . . there is no name more noble, none more excellent, none 
more divine than "the mystical body of Jesus Christ"."8 On 
the basis of the synthesis in which 'people of God' is the wider 
notion which embraces 'body of Christ' and in which 'body of 
Christ' is the concept which presents the content, Schmaus 
concludes that there is no question of a repudiation since 'body 
of Christ' is still the most profound explanation of the church. 
To this he adds that 'body of Christ' is subordinate to 'people 
of God' as the Son is subordinate to the Father.19 Given this 
argument it is clear that Schmaus too defends the synthesis 
view on grounds of principle. 
It is not surprising to find both Congar and Schmaus 
defending this synthesis before the council.20 This aspect 
reveals an important point for the evaluation: the synthesis 
view is not to be evaluated in the light of the analysis of Lumen 
Gentium alone, but also in the light of the arguments for a 
necessary complementarity of 'people of God' with 'body of 
Christ' — or, as Beumer puts it, for the necessary occurrence of 
'body of Christ' in the description of the church.21 If this last 
point could be established, it would carry much weight in 
support of the claim that this synthesis is the only possible way 
of resolving the problems discovered in the analysis of Lumen 
Gentium. If not, the synthesis view would lose much of its 
appeal. How convincing are the arguments for a necessary 
complementarity? 
The basic presupposition in this type of argument is that 
'people of God' remains basically an Old Testament notion. 
But this presupposition is brought into question by the 
occurrence of 'people of God' as a fundamental concept in the 
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New Testament. Or, as Keller remarks: 'It remains obscure 
why the church of the New Testament should have selected a 
description of its nature which only secured its relationship to 
past history without at the same time including the demarcation 
and the newness'. And he adds that 'body of Christ' cannot 
fulfil this function since it is not the concept of the church of 
the New Testament: it is used only by Paul, and Paul uses 
other concepts as well.22 This general point of criticism can be 
used against Congar's line of argument, for he mentions some 
of the ideas related to 'people of God' but not the concept itself 
in its New Testament setting. Another point of criticism can 
be raised as well: he prejudges the issue by his formulations, 
for the introduction of 'body of Christ' in his formulations of 
the shortcomings is not necessary or even obvious. The theme 
of heir and heritage is a central connotation of 'people of 
God' , as Congar acknowledges, and the transposition in the 
understanding of heritage and heir, apparent in the New 
Testament, is also present in the Old Testament, as Congar 
admits.23 So there is no need to appeal to another notion. And 
even if this change is so fundamental that 'people of God' 
cannot be used any longer, it is not clear why 'family of God', 
another related concept, could not have been emphasized, or 
why this change could not have been marked by the addition 
of 'new' or ' true' . 'Adoption' does not necessarily suggest 
'incorporation', and these two concepts cannot be connected 
that easily either. 
The theme of God dwelling among his people is not 
exclusively related to the notion of 'the body of Christ', as 
Congar himself indicates: God dwells among Christians, who 
through the action of the Spirit form the temple of God.24 
Congar does not appeal to Scripture for calling the Holy Spirit 
the soul of the church-body, but to Augustine and Mystici 
Corporis. The quotation from Joel in Acts shows, though, that 
the sending of the Spirit can be articulated in a different way 
as well. Even the emphasis on the group as distinct from 
individuals, which Congar thinks important, can be expressed 
by 'people of God'.25 The final argument about this new 
spiritual people appeals also to non-scriptural sources. Apart 
from not developing the qualification tertium genus, which 
indicates a third kind of people next to the Jews and the 
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Gentiles, the use oí corpus and corporatie assumes a straight line 
between the religious and the legal or juridical use of corpus 
which is far from obvious.26 Moreover, if the people of God is 
called into existence by God and consists of those who respond 
to his call, faith seems to be a central feature, with the 
consequence that the people of Israel and the people of God do 
not automatically coincide. But if faith is from the beginning a 
central feature of the people of God, the insistence upon the 
difference between the people of God of the Old Testament 
and that of the New Testament in terms of blood versus faith is 
incorrect.27 Finally, if Congar's argument about the spiritual 
character of this new people is taken seriously, one of the 
positive points mentioned by him no longer seems to apply -
the point, namely, that 'people' implies organization, functions, 
and structures.2" 
Related to Congar's final argument is Schmaus' emphasis 
on the correct way of understanding 'people of God' if used for 
the church. By insisting that 'people of God' should not be 
contrasted and compared with 'people' in its ordinary sense, 
but with the people of God of the Old Testament, Schmaus 
makes the complement of'body of Christ' superfluous. It is 
enough to specify the role of Jesus. Schmaus does this by 
calling him the Messiah, which does not necessarily call for 
'body of Christ', and by calling him the way to the Father, 
which does not call for 'body of Christ' either, as Schmaus 
himself reveals when he writes that on this way the people of 
God becomes and remains the people of God.29 As in the case 
of Congar, this way of fixing the meaning of 'people of God' 
undermines the positive evaluation of 'people of God' in the 
light of present democratic culture. Schmaus also presents his 
synthesis as the solution to the discrepancy between the choice 
of the central term in Mystici Corporis and the choice of the 
central term in Lumen Gentium; but this solution cannot be 
accepted as a real one, and the reason for this negative judge-
ment is not just the previous argument. Schmaus proceeds by 
arguing that Mystici Corporis and Lumen Gentium are comple-
mentary on this point, since 'body of Christ' and 'people of 
God' are complementary in Paul's writings, but such a 
procedure yields results only if the understanding of these 
terms is the same in all cases. Schmaus's own outline of Paul's 
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understanding of 'body of Christ' contains two elements: the 
relationship to Christ and the relationship of the members to 
each other, to which Schmaus adds that the basic equality of 
all members is implied and that no hierarchical order is 
entailed. But this outline is not the same as the understanding 
of'mystical body of Christ' in Mystici Corporis?0 Moreover, the 
statement that 'body of Christ' expresses the most profound 
explanation, which is the basis for saving the pronouncement 
in Mystici Corporis, is contradicted by Schmaus' other state-
ment that 'body of Christ' is subordinate to 'people of God' as 
Christ is subordinate to the Father. If Christ is not the aim, 
but, as Schmaus puts it, the pilgrim pointing to the Father, 
'body of Christ' can in no ordinary sense of'profound' be the 
most profound explanation of the church.31 Ratzinger qualifies 
'body of Christ' as the differentia specifica indicating the funda-
mentally different way the new people of God is a people and 
by which it is distinguished from the way other peoples, 
including Israel, are people.32 But if the difference is so 
fundamental it raises the question whether differentia specifica is 
a qualification that should be used, since it presupposes the 
same genus: people. Moreover, Ratzinger defines this difference 
in terms of a cultic community (the people become people in 
the cult) and in terms of ties of faith and service. But all these 
aspects are basic to the Old Testament concept of people of 
God. Here, too, there is no need to introduce 'body of Christ' 
as a necessary complement. Kiing, who regards 'people of 
God' as fundamental and all the other notions as secondary, 
faces the problem of clarifying why and how a fundamental 
concept has to be complemented by a secondary one. An 
additional problem is that Kiing also raises baptism and 
eucharist — the two aspects of the church which he uses to 
introduce 'body of Christ', and which apparently are to be 
taken as the basis of the necessary complementarity - in the 
context of his discussion of'people of God'.33 
This leads to the conclusions that, on the basis of the pre-
suppositions of the theologians and on the basis of very general 
data, the synthesis view does not appear to be coherent, and 
that there is no decisive argument in favour of the thesis that 
'people of God' necessarily has to be complemented by 'body 
of Christ'. Since the analysis in the previous section has shown 
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that Lumen Gentium does not integrate the notions 'people of 
God' and 'body of Christ' but leaves them juxtaposed in an 
uncertain and far from clear relationship, the synthesis view 
cannot be said to be a correct interpretation οι Lumen Gentium. 
And, given the conclusion that 'people of God' is not necessarily 
to be complemented, the usefulness of the synthesis view in the 
further development of the insights of Lumen Gentium towards 
an ecclesiology is highly questionable. 
2.1.2 'People of God' as the central term 
Roster 's best known and debated contribution to the field of 
ecclesiology, 'Ekklesiologie im Werden', dates from 1940. Given 
his attack on the mystical-body theology ofthat period and his 
own plea in favour of 'people of God', it is not surprising to 
find him during the council period arguing again that the 
council should take 'people of God' as its leading image.' Such 
a leading image needs to be one that captures the whole of the 
church as intended by Christ, and needs therefore to be based 
upon Scripture and upon New Testament cult. The church can 
have only one leading image of this kind, since more than one 
overall leading image results in a contradiction. This means 
that 'body of Christ ' and 'people of God' cannot at the same 
time function as such an image. Koster therefore rejects the 
attempts to synthesize the two. He argues for 'people of God' 
as the leading image on the following ground: in the New 
Testament the total image of the church is expressed by means 
of three terms, ekklesia, laos theou, and soma Christou. These terms 
have the same meaning and content, which is not so difficult to 
show in the cases oí ekklesia and laos theou, and, ekklesia and soma 
Christou. The problem is whether laos theou and soma Christou, 
'people of God' and 'body of Christ', express the same leading 
image. Many theologians give a negative answer, but, 
according to Koster, these two terms express the same image. 
He gives two main arguments in support of his positive answer. 
First, in the letter to the Ephesians, 'body' is used for the unity 
of the church consisting of Jews and Gentiles, while in Romans 
'people' is used with the same reference (Rom 9-11) and the 
phrase 'you are all one in Christ Jesus ' (Gal 3:28) can only 
refer to 'people'. The second argument is that the Greek soma 
Christou is the material translation of the Hebrew got Elohim. 
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Koster holds this on the following grounds: Paul could not use 
'people of God' for his missionary activities, and therefore 
chose 'body of Christ'. Although there is no direct link between 
laos theou and soma Ckristou, there is such a link between goi 
Elohim and soma Christou. Goi cannot be connected with JHVVH 
or soma with theou. Moreover, soma and goz' do not conceive of 
people as an undifTerentiated mass of men, but of people as 
men with the same origin, and both express the idea that men 
belong to their origin.2 This explanation leads Koster to say 
that those who maintain that the relationship to Christ is 
lacking in 'people of God' are mistaken, for the relationship to 
Christ does not fundamentally change the structure and 
essence of the church as the congregation of Christ's and 
God's men and women, i.e., as the people of God. 'You are 
Christ 's and Christ is God's' (1 Cor 3:23) indicates that the 
church belongs to Christ and that Christ belongs to the Father. 
'Body of Christ ' underlines only that the church is the people 
of God. Koster finds a similar remark in Mystia Corporis where 
'mystical body of Christ' is called a transferral expression 
(metaphor), implying - although not explicitly saying - that it 
refers to the people of God and of Christ.3 Having established 
'people of God' as the leading image, Koster proceeds to 
develop it in three steps: first, he mentions the order that can 
be discerned in the people of God right from the beginning, 
and via two analyses of 'bride of Christ' and 'family of God' 
the elements of service to God and to the world and of leader-
ship are introduced. His conclusion is the following description 
of the church: the church is the faithful and sacramental 
people of God and of Christ which as maid-servant serves God 
and men each in a different way, and which is guided internally 
by the Holy Spirit and externally by the Pope and, with and 
under him, by the bishops as Christ's vicars,4 
These arguments in favour of'people of God' as the central 
term or leading image are not convincing, since they contain 
some basic mistakes and show some puzzling features. In his 
argument that the term 'body of Christ' is the material trans-
lation of 'people of God', Koster refers to the Hebrew goi 
Elohim, but this combination does not occur in the Old 
Testament, which means that his first argument (goi is not 
connected with J H W H and soma cannot be connected with 
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theou) fails even on its premisses. The two terms used to refer 
to the people of Israel are am and goi, and although it is 
impossible to treat them as two completely separate concepts 
each has different connotations. Goi carries connotations of 
race, government, and territory, though the relationship to 
God and to origins are not entirely absent. These last aspects 
are more prominent in am, however, which connotes primarily 
family relationships, internal relationships (help), and the 
relationship to God.5 Given this distinction, the choice of goi in 
the other arguments is not an obvious one. Moreover, in the 
argument about origins Koster changes from the concept of 
'people of God' to that of 'the people of Abraham', but in 
terms of the type of origin, 'people of God' and 'people of 
Christ' are closer than 'people of Abraham' and 'people of 
Christ'. In the third argument he changes back to 'people of 
God', but goi'does not express service to its origin. 
Apart from these mistakes with regard to general biblical 
data Koster makes the strange claims that 'body' means simply 
'people' and that 'body of. . .' refers to the origin of the body.6 
As a whole this argument is puzzling, since Koster starts it 
after saying that there does not exist a direct material relation 
between soma Chnstou and laos theou. But laos theou is the trans-
lation of the Hebrew AmJHWH, people of God. It is therefore 
far from clear why there should exist a material relation 
between the two in the one case and not in the other.7 Another 
puzzling feature is that the attempt to show that 'body of 
Christ' and 'people of Christ' mean the same undermines the 
whole argument that 'people of God', and precisely this term, 
should be the leading image. In Koster's article there are two 
series of remarks, one about 'people of God' as the leading 
image expressed in the whole argument which tries to show 
that 'body of Christ' is the material translation of 'people of 
God', and the other about the interchangeability of 'body of 
Christ' and 'people of God', related to remarks that he is not so 
much concerned with the linguistic expressions of the leading 
image, although they are relevant, and that either 'people of 
God' or 'body of Christ' can be chosen for pastoral or 
ecumenical reasons.8 The roots of this combination lie in the 
thesis that the terms ekklesia, laos theou, and soma Chnstou must 
have the same meaning and content. If this only means that 
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they refer to the same reality, or, as Koster formulates it, 'the 
reality of faith that according to God's and Christ's intention 
exists in the church','1 this would not lead to any particular 
problem. It is common that different names or descriptions 
refer to the same person, place, or event. But it leads to 
problems if attempts are made to show that since these names 
and descriptions refer to the same person, place, or event, they 
mean the same as well. 'The medieval university city on the 
Isis' and 'the city where Newman preached his university 
sermons' both refer to Oxford, but are by no means 
synonymous and do not have the same 'content'."1 The thesis 
itself implies a difference between the leading image and the 
expressions of that image. The fact that Koster selects one of 
these biblical expressions as the formulation of that leading 
image, namely 'people of God', conceals the difference, and 
with it the problem of how to conceive of this difference. 
Koster also sometimes uses 'the people of God and of Christ' 
to express this leading image, but this formulation calls into 
question the link with the Old Testament concept which is 
presupposed in the arguments." 
While Koster wrote his article during the council period, 
Luneau published his book Eglise ou troupeau? several years 
after the council closed.'2 The thesis he sets out to defend is 
that the church is not a flock because it is the people of God.13 
When the church uses 'people of God' to describe itself, it 
implies a return to the purity of its origins, to the early 
Christian community where more attention was given to the 
whole and the poor than to privileged groups and the rich. 
Moreover, it enables the church to make itself understood in 
the modern world, for in the all-pervading changes in church 
and society a new awareness breaks through: the people want 
a greater democracy and participation, the people want to be 
heard. By using 'people of God' the church appeals to these 
feelings as well. Luneau supports this thesis via analyses of 
'people', 'people of God', and Lumen Gentium}* 
Luneau discerns in the concept 'people' certain constant 
elements which become clear when 'people' is contrasted with 
concepts like 'multitude', 'mass', and 'nation'; these elements 
are: number, awareness of the same values and destination, 
organization, responsibility, equality, and history - and history 
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is understood here as the history of the unimportant and the 
oppressed. The word 'people' is thus rich and evocative, but 
for that very reason imprecise. This explains the appeal and 
the ambiguity of 'people of God'.''i Luneau sees three major 
positive points in the use of'people of God' for the church. He 
follows Congar here, but makes some different emphases. First, 
'people qf God' underlines the human nature of the church. It 
is God's people since he calls it together, but it is also a 'people' 
indicating the importance of the collective aspect of the human 
contribution, i.e., the role of mankind in God's plan and the 
importance of the response by man. This feature prevents 
attempts to hypostatize the church and to place it outside the 
human situation. Secondly, it indicates the historical continuity 
with Israel: the church is a messianic and pilgrim people. This 
implies that it is open to failure and sin and that it is not 
absolutely perfect, although it will never err completely. 
Thirdly, it gives the first place to the community of faith and 
baptism, i.e., to the people and not to the hierarchy. This 
implies a basic equality of brothers, which docs not exclude 
structure, etc., since 'people' connotes also structure and 
authority.16 
These elements are highly valued at the present time, since 
they take into account elements such as personal responsibility, 
decision, liberty, and equality. The use of'people of God' for 
the church therefore has appeal, while 'church' evokes too 
much a history of mistakes and clerical dominance, and 'body 
of Christ' remains a strange and obscure term. The Second 
Vatican Council set out to be a pastoral council and therefore 
chose 'people of God' and attached great value to it, as is 
apparent from Lumen Gentium}1 Nevertheless, Luneau 
observes, Lumen Gentium uses 'church' more often than 'people 
of God'. The reason for this is not just habit: 'people of God' 
presents Christ's work in its historical and human dimension, 
while 'church of God' expresses better the mystery of the 
church.18 'People of God' is, moreover, too short and remains 
ambivalent. It does not specify sufficiently the new features of 
the New Testament message: hope partly realized instead of 
mere promises, the role of Jesus, and the crossing of the limits 
set by territory and race. Basically, 'people of God' remains an 
Old Testament formula. It is a dangerous term, too, for with 
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its present connotations, 'people of God' can suggest that the 
church is a democracy in which people decide by majority vote 
upon laws, structure, etc.; these connotations do not disappear 
by the addition'of God'.19 
Luneau concludes that 'people of God' is not a bad term, 
but one that leads easily to misunderstanding. It is therefore 
not the first term and stands in need of correctives, namely 
'church' and 'body of Christ'. 'Church' is a term that is 
preferred by Vatican II and that occurs frequently in Scripture. 
'Church', ekklesia, qahal JHWH refer to the assembly or 
congregation called together by God, while 'people' refers to a 
group formed by its own initiative, but 'church' does not 
express the importance of Christ. 'Body of Christ', which 
receives ample attention in the documents of Vatican 11, is not 
a substitute for 'people of God' and 'church', but states what 
these are: 'body of Christ' gives these other terms a New 
Testament face. It expresses, moreover, the unity among 
members and growth - a concept that belongs to 'body'.20 
These reflections lead Luneau to say that, since one image 
cannot exhaust the reality of the church, one cannot build an 
ecclesiology upon one image only: one must, like Vatican II 
and like the Scriptures, use many images. Not all images are 
equally important: 'people of God' occupies one of the most 
important places among them. He remarks, too, that since the 
church must use an intelligible language, the church must at 
the present time use 'people of God'.21 
This conclusion and the preceding arguments reveal several 
tensions. Luneau sets out to establish the thesis that the 
church is the people of God, and supports this with a major 
line of argument concerned with the content of'people of God' 
and with a minor one concerned with the evocative power of 
the term 'people' in our contemporary culture. The major line 
exhibits a declining importance of 'people of God', though. 
Luneau starts by saying that the church is able to rediscover 
the purity of its origins if it uses 'people of God' and that Lumen 
Gentium does not see 'people of God' as one image among 
others but as reality. He continues by saying that the council 
prefers 'church' because it expresses the mystery better and 
that 'people of God' is in need of correctives, and he concludes 
by listing 'people of God' among other images. This drastic 
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change in the course of the argument shows that the initial 
thesis is not supported by this argument. 
Apart from this, the argument contains contradictory 
remarks which shows that the change is not just a question of a 
weakening of the argument. The claim of the purity of the 
origins and the remark that 'people of God' expresses the work 
of Jesus in its historical and human dimension cannot be 
reconciled with the remark that 'people of God' remains an 
Old Testament concept and that it does not express Jesus's 
role. And there are further points on which Luneau contradicts 
himself: to invoke 'church' as a corrective, because 'church' 
connotes God's initiative in calling together men, while 
'people' connotes men's own initiative, involves refuting the 
earlier positive evaluation of 'people of God'. That Luneau 
invokes 'church' is especially strange, since it does not specify 
Jesus 's role, as he remarks himself, and since it has the un-
desirable connotations he mentions. What remains is the other, 
minor line of argument. But this line is not without ambiguities 
either, since he cites the current appeal which 'people' has as 
an argument for using 'people of God', and yet mentions rather 
fundamental différences between 'people' and 'people of God', 
which seems to destroy at least part of the power of'people'. If 
the positive points Luneau mentions at the beginning are 
sufficient to turn 'people of God' into a term with appeal, it 
means that the decisive factors for using 'people of God' as the 
central term is a practical one. 
So, in the end, both Koster and Luneau are left with 
arguments stressing practical points. The question arises 
whether this is all that can or need to be said about the central 
term in ecclesiology. 
2.1.3 Another term 
Apart from the synthesis view and the thesis that 'people of 
God' should be the central term, there is a third type of 
argument that can be found in the literature related to Vatican 
H and discussing this issue of the central term explicitly. This 
argument proposes a term different from either 'people of God' 
or 'body of Christ ' . It is not the case that theologians are led to 
this proposal only by their analysis of 'people of God' and 
'mystical body of Christ': their views about the nature of 
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theology and of theological language also play a role, and a 
decisive one in certain versions of this argument. Relevant at 
this point, though, are the remarks made about the content of 
'people of God' and of 'body of Christ', and, where they exist, 
the comments on Lumen Gentium. These remarks taken in 
isolation reveal the presence of important elements of the 
synthesis view. 
Aymans as a canon lawyer is not so much concerned with 
the inquiry into the relationship between the two 'image-
concepts', but is mainly interested in what the council says 
about the juridical structure of the church when it uses 'people 
of God' or 'body of Christ'.1 Nevertheless, remarks about the 
relationship can be found. Despite the fact that 'people of God' 
is the leading image, in Aymans' judgement Lumen Gentium 
avoids a one-sided emphasis by using 'people of God' and 
'body of Christ ' equally often.2 The relation between the two is 
not indicated in the text of Lumen Gentium but the theologians 
tend to take 'people of God' as the more encompassing and 
more general concept.3 But his main attention is directed to 
the consequences for juridical structure that are implied in 
'body of Christ ' and 'people of God'. 'People of God', as used 
for Israel, has a religious meaning which is not the same as the 
normal meaning: God constitutes the people by his will and 
directs them towards his aim. The addition of'new' indicating 
the role of Jesus does not change this fundamental perspective. 
Although the community-character of people does not exclude 
a juridical structure beforehand, such a structure cannot be 
deduced from 'people of God' via the rule ubi societas ibi jus 
since the people of God is not just a people. God's lordship, 
not human power, determines the basic structure of the church. 
'People of God' cannot be used as a justification for either the 
concrete form of the hierarchical structure or a political-
democratic structure.4 'Mystical body' has profoundly 
influenced the development and the place of canon law since it 
was understood juridically. Because of this interpretation, the 
relationship between the church-body and the eucharistie 
body was severed, and consequently the relationship between 
the structure of the church and its sacramental basis. The 
church, though, does not have an order because it is the 
mystical body in the juridical sense, i.e., a corporation, but 
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because it celebrates the eucharist. It is in the eucharist that a 
difference in role emerges, and this is the basis of hierarchical 
structure.5 Aymans thinks that communio is a concept that is 
best able to accommodate the central elements of both 'people 
of God' and 'body of Christ' and to develop the juridical aspects 
contained in those: it expresses the community-character of 
'people of God' and the sacramental character of 'body of 
Christ' (hierarchy).6 
A concept similar to Aymans's choice is 'communion', which 
King prefers above 'sacrament' in restating Paul's synthetic 
view of the church.7 In his article on an adequate concept of 
the church, written during the council period, King sets out to 
establish an 'antecedent necessity' of such a concept, i.e., 'a 
synthesis of the juridical and spiritual viewpoints', a synthesis 
that can be found in Paul's letters.8 Among the many images 
Paul uses 'people of God' and 'body of Christ' occupy the most 
prominent places. 'People of God' expresses the societal, visible 
aspect: 'This notion of the people of God is without doubt an 
institutional and juridical one'.9 The difference between the 
people of the Old Testament and the people of the New is that 
the latter has an exclusively religious character and that it is 
purchased with Christ's blood.10 'Body of Christ' expresses the 
life, the spiritual aspect." In both cases the influence of Paul's 
realized eschatology is noticeable: the church is, and has to 
become, the people of God, and the church's life must grow. 
The identification of these two notions is central to Paul's 
thinking about the church. 'There is only one reality which is 
at once visible and spiritual. Body thus qualifies, complements 
people'}2 'The people of God is not only an identifiable 
corporeity but also an organism alive with the life of Christ. 
The body of Christ . . . is not just an individual invisible 
sharing but one which possesses a corporate aspect'.13 
'Communion' is the term adequate to restate this synthesis, for 
it indicates that the church is a 'solidarity' growing out of the 
common possession of the life in Christ and giving rise to the 
common activity, the life, of the new people of God.14 
Unlike King, who rejects it, the concept of 'sacrament' is 
taken as the central category in the systematic part of the 
Mysterium Salutis volume on the church. It is not the only 
possible choice, it is claimed, but it is a meaningful and good 
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choice on several grounds: it expresses the same view as Lumen 
Gentium; it is adequate for a salvation-historical approach, for 
it relates the church to Christ and the eschaton; it links the 
visible and the invisible elements of the church; it exhibits the 
salvation-historical relationship between Christ, the sacrament, 
and the church, the root-sacrament; it shows the church as the 
salvation of the church; and it connects the biblical images.'s 
How this last point is envisaged is made clear by Semmelroth 
in an article on the unity of the church concept written before 
the council."' In it he argues that the concept 'primordial 
sacrament ' indicates the relation between the inner and the 
outer aspect of the church; these two aspects are expressed, as 
in King's vision, by means of 'people of God' and 'body of 
Christ'.17 In a later article commenting on Lumen Gentium, he 
remains within this formal frame of a synthesis, but develops 
'people of God' in a somewhat different way around two main 
points: the unity and fundamental equality within the 
hierarchical church, and the salvation-historical character.18 
'Communion' or 'mystical communion' again plays a role in 
the way Dulles understands 'people of God' and 'body of 
Christ ' , and in his interpretation oí Lumen Gentium. With regard 
to the understanding of'mystical body of Christ', Dulles notes 
a dilference between Mystici Corporis and Lumen Gentium, which 
has, moreover, 'people of God' as its 'principal paradigm'. 
'People of God' and 'mystical body of Christ' have many 
features in common: they are co-extensive. They are both 
more democratic than 'the church as society or institution' 
and they both emphasize the relation between believers and 
the Holy Spirit, the mutual service of the members, and the 
subordination to the whole.19 Dulles mentions, apart from these 
common elements, the strong and weak points of each notion. 
In the case of 'people of God', the distance between church 
and Christ, the faithful as responsible persons, and the need of 
reform are its strong points; while its weak points consist in its 
failure to express the newness and uniqueness and its 
presumptuous, egoistical, and monopolistic claims. 'Body of 
Christ ' expresses the uniqueness better, but it can lead to the 
divinisation of the church; moreover, it is not clear in the 
modern understanding whether it refers to a communion of 
grace or to an essentially visible communion.20 'In sum, the 
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two models of Body of Christ and People of God both illuminate 
from different angles the notion of the Church as communion 
or community. The Church, from this point of view, is not in 
the first instance an institution or visible organized society. 
Rather it is a communion of men, primarily interior but also 
expressed by external bonds of creed, worship and ecclesiastical 
fellowship'.21 
As Dulles draws attention to 'communion' as the common 
background of'people of God' and 'mystical body of Christ', 
so Mühlen sets out to show that both are based upon the same 
idea of the Gross-Ich, his translation of'corporate personality'.22 
The two metaphors both highlight one aspect of the reality of 
this 'Gross-Ich'P Mühlen sees a difference between 'people of 
God' in the Old Testament and in the New Testament. In the 
Old Testament it contains ethnic, cultural, and similar 
components and a religious component, while in the New 
Testament 'people of God' is understood purely in the religious 
sense: in the New Testament 'people' is thus used analogically. 
While in the Old Testament the punctum tertium comparationis is 
formed by the 'Gross-Ich' consisting of biological, historical and 
religious elements, in the New Testament the coherence of the 
'Gross-Ich' is only determined by faith and grace.24 In a 
commentary on the council he notes the difference between 
Mystici Corporis and Lumen Gentium and locates the introduction 
of 'people of God' in the desire to accentuate the salvation-
historical dimension of the church. This cannot be done by 
means of'body of Christ'.25 With regard to the section on the 
mystical body in the first chapter of Lumen Gentium, he remarks 
that this attempts to connect 'people of God' and 'body of 
Christ': the church is the new people of God in such a way that 
it exists as body of Christ.2b 
As is the case with the defenders of the synthesis view, these 
theologians understand 'people of God' and 'body of Christ' in 
conflicting ways. While Mühlen, Semmelroth, and King 
understand 'people of God' in institutional and societal terms, 
Dulles sees a difference between the church as people of God 
and the church as society and institution, and Aymans does 
not want to use 'people of God' to justify either a hierarchical 
or a democratic structure. There are also internal tensions, as, 
for example, on the one hand the insistence upon the special 
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meaning of 'people of God', and on the other the appeal to 
'people' for the structure. (King, Mühlen). The interpretation 
of 'people of God' makes it either superfluous or results in an 
interpretation of'mystical body of Christ' expressing the inner 
side only. But given the organizational interpretation of'mystical 
body of Christ ' in Mystici Corporis, this limited interpretation is 
forbidden, as Semmelroth and King acknowledge, with the 
consequence that 'people of God' understood in the limited 
sense becomes superfluous. King shows this last point when in 
his conclusion he does not mention 'people of God', but writes 
that 'in order to restate the Pauline synthesis in our day, we 
must first recognize the Church as a complex reality which is 
at once visible and invisible. We must recognize that the 
Mystical Body and the Roman Catholic Church are one and 
the same reality'.27 This all means that as far as content is 
concerned there is, on these presuppositions with regard to the 
understanding of'people of God' and 'body of Christ', no need 
for another concept. So, in this type of argument, even if it is 
not recognized by the theologians, the decisive argument must 
be the one about the 'linguistic status' of'body of Christ' and 
'people of God'. 
2.2 The linguistic status ojthe terms 
Most theologians do not explicitly discuss the nature of terms 
like 'body of Christ' and 'people of God' when applied to the 
church, do not argue for any qualification but simply call them 
'metaphor ' , 'concept' or something else, and do not develop 
systematically their ideas about what can and what cannot be 
done with these terms. They make remarks in passing, and 
these remarks, taken together, present rather a chaotic picture. 
Some see a difference in the status of 'body of Christ' and 
'people of God', while others consider them to be of the same 
kind. Koster, for instance, introduces a sharp distinction 
between the two: 'body of Christ' is a metaphor and belongs to 
the pre-theological level, 'people of God' is an imageless 
material name and belongs to the theological level. In his later 
article he uses 'leading image' to qualify 'people of God' and 
'people of God and of Christ'. This leading image is also 
expressed in 'people of God' and 'body of Christ', and equally 
well; these expressions belong presumably to the same pre-
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theological level.1 Luneau and Philips also introduce a distinc-
tion between the two terms with regard to their linguistic 
status by saying that 'people of God' is not just an image 
among other images, or a comparison, but reality. Both use 
this formulation to capture the difference in treatment that can 
be found in the text oí Lumen Gentium between 'field' and 'vine' 
on the one hand and 'people of God' on the other hand. The 
church is not strictly speaking a vine or a field, but it is truly 
the people of God, as Luneau puts it;2 or, according to Philips, 
the church is not similar to the people of God, it is the people 
of God.3 Philips uses several terms for 'the body of Christ' or 
' the mystical body of Christ': allegory, image, figure of speech, 
comparison or simile, representation. Luneau uses, apart from 
'image', neutral terms like 'formula' and 'expression' to qualify 
'body of Christ'.4 
Koster's opposition between the mere metaphor 'body of 
Christ ' and the imageless material name 'people of God' is 
rejected by Beumer, Ratzinger, and Mühlen. Ratzinger argues 
that 'people' is used in an analogical sense, as do Congar and 
Schmaus.3 Beumer concludes from this analogical use that 
'people of God' is a metaphor like 'body of Christ'.6 Mühlen 
reports a consensus about the metaphorical character of'body 
of Christ ' and argues like the other theologians: the original 
biological, linguistic, and cultural relations characteristic for 
'people of God' in the Old Testament are disturbed when 
'people of God' is applied to the church. The only important 
relation is that of faith; 'people' is therefore used analogically, 
and so 'people of God' is a metaphor when used of the church. 
Mühlen also calls both terms 'concepts'. Metaphors are 
contrasted by him with real definitions and essence-descriptions, 
and also with dogmatic formulae that are formal summaries of 
what is essential. Such a formula does not contain an image 
and expresses the mystery as such - expresses the mystery 
itself directly.7 
Schmaus, too, sees 'people of God' and 'body of Christ' as 
one of a kind, but instead of using one qualification, he uses 
several: image, image-representation, image-concept, concept, 
leading-image are used for both, while people-concept and 
body-concept is used for each respectively. 'Body of Christ' 
and 'people of God' together form the full concept, or the 
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Scripture-concept." Dulles qualifies both as 'images', 
'metaphors', and 'models'. 'People of God' is a metaphor since 
it is based upon a type of military and political treaty.9 
Scmmelroth considers both to have an equal linguistic status 
(metaphor and image) and also uses 'concept', despite his own 
misgivings about a conceptual, rational approach and a 
definition.10 Aymans calls both 'graphic descriptions' and 
specifies them further as 'theological images'. Theological 
images occupy a middle position between pure metaphors or 
analogies and concepts that identify something directly. What 
is expressed in an image connects with something in the world, 
but does not stay on this level of analogical use. The image is 
transformed to a new level where it names and refers to a new 
reality: the church is like a people and is like a body, and really 
is a people and really is a body." 
Related to this classification is an evaluation on the point of 
suitability and adequacy of these terms for theology. Mühlen 
and Koster both judge that metaphors or images cannot be 
used on the level of theology. According to Mühlen, an image 
illuminates one aspect but does not present completely the 
reality referred to. An image presents something graphically, 
but that always implies onesidedness, and this has important 
consequences, especially in the case of the mysteries of faith. 
The mystery cannot in the end be presented graphically, for 
more must always remain to be said, precisely because the 
mystery exceeds all human imagination. An image of such a 
mystery is only an aid to elucidation by way of analogy - as, 
for instance, Paul indicates when he first tells about the 
different gifts of the Spirit and of the one Spirit, and then as an 
elucidation refers to the many members and the one body 
(1 Cor 12). The danger of metaphors is that people remain on 
the level of images, overlook the differences, and forget to pay 
attention to Úit punctum tertium comparationis}1 Koster concludes 
that (German) ecclesiology ofthat period (1940) still belongs 
to the pre-theological level. One of the symptoms of this is the 
use of metaphors, especially that of'body of Christ', and one of 
the factors that impede the move towards the truly theological 
level is the view that theologians should be satisfied with using 
rhetorical devices that really belong to the level of preaching. 
Preaching and proclaiming have the aim to please and to 
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persuade, for which purposes metaphors are more apt than 
abstract concepts. But it is incorrect to think that metaphors 
should be used in theology as well, that they should be 
terminal points of reflection, for this presupposes that theology 
and preaching are the same.1J Koster argues further that it is 
impossible to start reflections from images only, for images, 
despite their greater appeal, mean less than material descrip-
tions: figurative language remains unintelligible without these 
descriptions.14 
But Beumer, who does not agree with Roster's distinction 
between metaphors and material names or essential descrip-
tions, asks whether it is not an unbiblical and untheological 
distinction, and whether we cannot in fact express the supra-
natural reality, but necessarily analogically and therefore 
graphically.11 Philips also differs from Koster and Mühlen. He 
remarks that theologians prefer a clear and abstract conceptual 
language as opposed to the evocative language of the parables 
and he acknowledges that theology cannot do without 
concepts. Nevertheless, it is clear that Philips evaluates 
metaphors higher than concepts. Since concepts do not have 
evocative power they are not really adequate to express the 
message of the gospel: this message is concerned with man's 
relationship with God and with man's life, and has therefore to 
be articulated in a way that touches people. For this purpose 
figurative language, although vague and diflicult to understand, 
is more effective than conceptual language. Moreover, concepts 
are more dangerous, since people are tempted to forget the 
analogical character of concepts, while in the case of metaphors 
the contradictions are so obvious that people do not make this 
fatal mistake. And, apart from this, man reaches the divine 
domain more easily via material (i.e., metaphorical) language 
than via the abstract level of concepts. Philips quotes Thomas 
in support of this positive evaluation of metaphors.16 And 
Semmelroth argues that since one cannot capture the essence 
of the church in one concept or in one image, several are 
required. The theologian must be aware, moreover, that he 
cannot understand or express supranatural reality by means of 
natural concepts.17 Aymans thinks image-concepts especially 
apt to refer to the mysterious reality of (for example) the 
essence of the church.18 Dulles, also referring to the mystery of 
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the church, maintains that clear, univocal concepts are 
impossible. This does not mean, though, that we can only be 
silent about the church, for there are other positive possibilities 
like models.19 A definition of the church is, on this line of 
argument, ruled out, while Koster among others thinks it 
possible.2" 
In the face of such a variety of qualifications and evaluations, 
the question arises which one is correct, especially since some 
contradict others, while certain views appear on reflection to 
be incoherent. Beumcr (cf Congar and Schmaus) implies by 
his argument that the difference between biblical and theological 
language is not one of image or metaphor and concept, while 
Mühlen, Koster, Philips and Aymans stress the difference, 
especially as one between metaphor and concept; but Philips 
does not evaluate this diflerence in the way Mühlen and 
Koster evaluate it. Some argue (e.g., Semmelroth and Dulles) 
that to express and to safeguard the mystery a number of 
metaphors are required, while Mühlen thinks that a concept 
performs this task better. The issue of definition is related to 
this: some think the mystery of the church cannot be defined, 
while others think it is possible, and Mühlen prefers yet 
another type of description, the theological formula. 
The incoherence in (e.g.) Philips's and Luneau's views 
appear when their qualification of'people of God' as reality is 
taken seriously. They use this qualification to explain the 
difference between 'people of God' and 'body of Christ' in 
Lumen Gentium. In Philips's view this leads to another type of 
language, which is not conceptual or figurative. For, given his 
positive evaluation of'people of God' and his rather negative 
remarks about theological concepts, it is unlikely that 'people 
of God' is a concept. But how does this new type of language 
relate to the other two? Does it express the mystery even better 
than metaphors do? Does one need only one term like 'people 
of God'? Given his views, an affirmative answer to the last 
question seems probable, but that results in a contradiction 
with the synthesis-view which he also defends. A more subtle 
sign of incoherence is the wide variety of terms, ranging from 
metaphor to concept, which are all used indiscriminately. 
Intuitively, there is a difference between the two extremes, and 
the use of both for the same term at the same time seems prima 
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facie incorrect and in need of explanation. Even the simple 
juxtaposition of metaphors and similes or comparisons seems 
to be wrong. And the bewildering appeal to analogy does not 
improve the confusing situation.21 Strange word combinations 
like 'image-concept' reveal a dissatisfaction with both image 
and concept and suggest, like the incoherences and the 
contradictions, a fundamental uncertainty about the linguistic 
status of 'people of God' and 'body of Christ' - about what 
kind of terms these are and for what use they can be employed 
— which must have repercussions for the overall argument 
presented by the theologians. 
2.3 Conclusion 
The analysis of the reactions of various theologians to Lumen 
Gentium and of the arguments presented by these theologians 
with regard to the content and status of 'people of God' and 
'body of Christ', to the relation between these two notions, and 
to their usefulness as central terms in ecclesiology or for a 
definition or description of the church, reveals a number of 
incorrect, incoherent, and mutually exclusive views on these 
matters. First, the interpretation of Lumen Gentium as having 
'people of God' as its leading image or as exhibiting a synthesis 
between 'people of God' and 'body of Christ' appears to be 
incorrect in the light of the analyses of the previous section. 
There it is shown that Lumen Gentium does not have one leading 
image and that Lumen Gentium does not indicate the relation 
between 'people of God' and 'body of Christ'. Secondly, among 
the defenders of the synthesis thesis (see also the other 
theologians) there are points of difference in the interpretation 
of both 'people of God' and 'body of Christ' which do not seem 
to be mere differences in emphasis (equality, the salvation-
history dimension, organization and structure) and which 
suggest that certain interests or theories influence those 
interpretations.' Thirdly, the comments on the linguistic status 
of'people of God' and 'body of Christ' show a chaotic disparity. 
The analysis shows that theologians relate their qualifications 
to remarks and arguments about the relation or difference 
between biblical and theological language, about the way the 
mystery of the church can or should be expressed. Some argue 
that no definition can be given, but that only a number of 
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metaphors or models can be used, and that there is no sharp 
distinction between biblical and theological language, so 
calling into question the very possibility of theology. 
The comments on metaphor reveal a certain view which has 
been under attack for some time. Over the last fifty years one 
cannot only discern a growing interest in metaphor, but also 
the emergence of an approach which differs considerably from 
the traditional rhetorical metaphor-theory. Remarks like 
'metaphors are used to please people', 'metaphors are just aids 
for elucidation', 'it is only a metaphor' and 'it is not a 
metaphor but reality', which can be found in the writings of 
theologians and which reveal shared presuppositions despite 
their différent arguments, are all expressions of this criticized 
rhetorical view. Because of the link between these remarks and 
those made about the possibility of a definition of the church, 
and about the possibility of theology, because the removal of 
uncertainty about the linguistic status of the central term 
seems a necessary preliminary to any systematic treatment, 
and because of the prominent use of metaphors and images in 
Lumen Gentium, a reflection upon metaphors and their possible 
function in theology is necessary before decisions can be taken 
as to whether a metaphor, a combination of metaphors, or 
some other kind of term should be the central term in the 
development of the insights of Vatican n, and therefore 
necessary to that development. 
Some of the differences in interpretation might be removed 
by accepting the biblical understanding of'people of God' and 
'body of Christ' as a common point of departure, but such a 
move would, apart from the questionable presupposition of the 
biblical understanding, still fail to solve the methodological 
problems. The points concerned with the central term in 
ecclesiology have to be clarified if the whole enterprise of 
developing the insights of Vatican и into an ecclesiology is not 
to be doomed to failure. The arguments of the following 
chapters aim at such a clarification. The next chapter 
concentrates upon metaphor and the theory explaining the 
structure and function of metaphors; the third chapter 
presents three types of argument about the role of metaphor in 
theology. The final chapter relates the results to the problems 
encountered in this first chapter. 
Chapter II 
Metaphor 
This chapter, the first step in solving the problems we have 
discovered in our analyses of Lumen Gentium and of the argu-
ments presented by various theologians, contains the develop-
ment of a theory of metaphor. After stating the requirements 
of such a theory, we offer an outline and a further development 
of central notions and categories. A contrast with other theories 
and a discussion of two problems form a continuation of the 
search for appropriate notions in the theory of metaphor. The 
overall argument is summarized in the final section. 
1. Preliminary remarks 
1.1 The requirements 
Before a theory of metaphor can be developed, the requirements 
such a theory must fulfil have to be clear. There are two main 
points that will direct the formulation of these requirements: 
first, the theory must explain metaphors; and secondly, the 
theory must explain metaphors in such a way that the theory 
can be used to clarify the problems discovered in the previous 
chapter. This last point means that the theory must deal with 
two main questions: 'what is the structure or mechanism of a 
metaphor?' and, 'what is the function of a metaphor?', and 
that the discussion must focus on the semantic aspects involved 
in these two questions.1 This implies some limitations and 
restrictions: although the theory that will be proposed gives an 
explanation of the important features of metaphor in general, 
it neither discusses aesthetic aspects like rhyme, rhythm, and 
sound which are of importance in the case of poetic metaphor, 
nor considers the emotional qualities of metaphor. A second 
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requirement is implied in this first point. A 'semantic' theory 
of metaphor should not just explain the formal structure of 
metaphors, but should explain how meaning in metaphors 
comes about, what the mechanisms are that make metaphors 
part of communication, and how people are able to understand 
metaphors that they have not encountered before. Such a 
theory should also give criteria for distinguishing between 
metaphors on the one hand and mistakes, nonsense, and falsities 
on the other hand. Related to this requirement is another. A 
semantic theory for natural languages that claims to explain 
how people use and understand language must also be able to 
explain metaphors, since metaphors are a normal part of natural 
languages. So the third requirement is that a theory of 
metaphor should be part of a more general semantic theory. 
This means that the same central notions and the same basic 
presuppositions should be used in both cases, although a 
qualification of these notions may be necessary. A general 
semantic theory that is not able to accommodate a theory of 
metaphor, or a theory of metaphor that does not fit into a more 
general theory, cannot be considered to be adequate. 
The first point - that a theory of metaphor must explain 
metaphors — may seem too obvious to be mentioned, but a 
determination of the phenomena that are to be explained is not 
so easy. There is not a generally accepted modern definition or 
theory that can be used as a starting-point, and the ordinary use 
of 'metaphor ' is not helpful either since it reveals the traces of a 
wide variety of descriptions employed in the course of history.2 
The best solution seems to be to start with some examples of 
what most, if not all, writers would call metaphors,1 and to look 
for those features that should play a prominent part in an 
adequate theory of metaphor:4 
(a) I'll yet follow 
the wounded chance of Anthony, though my reason 
sits in the wind against me 
(b) life's but a walking shadow; a poor player, 
that struts and frets his hour upon the stage, 
and then is heard no more: it is a tale 
told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, 
signifying nothing 
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(c) especially when the October wind 
with frosty finges punishes my hair 
(d) The yellow fog that rubs it back upon the window-panes 
the yellow smoke that rubs its muzzle on the window-panes 
licked its tongue into the comers of the evening . . . 
(e) Time and bell have buried the day 
the black cloud carries the sun away 
(f) I am aware of the damp souls of the housemaids 
sprouting despondently at area gates 
A first feature that should be noticed is that a metaphor is not a 
word but a combination of (at least) two words: it is an 
expression or a sentence. This is a purely formal description 
that suffices as a starting-point, but that needs further develop-
ment in the theory. A decisive step towards such a development 
is set when the second important feature is recognised: the 
words in these sentences have retained their normal, usual 
meaning, but are used in a special way, and form an extra-
ordinary combination. The crucial distinction here is the one 
between 'metaphorical sense' and 'metaphorical use'.5 A word 
can have normal sense or normal senses and metaphorical sense 
or metaphorical senses and both are listed in dictionaries. To 
use a word in its metaphorical sense is to use that word literally. 
The metaphorical use of a word cannot be found in dictionaries, 
however, simply because there is not such thing as the meta-
phorical use of a word: metaphorical uses cannot be found in 
dictionaries for the same reason that sentences cannot be found 
there. Words with a metaphorical sense are often called 'dead 
metaphors' and are contrasted with 'living metaphors', i.e., 
with words used metaphorically. But there is a danger in this 
terminology: it suggests that both belong to the same category, 
while in fact they describe two different phenomena from two 
different angles. 'Dead metaphor' refers to the extended sense of 
a word and says something about the history of that extension; 
'living metaphors' says something about an expression or a 
sentence, and about the actual use of words in that expression or 
sentence. The same caution should be applied to a term like 
'ex-metaphor' (Weinrich) or a classification like 'extinct-
dormant-active' metaphors (Black). 
These two features are connected: only on the level of a 
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sentence can one talk about the use of words, and only on the 
level of a sentence can one talk about the metaphorical use of 
words. The strangeness of a metaphor arises precisely from its 
metaphorical use, from the extra-ordinary combination of 
words that retain their ordinary meaning: it is this strangeness 
that leads to the recognition of a metaphor, and it is this that 
needs explanation in a semantic theory. Soa fourth requirement 
can be formulated as follows: a theory of metaphor should 
explain the metaphorical use of language, and not the meta-
phorical sense of words. Of these four requirements, the last is 
in a sense the most important, for a theory of metaphor that 
ignores the point about metaphors being sentences and the 
distinction between metaphorical sense and metaphorical use is 
doomed to failure. This is shown by linguistic theories about 
metaphor, and can be illustrated by a discussion among some 
linguists about the question as to what a linguistic theory of 
metaphor should be like. 
1.2 A discussion among linguists 
The discussion about the theory of metaphor centres around 
the distinction between competence and performance, which is 
introduced by Chomsky as a corrective of the Saussurian dis-
tinction between langue and parole. F. de Saussure can be called 
the father of modem linguistics in two senses: he circumscribed 
the task of linguistics as being to define the units of language, 
their relation and their combination-rules. This view has 
influenced linguistics so much that 'someone who wishes to take 
issue with Saussure's view of the task of linguistics would not do 
so by attacking Saussure but by challenging the idea of 
linguistics itself.1 Moreover, linguistics can be seen as an 
inquiry into the concepts and distinctions that de Saussure used 
or introduced. One of the crucial distinctions he made is the one 
between langue and parole. Langue is the system of forms, the 
underlying social system, parole is the individual realization of 
that potential system in speech-acts.2 Langue is the proper subject 
of linguistic investigations. Chomsky replaces this distinction 
with another one: competence (the speaker-hearer's knowledge 
of his or her language) and performance (the actual use of 
language in concrete situations). He does so, since de Saussure 
sees language 'as merely a systematic inventory of items',3 as 'a 
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store of signs with their grammatical properties, that is a store 
of word-like elements, fixed phrases and, perhaps, certain limited 
phrase types.'4 Chomsky sets out to include the 'rule-governed 
creativity' that occurs in sentence-formation on the side oí langue. 
But he does not question the distinction as such; on the 
contrary, he calls the distinction 'fundamental' and says that if 
linguistics is to be 'a serious' discipline, the use of language 
cannot constitute the subject-matter of linguistics. 'A grammar 
of language purports to be a description of the ideal speaker-
hearer's intrinsic competence.'5 So both de Saussure and 
Chomsky insist that a linguistic theory should be a theory about 
langue or competence. 
The instructive debate about metaphor and metaphor-theory 
among linguists was opened by Bickerton in 1969.'' He begins 
his article with the argument that a new theory of metaphor is 
necessary and that such a theory should be a linguistic one. 
Other approaches have only obscured the issue and have failed 
because they were not linguistic theories. But even within the 
linguistic approach, within generative grammar, those notions 
that seem to be helpful in constructing a theory of metaphor 
are, in fact, of no use. He has in mind notions like the violation 
of specific rules. The reason why these notions are of no use is 
that generative grammar is not able to distinguish between 
metaphor and non-metaphor: all metaphors can be viewed as 
rule-violations, but not all rule-violations are metaphors.7 
Bickerton quotes the following examples to support this claim: 
'hearts that spaniel'd me at heels' and 'scientists truth the 
universe' (both instances of major category rule violations), 
'misery loves company' and 'ability gripped the town' (sub-
category rule violations), 'the flinty and steel couch of war' and 
'short hats' (projection rule violation). The first sentences of 
these couples are metaphors, while the second sentences are 
meaningless.8 
Bickerton uses in his own proposal the notion of 'specific 
attribution assignment', and this notion provides the criterion 
for distinguishing between metaphors and deviance or nonsense. 
Taking the words 'iron' and 'steel' and using examples like 'iron 
determination' - 'steel determination', 'iron will' - 'steel will', 
'iron discipline' - 'steel discipline', he remarks that in English 
the attribute 'hardness' is attached to 'iron' and not to 'steel'. 
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Lexemes like 'iron' Bickerton calls 'marked signs' and words 
like 'steel' 'unmarked signs'. The fact that certain attributes are 
attached to certain signs makes it 'possible for those signs to 
combine with, or stand in the place of, other signs held to share 
the same attributes'.9 This is the reason why the 'iron'-
combinations make sense and the 'steel'-combinations do not. 
To distinguish between metaphors and nonsense is now possible: 
one has to look for the marked signs. In the final stage of his 
argument Bickerton turns to what he calls 'true' metaphors 
('original and near-unique creations') and maintains that 'these 
. . . may be best regarded as merely an extension of the system 
of attribute assignment.. ."0 
Matthews' contribution to the discussion consists partly in 
a criticism of Bickerton and partly in his own proposal. 
According to Matthews, a theory of metaphor should fulfil two 
minimal requirements. The first one is: 'the theory of metaphor 
would have to be such that it establishes necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the distinguishing of metaphor from 
non-metaphor'. The second requirement is: 'the theory of 
metaphor would have to be such that it accounts for how, in 
terms of linguistic competence, the speaker understands or 
interprets metaphors'." Bickerton fails to meet these two 
requirements, and since Bickerton hardly comments on the 
speaker's competence, most of Matthews' criticism centres 
around the first requirement. He argues that the notion of 
marked signs begs the question: '. . . the question as to 
whether or not a particular sign is in fact "marked" will 
presupposed our being able to determine that it is potentially 
metaphorical, and not simly deviant, even before we have 
ascertained its "marking"."2 Moreover, it does not give the 
necessary condition mentioned in the first requirement. Almost 
all of Bickerton's examples which he indicates as unmarked 
signs, deviant and meaningless, can be taken as metaphors 
given an appropriate (linguistic or extra-linguistic) context. 
Matthews refers then to 'green ears' but as Bickerton remarks 
'the main colour-terms are usually marked',13 i.e., usually have 
a metaphorical sense. There are other examples in Bickerton's 
text that show the point Matthews wants to make in a clearer 
way; e.g., 'she stabbed my self-respect', 'quit donkey ing with 
my car . . .', 'the house faced the car', 'the sea faced the house'. 
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Matthews also has doubts as to whether Bickerton's theory 
meets the sufficiency condition, since it fails to deal with 'true' 
metaphors, those metaphors 'which do (and could) not 
involve a "marking" simply because they have not been 
previously constructed'.14 
Matthews summarizes his criticism as follows: '. . . 
Bickerton's fundamental error in his notion of "marked signs" 
was the presumption that the performance distinction between 
metaphor and non-metaphor was equivalent to the competence 
distinction between potential metaphor and simple deviance, 
rather than between deviant and non-deviant sentences'.15 
Since a linguistic theory should deal with phenomena on the 
competence level (Matthews' second requirement), a theory of 
metaphor should explain 'deviance'. Matthews argues that the 
violation of selectional restrictions16 causes the deviance. 
These restrictions are specified in terms of lexical features and 
these 'characterise the common use of the lexical entry'.17 This 
notion of selectional restriction violation fulfils the first 
requirement. With regard to the second requirement, 
Matthews claims that metaphors are understood in the same 
way that normal sentences are understood, with the difference 
that the features connected with the violation are not 
important. In 'man is a wolf, for example, the features 
' human ' and 'non-human' are less important than the features 
'vicious', 'predatory', and 'nocturnal' which are not involved 
in the violation. 
So Bickerton's explanation is, according to Matthews, 
inadequate because he confuses the competence and the 
performance level. Since a linguistic theory should only deal 
with the competence level, Bickerton does not in fact provide a 
linguistic theory of metaphor. But Matthews' own proposal 
involves those notions which Bickerton rejects as central 
notions of a theory of metaphor. When Bickerton finishes his 
short discussion of a Chomsky-inspired approach — and 
Matthews' theory falls into this category — his conclusion is 
that ' there is no level of rule violation at which metaphor and 
non-metaphor cannot coexist, and no means within the theory 
for distinguishing between them at any level'.18 This may at 
first sight not cover Matthews' proposal, but if 'metaphor' and 
'non-metaphor' are replaced by 'deviant (= metaphor)' and 
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'deviant (= non-metaphor)', it becomes apparent that this 
criticism is also directed against Matthews' proposal. So, 
Matthews criticizes Bickerton and Bickerton in fact criticizes 
Matthews. This is a puzzling but at the same time a revealing 
situation. Matthews' criticism, that Bickerton confuses per­
formance and competence, implies that he thinks that Bickerton 
gives a competence theory, i.e., a synchronic analysis, of 
metaphors — but is this the case? Matthews, who fits into the 
category of the generative grammarians criticized by Bickerton, 
sets out to give a competence theory of metaphors - but does 
he provide an explanation of metaphors? The answer in both 
cases is 'no', for Bickerton provides a diachronic analysis, and 
Matthews only an explanation of deviant sentences. 
That Bickerton really is talking about how metaphorical 
meaning originates is made obvious by the following indica­
tions. He begins his article by quoting Bolinger's remark that 
'a semantic theory must account for the process of metaphorical 
invention . . Λ14 This remark can be found in a section of 
Bolinger's paper which bears the subheading 'the problem of 
metaphor', and in that section Bolinger makes remarks like 'A 
complete semantic theory must not only map the markers of 
all senses but show how markers are added and subtracted to 
alter the sense of words', '. . . one corroboration of a marker 
theory would be its ability to predict semantic shifts . . .', and 
'. . . the radical shifts effected by metaphor . . Λ20 All these 
quotations show that Bolinger is concerned with the process of 
meaning-change. Bickerton shares this concern. This is the 
reason why he criticizes the generative grammarians for being 
too much fascinated by logic and too much inclined to think in 
rigid semantic categories: due to this, they do not ask the 
relevant question about the transfer of signs from one category 
to another.21 Consequently, he explains how words acquire 
metaphorical meaning, and his examples are, not surprisingly, 
examples of metaphorical sense. It is quite understandable 
why he is not able to cope with 'true' metaphors, and why the 
examples which he qualifies as meaningless and which 
Matthews correctly sees as examples of metaphor, have an 
asterisk attached to them: they are not examples of meta­
phorical sense.22 
Matthews, on the other hand, gives a synchronic analysis, 
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but he is not able to explain metaphors - that is to say, he is 
able to give a formal analysis of metaphors, but nothing more. 
He can give the necessary conditions, but not the sufficient 
conditions: he cannot explain the metaphor-mechanism. All 
he can say is that metaphors are deviant sentences, and that is 
clearly not enough, for, as Bickerton correctly remarks, not all 
deviant sentences are metaphors. Bickerton saw the problem 
of a synchronic approach to metaphors and correctly concluded 
that this approach would not do. But in his own proposal he 
gives a diachronic explanation, and that is even worse, for not 
only does it explain metaphors in terms of meaning-change, it 
also shifts the focus from sentence to words. These two aspects 
are of course connected: one can only talk about words acquiring 
metaphorical sense. The only way to escape this dilemma is to 
maintain that the explanation has to be found on the level of 
sentences and to reject the self-imposed limitation to the 
competence-aspect: that is to say, metaphors have to be 
treated in terms of speech-acts. This means, given the definition 
of linguistics as exclusively dealing with competence, that 
linguistics cannot deal adequately with metaphors. 
The problematic insistence on competence in metaphor 
theory is taken up by Price and Loewenberg in their criticism 
of Matthews, and their comments elucidate further the 
conclusion reached about the linguistic approach to 
metaphors. Price argues that Matthews fails to keep the 
distinction between competence and performance himself, 
since he uses the performance-concept of 'intention'; he 
argues further that Matthews, within his competence theory, 
is able to distinguish between non-deviance and deviance, but 
not between metaphor-deviance and nonsense-deviance. Price 
is correct: Matthews adds in his conclusion 'excepting of 
course those cases where utterances are not intended to be 
meaningful'.23 Having made these points, Price asks the 
fundamental question 'whether Matthews' failure to construct 
a linguistic theory of metaphor is an isolated case or whether 
there is some consideration which, in principle, would preclude 
an understanding of metaphor on the language competence 
model alone'.24 Price thinks that it is not an isolated case, and 
suggests that a further exploration of the role of creativity in 
language might be helpful. Chomsky makes a distinction 
76 The Concept of Church 
between the creativity that leaves the rules unchanged and 
that manifests itself in the production and understanding of 
new sentences, and the creativity that changes the rules. Do 
metaphors change the language rules, or do they fall under the 
first type of creativity, with the consequence that it should be 
possible to explain them on the competence model? Price thinks 
that metaphors belong to the rule-changing creativity and 
recommends the development of linguistics of that kind of 
creativity as an important step towards an adequate theory of 
metaphor. But Price here makes the same mistake as 
Bickerton: he thinks that the explanation of metaphor is an 
explanation of a change of meaning. To think that a linguistics 
of rule-changing creativity can help the construction of an 
adequate theory of metaphor is to think that a change of 
meaning occurs in the words used in a metaphor. But there is 
a further problem here, for by introducing 'change of rule' 
Price does not introduce a synchronic concept. So, although 
his attempt might at first sight seem an impfovement on 
Bickerton's word-centred approach, the focus on change of 
rule makes it impossible for him to explain metaphorical use. 
Loewenberg's comments on Matthews' article are part of a 
more general criticism. Her article is concerned with the 
identification of metaphors and she argues that formal 
linguistics are not able to make this identification. The reason 
for this is the important influence of two distinctions that 
shape the linguistic theory. The first is the distinction between 
linguistic knowledge and extra-linguistic knowledge, and the 
second is the distinction between knowledge of language 
(competence) and the use of language (performance). A 
linguistic theory must deal with the knowledge of language 
understood as linguistic knowledge. Both distinctions can be 
made, but not in the way that formal linguistics make and use 
them, namely, as separated, isolated parts for which a theory 
can be devised. With regard to the performance-competence 
distinction, she remarks that they are interdependent, not only 
on the level of discovery ('. . . regular patterns in my speech do 
reflect my competence, and regular patterns discernible in the 
speech of speakers of a language determine what counts as 
competence in that language'), but also on the level of theory-
formation ('performance data suggest the form and the 
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content of a theory of competence; the predictions of the 
competence theory . . . test the theory's adequacy').23 She 
agrees, in fact, with Price that a competence theory of 
metaphor is impossible, but while Price adheres to the distinc-
tion between competence and performance, she questions it. 
But how radical her position is becomes clear when she also 
questions the other distinction between linguistic and extra-
linguistic knowledge. Loewenberg argues correctly that 
without taking into account extra-linguistic knowledge 
metaphors cannot be distinguished or identified as such. 'I 
was a morsel for a monarch' implies the claim that 'humans 
are (in most places at the present time) not used as food', a 
claim which cannot be classified as linguistic knowledge. But 
this claim is 'crucial' to the conflict between the meaning of 
words.26 She does not just question the competence-approach, 
she questions the whole linguistic programme.27 This change 
in perspective from 'words' or 'sentences' to 'utterances' - to 
use Loewenberg's terminology28 - is a change from a purely 
linguistic interest to an interest in how language is used to 
make speech-acts (statements and questions about states of 
affairs, promises, etc.), how this process is related to the 
speaker and the hearer, and how the context contributes to 
communication. 
The result of this discussion is not only that the importance 
of considering metaphors as sentences is shown, but also that 
some of the implications of this starting-point have become 
clear. It is not enough to start with 'a metaphor is a sentence', 
for if a sentence is understood as an extra-long word, nothing 
is changed. Only if the function of sentences, their role in 
communication, is considered can the two mistakes or 
deficiencies of the linguistic approach — i.e., explaining 
metaphors in terms of change of meaning, or describing them 
as deviant sentences — be avoided. A further result is a clari-
fication about the usefulness of certain notions for a theory of 
metaphor. Two notions should not be used: the first is 'change 
of meaning', for it directs the attention to a diachronic 
explanation; and the second is the notion central to Matthews' 
theory, 'violation of rules'. Even apart from the question 
whether it should be used in a theory of metaphor, this is a 
strange notion, for, on its own, it can only explain nonsense 
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and not meaningful language. Since it requires an additional 
notion, like 'change of rule' or 'change of meaning', and since 
these further notions are not adequate, 'violation of rule' 
should be dropped as well. 
The conclusion of this exploration of the requirements of a 
theory of metaphor can be summarized as follows: a theory of 
metaphor must be able to explain, in terms of a general theory 
of language, how meaning is produced and understood when 
language is used metaphorically, and what function such use 
fulfils. This requires that metaphors are understood as 
sentences functioning in a communication process. The 
discussion among linguists shows that another approach ends 
up either explaining the change of meaning of a word over a 
certain period of time, or 'explaining' nonsense as well, 
without being able to distinguish between metaphor and 
nonsense. 
2. A theory of metaphor 
2.1. The general outline 
A basic presupposition in the study of language and in the 
theories about the communicative function of language is the 
thesis that all language is rule-governed behaviour. In a 
sentence like 'the beautiful house on the corner was destroyed 
by fire' one can distinguish several aspects, if one considers it 
as a speech-act: ' 
(a) The utterance aspect: the noise that is produced during 
the uttering or the signs that are written down, and the 
uttering of vocables or writing down of combinations of 
signs, as belonging to a certain vocabulary, according to a 
certain grammar.2 
(b) the content aspect: this aspect is concerned with reference 
and predication. To use the example above: reference is 
made to a house, which is further specified by 'on the 
corner' and 'beautiful'; this house is said to be 'destroyed 
by fire'. Searle calls this the propositional act.3 
(c) the frame aspect: the content aspect is always presented in 
a certain frame. In the case of the example the frame is 
that of an assertion. But the content could easily be 
presented in a question frame, a promise frame, a 
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command frame, etc. This aspect is normally called the 
illocutionary aspect, or the illocutionary force.4 
(d) the eifect aspect: this aspect refers to the effect of the 
speech-act and is commonly called the perlocutionary 
force. In the case of the example this might be pity. 
To all these aspects rules and criteria correspond, and the 
precise rules differ from level to level. To the first aspect 
correspond rules about pronunciation and spelling, and rules 
about the construction of grammatical expressions and 
sentences. The rules concerning the second aspect deal with 
how to refer and to predicate; the rules of the third aspect state 
what counts as an assertion, question, promise, etc.; and the 
conventions and rules of the final aspect make effects possible 
or prevent them — a promise becomes a marriage-vow because 
of certain conventions. 
Meaning and understanding and communication depend 
on the correct employment of these rules. And although not all 
the rules seem equally important for these purposes - a 
pronunciation error or spelling mistake may not prevent under-
standing, or may have less consequences than a promise made 
under insufficient circumstances — the general link between 
meaning, understanding, and communication on the one hand 
and rules and conventions on the other is of great importance. 
If one wants to give a theory of metaphor which explains the 
meaning-mechanism and how it is possible that people can 
understand these types of sentences, it seems obvious that one 
has to look at the rules used in language and see whether 
something special happens to them when language is used 
metaphorically. It is clear that not all the rules are important 
in this respect. Sentences are neither metaphors because they 
are spelled or pronounced in a certain way nor are they 
metaphors because their grammar differs from that of ordinary 
sentences. A metaphor is not distinguished by form. And since 
metaphors can occur in all kinds of illocutionary frames - they 
can be questions, promises, etc.—it seems that the illocutionary 
rules are not affected by the metaphorical use of language. 
But Warner argues that living metaphors should be treated 
as a distinct class of utterances and that their metaphorical 
force should be considered a special type of illocutionary force, 
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namely 'hortatory' or 'suggestive': '. . . the force of the 
utterance is to encourage one to try to see something as 
something else, and the point of doing so may well be illumi-
nationV It is difficult to maintain this position, however, since 
there are several problems attached to it. First, if all metaphors 
have a suggestive force, does that imply that all sentences with 
a suggestive force are metaphors? 'Think of ρ as q and you will 
notice aspects of ρ brought together which you had not noticed 
before'6 is of course not an advice that only 'the coiner of a 
powerful and fertile metaphor' is giving.7 So, one needs at least 
an additional criterion. < 
Secondly, if metaphors become a special class of utterance 
with a distinct metaphorical force, they should be contrasted 
with other illocutionary forces and they should belong to the 
same level - one cannot make an assertion and a question at 
the same time. Warner suggests the contrast when he writes 
that 'the key here is to cease treating such metaphors as 
assertions with unusual properties'.8 But that means that one 
cannot consider a question in which a metaphor occurs as a 
question. But what to do then with 'In what furnace was thy 
brain?'? with 'I promise to be aware of the damp souls of the 
housemaids'? or with 'I warn you that the yellow fog that rubs 
it back upon the window-panes may attack you!'?9 The 
conclusion must be that 'hortatory' or 'suggestive' is not of the 
same type and does not belong to the same category as 
assertion, question, promise, etc. 
The third problem arises when is assumed that hortatory 
belongs to the same category as assertion. In Searle's scheme 
there are several different rules that play a part on the level of 
illocutions, and of all the illocutions mentioned - request, 
assertion, question, thanks, advice, warning, congratulation, 
greeting — only greeting does not have a specification of rules 
concerning its propositional content. In the case of a request 
this specification is related to the future act of the hearer, in 
the case of a warning to a future event or state of affairs, etc. 
Would 'suggestion' have such a propositional content rule? It 
seems very likely.10 But what kind of specification is needed? 
Would the proposition be limited to future events, to past acts, 
or would any proposition do? An affirmative answer to the last 
question would be inconsistent with Warner's position, since it 
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would mean that 'suggestions' would then have the same rules 
as assertions (and questions). Moreover, it would beg the 
question: why should they be suggestive? So a special kind of 
proposi donai act is required. Which one? To pursue this line, 
or even the idea that every proposition will do, is in fact to 
cease to explain metaphors on the illocutionary level: the 
discussion has moved to the locutionary level. 
Warner, though, suggests something else as well: 'and the 
point of doing so may well be illumination'. Could metaphors 
perhaps be explained sufïiciently in terms of effect, that is, 
with regard to rules concerning the perlocutionary aspect? No. 
'Illumination' or a similar concept would be too broad, since a 
lot of other sentences would be covered as well, and, moreover, 
this explanation does not answer the question about the 
production of meaning and understanding. For such an 
answer, an appeal to an extra-linguistic convention is not very 
helpful; and that means that only the propositional content is 
left. 
So, the whole discussion of Warner's suggestions points to 
the content aspect and the rules concerned with that aspect as 
the place to look for an explanation of the special character of 
metaphors. The metaphor is basically a predication. And 
'basically' is added to accommodate those expressions which 
do not have the explicit structure of 'x is y', but that can be 
reconstructed in this way." But what is the special character of 
metaphorical predication? Earlier it was remarked that the 
strangeness of the metaphor, the reason why it is conspicuous, 
lies in the fact that the words in it retain their normal, usual 
meaning. This striking aspect can only be produced if the 
combination of the words is not just unexpected, but also 
extraordinary. The strangeness of the examples quoted at the 
beginning is thus based upon the extraordinary combinations 
of words, concepts like 'life' and 'tale', 'clouds' and 'carry 
away', 'fog' and 'back', etc. 
At this stage a distinction is needed between concepts and 
sets of concepts or conceptual realms, between, e.g., 'blue' and 
'red' or 'pain' and 'love' on the one hand and 'colour' or 
'feeling' on the other.12 This distinction makes explicit what is 
normally implicit in a predication, but is not meant to suggest 
that a predication is normally a two-step process. The purpose 
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of introducing the distinction is to explain the difference 
between falsity and metaphor and to explain, partially at least, 
the intelligibility of the metaphor despite its extraordinary 
combination. The combination that causes the strangeness 
occurs on the level of sets of concepts, involves conceptual 
realms, and does not occur on the level of concepts. If an 
extraordinary combination is made on the level of concepts, 
i.e., within a normal combination of realms, the result is a 
mistake or a falsity. If, though, in an extraordinary combination 
the concepts that are used clash on the level of concepts the 
metaphor can be incoherent. An example can illustrate these 
points using the earlier quoted 'when the October wind with 
frosty fingers punishes my hair'. If 'frosty fingers' is replaced 
by 'balmy arms' and 'punishes' by 'caresses', it is still a 
metaphor, although a rather different one from the original. If 
'October wind' is replaced by the name of a person, 'frosty' by 
'long' and 'punishes' by 'touches' the result is a normal 
sentence, and if the person in question has long fingers and 
touches my hair the sentence is true. If October wind' were 
replaced by 'July wind', the clash between 'July' and 'frosty' 
would render the metaphor incoherent and unintelligible. A 
variation on this general pattern is formed by those 
metaphorical predications in which one of the concepts 
involved is so highly determined that it can be considered 
almost as a realm of its own and that the extraordinariness 
typical for the metaphor arises from its being used outside its 
customary combination. Examples are the names of historical 
personages or names of figures from fiction. In these cases 
cultural influences will be even stronger than in the other 
cases. 
If the specific character of metaphors has to be explained on 
the level of realms or sets of concepts and in terms of rules 
concerning those realms or sets, the question arises as to how 
exactly this explanation should be phrased. 'To follow' those 
rules would not give an explanation of the apparent difference 
between normally and metaphorically used language, but 
neither would 'to break' or 'to violate' those rules do as an 
explanation. As mentioned earlier, if meaning is connected 
with obedience to rules, violation of rules must result in 
nonsense or in meaningless language whether the rules 
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concerned are those governing concepts or sets of concepts. 
The solution to take the violation as a first step to which a 
second step — the change of rules — is added, is also inadequate, 
since a change of rules implies a change of meaning. To put 
this point in a somewhat different way: the notion 'change of 
rule' (and, for that matter, 'addition to rules' or 'extension of 
rules') is not helpful, since it presupposes a frequency of use 
which does not refer to a repetition of the same sentence, but 
to a similar use in other sentences by a community of speakers. 
'Change', 'addition', and 'extension' can only be used if there 
is a dilîerent pattern that shows some consistency. So 'change', 
'addition', and 'extension' seem to be too strong, too drastic, 
and too permanent. 'Relaxing the rules' seems to be the notion 
that captures best the metaphorical use of language: the rules 
remain active and influential, and they are being used, but 
they are being used in a somewhat different way than they are 
used normally. But this 'relaxing the rules' is not enough, since, 
as it stands, the distinction between 'relaxing' and 'changing' 
is not clear. 'Relaxing' needs a further qualification: the rules 
are relaxed for the time being, or, for this particular occasion. 
This qualification is not so strange if one realizes that a 
metaphor is a sentence and that the meaning of a sentence can 
be called 'occasional'.13 
The basic answer to the question about the mechanism of 
the metaphor can now be put as follows: in using and under-
standing language metaphorically, the rules governing the use 
of the sets of concepts or the conceptual realms involved are 
relaxed for this particular occasion, and on that level a 
combination is allowed which under normal circumstances 
would not be permitted. 
With this outline in mind, the second main question can be 
approached — the question about the function of metaphor. 
Why do people want to make an extraordinary combination 
between conceptual realms? The way we normally combine 
sets of concepts reflects how we see reality, and a change on 
that level results in a change in our view about what reality 
looks like. For example, if we should decide to talk about 
colourless phenomena in terms of colour, about inanimate 
things in terms of feelings, our organization of reality would be 
quite different from our present one, with all kinds of con-
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sequences — what would happen to road-construction and 
mining if land and rock had feelings? But if we decided to use 
Orange' instead of 'blue', or 'disappointment' instead of 
'pleasure', our outlook on reality would not change that much, 
and we would continue to live the way we live now. To allow 
for an extraordinary combination of sets of concepts, of 
conceptual realms, is therefore to allow for another organization 
of reality — for a 'redescription of reality', to use Ricoeur's 
phrase. But since a metaphor does not involve a change of 
rules, it cannot be said that a metaphor constitutes a 
redescription of reality tout court: it is, more precisely, a 
proposal or suggestion of such a redescription.'4 
In the most general, though heavy, terms, this seems to be 
the function of metaphor. There can be all kinds of reasons for 
such a proposal and the various answers that have been given 
in the course of history can be repeated here. On the one hand, 
language can be used metaphorically to talk about known 
situations and states of affairs with the purpose of creating 
insight, or to propose an alternative to the dissatisfying flat 
descriptions of reality, or to avoid a particular terminology. 
On the other hand, language can be used metaphorically to 
talk about new phenomena and situations: the reason can be 
that the available conceptual structure is not adequate to 
place the new phenomena, or that the unknown can only be 
known and explored via the known, i.e., in relation to the 
accepted situation, or because the situation is not clearly 
surveyable and needs organization, internally or externally. 
Depending on the further specification of these reasons, the 
description of the function of metaphors as suggesting or 
proposing a redescription of reality can and should be 
qualified, for this rather ponderous terminology may seem to 
correspond to the purpose of religion and poetry but to sound 
overstated in the case of everyday language metaphors. 
The outline of the required theory of metaphor can now be 
summarized: in a metaphor the rules governing the sets of 
concepts or conceptual realms involved are relaxed for this 
occasion in function of a proposed redescription of reality. 
2.2 The background 
The outline of the theory is stated in terms of relaxing rules. 
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'Rules ' and its related notions like 'following rules', 'changing 
rules', 'relaxing rules' have to be explored further. How are 
rules in language to be understood? Is language thoroughly 
rule-governed? What is involved in following a rule? How 
easily are rules changed? The answers to these and similar 
questions will help to provide the background for the theory. 
When the notion 'rule' is used, it has normally two aspects: 
a descriptive aspect which states the regularity in behaviour, 
and a regulative aspect which makes it a criterion for correct-
ness. These two aspects are not always present at the same 
time. Sometimes 'rule' is used only to describe a regularity, 
e.g., the daily routine, but in the majority of cases the two 
aspects can be discerned, as in the case of language rules: 
dictionaries and books on grammar and syntax describe the 
usage of a particular period and at the same time state the 
criterion for correct use. In view of this, two extreme accounts 
of language-rules have to be rejected. First, the account that 
construes rules and rule-following too liberally, and does not 
give enough emphasis to the prescriptive aspect. If this aspect 
is underestimated, mistakes are no longer possible, for there is 
no criterion for correctness. The consequence of a too liberal 
construction is that the process of communication and under-
standing becomes inexplicable and impossible. Only by 
sharing and obeying common rules can communication and 
understanding take place. Another consequence is that there is 
no longer a différence between metaphorically used and non-
metaphorically used language. But the opposite account that 
emphasizes the prescriptive aspect too much runs into other 
problems. It is quite a normal feature of language that words 
change their meaning, that constructions and phrases become 
old-fashioned, that new concepts and notions are introduced. 
If rules are seen as laying down in advance all applications, if 
rule-following is seen as following a fixed pattern, these 
changes cannot be explained - certainly not if one realizes that 
these changes are often slow processes involving a substantial 
part of the language-speaking community. On too strict an 
account metaphors become nonsense. How can we avoid these 
two extremes? What is the basis of the prescriptive aspect? 
Reality? Are some rules more prescriptive than others? Can all 
rules be changed? A discussion of the conventional character 
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of language, of the relation between language and reality, can 
provide an answer to these questions.' 
To call language 'conventional' is to oppose a certain view 
on the relation between language and reality, namely that 
there is a domain of facts - an objective world 'out there' -
completely separated from the domain of concepts and 
language. The relation between these domains is, in this view, 
such that the concepts are 'read off from the objective world 
and that the structure of reality necessitates the system of 
concepts. There are several problems with this view. It holds 
that there is a necessary connection between changes in one 
domain and changes in the the other. In a number of cases -
e.g., in the discovery of a new physical element, the emergence 
of a new fashion, etc. - the change in one domain corresponds 
to the change in the other, but there is not always such a 
necessary connection. Changes in psychological or sociological 
terminology or differences in philosophical theories do not 
necessarily imply a change in the domain of facts.2 A more 
important point of criticism is that it is incoherent to hold this 
view. Imagine a term / and an object χ and suppose that / 
denotes x. In order to understand this we must understand the 
meaning of t, the meaning of the expression x, and the 
denotation-relation. But the expression χ belongs also to the 
language used, and in order to understand that expression, it 
is necessary to understand or know another statement like 'the 
expression χ denotes objecty', etc. On this division between 
language and reality it becomes impossible to explain how an 
object can be named.1 Furthermore, no explanation can be 
given of the fact that different peoples and cultures have 
different concepts and structures of concepts. Anthropologists 
and comparative linguists have shown the existence of 
differences in vocabulary — e.g. in the number of colour-terms 
- have pointed to the problems surrounding the translation of 
typical terms (fair, überhaupt, ennui), and have given evidence of 
differences in grammar and syntax, e.g. the lack of tense in 
verbs.11 If one accepts this view of language mirroring reality, 
and if one does not want to allow that there are different 
realities, one has to argue that one, and only one, of these 
structures of concepts is correct. But which one? And how can 
one be sure that it is this one and not that one which is correct? 
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The main mistake of this view is that not enough attention is 
paid to the role oflanguage and of language-users in structuring 
reality. The information given by anthropologists and 
comparative linguists has led to another view in which 
language determines reality. This view advocates a relativism 
that is, in fact, based upon the same division between language 
and reality present in the first view, but with a difTerence of 
direction. In this view language is primary and language 
creates and constructs reality. One of the problems here is that 
any form of translation becomes impossible, and what is more 
important, that the identification of the differences between 
various cultures is out of the question. It rejects what it 
presupposes, and that makes this view as incoherent as the 
first one. 
This suggests that there is something wrong with the picture 
of the two completely separated domains which underlies these 
two views. Wittgenstein in his later work takes a different 
starting-point which enables him to combine the correct points 
of both views without falling into one of the two extremes. His 
starting-point is that language-use is a human activity and 
that it is one element in life, and like other elements supported 
by a form of life, and that it is determined by who and what 
people are and by the purpose for which they use it. Because of 
this starting-point he can maintain at the same time the 
arbitrariness or the conventionality of language and the non-
arbitrariness of language and of the conceptual structure and 
locate their precise place and mutual relation. 
To describe a concept — that is, to describe its relation to 
other concepts, to indicate what kind of questions are 
appropriate, what kind of experience counts as understanding 
it, etc. - is summarized in the grammar of that concept.^ The 
grammar of 'chair ' consists, among other things, in the relation 
of 'chair' to 'sofa', 'stool', 'throne', 'table', 'bed', 'carpet', 
'picture', 'music-stand', etc.; in what counts as 'to own a chair', 
' to make a chair', ' to upholster a chair'; in what constitutes 'to 
sit in a chair', 'to sit on a chair'. 'It is part of the grammar of 
the word "chair" that this is what we call "to sit on a chair" ' . ' 
In Wittgenstein's view grammar thus understood is autono-
mous, since concepts and conceptual systems are not justified 
or justifiable by facts.7 'One is tempted to justify rules of 
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grammar by sentences like "But there really are four primary 
colours". And the saying that the rules of grammar are 
arbitrary is directed against the possibility of this justification, 
which is constructed on the model of justifying a sentence by 
pointing to what verifies it'.8 This justification is impossible 
because it presupposes what it attempts tojustify. 'Grammatical 
conventions cannot be justified by describing what is presented: 
any such description already presupposes the grammatical 
rules'." There is simply no position where an observer can 
oversee and compare the domain of facts and the domain of 
language: language is necessary to describe the domain of facts, 
and with the description, with language, that conceptual 
structure is introduced. It is possible tojustify a system from the 
point of view of another system: one can talk about the different 
ways of measurement, of dividing colours, of looking at the past, 
etc. But such justification does not show that the one is correct 
because it corresponds to reality: it shows that the one is more 
fruitful, more economical, more illuminating.10 The conventional 
character of language Wittgenstein is talking about is not the 
type of conventionality that is the result of the decisions of 
certain legislative bodies (decisions on spelling or on the 
occurrence of foreign words): the argument for the autonomy of 
grammar aims at showing that the current system is not 
absolute and not the only correct one. That is the reason why 
Wittgenstein gives examples of different conceptual systems, 
narrates alternative, and fictitious natural histories: '. . . if 
anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct 
ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing 
something that we realize - then let him imagine certain very 
general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, 
and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will 
become intelligible to him'." 
This method shows the other aspect: the role of nature.12 The 
facts of nature are central in Wittgenstein's view on the non-
arbitrariness of concepts and their structure. Although nature 
does not necessitate concepts and the conceptual system, there 
is nevertheless a relation between the two: the concepts are 
related to us living in the world, to the natural history of men, to 
'very general facts', to Observations which no one has doubted 
but which have escaped remark only because they are always 
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before our eyes'.11 Examples of these very general facts are 
features of constancy in external nature and in human nature. 
'We say we know that water boils and does not freeze under 
such-and-such circumstances. Is it conceivable that we are 
wrong? Wouldn't a mistake topple all judgement with it? More: 
what could stand if that were to fall? Might someone discover 
something that made us say "I t was a mistake"? Whatever may 
happen in the future, however water may behave in the future, 
— we know that up to now it has behaved thus in innumerable 
instances. This fact is fused into the foundations of our language-
game'. '4 There is a similarity in people's reaction to certain 
situations, e.g., pain, and in their judgements: 'the common 
behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of 
which we interpret an unknown language'.10 Another factual 
feature of human nature is that we use language and that we 
think and that both are combined, creating a specific human 
form of life. 'One can imagine an animal angry, frightened, 
unhappy, happy startled. But hopeful? And why not? . . . Can 
only those hope who can talk? Only those who have mastered 
the use of a language. Tha t is to say, the phenomena of hope are 
modes of this complicated form of life. . . ."b All these features 
are based upon the way we are and behave, upon our action: 'it 
is our acting which lies at the bottom of the language-game'.17 
There are other features as well which limit the otherwise 
sheer arbitrariness of the conceptual structure. First, the 
individual user cannot whimsically change the meaning of a 
word every time he uses it: he is committed to a certain 
constancy and regularity. Furthermore, the sound or sign for a 
concept may be arbitrary, but its meaning is not in the sense 
that it is part of a whole structure. Change of meaning of a 
concept implies a change in the conceptual system. And there is 
also the non-linguistic behaviour the speaker is committed to. If 
he or she changes the meaning of'chair', he or she can not go on 
to behave with regard to chairs as if nothing has happened. 
Secondly, the social aspects of language also prevent a view of 
sheer arbitrariness. The whole structure is given in the process 
of learning and education.18 It is because of these individual and 
social commitments that language can function as a means of 
communication. 
But we can imagine those very general facts to be different. 
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We can imagine people who experience pain only if they are in 
contact with some surface or in a certain region; those surfaces 
would be called 'painful' and one could say 'it is painful here' or 
'it is painful today'.14 Or we can imagine people who fix the 
price of wood with regard to the surface covered by it, but 
without taking into account the height of the pile; if a high pile 
covering a small area were spread out over a big area, it would 
cost more and would be considered to be a lot of wood.20 Or we 
can imagine people who are educated not to express their 
feelings and in the process of education complaints were 
punished. 'Shamming' these people might say, 'what a 
ridiculous concept!' (as if one were to distinguish between a 
murder with one shot and one with three)'.21 'I want to say: an 
education quite different from ours might also be the foundation 
for quite different concepts. For here life would run on 
difTerently. — What interests us would not interest them. Here 
different concepts would no longer be unimaginable. In fact, 
this is the only way in which essentially different concepts are 
imaginable'.22 But there is something strange in these examples: 
all of them are initially intelligible, but while some of them, 
when developed, could be incorporated into our way of life 
with more or less important changes as a consequence (e.g., 
the abandonment of property), others would imply such a 
different way of life that we have to say 'These men would 
have nothing human about them. Why? - We could not 
possibly make ourselves understood to them. Not even as we 
can do to a dog. We could not find our feet with them'.23 Those 
examples in particular which imply a completely different form 
of life show two things: first, that there are alternative systems, 
and secondly, that we cannot understand these systems 
completely because they are so different from our system. 
So, the arbitrariness of language is linked with the possibilities 
of alternative systems and with the impossibility of justifying a 
system by an appeal to reality, while the non-arbitrariness is 
linked with our natural history and with the commitment of 
the speakers. 
Within this overall picture of the arbitrariness and non-
arbitrariness of language, the function and the nature of rules 
is determined. An example used by Wittgenstein can clarify 
what is meant by 'following a rule', 'breaking a rule', etc. A 
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pupil is taught to continue a series by adding '2 ' ; he writes 
down 2, 4, 6, 8, . . . 996, 998, 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012. In the 
discussion of this example Wittgenstein opposes a view which 
understands linguistic rules as rules of a calculus; his choice of 
a mathematical example is based on the argument that even in 
mathematics, let alone in language, this calculus-view docs not 
work.24 The calculus-view maintains that the consequences are 
contained in the rule and that the only thing that has to be 
done is to trace them." What is a correct use and what is not, 
is all contained, comprised, in the rule. Wittgenstein discredits 
the connection between rule and necessity by imagining a 
genuine discussion about the application of the rule. If the 
pupil continues the series in the way he does not because of 
stupidity or misunderstanding but because he thinks this is the 
way the series should be continued, the teacher cannot appeal 
to an argument like 'he did not do the same as before' or 'he 
did not do what I meant',26 for what determines 'sameness' 
except using the same term?" And how is 'what I meant' to be 
understood? As an infinite number of propositions like writing 
1868 after 1866 and 100036 after 100034?28 An appeal to reality 
is not possible and an appeal to past usage insufficient, because 
every action can be made out to accord with a rule. But that 
leads to a paradox: 'no course of action could be determined 
by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to 
accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be 
made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out 
to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor 
conflict here'.29 And that would mean: no understanding, no 
communication. 
This does not mean that the concept of rule has to be 
abandoned: it only means that following a rule cannot be 
understood as being compelled by some objective pattern. If 
there is a necessity or compulsion, it is a psychological one: it 
is not the rule which compels us, but we compel ourselves to 
use the term in a certain way. Rules have a function: they are 
criteria and they give guidance. That everything can be 
interpreted as following a rule does not imply that everything 
whatsoever counts as following a rule: '. . . there is a way of 
grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is 
exhibited in what we call "obeying a rule" and "going against 
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i t" in actual cases'.10 That is to say, one cannot go on adding 
interpretation to interpretation: there are no rules for applying 
rules." In the end one has to refer to common practice." The 
infinite number of causes, of possible interpretations, should 
not be confused with the reasons, the finite chain of actual 
reasons." The chain of reasons has an end.34 'But the end is 
not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of 
act ing ' .u This is all related to being brought up in a certain 
tradition, and being taught the agreements of the community; 
because of this training it becomes natural to us to use a term 
in a certain way. 'If we teach a human being such-and-such a 
technique by means of examples — that he then proceeds like 
this and not like that in a particular new case, or that in this 
case he gets stuck, and that this and not that is the "natural" 
continuation for him: this of itself is an extremely important 
fact of nature'."' To apply a rule correctly is to apply it like the 
other members of the community, is to conform to an agreed 
and shared practice, and is not to follow a pre-fixed pattern. 
Against this background, the remarks about rules and 
metaphors can be understood. Because there is a prescriptive 
side to rules and because not everything counts as following a 
rule, metaphorically-used language is different from non-
metaphorically-used language; because rules are not fixed, 
divergence is possible without the creation of nonsense as a 
necessary consequence. Furthermore, this view of language 
can clarify three features in the use of metaphors. First, certain 
metaphors change rather easily into metaphorical meaning, 
while other remain metaphors. The time of origin, or the 
frequency of use is not decisive here, as the Shakespearian 
metaphors quoted in the beginning of this chapter show. It 
seems that the place the concepts involved occupy in the whole 
structure and their relation to our natural history play a 
decisive role: the more consequences that would follow from 
the acceptance of a change of a rule, the more resistance there 
is in the process from metaphor to metaphorical meaning.37 
Secondly, because of the interwovenness of language and life, 
the way people live and behave plays a role in what counts and 
what does not count as a metaphor. In other words, metaphors 
are culturally determined, and as such parasitical. Thirdly, 
the function of the metaphor as proposing a redescription of 
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reality appears to be a possible and coherent aim. And given 
the structure of metaphors, their usefulness for this purpose is 
clear. Wittgenstein makes a remark about what to do when 
one meets somebody with a different picture of reality. 'I can 
imagine a man who had grown up in quite special circumstances 
and been taught that the earth came into being 50 years ago, 
and therefore believed this. We might instruct him: the earth 
has long . . . etc. - We would be trying to give him our picture 
of the world. This would happen through a kind of persuasion1."' 
Metaphors have always been important tools for persuasion. 
This very fact has been the ground for both praise and 
condemnation/9 
3. Theories of metaphor 
In this section several theories of metaphor will be discussed 
under three headings: the word approach, the sentence approach 
and the category-mistake approach. This discussion has a 
double aim which also functions as the selection criterion: first, 
to contribute to the argumentation of the theory proposed in 
the previous section, be it in a somewhat negative way, since 
the examination will bring out the inadequacies and incoherent 
features of these theories; and secondly, to facilitate the discus-
sion in the next chapter, for these theories are used by 
theologians and philosophers of religion in their discussions of 
metaphors and models.' 
3.1 The word approach 
There is a long tradition, starting with Aristotle, of defining 
the metaphor as a word.' Aristotle describes the metaphor as 
follows: 'Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that 
belongs to something else; the transference being either from 
genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to 
species, or on grounds of analogy'.2 Aristotle uses this defini-
tion from the Poetics in his Rhetoric also. In this definition at 
least three features can be distinguished: the metaphor is 
described as something that happens to a word (onoma), what 
happens to that word is specified in terms of movement 
(epiphora), and the word concerned is further qualified as 
'strange' (allotrios). 
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T h a t the metaphor is defined as a word is not surprising, 
since the definition and the discussion that follows it are part 
of a broad analysis and discussion of lexis (style), which covers 
the whole process of combining words into an intelligible 
sequence.3 Aristotle divides lexis into several elements: the 
letter or element (stoicheion), syllable (syllabe), conjunction or 
connection (sundesmos), article or joint (arthron)* noun (onoma), 
verb (rhema), case or inflection (ptoosis), and speech or 
discourse (logos). Onoma is the key-term in this list. The four 
elements mentioned before onoma are all non-significant 
elements and are described in such a way that they are 
directed towards the first significant element: word, noun.5 
And in the description of verb, case and speech, Aristotle uses 
the олотеа-definition as the basis and adds to it or modifies it. 
T h e whole treatment of lexis centres around the word, and the 
sentence does not occupy a privileged place.6 
T h e more immediate context of the metaphor definition is 
formed by a list in which Aristotle brings together the different 
ways in which words can be qualified: ordinary, foreign, 
metaphor, ornament, coined, lengthened, curtailed, and altered. 
T h e first term of this list, Ordinary' (kunon) refers to 'our' 
current usage, while the second one, 'foreign' (glootta) refers to 
the current usage in other countries or in other times.7 This 
means that metaphor is contrasted with current usage, which 
is brought out by the reference to allotrios in the definition." In 
the passages that follow, allotrios is connected with 'deviant'.9 
Ricoeur points out that apart from this negative aspect -
deviant — allotrios implies also the positive notion of borrowing: 
it is always possible to mention the domain oforigin.10 There is 
a third element which Aristotle on most occasions connects 
with allotrios and which is implied in the contrast with kurion, 
namely, that of substitution: the metaphor can be replaced by 
an ordinary word except in those cases where there is no such 
word available." 
T h e later tradition takes over this focus on the word as the 
central unit of meaning and develops Aristotle's view on 
metaphors in a certain, narrower way.12 The theories of 
argumentation and composition no longer belong to the field 
of rhetoric, as they did in Aristotle's conception: rhetoric is 
limited to the theory of style and becomes an elaborate 
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meaning, and the second with the theory of metaphor proper. 
These stages are connected, for one cannot criticize the 
rhetorical theory of metaphor fundamentally without calling 
into question the word-centred theory of meaning. In this 
theory, the meaning of a word is not distinguished from the 
meaning of a sentence: a sentence is an extra-long word. In 
modern theories of meaning, though, the difference between 
word and sentence, between word-meaning and sentence-
meaning, is fundamental. One cannot communicate or under-
stand, one cannot perform speech-acts like stating, 
questioning, promising on the level of a word but only on the 
level of a sentence. Or, as Ryle puts it: 'Sentences are things 
we say. Words and phrases are what we say things with', and, 
'Sentences and clauses make sense or no sense, where words 
neither do nor do not make sense but only have meanings'.'" A 
theory of meaning that attempts to explain how people com-
municate and understand language has to take the sentence as 
the central unit of meaning. 
Fregc's remark 'we ought always to keep before our eyes a 
complete proposition. Only in a proposition do the words 
really have meaning 'Ä became so influential because he was 
able to explain this truism.21 Dummett expresses this 
explanation in the slogan: 'in the order of explanation the 
sense of a sentence is primary, but in the order ofrecognition the 
sense of the word is primary'." The word is primary since we 
'derive our knowledge of the sense of any given sentence from 
our previous knowledge of the senses of the words that compose 
it, together with our observation of the way in which they are 
combined in that sentence' .a But the sentence is primary if we 
want to explain 'what it is for sentences and words to have a 
sense, that is, what it is for us to grasp their sense'.24 The sense 
of a word consists in the contribution it makes to the deter-
mination of the sense of the sentence. But that means that the 
sense of the sentence must be explained without reference to 
the words used, otherwise the explanation would be circular.25 
The fact that in the order of explanation - the order to which 
questions about the structure of the metaphor belong - the 
sentence is primary docs not imply that word meaning is not 
important or a totally wrong concept. But the thesis that 'only 
in the context of the sentence do words have meaning' states 
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classification of tropes. Ricoeur lists a series of postulates 
which exhibits the model of the tropology and which shows 
how the primacy of the word and the view that a metaphor is 
only an ornament are connected.'1 Certain words belong 
properly to certain things, and in the case of style-figures (e.g., 
metaphors) the words are used improperly. The reason for 
using an improper word is the lack of a proper word and this 
can be either a stylistic gap or a real gap. This gap is filled by 
borrowing a strange word, which constitutes a deviance. The 
borrowed term can be replaced by a word with a proper sense. 
There is a relation between the improper term and the absent 
term, and in the case of metaphor this relation is one of 
resemblance. Understanding a trope is finding, guided by the 
appropriate type of relation, the absent word, and this 
restitution is in fact an exhaustive paraphrase. This means 
that the metaphor conveys no special information and has 
only an ornamental function. 
According to Ricoeur the contemporary 'Nouvelle Rhétorique' 
stays within this word-centred framework in its discussion of 
metaphors. '4 And within linguistics Ullmann's work is an 
example of a theory that takes the word as the central unit of 
meaning, which has consequences for his theory of metaphor.'"' 
Ullmann distinguishes between the name (phonetic shape) of 
a word and the sense ofthat word, i.e., 'the information which 
the name conveys to the hearer'.'6 He makes further the 
familiar distinction between descriptive (synchronic) analysis 
and historical (diachronic) analysis. Descriptive analysis is 
concerned among other things with the relations between the 
sense and the name of a word, and polysemy - the phenomenon 
that one name has several different senses — is an important 
type of such a relation. Related to polysemy is the semantic 
change with which historical analysis deals. Metaphor is 
discussed in this context: it is a change of meaning. So, the 
study of metaphor is limited to diachronic analysis and all that 
can be said about metaphor on the synchronic level is that it is 
a word with more than one sense, a case of polysemy." Other 
writers, too, use Aristotle's definition as their starting-point, or 
approach the metaphor basically as a word.'8 
There are two stages in the criticism of this type of metaphor 
theories: the first is concerned with the underlying theory of 
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that word meaning cannot be the starting-point for a theory of 
meaning. And how central the sentence is, is even noticeable 
in the order of recognition. Words are classified on a gram-
matical basis, that is, on the basis of their use in a sentence. 
And, more important, the senses of a word - and most words 
have more than one sense — are derived, distilled from past 
uses in actual sentences and actual contexts, and indicate 
possible future uses.26 If used, the actual context or the actual 
sentence selects the meaning that is appropriate and 
required.27 
The second stage of criticism is concerned with the theory of 
metaphor proper. To define a metaphor as 'a word that. . .' is 
in a certain sense obviously wrong: one needs more than one 
word to make a metaphor. But given the definition of metaphor 
as a word, the explanation must invoke notions like 'strange' 
or 'change of meaning'. How could one otherwise explain, 
within this framework, the difference between a normal 
sentence and a metaphor? But it is here that problems arise. 
The assumption that a word receives a new meaning or 
acquires a special meaning in these cases is contrary to the 
observation that words retain their standard meaning when 
used in a metaphor. This observation corresponds to the points 
already mentioned with regard to the order of recognition: the 
ordinary senses of words, distilled from past use, are the only 
ones available. The assumption is also incoherent: a word does 
not lose its ordinary, dictionary sense(s), nor does it exchange 
its sense(s) for another sense just for one occasion. This is not 
possible because a change of meaning is, as argued before in 
the context of rules, a process that is stretched out over a 
certain period of time involving at least a substantial part of 
the language-speaking community. And although an 
individual speaker can change the meanings of certain words, 
he or she has to be consistent and has to draw the consequences 
of this change, if he or she wants to communicate. Both con-
ditions are such that individual stipulation is much more 
difficult than may appear at first sight. It is also not possible to 
use the notion 'rule', for rule, obeying a rule, etc., imply that 
there is more than one application.28 If the notion 'change of 
meaning' is taken seriously, the result is that metaphors can 
only be discovered and explained in a historical or diachronic 
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analysis. And the consequence of this is that the actual use and 
actual understanding of metaphors becomes inexplicable. 
Finally, 'change of meaning for just one occasion' is also 
incoherent for another reason: terms like Occasion' cannot be 
used in connection with word meanings. Occasion' and 'event' 
are terms that belong to sentence meaning. Λ word has 
meanings or meanings in general, a sentence has meaning on a 
particular occasion.29 Ricoeur rightly lists as the first special 
feature of the sentence that it is an 'event'.30Here, as in the 
previous points, it is clear how the two stages in this criticism 
of the rhetorical theory of metaphor are connected. 
3.2 The sentence approach 
In recent decades several books and articles have been 
published in which the traditional rhetorical treatment of 
metaphor is criticized and in which another theory of metaphor 
is presented. The feature these theories have in common is 
that they do not limit the metaphor to a word, but that they 
consider it, more or less explicitly, as a sentence. That these 
theories in the end are not successful is due to the fact that the 
shift of attention is not radical enough and that residues of the 
traditional theory still function in them. 
I. A. Richards is commonly considered to be the first author 
in the English-speaking world to propose a theory of metaphor 
that differs on main points from the traditional one.' His view 
forms the basis of other theories.2 His short book The Philosophy 
of Rhetoric contains a series of lectures in which he aims at a 
revitalization of'rhetoric', 'the study of verbal understanding 
and misunderstanding'.3 He reflects on the workings of 
language and submits a theory of metaphor as part of that 
reflection. In his general theory of language he objects to two 
related views of language: the first one is 'the common belief. . . 
that a word has a meaning of its own (ideally, only one) 
independent of and controlling its use and the purpose for 
which it should be uttered': the 'Proper Meaning Super­
stition'.4 The second view is the 'Doctrine of Usage' that holds 
'that there is a right or good use for every word'.5 What 
Richards does in these lectures is not only attack the view that 
words have fixed meanings which they carry as such into a 
sentence,6 but also the primacy of the word in the theory of 
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language: 'we have to renounce, for a while, the view that words 
just have their meanings and that what discourse does is to be 
explained as a composition of these meanings . . .'.'The correct 
approach is not from words to discourse, but from discourse to 
words. The common way of stating the problem is to ask 'what 
happens when we put words together', but we should ask 
'what happens when out of the integral utterance which is the 
sentence, we try to isolate the discrete meanings of the words 
of which it is composed'.8 Instead of a fixed word-meaning 
view, Richards proposes a 'context theorem of meaning': 'what 
a word means is the missing parts of the context from which it 
draws its delegated efficacy'.9 Words exert 'mutual control and 
interanimation' and this includes even the words that are not 
uttered but are only in the background.10 The meanings of the 
words 'are the resultants which we arrive at only through the 
interplay of interpretative possibilities of the whole utterance'." 
Richards' simplest formulation of his theory of metaphor is: 
'when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different 
things active together and supported by a single word, or 
phrase, whose meaning is the resultant of their interaction'.12 
He introduces further the terms 'tenor' and 'vehicle': 'tenor' is 
'the underlying idea or principal subject which the vehicle or 
figure means'.13 And he stresses that 'the co-presence of the 
vehicle and tenor results in a meaning (to be clearly dis-
tinguished from the tenor) which is not attainable without 
their interaction',14 that the vehicle is not just an embellish-
ment, and that the respective contributions of tenor and 
vehicle diifer from case to case.15 His argument, therefore, is 
that a metaphor is not just an ornament, and the basis for this 
argument is a theory of metaphor in terms of 'tenor' and 
'vehicle' interacting. 
This theory of metaphor is not given simply against the 
background of a general theory of language: metaphor theory 
and language theory are really the same. Richards acknow-
ledges this when he says that the context theorem of meaning 
is a 'summary account of the principle of metaphor'.14 The 
interchangeability of the two is possible because 'metaphor is 
the omnipresent principle of language'.15 It is rather difficult to 
accept this without qualifications. If Richards understands it 
as a commentary on the diachronic structure of language it 
100 The Concept of Church 
might be correct, but it is irrelevant for the present discussion; 
if he intends it to be taken as a synchronic observation, it is 
incorrect and insufficient, for it denies the difference between 
metaphorically-used language and non-metaphorically-used 
language, and between metaphorical use and metaphorical 
sense. One can agree with Richards that 'this favourite old 
distinction between dead and living metaphors . . . is, indeed, 
a device which is very often a hindrance to the play of sagacity 
and discernment throughout the subject. For serious purposes 
it needs drastic re-examination',18 but one has to disagree with 
him about the result of his re-examination: he abolishes the 
distinction, while it would have been better to locate the 
problem in the suggestion that both refer to the same or to a 
similar language phenomenon, and to reject that suggestion. 
T h e remarks about metaphor show, moreover, traces of the 
traditional rhetorical theory, namely, the focus on the word 
and its change of meaning. Richards recommends starting 
with discourse, with the sentence, and going from there to 
words, but the only consequence he draws from this shift in 
perspective is a rival theory of word meaning: words do not 
have fixed meanings, but the meanings they have are the 
result of interanimation.19 In his theory of metaphor this 
results in the view that 'two thoughts of different things are 
supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is the 
result of their interaction'. And apart from the problems with 
the broadness of 'different', the resultant meaning can only 
refer to a change of meaning ofthat single word or phrase. The 
remark that this resultant meaning must be clearly distin-
guished from the tenor points in the same direction.20 This 
explains, too, why 'tenor' and 'vehicle' sometimes refer to 
words in the text, sometimes to objects or ideas not explicitly 
mentioned.21 
Richards' theory is further developed and refined by 
M. Black, who criticizes the rhetorical substitution and 
comparison views and presents his own interaction-theory.22 
His starting-point is that metaphors are sentences or 
expressions 'in which some words are used metaphorically while 
the remainder are used non-metaphorically'.21 His version of 
the interaction-theory runs as follows: in a metaphor, e.g., 
'man is a wolf, the subsidiary subject (wolf) acts like a filter 
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and 'the system of associated common-places' that is connected 
with that subsidiary subject organizes the view of the principal 
subject (man): in this case, man is seen through wolf, through 
the metaphorical expression.24 
At first sight this version is an improvement: metaphors are 
explicitly called sentences and are treated as predications 
(principal and subsidiary subjects), but further reflection 
shows that the main weaknesses of Richards' theory are still 
present in this refined version. First, the distinction between 
metaphorical and non-metaphorical language. The interaction 
is now formulated by means of 'filtering' and 'organizing'. 
This explains the working of metaphorical and non-meta-
phorical language alike, but not the specific character of the 
metaphor: 'filtering', 'organizing' describes the process that 
occurs in all kinds of predications. 'That man is a wolf' comes 
close enough to Black's own example 'man is a wolf' to be 
helpful for the discussion. If'that man is a wolf is compared to 
'that man is a gentleman', 'that man is a fascist', and 'that 
man is a father', it is clear that in all four cases 'that man' is 
seen through the subsidiary subject and that our view of 'that 
man' is organized by the various systems of commonplace 
associations. One might argue now that despite a superficial 
likeness there are really two different processes: in the case of 
the last three examples, all the defining properties are 
attributed to 'that man', while in the case of 'that man is a 
wolf' not all the defining properties are attributed. In the case 
of a metaphor those properties that cause an 'undue strain' are 
suppressed: in the case of metaphors, 'filtering' refers to that 
process of suppression.25 
This argument locates the difference in a complete and a 
non-complete attribution of properties. The non-complete 
attribution one can understand in two ways: as a suppression 
of all defining properties or as a suppression of some of the 
defining properties. Here it is understood in the last sense.26 
The question then is in which of the two subjects the selection-
criterion lies. Black's formulation suggests that the subsidiary 
subject exerts the greatest influence, but he maintains also 
that the other subject determines the process.27 And that 
means that only those properties that are common to both 
subjects are selected, with the result that a metaphor states the 
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resemblance between the two subjects with regard to certain 
properties.28 But this conclusion seems to be contrary to 
Black's intention to liberate the metaphor from the comparison 
view. A more fundamental question is whether the selection of 
defining properties is typical for a metaphorical predication. 
In sentences like 'I love my wife', 'I love my son', 'I love 
music', 'I love my country', 'I love God' such a selection 
occurs. The flexibility or broadness of verbs like 'to love', 'to 
do', 'to make', 'to feel', of words like 'war', 'peace', 'struggle', 
'hope', 'game', 'movement' - the feature of language to which 
Wittgenstein refers with his 'concepts with blurred edges', 
which make selection both possible and necessary, is not 
limited to metaphorically-used language. 
The second problematic point is that there are residues of 
the traditional theory left in the general description of 
metaphor. Black distinguishes between some words that are 
used metaphorically, while the rest are used non-meta-
phorically.24 The metaphorically-used words Black calls 'the 
focus', the rest of the sentence 'the frame'. The terms 'focus' 
and 'frame' are introduced to improve Richards' terminology. 
The focal word Obtains a new meaning which is not quite its 
meaning in literal uses, not quite the meaning which any 
literal substitute would have', it undergoes 'an extension of 
meaning, a change of meaning. The reader must attend to 
both the old and the new meaning together'.30 The interaction 
is thus located in the focal word and this interaction is further 
qualified as 'change of meaning'. This is of course compatible, 
for 'change of meaning' is a notion that belongs to the level of 
words, more precisely to the diachronic structure of words. 
But, as argued before, in the context of a theory of metaphor 
this notion is misplaced. This residue of the traditional theory 
makes it impossible for Black to develop fully the perspective 
he gained by calling the metaphor a sentence and a predication. 
In a recent article Black elaborates and defends his inter-
action view. Some of the differences between this article and 
the earlier one are related to the topics discussed: instead of 
talking about metaphors as sentences, he now uses 'statements' 
and places the metaphor within the speaker-hearer situation. 
In the outline of his interaction view some changes occur also: 
the set of associated implications are now said to be comprised 
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in the 'implicative complex'. 'The making of metaphorical 
statements selects, emphasises, suppresses and organizes 
features of the primary subject by applying to it statements 
isomorphic with the members of the secondary subject's 
implicative complex'. ' In the context of a particular metapho-
rical statement the two subjects "interact" in the following 
ways: (i) the presence of the primary subjects incites the 
hearer to select some of the secondary subject's properties; and 
(ii) invites him to construct a parallel "implicative complex" 
that can fit the primary subject; and (iii) reciprocally induces 
parallel changes in the secondary subject'.31 
But these differences do not fundamentally change the 
interaction view, and the criticism of the earlier article can be 
directed against this one as well: it is a view that explains the 
general features of the meaning process but not the particular 
features of metaphorically-used language. Remarks that a 
metaphor is 'an instrument for drawing implications grounded 
in perceived analogies of structure between two subjects 
belonging to different domains'32 is not suflicient as long as the 
difference is not further determined. Black's remark that the 
interaction view is 'an attempted application of Richards' 
striking image of the "interanimation of words"33 is a 
revealing comment in this context. The other point of criticism 
— the appeal to the notion 'change of meaning' - can be main-
tained also, for that notion is still central: ' that the use of the 
relevant concepts employed should change (so that "game" is 
made to apply to marriage; "information" to life; "reed" to 
man; and so on) seems essential to the operation'.34 
In the course of discussing Black's first article the suggestion 
that metaphors could be sufficiently explained in terms of the 
selection of defining properties was developed in a certain way. 
Beardsley's contribution to the theory of metaphor consists in 
a different development of that suggestion: in his original 
theory and in subsequent revisions 'defining properties' play a 
central role, for he explains the mechanism of the metaphor 
with reference to extension and intension.35 And there is 
another reason why his theory is of interest for the present 
discussion: the theory he rejects can be understood as the 
theory we proposed in the previous section. 
Like Richards and Black, Beardsley rejects the traditional 
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rhetorical theory and proposes his own theory against the 
background of a non-referential theory about the status of a 
literary work. These two elements return in the titles he gives 
to his own theory and to the rival theory: 'verbal-opposition 
theory' and 'object-comparison theory'. He criticizes the 
object-comparison theory not only for treating metaphors as 
comparisons or similes, but also for using a 'thing-approach'. 
The 'thing-approach' maintains that 'the modifier . . . in the 
metaphor . . . retains its standard designative role when it 
enters into the metaphor and therefore continues in that 
context to denote the same object it denotes in literal contexts'.36 
The three arguments Bcardsley gives for rejecting this approach 
are: first, the properties an object is believed to have are 
important for a metaphor, and these believed properties are 
not considered if one looks for an object; secondly, the search 
for an object often results in 'that flow of idiosyncratic imagery 
that is a serious barrier between the reader and the poem';37 
and lastly, this theory tends to lead to 'the unfortunate theory 
of appropriateness'.38 The last two arguments are not very 
strong, because they point only to possible or actual abuses, 
which are not necessarily connected with this approach.39 The 
first argument has more force, but could be accommodated for 
by including in the theory the way objects are perceived by a 
community of speakers. This rival theory can also be formu-
lated without reference to objects, but with reference to the 
meaning of words that remain the same. This means that 
Beardsley's theory can be understood as a criticism of the 
theory proposed earlier. Is Beardsley's theory a genuine 
alternative? 
Beardsley's starting-point is that a metaphor is a kind of 
attribution, i.e., 'a linguistic expression containing at least two 
words, one of which denotes a class and also characterises it in 
some way, and the other of which qualifies or modifies the 
characterization'.40 The possibility of metaphorical language 
depends upon the difference between two sets of properties in 
the intension of a general term: the difference between defining 
properties, whose presence is a necessary condition for the 
correct use of the term and the accidental properties, or, the 
difference between 'central meaning' and 'marginal meaning'. 
In the metaphor theory this distinction is used as follows: 
Metaphor 105 
'when a term is combined with others in such a way that there 
would be a logical opposition between its central meaning and 
that of the other terms, there occurs that shift from central to 
marginal meaning which shows the word is to be taken in a 
metaphorical way'."" This shift implies that 'the predicate loses 
its ordinary extension, because it acquires a new intension, 
perhaps one that it has in no other context' Z12 
So there are three elements in Beardsley's theory: a logical 
opposition, or, as he puts it sometimes, an absurdity; a 
difTerence between two levels of meaning within a term, and, a 
shift within the modifier from one level to another, from 
central meaning (designation) to marginal meaning (connota-
tion in the literary sense).43 These elements do not lead to an 
adequate theory of metaphor, though, as a closer examination 
reveals. The central place is occupied by the notion of marginal 
meaning, and Beardsley has apparently sensed the problematic 
aspects of this notion, for in his two revisions he makes 
changes on this point. In his first revision, he adds a further 
distinction inside the marginal meaning, inside the 'potential 
range of connotations': staple connotations and connotations 
that 'wait so to say, lurking in the nature of things for 
actualization'.44 But this refinement inside the marginal 
meaning does not solve the main problem that surrounds this 
notion and the shift to marginal meaning. These suggest that 
the central meanings can be separated from the marginal ones 
and can be put out of order, so to say, but the link between the 
two cannot so easily be severed. For example, 'quietness' can 
belong to the connotations of a ghost-town, a medieval church, 
a forest, and the adagio of Schubert's string quintet, but it 
makes a difference to which of these 'quietness' belongs. The 
shift further suggests that in the case of metaphors the level of 
marginal meanings is the really important one and this leads 
to a reductionist, rhetorical theory of metaphor, for it is not 
clear why the level of the central meaning is necessary: the 
speaker could have chosen a shorter way and could have 
expressed himself more directly. 
Beardsley cannot, strictly speaking, appeal to the central 
meanings as a continuous source for new implications.45 The 
formulation of the shift in terms of extension-intension does 
not make the situation much clearer. 'The predication loses 
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its ordinary extension, because it acquires a new intension, 
perhaps one that it has in no other context'.46 The extension of 
a term consists of the class of objects to which the term is 
applicable and this class can consist of many (human being), 
of one (sun), or none (unicorn). 'Losing its extension' means, 
then, that the term is no longer applied or applicable to its 
usual class, but since a term has by definition an extension 
(which may or may not be empty), 'losing its extension' 
cannot be understood as saying that this term, which once had 
an extension, does not have one now. The question now is how 
this new extension is related to the ordinary one. If the central 
meaning of a term - i.e. the defining characteristics - is 
dropped, completely, as Beardsley suggests, the marginal 
meanings are presumably the defining characteristics of this 
new extension. The reason the term loses its ordinary extension 
is the acquisition of a new intension. How is the marginal 
meaning related to the intension of a term? The intension of a 
term consists of the attributes or characteristics an object must 
have in order to qualify for the application of a term. The 
intension is commonly divided into 'objective intension' - all 
the attributes that the objects in the denotation of the term 
have in common - 'subjective intension' - the attributes that 
come to a person's mind when he or she uses the term - and 
'conventional intension' - the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for regarding an object as qualifying for the term. 
Marginal meaning comes, at first sight, closest to subjective 
intension, but subjective intension normally includes defining 
characteristics. Marginal meanings, or accidental properties, 
seem therefore to point to personal associations.47 If that is the 
case, the presuppositions of a communication structure are 
destroyed, and the 'meaning' of a metaphor becomes some-
thing personal and individual. 
These problems attached to the distinction between the two 
levels of meaning cast doubt upon that distinction. Beardsley 
may be correct in pointing to 'a felt difference between sets of 
properties',48 but he is incorrect in interpreting this difference 
as a difference of meaning. Mackie, who qualifies Beardsley's 
theory as 'the most adequate account of the semantic structure 
of metaphor' , says, nevertheless, referring to marginal meaning, 
that he is 'of course wrong to call this "meaning".'49 The 
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explanation in terms of a shift to marginal 'meanings' does 
therefore not constitute an explanation of metaphors function-
ing in a communication process. 
In his second revision, Beardsley returns again to this 
central notion of marginal meaning. Compared with the 
previous version, it contains some terminological différences: a 
metaphorical sequence, or metaphor, is now divided into a 
metaphorical segment and a non-metaphorical segment; the 
intension of a term, understood as a set of properties, is now 
formulated in terms of 'sense'; each distinguishable intension 
is a sense, and a standard sense is the sense that stays 
unchanged in various similar contexts. For the outline of the 
theory of metaphor this results in, a metaphorical segment 
'acquires a sense different from any of its standard senses'.50 
The properties that are of importance in the case of a 
metaphor are the believed properties - 'credence properties' -
that include 'the undented defining properties of the members 
of the extension of the metaphorical segment'.51 The inclusion 
of the 'undenied properties' is due to the acceptance of a point 
of criticism made by Mackie.52 But this revision of 'the 
marginal meaning' notion is more drastic than the previous 
one which concerned a refinement inside the marginal 
meaning: here Beardsley allows the defining properties to 
continue to determine the meaning of a term. This means that 
the original shift from one level to another is replaced by the 
denial of some defining properties, and the result is a theory 
very much like the one Black proposes.53 
So Beardsley's possible alternative to the theory proposed in 
the previous section does not turn out to be a genuine one. His 
theory, based upon the suggestion that in a metaphor a non-
complete attribution of defining properties occurs, develops 
this suggestion originally in the most radical way and 
maintains that all defining properties are suppressed. But this 
development does not prove to be coherent. In his latest 
revision Beardsley presents a less radical interpretation of that 
suggestion by claiming that only some of the defining properties 
are suppressed, but this way of solving the problems, which is 
similar to Black's theory, does not give a sufficient explanation 
of metaphorical predication. 
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3.3 The category-mistake approach 
In the literature on metaphors one can find a few attempts to 
link metaphors with category-mistakes or type-crossings. At 
first sight these theories resemble the one proposed in the 
previous section, but there are major differences with regard to 
identification and explanation, which call the helpfulness of 
this approach into question. 
'Category mistake' is a concept used by Ryle.' Ryle lists two 
kinds of sentences as specimens of category mistakes, i.e. 
mistakes in the use of concepts. First, sentences like 'I am now 
lying' and 'heterological is heterological'; and, secondly, 
'Saturday is in bed'.2 Both kinds are 'absurd', and their 
absurdity is the result of'type-trespassing', 'type-rule breaking', 
and 'improper coupling'. But since the two kinds are rather 
different, the relation of the metaphor with regard to these two 
has to be established. Do metaphors belong to the first kind? 
This is the kind Ryle is mainly interested in. The important 
feature of this type is that people who make this kind of mistake 
do not fully know the use of the concepts involved, and that is 
precisely the reason why they are 'theoretically interesting' 
and 'insidious'.3 But insufficient knowledge of the concepts 
involved does not result in metaphors, nor does it play a role in 
understanding them. So one has to locate metaphors among 
the sentences of the second kind. Ryle makes only a few remarks 
about this type of sentences: they are formulated only with 'the 
deliberate intention to produce balderdash' and they are 
Obviously absurd'.4 These two points might be correct for the 
description and qualification of sentences like 'the concept of 
real numbers is drowning between the morning star and 
poverty', but are they also correct in the case of metaphors? 
Can metaphors be identified by means of these two charac-
teristics? No, for metaphors are produced with the intention to 
make sense and are not obviously absurd. 'Absurdity' seems to 
suggest and to indicate that one cannot make sense, that one 
cannot give a context to the sentence, and Obviously' points to 
clear evidence of the nonsense. But absurdity is often a 
qualification that is applied after a search for meaning. Very 
few grammatically well-formed sentences are 'obviously absurd', 
more sentences appear to be absurd after some inquiry, but 
even Ryle's example 'Saturday is in bed' does not belong to 
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that category. And apart from the problem of how to identify 
metaphors with the help of Ryle's remarks, there is also the 
problem how to explain them in terms of Ryle's analysis. Ryle 
talks about 'rule-breaking' which is a correct explanation for 
mistakes, absurdity, and meaninglessness, but, as argued 
earlier, this notion is distinctly unhelpful in explaining 
metaphors. How then do writers, who use this notion of 
category mistake in their theory of metaphor, solve these 
problems? 
Turbayne is one of these authors and he uses Ryle's notion 
to improve certain facets of the Aristotelian definition of 
metaphor which he thinks basically correct.5 Two phrases from 
Ryle's The Concept of Mind- 'the presentation of the facts of one 
category in the idiom of the other', and 'it represents the facts 
of mental life as if they belonged to another' - help him to state 
the necessary and the sufficient conditions for a metaphor: it is 
a sort-crossing and it has an as-if character. But he does not 
adopt Ryle's analysis completely: in order to facilitate the link 
between category mistake and metaphor Turbayne tries to 
soften the mistake aspect. 'But it seems altogether unlikely 
that Ryle regards metaphors as mistakes, for such category 
mistakes may have great value. It is not necessarily a mistake 
to cross sorts'.6 Turbayne's solution is then to introduce a 
distinction between sort-crossing or category-fusion on the one 
hand, and sort-trespassing or category-confusion on the other. 
The distinction is connected with a duality of sense. The last 
word of the sentence 'timberwolves and men are wolves' does 
not refer to different sorts of wolves as in 'timberwolves and 
Tasmanian wolves are wolves', because in the first sentence 
'wolves' is used in two different senses, even though it looks as 
if it is being used only in one sense. The two senses are called 
the literal and the metaphorical sense of'wolf .7 Metaphor is a 
category fusion if the users are aware of the duality of sense 
and pretend that the two senses, literal and metaphorical, are 
one.8 Metaphor is a category confusion and a mistake when it 
is taken literally, i.e., when the metaphorical sense is taken for 
the literal one.9 And this leads Turbayne to the statement that 
'since a metaphor is not a metaphor/)«·se, but only for someone, 
from one point of view it is better to say that sometimes the 
metaphor is not noticed; it is hidden. That is, if X is aware of 
по 
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the metaphor while Y is not, X says that Y is being taken in by 
the metaphor, or being used by it, or taking it literally. But for 
Y it is not the case of taking the metaphor literally at all, 
because for him there is no metaphor'.") 
Turbayne's way of applying Ryle's notion does not solve the 
problems that arise when 'category mistake' is employed in 
metaphor theory. On the contrary, the introduction of the 
distinction between category fusion and category confusion 
adds some more problems. The distinction presupposes that a 
metaphor is a word with a metaphorical sense. The distinction 
changes the original concept almost completely, moreover. 
The result is that whether a sentence is a metaphor or not 
depends on the personal understanding of the user, and that 
no metaphor can be taken literally, for if it is taken literally it is 
not a metaphor. The first point destroys the communication 
structure, while the second undermines Turbayne's argument. 
The strangeness of the appeal to 'interpretation', which under­
lies this argument (cf Beardsley) is hidden by the presupposi­
tion of the duality of sense; it is much clearer in a book about 
the basis of meaningless sentences, which also mentions 
metaphors briefly and which belongs to this type of approach, 
namely, Drange's Typecrossing.n 
Drange defines a typecrossing as a sentence 'which ascribes 
in a positive manner to a thing (or set of things) x, a property, 
the type associated with which is a class to which χ does not 
belong'.12 Some of his examples can elucidate this definition: 
'chemistry is a greater ordinal than the concept of truth', 'the 
number 5 weighs more than the number 6' and 'the theory of 
relativity is blue'. These sentences are meaningless, and their 
meaninglessness cannot be explained in terms of the violation 
of rules, or type-rules, or linguistic conventions (so, e.g., Ryle), 
but must be explained in terms of 'unthinkability'. Type-
crossings designate unthinkable propositions, i.e., 'combina­
tions of concepts which cannot be put together in thought'.'1 
Interpretation plays a crucial role in this argument and it links 
metaphors and type-crossings. 'All typecrossings then are 
meaningless and this is so by virtue of the interpretation given 
to them . . . what distinguishes a metaphorical sentence from a 
typecrossing composed of the same words in the same order is 
the meaning or interpretation to be given to some of the words. 
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No doubt most metaphorical sentences would be typecrossings, 
if they were taken literally'.14 And Drange returns to this theme 
at the end of the book: 'Actually, a metaphorical sentence, 
taken literally, is invariably a typecrossing . . . Since it cannot 
be taken literally, the reader or listener is forced to reinterpret 
what is presented to him'.15 
The problem here is not just that there is an inconsistency 
between the two quotations (most-invariably), nor that the 
metaphor is seen as a word with a special non-literal sense: the 
main problem lies in the use of 'interpretation' in connection 
with meaninglessness and metaphors. Orange's use of 'inter­
pretation' is similar to that of Turbayne and Beardsley.16 How 
is 'interpretation' to be understood? That a sentence is meaning­
less in virtue of the interpretation given to the words used is 
correct, if 'interpretation' is understood and used in the sense 
of 'understanding these words in their normal senses'. For if 
this is not the case, everything is allowed and possible. An 
absurd and meaningless sentence like 'the square root of — 5У4 
sits on the mat' become a meaningful sentence if 'the square 
root of — S1/»' is interpreted as 'cat'. This absurd conclusion 
can only be avoided by recognizing that the words used 
determine, guide and limit the interpretation. An interpretation 
without this type of control undermines the communication 
function of language and questions the need of using precisely 
these words. But if understood in this way, the thesis is also 
correct in the case of meaningful sentences: it is trivially true. 
'Interpretation', refers, then to what was earlier called the 
interanimation or interaction of words in a sentence, and so 
refers to the selection procedure that takes place in every 
sentence. 'Interpretation' can also be understood as a 'second 
move' in the process of understanding a sentence. Interpreta­
tion furthers understanding by correcting or developing the 
initial understanding via specifying the precise meaning of a 
technical term or via referring to the appropriate context or 
theory, etc. In this sense events, objects, words, texts, etc. are 
interpreted in an everyday way or in a more systematic way in 
the sciences. This 'reflective interpretation' cannot be used to 
distinguish the understanding of metaphors from the under­
standing of other sentences since such a process can be called 
for in both cases." 
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So, although 'interpretation' in either sense can be used 
within a metaphor-theory, it cannot fulfil the task some think 
it can: it cannot mark the difTerence between metaphors on the 
one hand and other sentences, meaningful or meaningless, on 
the other, and it cannot explain the meaning mechanism of the 
metaphor sufficiently. 'Interpretation' can only give the 
suggestion of being an explanatory term if metaphorical sense 
is thought to be the explanandum. The conclusion, therefore, 
is that the notion of category mistake as used by Ryle is not 
very helpful for metaphor theory, and the changes made by 
Turbayne (to soften the mistake aspect) and Drange (to drop 
rule violation) change the notion rather drastically. But even 
with these changes the proposed theories are not satisfactory, 
because of their concentration on metaphorical sense and 
because of their peculiar use of'interpretation'.18 
4. Two problems 
The discussion of two issues with a somewhat different focus 
concludes the exposition of our theory of metaphor. The first 
issue is the need to introduce 'true' and 'false' into metaphor 
theory, the second is the paraphrase of metaphors. While the 
discussion of these issues can be seen as the continuation of the 
search for appropriate notions in metaphor theory, the second 
is more concerned with some consequences of the proposed 
theory and as such also forms a link with the following chapters. 
4.1 True and false 
Are the notions 'true' and 'false', or one of these, indispensable 
to a coherent theory of metaphor? Do both, or does one of, 
these notions have to be introduced into the theory to explain 
the typical, characteristic features of metaphor? Some authors 
employ these notions, but what are their reasons for doing so? 
When Berggren explains the point which constitutes the 
new insight of interaction theory, or tension theory as he calls 
it, he notices two related dimensions in the tension: 'On the 
one hand, a logical or empirical absurdity stands in apparent 
conflict with a possible truth. On the other hand, this possible 
truth may itself depend upon a creative interaction between 
diverse perspectives which cannot be literalized or disentangled 
without destroying the kind of insight, truth, or reality which 
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the metaphor provides'.' As this quotation indicates, and as 
Berggren again stresses when he says that the truth of a 
metaphor 'can survive only at the intersection of the diverse 
perspectives whose interaction made it possible',2 the truth of 
a metaphor is related to the interaction. These sayings imply 
also that every metaphor, or every 'vital metaphor',3 is true. 
There are three problematic features to this and similar positions 
(cfBeardsley). 
First, the appeal to the special meaning, to the 'creative 
interaction between diverse perspectives', is an appeal to a 
'stereoscopic vision', in which 'the perspectives prior to and 
subsequent to the transformation of the metaphor's principle 
and subsidiary subjects must both be conjointly maintained',4 
— an appeal to both the normal meanings and the metaphorical 
meanings. But this interpretation and explanation of metaphor 
is not an adequate one, and cannot therefore function as the 
ground for introducing 'true'. Secondly, the argument leads 
Berggren to maintain that a metaphor is false or absurd and 
true. This is the consequence of his appeal to both the normal 
and the metaphorical meanings. But, as the previous section 
has shown, the view that an absurd sentence becomes a 
metaphor via an additional interpretation (metaphorical 
meaning) is not coherent. The same criticism can be used 
against 'intention', another possible addition. 'Intention' is 
not an element exclusive to metaphorical language and is not a 
decisive element in it: the words used in it do not change their 
meaning by mere intention. 
Even if we only wanted to keep one of these notions, there is 
still the third problematic feature, viz., that the metaphor is 
called ' true' in a special way (the metaphor is not true, but 
' true') or that the notion 'metaphorical truth' is introduced. 
This provokes a 'suspicion of equivocation',5 especially when, 
as in Berggren, all 'vital metaphors' are true. That implies a 
departure from the normal use of ' true' , for it is not customary 
to claim that every statement is true. One can decide 'to take 
metaphors as true merely by stipulative definition, when novel 
and as no longer metaphorical, but rather literally true or 
false when deceased', as Loewenberg prefers. But, as she 
acknowledges, ' truth by stipulation is, of course, too trivial to 
be helpful'.6 Ricoeur uses 'metaphorical truth' to indicate the 
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final consequences of the tension or interaction theory.7 He 
asks whether the tension that affects the relational function of 
the copula also affect the existential function of the copula. He 
proceeds in a dialectical way and reaches in the end an affirma-
tive answer. He points to the inadequacies of the non-critical 
insistence upon the logical commitment implied in metaphor, 
as (e.g.) Wheelwright does, and to the inadequacies of the 
critical interpretation of metaphor that stresses the need to 
expose and demythologize metaphors, as Turbayne does. In 
the first case the 'is-not' is neglected, in the second case the 
'is', but both elements have to be maintained. Ricoeur thinks 
the concept 'metaphorical truth' apt to express both elements, 
for it 'includes the point of criticism of the "is not" (literally) 
in the ontological impetuosity of the "is" (metaphorically)."1 
Or in other words, 'metaphorical truth' expresses the same as 
the notion 'proposal to redescribe reality', which is the refine-
ment of another notion used by Ricoeur. This makes clear that 
it is a notion explaining the function of the metaphor, as also is 
indicated by Berggren when he juxtaposes 'insight' and 'truth'. 
But apart from this, 'proposal to redescribe reality' seems to be 
more apt to capture and express the tensive relation with reality 
than 'metaphorical truth', without the suspicion of equivoca-
tion. That the relation with reality does not necessarily have to 
be expressed by means of'true' is shown by hypotheses, which 
reveal a somewhat similar tensive relation with reality.9 
So, the arguments for introducing 'true' and 'false', or 'true' 
alone, as indispensable concepts in metaphor theory are not 
convincing. What is problematic about metaphors is not that 
they are true or false, or neither true nor false (cf hypotheses), 
but that they present an extraordinary combination of concepts. 
4.2 Paraphrase 
11 is a common agreement among modern writers that a para-
phrase of a metaphor lacks the evocative power of the original. 
But the question whether a paraphrase necessarily causes a 
difference in 'cognitive content' does not receive such a 
unanimous answer. The interaction theorists argue for a strong 
thesis: a paraphrase is inadequate with regard to both the 
evocative power and the cognitive content. Others argue for a 
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weaker thesis and maintain that there is only a diiTerence in 
evocative power.' 
Black formulates the stronger thesis like this: 'But the set of 
literal statements so obtained will not have the same power to 
inform and enlighten as the original. . . The literal paraphrase 
inevitably says too much - and with the wrong emphasis. One 
of the points I most wish to stress is that the loss in such cases 
is a loss in cognitive content; the relevant weakness of the 
literal paraphrase is not that it may be tiresomely prolix or 
boringly explicit (or deficient in qualities of style); it fails to 
give the insight that the metaphor did'.2 And Berggren argues: 
' I t is precisely this transformation of both referents, moreover, 
interacting with their normal meanings, which makes it 
ultimately impossible to reduce completely the cognitive 
import of any vital metaphor to any set of univocal, literal or 
non-tensiona! statements. For a special meaning and in some 
cases even a new sort of reality, is achieved which cannot 
survive except at the intersection of the two perspectives which 
produce it'.3 There are several claims in these quotations: 
there is a special meaning due to the interaction which is lost 
in a paraphrase,4 there is a difference of cognitive content 
between the metaphor and its paraphrase,5 and the paraphrase 
does not have the same effect, i.e., does not give the same 
insight that the metaphor gives. Although the elements are 
interconnected, the first two are different from the third: the 
former concern the mechanism of metaphor, the latter concerns 
the effect of metaphor, and the two should not be confused. 
This strong thesis seems to be robbed of its basic argument by 
the discussion in the previous section about the inappropriate-
ness for metaphor theory of the notion 'change of meaning' or 
'special meaning localized in the focal word'. Is this the only 
argument in favour of the strong thesis? Are other arguments 
possible? What are the criticisms and arguments of those who 
defend the weaker thesis? 
Warner concerns himself with Black's article only and he 
concentrates his criticism on the notion 'cognitive content' and 
the way Black employs it. Warner defines cognitive content in 
terms of truth conditions: 'The content of an utterance is 
presumably cognitive . . . in so far as it is capable of being 
asserted to make a truth claim'.6 If sentences have the same 
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cognitive content, they have also the same truth conditions; if 
they have a difFerent cognitive content, they have diflerent 
truth conditions. Thus, when Black says that there is a difler-
ence in cognitive content between a metaphor and its para-
phrase, it implies that there are diflerent truth conditions in 
both cases. Warner selects two phrases from Black and develops 
these. The first one is 'the literal paraphrase says too much'; 
this implies that 'there are logically possible conditions in which 
the metaphor will hold and the paraphrase be false'.7 But this 
does not amount to the claim that a metaphor has some 
inexpressible truth; it only means a refusal to specify the truth 
conditions of the metaphor. The second remark Warner 
develops is the one about 'the loss of cognitive content', and 
this remark implies the opposite: 'in certain circumstances the 
metaphor will fail to hold while the paraphrase is true'.8 If this 
is the case we can adjust the paraphrase. So, this only says 
that one cannot be sure that one has given all possible implica-
tions and paraphrases, but it does not mean that, when one 
sees that an implication is missing, one cannot put it into a 
paraphrase.4 Manns has argued that Warner, by connecting 
'cognitive content' with truth conditions, gives it an interpreta-
tion which is narrower than Black's and narrower than the 
term itself suggests.10 Manns is correct. Furthermore, Warner 
places too much emphasis on the remark he develops first: 
Black's main point is the second remark; moreover, Black adds 
to the first remark 'with the wrong emphasis', for a paraphrase 
presents the implications 'explicitly as though having equal 
weight'." What is left of Warner's argument is that 'loss of 
content' refers to the fact that due to the 'open texture' metaphors 
may imply more implications than one has realized.12 
Paul's criticism of the strong thesis centres around the way 
'meaning' is used in defence of that thesis, namely, that 
meanings or parts of meaning are not accessible to translation 
or explication.11 According to Paul, a string of words has 
meaning 'if and only if it is intelligible (understandable, 
comprehensible) to suitable informed speakers of the language 
. . . if and only if there would be consensus among the speakers 
of the language as to its meaning'.14 If there is no consensus 
about the string, it is a nonsense-string.15 An indication of the 
difference between sense- and nonsense-string is that the first 
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is paraphrasable, that is to say, that the meaning of the 
sentence as a whole is paraphrasable, and not just the indiv-
idual words that are used in it. What a sentence means can be 
determined by looking at how speakers paraphrase, explicate, 
use the sentence: '. . . meaning in a language is a public matter 
for which paraphrase, explication and use are the only plausible 
public criteria'.16 The strong thesis maintains now that there 
remains some residue of meaning that cannot be captured by a 
paraphrase, but can this 'more' be called 'meaning'? No, 'since 
there is no reliable indicator that different speakers attribute 
the same residue of inaccessible meaning to the metaphor, 
there is no reason to suppose that it actually does mean any-
thing more than is brought out in the analysis'.17 Meaning is 
not a matter of 'idiosyncratic feelings individual speakers may 
have'.18 Paul adds further that 'semantic indeterminacy', i.e., 
'the uncertainty as to what we really take the metaphor to 
mean"9 causes this idea that the paraphrase is inadequate. 
But what this indeterminacy really amounts to is not that 'we 
perceive in the metaphor some aspect of its meaning that 
defies specification, but that we are not sure what we take it to 
mean'.20 Paul's argument about the public character of 
meaning is correct.21 It is therefore surprising that Paul fails to 
see that the thesis would not follow if the claim that the 
meaning of the focal word changes is taken seriously, and that 
he fails to question that claim. His final comment is surprising, 
too, since 'we are not sure exactly what we take it to mean' 
seems to contradict his previous argument and to be inadmis-
sible on his own description of meaning. But he is certainly 
correct to point to the semantic indeterminacy of the metaphor. 
So, both Warner's remaining, valid point and Paul's semantic 
indeterminacy imply that there is an uncertainty as to whether 
the given paraphrases cover all the elements and implication 
of the metaphor, and as to whether the balance is correct. This 
is an important point and it gives the metaphor a special 
function on the level of heuristics. This is acknowledged by the 
interaction theorists, and it seems that this is the point that 
remains valid when the appeal to the change of meaning is 
removed. This reconciliation between the two parties seems a 
little too easy, though, for there is another element in the 
whole discussion that colours the views on both sides and that 
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prevents them from seeing this common point: the shared view 
of what 'paraphrase' stands for. 
With regard to paraphrase there is first a point that concerns 
the paraphrase of literal and metaphorical sentences alike. 
Apart from the problem of synonymity, the possibility of an 
adequate paraphrase on the interanimation view does not 
seem to be so great: other words exert another controlling 
influence. Even if one does not accept this argument, one has 
to deal with the following point. Equivalence in paraphrase, 
covering everything (including personal, psychological 
associations) has been given up since it is an impossible ideal. 
But this has turned equivalence in cognitive meaning into a 
'chimera' as well. 'For, if cognitive meaning is that meaning 
which remains constant between two sentences which are 
mutual paraphrases, we are begging the question we wanted 
to answer. And no better definition of cognitive meaning has 
been ofleredV2 We are in fact satisfied with less than equivalent 
paraphrases in the case of normal sentences; why should we 
require equivalent paraphrases in the case of metaphors? 
But there is another point that is more important for this 
discussion. The parties involved share the presupposition that 
in the case of a normal sentence and in the case of a metapho-
rical sentence 'paraphrase' amounts to the same. But is that 
presupposition correct? Manns points to a remarkable feature 
of the paraphrase discussion: the participants come up with 
their own attempts at paraphrasing, while they use poetical 
metaphors as their examples. Hardly anybody refers to 'the 
genuine source of the great majority of paraphrase': literary 
criticism. If one looks at the practice of literary critics one sees 
that they are 'making no attempt whatever at delineating in full the 
sense of any metaphor. What they are doing is directing with 
words our intellectual gaze in a manner which, it is hoped, will 
enable us to trace out for ourselves the myriad of implications, 
associations, and images that diffuse themselves behind the 
concentrated focus that is the metaphor'.23 This is not special 
to literary critics, or to poetical metaphors. Stewart argues 
that to paraphrase a non-metaphorical expression is something 
different from paraphrasing any metaphor. If one paraphrases 
a non-metaphorical sentence, the relation between the original 
and the paraphrase is symmetrical. 'If we are to say that one 
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expression means the same thing as another expression, then 
we must say that the second expression means the same thing 
as the first'.24 Paraphrases of metaphors, including those of 
'moribund' metaphors like 'Richard is a lion', do not achieve 
this kind of symmetry. A symmetrical paraphrase is possible in 
the case of normal sentences, since they have an accepted 
meaning; in the case of metaphors there are several interpreta-
tions possible." This point can be put in terms used earlier: in 
the case of a normal expression the rules are followed, and that 
is the reason why there is an accepted, established meaning; it 
can be paraphrased in a 'symmetrical way' because it remains 
within the accepted structure of concepts. In the case of 
metaphorically-used language, the rules are relaxed for the 
time being and the paraphrase attempts to bring out the 
implications, possible connections, eventual revisions in the 
structure that would form the consequence if this metaphorical 
connection was accepted as a normal one. The semantic 
indeterminacy of the metaphor, the openness of the metaphor, 
requires a type of paraphrase all its own. One may wish to give 
some explication of the words used in a metaphor, but if one 
remains satisfied with this phase, one is not only incapable of 
doing justice to the richness and complexity of the metaphor, 
but one is also in danger of treating the metaphor as a word. 
Precisely what this special type of paraphrase will look like will 
depend on the purpose for which it is given, but it will be some 
variation on the general pattern of revealing and showing 'the 
myriad of implications' of the extraordinary combination. 
5. Conclusion 
The starting-point determining the whole discussion about 
metaphor theory is the observation that a metaphor is a 
sentence. This rather formal beginning leads to the discovery 
of two crucial elements: the need to concentrate upon the 
metaphorical use of words, and the recognition that the 
characteristic features of metaphors have to be located on the 
level of propositional content. In the development of this 
recognition, it appears that the typical features of metaphors, 
which accounts for their strangeness, is caused by their extra-
ordinary combination between ranges or realms of concepts 
which are normally not combined. The need to concentrate 
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upon metaphorical use bars any explanation in terms that 
suggest or indicate some kind of permanency. The solution, 
then, is to explain the meaning mechanism of the metaphor in 
terms of a temporary relaxation of the rules governing those 
realms of concept. And since the way these concepts are 
structured and can be combined is related to the way we see 
reality and the way we live, the function of such an extra-
ordinary combination, the function of metaphor, can be 
formulated as a proposal to redescribe reality. The exploration 
of the question of how the relation between language and 
reality has to be seen constitutes a coherence test for this 
solution. Reflections upon the conventional character of 
language, the function of rules in language, and the interweaving 
of language and life show that it is possible to explain the 
meaning mechanism of the metaphor in these terms. 
In the course of the discussion elements and notions also 
emerge that turn out to be inappropriate, misleading or 
incorrect for a theory of metaphor. The other side of the 
concentration upon metaphorical use is that metaphorical 
sense — the metaphorical meaning a word has acquired in the 
past — is not an issue in a theory of metaphor. Consequently, 
explanations suggesting a change of meaning or a change of 
rules are beside the point. Moreover, the focus on metaphorical 
meaning implies a focus on a 'metaphorical word'. These 
elements return in a more systematic discussion of other 
theories. The analysis of the word approach shows that this 
type of theory can only give a diachronic analysis, i.e., an 
analysis of how words receive a metaphorical extension. Given 
the starting-point this is understandable, and also the only 
possible explanation. 
As the discussion among linguists shows, broadening the 
view to metaphors as a phrase or sentence is not enough if one 
remains within the sphere of linguistic competence. The self-
imposed limitation to the study of linguistic competence only 
results either in an incapacity to distinguish between metaphor 
and deviant sentences or in a diachronic explanation of 
meaning acquisition. Only if the metaphor is treated as a 
speech-act can the special kind of predication that it is be 
discovered. The account given in the interaction theories is 
insufficient insofar as the selection and interaction procedure 
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which occurs in every sentence or predication is presented as 
the explanation of the typical features of the metaphor, and 
correct insofar as a preoccupation with metaphorical sense 
and change of meaning still determines the theories. 
Other inappropriate notions or misleading concepts and 
presuppositions are discovered as well in the course of a 
systematic discussion. Use of the term 'category mistake' itself 
suggests that the distinction between metaphor and mistake 
has disappeared. The appeal, made in this context but also in 
others, to interpretation or intention as a second phase does 
not solve the problem, and leads in the end to the destruction 
of the communicative function of language. 'Truth ' (or 
'metaphorical truth', which is a problematic notion in itself) is 
not a necessary category in a theory of metaphor: the proble-
matic aspect of metaphors does not lie in the fact that they are 
true or false or neither true nor false, but that they express an 
extraordinary combination. It is this which requires a type of 
paraphrase that diifers from what is presupposed in most of 
the discussion about the possibility of paraphrasing a metaphor. 
So, the notion of'relaxing the rules for the time being', and 
the further specification of the rules as those rules that govern 
the use of ranges of concepts, is central and sufficient to the 
explanation of the meaning mechanism, of the metaphorical 
use of words, while the notion 'proposal to redescribe reality' 
captures the variety of purposes such a use has. 

Chapter III 
Three Answers 
A discussion of the relation between metaphor and theology is 
the second step in solving the problems brought to light by the 
analyses of Chapter I. Against the background of the theory 
proposed in Chapter II, the following questions have to be 
answered: Do metaphors play a crucial role in theology? Can 
they? Should they? Some answers have been indicated, albeit 
rather sketchily, by some theologians in their discussion of the 
central term of Lumen Gentium. The negative answers of tradi-
tional systematic theology can be discovered in, e.g., Miihlen's 
and Koster's arguments, while Dulles, by using models, and 
Philips, by stressing the evocative power of parables, reflect a 
positive answer which has been developed in recent years. The 
more elaborate answers have to be examined. But since the 
presuppositions about metaphor in these theoretical discussions 
are not always correct, the various arguments have to be 
restated and reconstrued in order to make a proper evaluation 
possible. A first positive answer can be found in narrative 
theology, although both a radical and a moderate version can 
be discerned. (Section 1.) A second positive answer is presented 
by some philosophers of religion, who stress the similarity 
between the use of models in science and in theology. In this 
context a closer look at one particular theory in the philosophy 
of science is necessary in order to evaluate the transition from 
metaphor to model. (Section 2) A negative answer is given in 
traditional systematic theology. An exponent who is mentioned 
and criticized by some narrative theologians, and who stands 
at the head of the process which has led to the division between 
exegesis and systematic theology, is Thomas Aquinas. He 
discusses the issue explicitly in his first and last systematic 
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theological works, and his views provide material for the 
negative answer. (Section 3.) 
1. Narrative theology 
In recent literature on narrative theology one can distinguish 
difFerent sources or emphases.' A first important source is the 
analysis of scriptural language, especially the language of the 
New Testament. 'Story' appears as a central category, referring 
either to the gospel genre or to the parable genre. Gospel or 
parable are considered the most characteristic formulations 
and expressions of Christian faith.2 A second source is formed 
by autobiography and biography. The starting-point here is 
the understanding of life as a story and the influence of religion 
in that life, the changes it causes, and the developments it 
brings about. In the case of biography contemporary religious 
men or women are often selected and presented as examples.3 
A third source is concerned with the link between experience 
and story or narrative. All experience takes place in time, 
which means that it occurs in one of the modalities of time: 
past, present, or future. These modalities are not separated 
but united in every experience. This unity exhibits the begin-
ning of a narrative form: 'the formal quality of experience 
through time is inherently narrative'.4 Related to this is a 
criticism of academic or argumentative theology: this type of 
theology fails to relate to people's experiences and is distinctly 
unhelpful in education, counselling, and preaching, for its 
language does not appeal to people.5 
These elements, albeit with differences of emphasis and 
approach, can be discerned in a book by S. TeSelle, which 
deals explicitly with the main question of this chapter, and in 
the view of narrative theology developed over the recent years 
by J . -B. Metz. These views will be presented in the next two 
subsections, while in a third the questions provoked by a 
construction of a 'metaphorical theology' on the basis of these 
arguments will be discussed. 
1.1 Intermediary theology 
TeSelle's Speaking in Parables: A Study in Metaphor and Theology is 
divided into a foundational and a constructive part.' In the 
first part TeSelle argues for a kind of theology that she calls 
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'parabolic' or 'intermediary', i.e., a theology that uses 
metaphors and parables as basic forms of reflection. In the 
second part the sources of this type of theology are discussed: 
poem, story, and autobiography. For the present discussion 
the first part is the more interesting. 
In the introduction TeSelle states that theology could better 
fulfil its function of making the gospel credible or possible in 
our secular and disbelieving time if theology were 'to attend to 
Jesus ' parables as models of theological reflection, for parables 
keep "in solution" the language, belief and life we are called 
to, and hence they address people totally'/ In this quotation 
two different arguments can be distinguished - one about the 
function of theology and one about metaphor - which are both 
developed in the following chapters. 
The argument about metaphor is connected with the overall 
argument by means of an identification between metaphor 
and parable: parables are extended metaphors. A metaphor is 
'a word used in an unfamiliar context to give us new insight . . . 
metaphor is a way of knowing, not just a way of communicating'.' 
This connection between metaphor and knowledge is discussed 
in a chapter entitled 'Metaphor: the heart of the matter', 
together with two other connections: first, the connection 
between metaphor and the creation of new meaning - metaphors 
create new meanings, which are only available in metaphors; 
and secondly, the connection between metaphor and the 
constitution of language - metaphor is the foundation of 
language, since 'language, all language is ultimately traceable 
to metaphors'.4 These two connections lead to the most 
important one: metaphor is basic 'to all human thought of 
whatever sort',5 and 'all thought is metaphorical'.6 In exploring 
this connection TeSelle uses the notion 'move' ('Metaphor as 
Human Movement' is the title of a section): 'Metaphorical 
thinking . . . is the way human beings, selves (not mere minds), 
move in all areas of discovery, whether these be scientific, 
religious, poetic, social, political or personal'.7 and 'our move-
ment, of whatever sort, is always metaphorical, with ourselves 
as one term of the metaphor',8 i.e., human beings understand 
the unknown in terms of themselves. This implies an epistemo-
logica! position; 'human knowing, at its most profound, is not 
disembodied, abstract or conceptual; the analogy for human 
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knowing is not the Cartesian machine but the evolutionary 
organism — the stretching of the whole creature beyond itself 
into the unknown';9 'Metaphor . . . is the way of human 
knowing'.'" Abstract thought and abstract language seem 
the natural completion of metaphorical language, but it is 
'unfortunate' to consider this completion as the 'highest' 
development: it is more appropriate to see it as a degeneration. 
'Discursive language, then, the language which relates, 
communicates, designates, measures, enumerates, dissects, 
analyzes, systematizes, depends on metaphorical language — it 
is, in fact the old age of such language'." 
In the light of the previous chapter the inadequacies of this 
view of metaphor will be apparent. The definition ('a word 
used in an unfamiliar context') is a word-centred definition 
and the discussion of the connection between metaphor on the 
one hand and the change of meaning and the constitution of 
language on the other, reveal that the crucial distinction 
between metaphorical sense and metaphorical use is not made. 
The central connection between metaphor and knowledge and 
the claims made concerning this connection are only possible 
because of the vagueness and the imprecision of the definition. 
'Unfamiliar' is a subjective and temporal term. Something can 
be unfamiliar to one person but not to another, and something 
can be unfamiliar to someone up to a certain time, till he 
becomes acquainted with it. If this is applied to metaphor, it 
means that a metaphor ceases to be metaphor after one has 
encountered it, or used it a few times, and that whether a 
sentence is a metaphor or not depends on personal experience. 
'Context', too, is problematic, since, if it is understood linguistic-
ally, all new information, even all new sentences, are covered 
by this definition of metaphor. For the same reason, the addition 
of 'novel connection"2 does not go far enough. The use of 
'move' and 'movement' show the same vagueness. In the 
Aristotelian definition 'movement' is used to point to the 
transference of the meaning of a word, which normally refers 
to one thing, to another thing, but TeSelle goes further by 
interpreting 'movement' as 'getting from here to there'. If this 
were taken seriously, every syllogism would be a metaphor. 
Apart from the vagueness of the definition, the account confuses 
two rather different claims: first, that metaphors are basic to 
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thought, and secondly, that thought-processes or persons 
('Jesus is the metaphor par excellence') are metaphors or 
metaphorical. TeSelle can only maintain the first point because 
of her vague and insufficient definition of metaphor. With 
regard to the second point, it is necessary to say that a metaphor 
is a qualification of a certain use of language, and that, if this 
qualification is used for non-linguistic entities, it is not used 
literally. What is explained by calling non-linguistic entities 
'metaphors' depends on the theory and definition of metaphor, 
but if they are inadequate hardly anything is explained.13 
The second argument of the central claim is concerned with 
the function of theology. The purpose and function of theology 
is, according to TeSelle, to make the gospel 'possible' and 
'credible', to help 'people to be encountered by the word of 
God',14 to make it possible for people to respond and to come 
to a moment of insight,15 to renovate the basic Christian 
language so that it will again be 'authoritative', 'revelatory', 
'meaningful',1'' to translate the gospel in such a way that people 
of a certain place and time are addressed totally.17 Theology is 
not primarily concerned with 'formulations or systems', but 
with how people 'get from unbelief to believing"8 - with 
' "believing", a process which is more like a story than it is like 
a doctrine'.19 To fulfil this task the theologian must use a 
language that keeps 'in solution' language, belief, and life, and 
must unite form and content, as parables do. Theologians 
must be metaphorical in language, i.e., utilize common 
language to evoke the uncommon; they must be metaphorical 
in belief, i.e., concerned with the 'narrative quality of believing', 
with 'the loves and fears and hopes that move one'; they must 
be metaphorical in life, i.e., they must be 'unabashedly auto-
biographical'.20 'Is the theologian like an aesthetician and 
philosopher or more like the literary critic? Is it his or her job 
to create a system which explains, interprets and organizes the 
primary data, or is it to help the preacher, to help the people to 
help the word of God today? I think it is the latter.. .'2I 
It is clear that TeSelle's proposal for an 'intermediary' 
theology implies a criticism of existing theological language 
and the prevalent way of thinking, but it is not clear how 
fundamental her criticism is meant to be. On the one hand she 
seems to propose parabolic or intermediary theology as an 
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addition to the existing tradition or systematic theology, or, 
more precisely, as a reinforcement of a way of doing theology 
which has always been present but which should be emphasized 
in our time because of its special needs. Parabolic theology 
does not deny the necessity of systematic theology.n TeSelle 
calls intermediary theology 'a way from religious experience to 
systematic theology'.21 On the other hand, though, she seems 
to reject traditional systematic theology: she talks about a 
radical correction of form and content that is needed and about 
a systematic theology that makes it 'more difficult, if not 
impossible for one to believe . . .V4 This ambivalence can be 
readily removed by looking at her remarks about metaphor 
and thinking, and by looking at her description of the task of 
theology. If these are taken seriously—and that seems necessary, 
for the whole argument would otherwise collapse — TeSelle 
must hold the latter view, and must be proposing a radical 
narrative or radical parabolic theology to replace traditional 
argumentative theology. 
TeSelle's argument for a narrative and metaphorical 
theology in the strong sense is thus supported by two 
arguments: one concerning the task of theology, and one con-
cerning metaphors. The second argument cannot be 
maintained, since it rests on an inadequate theory of metaphor. 
Docs this mean that the case for narrative and metaphorical 
theology collapses? One could hold that the first argument is 
still sufficient to support the claim, and one could even argue 
that a theory of metaphor as proposed in Chapter II above 
could be used for further support. One of the functions of 
metaphor is to give insight, to influence people, to change, to 
persuade, and to affect them, and it is exactly this which -
according to TeSelle - theology should do. The coherence of 
such a radical metaphorical theology will be discussed after a 
closer look at a somewhat different approach to narrative 
theology. 
1.2 Apologia/or narrative theology 
J.-B. Metz's arguments for a narrative theology are intended to 
show that stories, narratives, are not just aids in the field of 
applied theology, but essential parts of theology. 'The distinc-
tion "proclamation tells stories, theology argues", seems to be 
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too quick and too superficial and to eclipse the fundamentally 
narrative structure of theology'.' His arguments did not 
originally arise from analyses of parables, but constitute a 
phase in the development of his understanding of theology as 
political theology; in a more systematic presentation, however, 
an appeal to scriptural language does play a role.2 
Metz's starting-point is that the justification of hope (1 Pet 
3:15) forms a fundamental feature of every Christian theology. 
For such a project of justification to make sense, it has to take 
into account the ideas and processes that determine the culture 
and the situation in which it takes place. At the present time 
the context of theology is formed by the ideas of the Enlighten-
ment, embodying important changes and crises in the 
traditional western understanding of man, nature, and society, 
and provoking processes of liberation and emancipation. 'The 
principle of exchange' has become crucial in the organization 
of society: those values determined by it constitute the public 
sphere and are not considered to be necessary or primary (so, 
for example, religion). Tradition loses its power to determine 
and guide actions and becomes a topic for research instead; 
authority is questioned, because it implies a relation of 
inequality and guardianship. Since being enlightened is 
related to using one's reason in all areas publicly, the practical 
and political dimensions of the use of reason come to the fore 
and the need to create situations in which free use can be made 
of reason is felt. These points have a bearing upon revealed 
religion, which is consequently criticized for being ideological 
— i.e. a function of social processes and a support of a political 
fabric - and in opposition to revealed religion a 'religio 
naturalis' is put forward.3 Theology has to take these ideas 
seriously and to use them critically. But neither their rejection 
by the traditionalists and neo-scholastic apologetics, nor their 
acceptance by contemporary theology, are examples of such 
critical and serious use, for the former do not want to accept 
the changed situation or the new questions, while the latter 
accepts them too easily and does not 'enlighten the Enlighten-
ment'. This last point is only possible, according to Metz, if 
the subject of these processes, the bourgeoisie, is considered 
and criticized. It is a fatal mistake of theology to identify this 
bourgeois subject with the subject in the religious sense, or to 
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identify bourgeois practice with truly Christian practice.4 In 
his outline of a theology that responds adequately to the task 
of providing a justification of hope in these times, Metz uses 
'subject' and 'practice' or 'praxis' as key concepts and relates 
both concepts to that of'narrative'.3 
His insistence on attention to the subject is part of a criticism 
of the Enlightenment and of conceptions of emancipation and 
history derived from the Enlightenment. In these conceptions, 
the concrete subject more and more tends to disappear, and 
'development', 'progress', 'freedom', and 'future' are discussed 
in abstract terms. The dangers of uncontrolled technology and 
purely economic planning are examples of the consequences of 
such abstract approaches to freedom and development. The 
subject of history is, for example, the 'Weltgeist' or 'the 
proletariat', and its history is seen solely in terms of success 
and victory, while failure and sufTering are not related to that 
subject of history.6 
The importance of praxis in the understanding of theology 
is not just, or even primarily, due to the insistence of the 
Enlightenment on practical reason, but has its foundation in 
the biblical concept of God. Thinking about God is practical, 
for it takes place as a revision of immediate needs and self-
interest: 'metanoia' and 'exodus' are noetical categories.7 
Similar remarks can be made about Christology, which has 
'imitation' as its central category. 'Only in imitating him (i.e., 
Christ) can Christians know with whom they have associated 
themselves and who has saved them'.8 The biblical stories 
narrating the imitation of Christ (and those narrating exodus 
and metanoia) set out to change their hearers and to bring 
them to imitation (or metanoia). This means that Christological 
knowledge is not in the first place transmitted by concepts, but 
by stories. The practical constitution of theology is in this way 
the basis for the narrative features of theological language.9 
The stories of Scripture, moreover, do not present faith as 
something that is added to an already existing personality or 
people, but show that faith - the relationship to God -
constitutes the subject, forms the identity of a person or people, 
and is essential to the maintenance of that identity. The central 
categories in these processes are 'memory' and 'narrative'. 
Memory is not to be understood here as a nostalgic and 
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escapist remembrance of the past, but as a 'dangerous memory', 
recalling failure and suffering and expectations that were and 
are not fulfilled. This type of memory is dangerous, for it 
undermines the obvious character of the present and leads to 
rebellion and liberation. Emphasis on the subject, therefore, 
although not unrelated to the enlightening of the Enlighten-
ment, has — like the primacy of praxis — its basis in the Christian 
understanding of faith and religion. 
These views determine the way Metz approaches and 
criticizes other treatments of what he considers to be the main 
problem of contemporary theology: the relation between salva-
tion (or the history of salvation) and the experience of 
suffering and failure. Here again 'narrative' plays a central 
role. This main problem appears, for example, in his discussion 
of the diminishing influence of Christianity and the problems 
this creates for its own self-understanding.10 All solutions 
employ, according to Metz, an idealistic conception of history, 
be it a universal or a transcendental conception. As a clarifica-
tion Metz cites and explains the tale of the race between the 
hare and the hedgehog. The hedgehog wins the match without 
having to run by using a trick: he places himself and his wife 
who looks like him, at either end of the course. Every time the 
hare approaches an end, he or his wife appears and is seen to 
be already there. The hare runs from one end to the other until 
he collapses. The criticized solutions embody aspects of this 
hedgehog trick. The universal view embodies the trick in the 
sense that one oversees the whole course of history, and the 
meaning of history is there without interruption by danger. 
The transcendental view expresses another element: the 
threatened identity of Christianity is saved by a tautology, for 
beginning and end are identical, and the meantime - history -
is not relevant. A plausible rejoinder to this criticism is that 
Christian theology cannot but depart from the assumption 
that history makes universal sense, for is the sense of history 
not determined by God's eschatological act in Jesus?12 The 
common solution to this dilemma - either not taking the 
history of suffering fully seriously, or futurizing salvation to 
such an extent that it is exchanged for utopia - is to locate the 
experience of failure in the individual. The individual can then 
either apply or refuse to apply the history of salvation to his 
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own history." But this can only be done in narrative if there is 
no distortion of the individual history and the universal history 
of salvation.N For a story is 'on a small scale and without 
pretence' and 'it does not contain the dialectical key — not even 
from the hand of God - by which light could be brought in all 
dark corridors of history before one has entered and passed 
through them. But it is not without light'.15 
Metz acknowledges his dependence on Weinrich for his 
understanding of narrative."' Weinrich gives criteria for 
determining what belongs to the category 'narrative'.17 The 
criteria are syntactical signals - like verbs in the imperfect 
tense, temporal adverbs, or adverbs and conjunctions that 
appear in large parts of the text - and metalinguistic signals as 
indications ('novel'). Concepts like 'past' and 'truth', though, 
are irrelevant as criteria.18 The criteria Weinrich gives are 
developed in the context of his work in the field of literary 
criticism, but in his application some confusion is caused, for 
he seems to refer to narrative in an ordinary sense and to 
narrative understood as literature. Metz, too, refers to 
literature.19 But despite the apparent resemblance between 
Weinrich and Metz, Metz applies 'narrrative' to a less 
restricted category than either narrative in the ordinary sense 
or narrative in the sense of literature. For him, 'narrative' 
appears to be connected with 'original experience', 'new', 
'beginning and end' and 'never been before', and his thesis is 
that these experiences disrupt argumentative language and 
can only be expressed in narrative language.20 Narrative 
language is thus opposed to argumentative, conceptual language 
that describes normal, regular, customary, and unexceptional 
situations. Narrative language thus becomes identical with an 
open and open-ended language.21 His conception of narrative 
language makes Metz's arguments relevant to the discussion 
about the role of metaphor in theology. It is these disruptive 
features which are characteristic for metaphor; and it is the 
expression of the new and the exceptional, the redescription of 
reality, which are the functions we have ascribed to metaphor. 
An important question in the context of the present dis-
cussion is whether he proposes a radical narrative theology or 
whether he argues for a 'mixed discourse'. As in the case of 
TeSelle, one can find quotations supporting either answer. 
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The link between narrative language and original, new 
experience leads to the radical version ('can only'). Similar 
exclusive remarks can be found when Metz discusses the way 
the history of salvation is related to the history of sufTering: 
only narrative language can give an adequate solution. 'A 
conceptual-argumentative mediation and reconciliation 
between, on the one hand, the effective salvation that has 
taken place and, on the other, the human history of suffering 
seems to me impossible . . . The dilemma can, in my opinion, 
not be solved by any subtle speculative reasoning, but only by 
another way of expressing in language the effective salvation 
that has taken place in the non-identity of the suffering . . .', 
'soteriology . . . cannot be purely argumentative; it has to 
explain narratively; it is a fundamentally memorative-
narrative soteriology'.22 Or again, in the context of an analysis 
of the biblical concept of God: the practical constitution of the 
concept of God is also the basis for 'the essential and unalter-
ably memorative and narrative nature of the fundamental 
structure' of the language about God.23 Religion and the 
process of becoming and remaining a subject belong insepar-
ably together, and for these processes, memory and narrative 
are fundamental categories.24 
But there are also remarks that point towards a 'mixed 
discourse'. Metz stresses that he wants to show the insepara-
bility of argument and narrative, and that his arguments are 
not directed against argument in theology as such: narrative 
versus argumentation implies a regressive standpoint.24 He 
aims to relativize argument, not to reject it, for it has a task of 
its own: 'to safeguard the narrative memory of salvation in our 
scientific world, to interrupt it critically, and to lead us back 
time and again to narrative . . .'25 The relation indicated here, 
Metz elsewhere describes as follows: '. . . the linguistic content 
of Christianity is to be understood primarily as an inclusive 
story (Grosserzählung), which also contains and originates 
argumentative elements and structures . . ,'26 So, the narrative 
acts as a kind of frame which is and remains primary and 
fundamental.27 Although on the basis of the first series of state-
ments it seems difficult to come to any other than the radical 
view, his acceptance of a mixed discourse at the same time 
does not result in an incoherent position. And the reason for 
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this lies in the way Metz envisages this mixed discourse: it 
does not consist of two equal parts, for argument plays only a 
minor and secondary role.28 But can this position be 
maintained? 
1.3 Metaphorical theology: reconstruction and coherence 
The arguments put forward by the narrative theologians are 
explicitly or implicitly relevant to the central question of this 
chapter. Although TeSelle's metaphor theory is clearly 
inadequate, and although Metz does not mention metaphors, 
the function they allocate to metaphors or narrative can be 
assigned to metaphors understood by means of the theory 
proposed in Chapter II. On the basis of these arguments for 
either an exclusive narrative theology or a mixed discourse, 
one can reconstruct a radical metaphorical theology or one in 
which metaphors dominate the discourse, while concepts or 
arguments play only a minor and auxiliary role. The coherence 
of such a reconstruction depends on the arguments used for 
narrative theology. How coherent are these arguments? Can 
some of the basic presuppositions that determine the line of 
argument be maintained seriously? What are the consequences 
of a radical and exclusively metaphorical theology? 
Three groups of remarks are relevant in view of these 
questions. The first group is concerned with the role of 
narrative in the past and the present. Although not 
immediately relevant for the reconstruction of a metaphorical 
theology, these views have some bearing upon the evaluation 
of concepts. If narrative theologians are correct on this point, 
and if conceptual language constitutes a deterioration, this 
could be used as an argument against a conceptual theology 
and in favour of metaphorical theology. TcSelle suggests such 
an argument.1 The second group of remarks is related to the 
appeal or the effect stories have. The same can be said of 
metaphors: like stories, they provoke a response. The possi-
bility of abuse is clear in both cases. Do narrative theologians 
allow for procedures that decide whether such abuses occur? 
In the third group of remarks 'history' occupies a central 
place, and these have an immediate bearing upon the recon-
struction. If it is correct that conceptual refinement cannot 
solve the central problems of contemporary theology - i.e., the 
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relation between the history of salvation and the history of 
sufTering — then a criticism of metaphorical theology and a plea 
in favour of conceptual theology are open to the same objection. 
But how is this objection to be understood? Is the suggestion 
that the arguments found in the philosophy of history are 
helpful a correct suggestion?2 A closer look at these remarks 
will reveal how coherent a reconstruction of a metaphorical 
theology on the basis of the arguments put forward by TeSelle 
and Metz is. 
1.3.1 'Narrative innocence '? 
Both types of narrative theology presuppose an understanding 
of story-telling that is based upon historical evaluation and 
upon an assessment of the role of narrative in contemporary 
culture. But this double basis is highly questionable. The 
historical evaluation is expressed in claims like 'originally, the 
Christian community was a story-telling community, not an 
argumentative community' (Metz and Weinrich). The early 
church is then pictured as a community in which the stories of 
Jesus and about Jesus are told and retold. 'We can imagine a 
Christianity which transmits itself from generation to genera-
tion in an endless chain of retelling of stories: "faith comes by 
hearing"." But Christianity did not remain that story-telling 
community: it lost its narrative innocence when it entered the 
Hellenistic world. But this black-and-white picture is clearly 
wrong and oversimplistic. The Christian community did not 
exist apart from its Jewish background, where discussions 
about the interpretation of the Law, about the resurrection, 
about the question which commandment is the most important 
played an important role, as is clear from the gospels. More-
over, the New Testament does not consist of stories alone, and 
Jesus is portrayed as interspersing stories with arguments. 
Furthermore, myth and story are characteristic of the 
Hellenistic world as well, as Weinrich elsewhere points out.2 
To say Plato's attempt to give new brilliance to myth failed 
and that philosophers have ever since refused to tell stories 
might be correct, but is certainly not enough to support the 
claim that the Hellenistic world was a predominantly 
argumentative culture.3 
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Most writers on narrative theology are aware of the 
problems surrounding story-telling in contemporary culture. 
VVeinrich points to the fact that fiction has lost its narrative 
innocence — that contemporary writers 'subject the process of 
story-telling itself to critical examination' when they tell a 
story.+ 
TeSelle acknowledges the fact that even those among 
modern writers who are considered to be the best do not seem 
to tell stories.0 But the reaction to this phenomenon is rather 
naïve: a return to narrative innocence, or a retreat to parables. 
TeSelle retreats to parables because they do not call 'for the 
same degree of faith in cosmic or even social ordering' as is 
required in novels.6 If one argues for the importance of literature 
— be it on a purely technical level or on the level of content as 
well - one cannot exclude a major part of that literature or 
prominent tendencies in such a way.7 Estess, referring to 
American writers like TeSelle, warns against uncritical 
enthusiasm for the story form. The disruption of the story form 
by authors like Samuel Beckett creates an important challenge 
to narrative theologians (or religionists, as Estess calls them). 
Beckett does not present a 'successive among interrelated 
elements', a 'linear development with hierarchically arranged 
parts', but 'a puzzling interrelation of disrelated particles', a 
'contraction of attention to particulars of experience', a 
juxtaposition of elements in a 'desultory fashion'.8 Theologians 
should not succumb to the temptation to exclude 'renovative 
chaos', to 'disorder life by violent imposition of the order of 
story' for such an imposition can undermine 'the attitude of 
wonder towards the relatively chaotic flow of life-experience'.9 
Theologians often imply that life is a well integrated plot: 'one 
sometimes receives the impression that instead of literature 
imitating life, the religionists interested in story want life to 
imitate literature'.10 The complexity of life should not be 
obscured by a simple plot. Similar points are made by Mieth 
when he says that a more positive attitude towards the so-
called destructive tendencies in modern literature is required." 
Weinrich's return to narrative innocence is not desirable for 
the same reasons, and it is doubtful whether this return would 
solve anything: would story-telling become more innocent if 
less reflection took place? This leads to the problem of criteria. 
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1.3.2 Criteria? 
Do narrative theologians indicate criteria that determine, when 
changes occur in the process of retelling a story, which of these 
changes are permitted and which are not? Do they mention 
norms for the selection of some new stories and the exclusion of 
others? Do they allow for safety measures to prevent possible 
abuse? The necessity of this kind of question is clear in the 
light of the criticism of religion as being an ideology, and in the 
light of the need to preserve the specific character of the 
Christian tradition, for if every story can be part ofthat chain, 
it seems difficult to claim a distinctly Christian nature for it. 
There are elements in the writings of the narrative theo-
logians that can be understood as criteria: they are all 
concerned with the effect of the story. Stories should move 
people, should create insight, should start a process of coming 
to belief, should result in action and imitation. But the same 
story or metaphor can have opposite effects and can result in 
quite different actions. The story of a world-wide Jewish plot 
as told in the Protocol of the Elders of Zion can result — and has 
resulted - in both anti-semitism and the rejection of anti-
semitism. 'Life is a tale told by an idiot' can evoke feelings of 
despair and feelings of protest (dangerous memory), can 
result in resignation and in feverish action to change one's life. 
So, some further specifications are necessary, and these can in 
fact be found in the writings. In her discussion of the 
(re-)sources of parabolic theology, TeSelle argues that apart 
from the stories and the images of Scripture, poetry, novels, 
and autobiographies can serve as sources. The selection 
criterion here is 'the distortion of the familiar, for the purpose 
of providing a new and extraordinary context for ordinary 
experience'.1 As TeSelle acknowledges, this criterion applies to 
all good literature, or can be used as such, and states a charac-
teristic feature of poetry. But, as it stands, this criterion is not 
sufficient, and the introduction of 'anonymous Christian' in 
this context reinforces the suspicion that 'good' literature and 
'Christian' literature are to be identified. 
The criteria used in the evaluation of the examples of the 
sources are not of much help either. Some poets, TeSelle says, 
are better than others, because they see where others see 
nothing; some novels are not satisfactory because they do not 
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tell the story of people on the move towards belief; some 
biographies are Christian because they are vocationally 
oriented, while others are self-oriented. But these criteria are 
still too general: to see what? to believe what? to be called to 
what? On one occasion something like an external check is 
mentioned. 'The New Testament images and stories serve as a 
rough guide to keep us from calling everything that is merely 
hopeful or positive "Christian", and to make clear that such 
phenomena as racism and Manichaeism are definitely out'.2 
The problem with this remark is not just the vagueness of 
'rough', but the presupposition that those images are clear, 
that their meaning is obvious and not in need of explanation. 
The cases of racism and Manichaeism quoted defy this pre-
supposition: how could they have played such an important 
role in the Christian tradition, how could they have occurred 
at all, if it is so obvious that they are excluded? The problem of 
criteria is not a real problem to TeSelle.3 
Weinrich's introduction of the notion 'narrative tolerance' 
can be seen as a specification of criteria. Stories are told and 
retold with changes, but these changes are permitted within a 
story-cycle, like the stories in Boccaccio's Decameron. 'The 
point of the story cannot be extracted by an examination in 
terms of " t rue" and "false", but becomes part of the wisdom of 
the ages as a succession of stories gradually builds up our 
experience of life and salvation'.4 Weinrich's example of such 
retelling is the chain: the murder of the children of Bethlehem 
— the persecution of the Jews by the Nazis - Vietnam. But this 
example provokes several questions which cannot be answered 
satisfactorily by reference to this notion of'narrative tolerance' 
— questions like: are these stories limited to children (Jewish 
and Vietnamese), or are they about everybody who is helpless 
in the face of violence? Can one include abortion stories in this 
chain? Or, to change the example: it is a common feature in 
the Christian tradition that people understand their suifering 
in relation to the suffering of Jesus, as for example Paul (Phil 
l:12f; Col 1:24). But can a bishop whose authoritarian actions 
provoke a strong reaction and criticism identify his 'suffering' 
with that of Jesus? Can the wife of an alleged war-criminal link 
the arrest of her husband to that of Jesus? One cannot deny 
that in the history of Christianity the passion story has been 
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connected 'in some way' with pogroms, in the sense that the 
passion story functioned as the argument for the persecution. 
Is this a sign of the 'wisdom of the ages'? What is the status of 
that 'wisdom of the ages'? Is it an institution beyond 
questioning, a supra-critical authority? These questions are 
even more pressing since Weinrich rejects questions about the 
truth of stories and considers them irrelevant. Would the dis-
covery that the Protocol of the Elders of Zion was a forgery, 
written by an anti-semitic member of the Tsarist secret police, 
make no difference to the way we react and respond to that 
story? 
In Metz's view not all stories are acceptable: only those that 
have emancipatory power and express a social criticism are 
admissible. In other words, 'dangerous memory' serves as the 
criterion. But stories about oppression, failure, and suffering 
have been used for what turned out to be just a change of 
personnel or the consolidation of an oppressive society. So 
there is still some ambivalence left, and still a need for a 
discussion about the interpretation.5 
One could object that these criticisms are unjust, since it is 
impossible to formulate less general and more specific criteria. 
One cannot decide before the stories are told whether they are 
admissible or not. Insistence on more specific criteria is there-
fore unrealistic and should not be used against narrative or 
metaphorical theology. At first sight this seems a reasonable 
objection - certainly if it is understood as relating to content 
criteria - for if one tries to formulate more specific criteria one 
quickly discovers the problems. An example of further speci-
fication would be: all stories advocating the killing of people, 
all stories reducing the godhead of Christ, all stories denying 
the almight of God, are excluded a priori. But then someone 
might tell a story about the murder or the attempted murder 
of a tyrant - say, BonhoefTer's involvement in the attempt to 
murder Hitler; or acclaim Jesus Christ as Superstar, and point 
out that 'he is just a man but scares me so', is a 'Christology 
with parabolic indirection', as TeSelle does;6 or tell stories 
about evil and disaster; and people might even refer, in these 
contexts, to stories in Scripture - to the story of David killing 
Goliath, to the story of Jesus in Gethsemane, or to the silence 
of God in the period between Joseph and Moses. And even if 
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one tries to reformulate these criteria in a somewhat more 
general way without losing all content - e.g., stories that stress 
the commandment of loving one's neighbour, that recognize 
the importance of Jesus, that accept God's activity - the 
problems are not solved. For it is not so difficult to find groups 
of people in past and present who told and tell stories covered 
by these criteria and who considered and consider themselves 
Christians, but who were not and are not considered to be 
Christians by others who told and tell stories falling under the 
same criteria. So, it seems that the insistence on criteria is 
misguided: it is difficult to give criteria for stories that have 
been told, and it is impossible to give criteria for stories that 
will be told in still unknown situations. 
The answer to this important objection does not consist in 
insisting upon the necessity of content criteria, but in showing 
that a formal scheme can be produced that fulfils the require-
ments and that has built-in precautions against abuse.7 The 
first step towards such a formal scheme is the recognition that 
a story can belong to one of three different 'streams'; to 
Scripture, to tradition, or to the present time. A new story can 
be said to be a genuine Christian story if it can be linked with 
stories in Scripture and tradition. But this is clearly not 
enough, and two further steps have to be introduced. First, the 
nature of the linkage has to be defined; and secondly, the 
one-way check from Scripture and tradition on the new story 
has to be changed into a two-way check. The first of these two 
steps is connected with the problems that appeared in the 
attempts to formulate more specific criteria. The problem 
there was that it is possible to quote example from Scripture 
(or tradition) to support a story that seemingly ought to be 
excluded from the Christian story chain. The second of these 
steps is the result of the realization that faith is a living faith 
and that the expression of faith is always determined by 
historical and cultural circumstances, whether this expression 
is recognized by the Christian community as canonical, or 
belongs to tradition, or is contemporary. These last two steps 
imply, though, interpretation, analysis, and argumentation in 
all three 'streams'. Relevant questions for this interpretation 
and analysis include: Is the concept of neighbour the same in 
all three streams?; Is God's omnipotence correctly understood 
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and invoked here?, etc. Since these two further steps are 
necessary, and since they necessarily imply the use of 
arguments, analyses, and interpretation, which is only possible 
by means of abstraction - i.e., by leaving the level of narrative 
and metaphor - it is clear that narrative or metaphorical 
theology necessarily has to be supplemented by argument. 
This conclusion becomes unavoidable from the moment one 
becomes aware of the problem of criteria: this problem can 
only be solved if one leaves the level of narrative and metaphor. 
The danger of the exclusive and radical version of narrative 
(and metaphorical) theology as defended by TeSelle and 
Weinrich is not so much that the available elements that could 
serve as criteria are insufficient, but that there is little or no 
concern about this important question regarding the criteria. 
On this radical view everything is possible and everything 
permissible, which leads to a Christianity void of content and 
rightly denounced as ideology. 
Metz escapes this danger by giving argument a place. But if 
the necessity of another type of language is recognized, the 
question arises how this conceptual or argumentative level is 
related to the metaphorical or narrative one. Metz allows 
argument to play a minor role within the framework of the 
narrative. One of the reasons he gives for denying argument a 
more important place can be found in his already-quoted 
thesis that an argumentative and conceptual mediation 
between the history of salvation and the history of suffering is 
'out of the question', since such a solution implies either a 
'gnostic perpetuation of God's suffering' or 'the reduction of 
suffering to its concept'. The dilemma cannot be escaped by 
'more subtle reasoning'.8 One may presume that Metz does 
not intend to say that, since the available conceptual solutions 
are not satisfactory, no conceptual solution will ever be satis-
factory. In order to make sense he has to present other 
arguments for that conclusion. An argument that Metz seems 
to indicate is the following: conceptual solutions and specula-
tive reasoning do not solve the problems of suffering and 
salvation, because those problems are only solved when some-
thing is done, when the suffering is removed and the salvation 
realized. In this sense conceptual solutions are always 
inadequate: practical problems are not solved by speculative 
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arguments. This is a point that might be necessary to make in 
those cases where conceptual power is overstated or the 
expectations with regard to discursive reasoning are too high. 
Once the point is seen, though, it loses much of its initial 
force,'1 and one can ask whether in the case of narrative the 
same or a similar point cannot and should not be made. Why 
should narrative be better in mediating between the history of 
suffering and the history of salvation? Metz suggests a connec-
tion between narrative and praxis when he uses formulations 
like 'the theological language of Christians has a narrative-
practical feature'w and mentions the lack of pretence and 
small scale of narrative: insofar as this presupposes that 
narrative language exerts great influence on people and on 
their acting, the problem of the criteria returns. Another 
possibility is that history and stories are so related that this 
link constitutes the basis for Metz's claim, viz., that stories are 
themselves explanatory, as is maintained by some philosophers 
of history. Is the philosophy of history, to which some authors 
appeal, helpful on this or other points? " 
1.3.3 'History tells stories' 
The narrative historians hold two related claims: first, that 
narrative is not a stylistic ornament, but a feature which 
belongs essentially to historical work; and secondly, that the 
understanding which is typical of history is reached through 
narrative.1 If this position is taken to maintain that every 
historical work must show an overall narrative pattern, the 
position is, according to some critics, untenable. Works that 
undeniably belong to history - like Huizinga's The Waning of 
the Middle Ages — would have to be excluded. If the position is 
understood as maintaining that all the important works are 
narratives and that the non-narrative ones are ancillary,2 that 
would still conflict with the practice of historians. Although 
these counter-arguments have some force, they are only 
decisive if one accepts the general opinion about what history 
is and historians do. But if one sees it as the task of the philo-
sophy of history not only to describe what in fact takes place, 
but also to criticize, if necessary, what historians do, one can 
still argue that those works are wrongly considered to be 
historical or central. This means that the second point - the 
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nature of historical understanding and the contribution of 
stories to that understanding - is the central point of the dis-
cussion. 
Gallic says that a narrative is self-explanatory and Louch 
calls narrative 'a distinct kind of explanation': 'it focuses 
attention on the fact that describing a chain of events from a 
certain perspective in itself reveals the connection among 
events'.3 Danto states that 'to ask for the significance of an 
event, in the historical sense of the term, is to ask a question 
which can be answered only in the context of a story'.* 
This answer can be given because a narrative is 'a form of 
explanation', it 'describes and explains at one and the same 
time'.5 There is a class of sentences, characteristic for historical 
writings, which exhibit this feature of narrative. These 
sentences 'refer to at least two time-separated events, though 
they only describe (are only about) the earliest event to which 
they refer. Commonly they take the past tense and indeed it 
would be odd . . . for them to take another tense'.6 Words like 
'anticipated', 'cause', 'began' are typical for such narrative 
sentences. An example of such a sentence is: 'The Battle of the 
Marne was one of the decisive battles of the world, not because 
it determined that Germany would ultimately lose or the 
Allies ultimately win the war, but because it determined that 
the war would go on'.7 
According to Danto, the role of narrative in history is to 
explain a change which may be a process that covers a long 
period of time. These processes have a beginning and an end 
which are both part of the explanandum, while the middle is 
constituted by the explanation. For example, 'Louis xiv died 
unpopular' (end) presupposes that he once was popular 
(beginning) and the changed attitude towards the king is then 
explained with reference to his foreign policy, etc. (middle). 
The selection of the beginning is determined by the end, and 
the explanation looked for is a causal one, pointing to one or 
several causes. This implies that to tell stories is to make a 
choice: 'stories, to be stories, must leave things out'.8 A 
complete description of events in the sense of a complete 
order-preserving transcription of absolutely everything that 
happened, as, when, and how it happened, is not the aim of 
history and the historian, since narrative sentences and causal 
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connections could not be included in such an 'ideal chronicle'. 
A complete description that is interesting from a historical 
point of view - i.e., that locates an event 'in all the right 
stories' - is impossible to obtain, since the future is open and 
the meaning of an event might be revealed only much later. 
What the historian does is to give a narrative organization. 
And this implies an 'impugnable subjective factor', and 
'element of sheer arbitrariness'.9 We organize events relative to 
some events we find significant in a sense not touched upon 
here. It is a sense of significance common, however, to all 
narrative, and is determined by the topical interests of this 
human being or that'.10 
The explanatory power of a strictly narrative sequence is 
questioned by Mandelbaum (among others), who argues that 
even in the cases where narrative seems most adequate, like 
reports of an election campaign or a biography, the historian 
has to appeal to non-narrative elements. A biographer must 
appeal to intelligence, temperament, personality, the society 
the subject lives in, etc. - to elements, in other words, that are 
not events which form part of a sequence; a historian writing 
about an election-campaign has to refer to voting habits, the 
cultural and social background of the constituents, etc., in 
order to explain why what happened did happen. Historians 
must appeal to background factors that cannot be formulated 
in terms of narrative." Or, to put it differently: 'narrate' can be 
used in connection with events, but not in connection with 
situations.12 
But there is another argument against the narrativist's 
claims about the role of stories, and it is concerned with the 
underlying linear model of history. It regards 'the events 
which form a unitary strand of history as a linear sequential 
series: a leads to b, b to с, с to d, and so on'.13 This model 
assumes that 'what occurs in history is to be construed as if its 
occurrence were primarily or even exclusively due to human 
actions'.14 Reference to antecedent human action then 
suffices as an explanation of what happened, and this can only 
be done in narrative, because narratives concentrate upon 
human agents and therefore prevent a distorted view. 
Mandelbaum and Ely argue that this model cannot be main­
tained, since it leaves no place for conditions, and conditions 
Three Answers 145 
are necessary, since they have causal significance. Historians 
in fact appeal to conditions in their work, and those that make 
history use conditions - as, for example, a politician who takes 
advantage of a certain crisis. Moreover, if in laboratory 
experiments the conditions have to be controlled, it is clear 
that conditions have a causal influence.15 
This short survey of the discussion about narrative in history 
shows that the suggestion that narrative theologians can 
appeal for support to the philosophy of history is not a useful 
one. First, there is a considerable difference in the under-
standing of narrative. In the discussion 'narrative' is used to 
characterize an explanation and a description of a process that 
is past: the future is excluded from this understanding of 
narrative. Danto is very clear about this point. His analytical 
philosophy is developed in opposition to what he calls a 
substantive philosophy of history, i.e., 'a systematic inter-
pretation of universal history in accordance with a principle by 
which historical events and succession are unified and directed 
towards an ultimate meaning'.16 To interpret history this way 
is 'a misconceived activity, because it supposes that the history 
of events can be written before the events have happened'.17 In 
this view the meaning of an event is seen in the context of the 
whole of history - past, present, and future. But, according to 
Danto, this is unacceptable 'because we are temporal-
provincial with regards to the future'.18 The meaning of an 
event may become clear later and it is the task of the historian 
to bring this to light, but this 'later' is always a part of the past 
with regard to the historian. Only after 1940 can historians 
talk about 'the first world war', although prior to 1940 they 
could have said that 'the great war' lasted four years. This is 
the reason why narrative sentences do not have a future tense. 
It is significant that Danto, agreeing with Lowith, calls the 
substantive view 'essentially theological'. For, 'from a 
theological point of view history becomes history, when it has 
hope, when it has future', as Mieth puts it.19 
Secondly, even if this difference in understanding can be 
removed without damaging consequences for the historical 
view and theory, the criticism of the self-explanatory character 
of narrative seems unsurmountable. A possible way of meeting 
this criticism — namely, by arguing that these objections are 
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typical to history — is not open to theologians, and certainly 
not to theologians like Metz, for it would imply that faith has 
no connections with or consequences for life and society, that 
faith is concerned with events, persons, human agents, but not 
with society, with the conditions these persons live in, etc. 
These criticisms of the self-explanatory character of narrative 
also casts doubt on biography and autobiography as 'pure' 
sources for an exclusive narrative theology. 
Thirdly, one of the unquestioned claims in the discussion is 
that historians present a subjective organization or construction 
of what happened.20 The emphasis on subjective selection, and 
thus on the difference between the data and the narrative 
construction, resembles Estess' remarks about the difference 
between life and literature. The dangers of reducing the one to 
the other are in both cases aggravated by too simple an under-
standing of literature and history, namely, a well-integrated 
plot and a linear model of history. But this means that narrative 
history faces the same problem as narrative theology - the 
problem how to decide whether a narrative construction is 
correct or not. One can escape cynicism about history, the 
work of historians, only when one allows for arguments to 
settle the differences. 
This all means that the appeal to the philosophy of history 
for help is not very useful, except that it underlines the 
importance of the question of criteria. But this line of inquiry 
does answer another question, namely, the question about the 
relation between the two types of language which was raised 
by Metz's position. It answers this question in a somewhat 
surprising way, though, since it points to a more important 
place for argument than Metz is prepared to acknowledge. 
Mandelbaum's criticism of the thesis that stories are self-
explanatory shows that stories cannot be understood without 
some general knowledge derived from analysis. Or, as Jones 
puts it, using a comparison with a game of cricket; 'Under-
standing depends not only on following the progress of play (or 
of the story) but also on recognizing that this or that event 
breaks the pattern of generalized expectations we wrongly or 
rightly hold in regard to the game (or story) . . . Following the 
story of Israel or the Church depends upon a framework not of 
stories but of certain non-narrative descriptions, analyses and 
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generalizations which we or others have worked out (well or 
badly) in a process of discussion and argumentation. Stories 
would then be parasitical upon this argued or at least arguable 
framework'.21 This realization has of course some consequences 
for the claims about the unique and exclusive relation between 
narrative and the experience of newness, etc. These experiences 
and narratives can only be recognized within such a framework 
and by using this framework. 
With regard to metaphors, a similar feature was mentioned 
when it was said that metaphors depend upon their literal 
meaning and presuppose the accepted order of reality, for 
otherwise they would not be discovered or recognized as 
metaphors. The complexity of the relations between language 
and reality is again relevant. Strangely enough, Metz does 
recognize this complex relationship, when he says that the 
reality we encounter is in fact a 'secondary world', i.e., a world 
determined and formed by theories and systems. Only within 
these world systems are we able to experience and change 
reality.22 The examples he gives of the two world systems 
dominating European-American culture are the evolutionist 
interpretation, which can be found in Western bourgeois 
cultures, and the materialist-historical interpretation which 
can be found in East European societies. As is clear from the 
examples, these world systems are not narratives. Metz was 
earlier quoted as saying that the linguistic content of 
Christianity is an exclusive story containing argumentative 
elements and structures with the explicit denial of a reverse 
relation, and that contradicts this point. Even if one recognizes 
that Metz at this particular point conducts a polemic against 
the view that narratives are just means of illustration, this 
contradiction is not resolved, for the view of theology is too 
limited and not in accordance with Metz's own practice. While 
in the one case the argument arises out of the narrative and the 
narrative remains primary, in the other the argument is outside 
the frame of the narrative; in the one case, theology consists in 
following the narrative and protecting it, in the other theology 
analyzes the narrative in the context of the secondary world 
and looks critically at the relations between them. Ambivalence 
about the view of the task of theology can also be found in his 
indiscriminate use of'theological language'. In his arguments 
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about the fundamentally narrative structure of theological and 
Christological knowledge and language, Metz uses 'theology' 
and 'Christology' in a broad and non-technical sense, but the 
technical sense of these terms appears in his argument about 
deficient soteriology. Only if this ambivalence in the under-
standing of theology and theological language is removed can 
a solution be found for the contradiction. 
1.3.4 Conclusion 
The discussion of these three groups of remarks shows that the 
reconstruction of a metaphorical theology on the basis of argu-
ments used in support of two types of narrative theology is 
unsatisfactory. An exclusive narrative or metaphorical theology 
is not able to counter the charge that it is a form of ideology, or 
that it empties Christianity of any specific content. Only by 
allowing for arguments and interpretation, by allowing for 
another type of language, can the questions about criteria be 
answered. The recognition of another type of language as an 
integral part of language is also the result of the criticism of the 
presuppositions about narrative innocence and the purity of 
the narrative sources. It is the all-pervading presence of 
'argumentative', 'analytical', and 'abstract' language in 
language generally that reveals the unsatisfactory character of 
the solution presented in the moderate version. The complexity 
of the relationship between language and reality is not 
sufficiently recognized in this view. 
2. Models 
There is, apart from the type of argument presented in narra-
tive theology, another type of argument in favour of the 
importance and necessity of metaphors in theology and 
theological language: the argument that theology, like science, 
uses models. This type of argument rests upon three distinct 
claims: metaphors and models are similar in important 
respects, models play a crucial role in the formation of theories 
in science, and similar functions in theology are fulfilled by 
models. 
For a proper discussion of the first claim, it is necessary to 
recall both the distinction between the structure and the 
function of the metaphor and the importance of an adequate 
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explanation of the structure. It is not enough to defend a 
similarity in function: a similarity in structure is required as 
well. With regard to the second claim, an extensive examination 
of the different positions in the philosophy of science goes 
beyond the scope of the present discussion. It is enough to 
explore one position that gives models an indispensable role in 
scientific research and theory formation, for if on this account 
no sufficient case can be made for metaphor models in theology, 
it certainly will not be possible to do so with the help of other 
positions that give models less prominence. 
The term 'model' is used for a bewilderingly wide variety of 
phenomena: in order to structure the field somewhat and to 
limit the discussion to types relevant to theology, a classification 
of the use of 'model' in science is necessary. In the literature 
several classifications, or principles for classification, are 
proposed. Apostel classifies models on the principle of their 
relation to their prototype. 'Models and prototypes can belong 
to the same class of entities or to different classes of entities'.1 
Harre makes a similar remark when he distinguishes between 
models whose source and subject are identical (homoeomorph) 
and whose subject and source arc different (paramorph).2 
Black's classification is used by some philosophers of religion 
and he distinguishes four types: scale models, analogue models, 
mathematical models, and theoretical models.3 Scale models 
cover 'all likeness of material objects, systems and processes, 
whether real or imaginary, that preserve relative proportions'.4 
Analogue models are 'some material object, system or process 
designed to reproduce as faithfully as possible in some new 
medium the structure or web of relationships in an original'; in 
these models a 'change of medium' occurs.5 The theoretical 
model comes close to the analogue model, for here, too, an 
identity of structure is basic. The difference between the two is 
that the theoretical model does not need to be constructed; it is 
enough to describe it: 'the heart of the method consists in 
talking in a certain way'.6 
A more elaborate classification is given by Bertels and 
Nauta.7 They base their classification on three main principles: 
the type of entity out of which the model consists, the 
mechanism of the model, and the function of the model. The 
various sciences study three types of entities and each of these 
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can be used for a model: concrete, conceptual, and formal 
entities. Each of the three types can be a model for one of the 
three entities (an empirical or concrete model of a conceptual 
system, a conceptual model of a conceptual system, etc.). They 
further distinguish six different principles according to which a 
model works {mechanism): change of scale {scale models, like 
miniature cars or samples), change of medium with isomorphism 
as result of analogy {analogy models — these include Black's 
analogue and theoretical model - like measurement of the 
temperature of stars by means of light, or the representation of 
the electrical field in terms of an imaginary fluid as Maxwell 
proposed), idealized circumscription {ideal model, like 'ideal 
gas'), presentation of qualitative structure {structural model, like 
blueprints of an organization) and mathematical and abstract 
models. All types of models have a number of functions in 
common: they visualize, reduce, and represent, and they are 
didactically and heuristically helpful. The different types have, 
moreover, specific functions: so, for example, an analogy model 
can explain phenomena. 
Most writers on models in theology are interested in what in 
this classification falls under 'conceptual models'. This does 
not mean that empirical or abstract models do not occur in 
theology: iconography and logic can play a role in theology, 
but the point is that they do not play a central role. The 
limitation to conceptual models excludes scale models and 
abstract models, since the first type belongs to the empirical 
models and the second type is only used in the formal sciences; 
mathematical and empirical analogy models can be excluded 
as well, which leaves analogy models (Black's theoretical 
models), ideal models, and structural models as the types of 
model that can occur in theology. This narrows down the field 
sufficiently for the following discussion. In the course of the 
discussion a further refinement will be made. 
2.1 Models and metaphors 
One of the philosophers who compares models to metaphors is 
Black, and he refers explicitly to a theory of metaphor to 
support his claim.' He invokes the similarity between models 
and metaphors in his discussion of two problems connected 
with theoretical models. The first of these problems is 
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concerned with claims about reality which are implied in the 
use of models. According to one view, the use of models is a 
heuristic device: it presents something 'as if'. This view 'uses a 
detached comparison reminiscent of simile and argument 
from analogy'.2 In this view models do not have explanatory 
power, since they do not claim that reality is such and such. 
The other view maintains that in using models the scientist 
makes an existential claim: something is said to be such and 
such. This view requires 'an identification typical of metaphor'.3 
Models understood in this way are able to explain, but there is 
a danger of self-deception. The second, closely related problem 
is one about the status of models. Some philosophers argue 
that models are not necessary and that, even if used, they can 
be replaced adequately by a clear and logical language: models 
are 'props for feeble minds', 'surrogates', but not 'a rational 
method having its own canons and principles'.4 This argument 
resembles the discussion about the possibility of an adequate 
translation of paraphrase of metaphors. Referring to his inter-
action theory of metaphor, Black points to the extended 
meaning of the metaphor that 'can neither be adequately 
predicted nor subsequently paraphrased in prose . . . Meta-
phorical thought is a distinctive mode of achieving insight, not 
to be construed as an ornamental substitute for plain thought'.5 
Similar remarks can, according to Black, be made about 
models. And an objection about the use of models in science as 
irrational is answered by Black as follows: a model must be 
isomorphic with the domain it is applied to, and 'in stretching 
the language by which the model is described in such a way as 
to fit the new domain, we pin our hopes upon the existence of a 
common structure in both fields. If the hope is fulfilled, there 
will have been an objective ground for analogical transfer'.6 
So, the irrational charge is countered with a defence that 
appeals to the existential commitment. 
Hesse, like Black, mentions a theory of metaphor in connec-
tion with her views on models, and the theory she mentions is 
basically Black's interaction theory. But there is an interesting 
point of difTerence. Black says that metaphors can create a 
similarity, but Hesse thinks that, although this may be the 
case in poetry, it is not the case in science. 'The question that 
any scientific model can be imposed a priori on any explanandum 
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and function fruitfully in its explanation must be resisted. Such 
a view would imply that theoretical models are irrefutable . . . 
no model ever gets off the ground unless some antecedent 
similarity or analogy is discerned between it and the 
explanandum'.7 The danger of the comparison view, with its 
implication of an adequate translation, can be avoided on the 
interaction view, and also by realizing that 'as long as the 
model is under active construction as an ingredient in an 
explanation, we do not know how far the comparison extends'.8 
Both Black and Hesse acknowledge differences between 
(poetic) metaphor and model. A metaphor, Black says, is a 
short statement, while models are like sustained and systema-
tically developed metaphors. In a metaphor common-place 
associations are at work, while in a model a known scientific 
theory is used, and a typical and essential requirement for a 
model is 'the systematic complexity of the source of the model 
and the capacity for analogical development'.9 Hesse sees the 
main difference in the reference and the application of 'true', 
and the other points of difference follow from this basic 
difference. Poetic metaphors are striking, unexpected, even 
shocking, and are not meant to be analyzed, and several 
formally contradictory metaphors can be used for the same 
subject. Models on the other hand may be unexpected, but 
they are meant to be analyzed, and contradictions or inconsis-
tencies are a challenge to reconcile the models or to refute one 
of them. 'We can perhaps signalize the difference by speaking 
in the case of scientific models of the (perhaps unobtainable) 
aim to find a "perfect metaphor" whose referent is the domain 
of the explanandum, whereas literary metaphors, however 
adequate and successful in their own terms, are from the point 
of view of potential logical consistency and extendability often 
(not always) intentionally imperfect'.10 
But these differences are apparently not so great that they 
sever the link between metaphor and model. The question is 
whether the metaphor theory used can support this near-
identification: that is to say, are the reasons for appealing to 
metaphor for the solution to the problems concerned with the 
structural features of the metaphor? In the previous chapter 
the argument was put forward that the interaction theory 
cannot sufficiently explain the mechanism of the metaphor, 
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because it wrongly supposes that what has to be explained is 
the change of meaning of a term, i.e., metaphorical meaning. 
The two points concerning the structure of the metaphor that 
Black uses to defend the necessity of theoretical models are 
'extended meaning' and 'the inadequacy of translation', and 
the basis of the second point is the first. So, if extended meaning 
is the characteristic feature of models, one cannot use that to 
link models to metaphors, for no extension of meaning occurs 
in a metaphor. The point on which Hesse disagrees with Black 
— the necessity of some antecedent similarity - does not 
strengthen the case for a link between model and metaphor: on 
the contrary, it makes the gap between the two even greater. 
One can also ask whether the differences mentioned by Black 
and Hesse are not such that the connection is less obvious than 
they suggest. Is a sustained, systematically developed and 
analyzed metaphor still a metaphor? Is there only a small 
difference between common-place associations and a known 
scientific theory? Is the 'perfect metaphor' in the sense Hesse 
uses this phrase still a metaphor? Both Black and Hesse 
emphasize the claims about reality made in the use of models, 
but does that not show that a scientist when using models is 
not just proposing a possible redescription of reality, but is 
redescribing reality? This seems to be the motive behind 
Hesse's critique of Black." These questions require a further 
discussion of the place of models in science. Harré's transcen-
dental realism is a theory that gives models a prominent place 
and that shares some basic interests expressed by Black and 
Hesse (the existential commitment). Moreover, Harre employs 
a somewhat different theory of metaphor, which broadens the 
discussion. 
2.2 Transcendental realism 
A scientist has two distinct tasks: first, to single out patterns in 
nature and experience, and secondly, to explain those patterns. 
The explanation should not only include the conditions under 
which the pattern occurs, but also the description of the 
mechanism that causes this pattern. This second task of 
explaining receives most attention in the analyses of the 
philosophy of science, and is of special interest to the present 
discussion.1 
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Λ look at the practice of scientists shows that when they 
provide a causal explanation a regress or an ongoing stratifica­
tion takes place. The description of a phenomenon that can be 
observed and that has to be explained constitutes one level, 
while the explanation of the phenomenon, that is, the descrip­
tion of the mechanism that causes it, constitutes another. This 
mechanism can in turn become the subject of an explanation, 
and so on. For example, 'the liquid corroded the metal' can be 
explained by 'the liquid in this case contained acid' and this 
can lead to research into the nature of acid.2 This development 
in scientific explanation implies, according to Harre, the 
presupposition of three 'zones' of reality: a zone of actual 
experienced reality, a zone of reality that can be experienced 
in principle, and a zone of reality that is for ever beyond 
experience.3 The first two zones can be combined in 'realm Γ 
while the third zone constitutes 'realm 2'. It is impossible to 
settle in advance what can and what cannot be experienced, 
and the dividing line between actual and possible experience is 
therefore flexible and révisable: the factual division is deter-
mined by the state of science at a given time. The development 
of more powerful microscopes, slow-motion films, etc, have 
enabled scientists to prove the existence of causal mechanisms 
like viruses, whose existence could only be presupposed before 
these developments. 
This ongoing stratification means that perception and 
imagination both play a role in science. Perception alone is not 
enough for the required causal explanation: structures and 
mechanisms have to be imagined and postulated as well. Using 
Coleridge's analysis of imagination, Harre distinguishes two 
phases which correspond to the second and third zones: a 
reproductive and a creative phase. The first is concerned with 
the anticipation of possible perception and experience. It 
conceives of things that are too slow or too quick, too small or 
too big to be perceived by us due to the limitations of our 
senses, and it conceives of these things parallel to what we 
experience and perceive. The second phase is concerned with 
what can never be experienced, with what transcends all 
possible perception. The imagination conceives of these things 
in a way different from the reproductive phase: it 'dissolves, 
diffuses, dissipates in order to recreate; or where this process is 
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rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to 
idealize and to unify'.* 
The imagination is subject to two constraints in science. 
First of all, the mechanism is imagined in order to give a 
causal explanation of a certain pattern of behaviour. So it must 
be structure that could produce such behaviour: the behaviour 
of the imagined world must match the behaviour of the real 
world. Secondly, since the model must be satisfactory as the 
source of the content of the theory, the structure must be 
possibly existent. So our experience of reality, existing scientific 
knowledge and theories, and our concepts of what reality looks 
like determine also what can and cannot be accepted as a 
causal structure.5 
The notion of models enters into science because models are 
the product of imagination. But since the term 'model' is used 
by philosophers indiscriminately for the non-verbal and verbal 
products of imagination, which sometimes leads to confusion, 
Harre introduces a more precise terminology: icon-model for 
the non-verbal product and sentential model for the verbal 
product, for the description of the icon. This refinement in 
terminology has a consequence for the discussion of models 
and metaphors: the more precise question now is whether 
metaphors occur in the sentential model, in the sets describing 
the icon. 
A scheme can present the outline of the theory of transcen-
dental realism and can serve for our discussion about the role 
of metaphors.6 
perception imagination 
subject matter observed causal icon- source 
pattern mechanism model 
sentential sets I II III IV 
Sentential set I contains the description of the pattern of 
behaviour that has to be explained; sentential set IV contains 
the description of the source of the icon-model. Sentential set 
II is empty but can be filled in two ways, either via set III if 
the icon-model becomes more and more plausible, or directly 
if existential hypotheses are generated and confirmed. This 
explanatory framework is used in the case of the realm of 
possible experience as well as in that of the realm of reality 
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beyond experience. In both cases an 'analogy of behaviour' 
between the icon and the mechanism is present, but only in 
the case of the realm of possible experience is there also 'an 
analogy of being'. That is to say, the claim for an icon-model 
in realm 1 includes a similarity between the characteristic 
items of source, icon and reality: the icon is like the source and 
is like reality. The item constituting the source forms the genus 
of which the item is in reality a species. Such a claim cannot be 
made when the icon-model represents reality beyond experi-
ence, since the relation between the unknown mechanism and 
the source is not one of species to genus. This difference is 
reflected in the language used. In the case of realm 1 the 
predicates used for the unknown mechanism are similes, for an 
investigation of the negative, positive, and neutral analogies is 
possible. In the case of the predicates for realm 2, they are 
metaphors, since the positive, negative, and neutral analogies 
cannot be investigated. The predicates used in the similes keep 
the same literal meaning in the context of the icon as they have 
in the context of the source and when at some stage, through 
research or the further development of instruments, the icon 
becomes the true representative of the causal mechanism, the 
terms preserve their meaning. But the discourse about reality 
beyond experience is the result of the creation of new semantic 
fields, of new meanings. For it is difficult to find a language 
that describes adequately and intelligibly the reality beyond 
experience: only metaphors can do that. This conclusion Harre 
reaches via an analysis of metaphors that is influenced by 
linguistics.7 The Saussurian notion of the 'meaning-field of a 
lexical item' that includes all the syntagmatic and paradigmatic 
dimensions of that item, can be rendered in terms of rules: 
syntactical rules summarizing the syntactical dimension (verb, 
noun, etc.), and selectional subcategorial rules summarizing 
the paradigmatic dimension. A metaphor is generated by 
violation of the subcategorial rules, while the syntactical rules 
are preserved. Subcategorial rules reflect our experience and 
are therefore not violated when we talk about our experience 
(realm 1), but are necessarily violated when we talk about 
what is beyond our experience, given the differences between 
the two realms. Metaphors are thus required to talk about 
realm 2. In this view metaphors are characteristic of a 
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particular sentential model, namely, that dealing with reality 
beyond experience, while the language of models dealing with 
the realm of possible experience is characterized by similes. 
At first sight this conclusion is rather different from what 
Black and Hesse say, and does not seem to be very helpful in 
solving the problems about metaphors and models. But they 
share ideas that seem to point to a general agreement: like 
Black and Hesse, Harre maintains that models are not just 
heuristic fictions, but indispensable parts of scientific theory; 
and, like Black and Hesse, Harre maintains that existential 
claims are made by scientists when they use models, for it is 
the aim of science to push the dividing line between actual and 
possible experience further. And it is on the basis of this 
agreement that doubt arises about this disagreement about the 
use of metaphor. What are the features of language that 
motivate this opposite conclusion? 
Black rejects the 'as-if' thinking as an adequate rendering of 
what takes place when a scientist uses models, and he stresses 
the 'as-being' thinking: the first he associates with simile, the 
second with metaphor. But that first connection is somewhat 
strange: a simile or comparison is normally not used to express 
an 'as-if', but to present a similarity, a likeness between two 
entities with regard to one or more particular features. 
Metaphor is correctly associated with 'as-being', but it is not 
quite correct to characterize model-thinking as 'as-being-
thinking' tout court, since there is an element of caution in the 
identification between model and metaphor. Black himself 
uses terms like 'putative' and 'hope'.8 And what is hoped for is 
a similar structure. One of Hesse's arguments for not using a 
simile, or, more precisely, for not using a comparison view of 
metaphor, is that models allow for the exploration of neutral 
analogy, i.e., the comparison is not limited to one particular 
feature or to a set of particular features, but is open. The 
argument employed by Harre for using 'simile' is in fact the 
same as Hesse's argument against its use: the likeness can be 
established because the positive, negative, and neutral 
analogies can be explored. But the use of simile or metaphor in 
this context is also a little strange, for interest in neutral (and 
negative) analogy is not typically connected with the normal 
use of simile and metaphor. Terms like 'open comparison', 
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'perfect metaphor', and 'extended metaphor' are witnesses of a 
terminological uncertainty: 'metaphor' and 'simile' do not fit 
the phenomenon described and it would be better if a new 
term could be found. So, Black, Hesse, and Harre agree 
basically about the language used, but this agreement is 
clouded by the 'uncertain' terminology. This conclusion 
directs our attention to the models used for the second realm 
and to the language describing them. Is Harre correct to 
characterize this language as metaphorical? Is the theory 
explaining metaphors an adequate one? 
In the discussion of the linguistic approach to metaphor at 
the beginning of Chapter I I , it was argued that certain 
presuppositions and concepts make it impossible for a number 
of linguists to give an adequate explanation of metaphor. Like 
the linguistic theorists, Harré uses as one of the central concepts 
in his theory of metaphor 'violation of subcategorial rules'. As 
was shown, this concept is not able to distinguish between 
metaphors, mistakes, lies and grammatically correct nonsense. 
Since it is one of the presuppositions of the structuralist 
approach that meaningful behaviour, including speech, is 
governed by rules, the violation of a rule must result in non-
meaningful behaviour or in non-sense. The awkwardness of 
this appeal to the violation of rules is here, too, disguised by 
the other notion Harré uses: the change of the meaning-field of 
a lexical item. This notion directs the attention to two features, 
the lexical item and the change of meaning, and neither of 
these is of much help in a theory of metaphor, since a metaphor 
is a sentence in which words keep their ordinary and original 
meaning. A change of meaning implies a change of rules, but 
this is not consistent with a violation of rules, if they are under-
stood to take place at the same time. The solution is to see the 
violation of the rules as a comment about the history of the 
meaning-change, and that implies, as was argued before, a 
diachronic approach to metaphor. 
It is clear that one of two things has to take place: either the 
term 'metaphor' has to be dropped, or a better theory has to 
be invoked to replace the one that is used currently. One way 
of deciding which of the alternatives should be chosen is to 
look at the language that is labelled 'metaphorical', i.e., the 
language describing the realm beyond experience. One of the 
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problems Harre sees with regard to the realm beyond experience 
is how to talk about that realm in an intelligible and adequate 
way. He argues then as follows: since realm 2 is probably 
different from realm 1, the language must show this difference. 
And since metaphors create new fields of meaning, metaphors 
must be used to express this difference. The premiss about the 
difference between the two realms requires some elucidation. 
What does the difference consist in? The realm beyond 
experience is beyond experience, not because of the limitations 
of our senses, but because it is a realm which cannot be 
experienced and which is not meant to be experienced: it is the 
realm of concepts, the realm where representations fall short 
and only abstract thinking is adequate. It is the realm of 
metaphysics. Harre indicates this not only by using the term 
'metaphysics', but also by selecting 'power' and 'structure' or 
'nature' as his key-terms for the realm beyond experience.' 
These terms are chosen because we can conceive of mechanisms 
and structures of powers, but we cannot visualize them or 
represent them (cf Aristotle's hyle and morphe or Aquinas' 
materia prima). But these terms show also that metaphors are 
not necessary. What is necessary - and this is valid for realm 1 
and realm 2 alike — is a precise, technical, and theoretical 
language. The aim of the imagination in both realms is to 
reach a scientific explanation, a theory of causal mechanism. 
The description of the source of the icon-model, of the icon-
model itself, and of the causal mechanism contain theories and 
the terms used are determined by this context. Whether they 
are arrived at by way of a change of meaning, whether their 
meaning could in certain cases be called 'metaphorical', is 
only of historical interest: at present they are understood and 
learned by reference to the theory they belong to. Their 
meaning is a technical and theoretical one. These arguments 
suggest that the first alternative - viz, to drop the term 
'metaphor' as a qualification of the type of language describing 
the models of realm 2 - should be followed. 
So these two sections show that the appeal to metaphor in 
the explanation of what scientists do when they use models is 
not very helpful. Metaphors and models are not the same, and 
the invocation of 'metaphor' appears to rest upon inadequate 
theories of metaphor and upon the idea that extension of 
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meaning or change of meaning form an essential part of 
metaphor. 
2.3 Models in theology 
Two of the three claims that constitute the argument in favour 
of using metaphors in theology by appealing to the use of 
models in science have now been examined. For the decisive 
phase of the discussion attention is again going to be directed 
to the first claim that relates models to metaphors, and to the 
third claim which states that theologians, like scientists, use 
models. After the arguments of the previous sections it is 
sufficient to see whether Ramsey, Ferré, and Barbour, who 
present this type of argument, introduce new concepts that 
improve theories of metaphor in such a way that the connec-
tion between models and metaphors becomes acceptable.' 
2.3.1 Metaphor and model 
Ramsey links models and metaphors very closely: he uses the 
terms indiscriminately.' In his Models and Mystery, which 
contains a more elaborate discussion of models than his earlier 
books, Ramsey mentions the similarity between his treatment 
and that of Black, but notes some differences as well. A first 
difference is partly a terminological one. Ramsey renames 
Black's scale model and analogue model as picture model and 
disclosure model.2 The disclosure model, as Ramsey under-
stands it, is not only central to natural and social sciences, but 
also to theology, and this disclosure model resembles the 
metaphor closely. Ramsey prefers the label 'disclosure model', 
since the structural similarity, or the similarity with 
differences, which is typical for this type of model 'generates 
insight . . . leads to disclosures'.3 The condition that has to be 
fulfilled, in science and in theology, in order to achieve a 
reliable understanding is that 'structurally the model must 
somehow or other chime in with and echo the phenomena. In 
this way the universe itself authenticates a model. The model 
arises in a moment of insight when the universe discloses itself 
in the points where the phenomena and the model meet. In 
this sense there must be at the heart of every model a 
"disclosure". Such a disclosure arises around and embraces 
both the phenomena and their associated model'.4 Disclosure 
Three Answers 161 
is also at the heart of metaphors: 'metaphors like models are 
rooted in disclosures and born in insight'.5 This is the reason 
that they are distinctive. Richards and Black locate 'the secret 
and the mystery' of metaphor in the connection between two 
contexts; but, Ramsey asks, how does this mystery arise? His 
answer is that it arises out of the connection 'when and 
because the point of connection expressed in the metaphor 
itself generates a disclosure . . . Hence, the "is" of a metaphor 
has to be understood as a claim that (i) A and В in contact 
have generated a disclosure, revealing some object and (ii) 
what it is that has been disclosed demands discourse which 
infiltrates В into A'.6 The introduction of'disclosure' into the 
theory of metaphor is another difference with Black.7 Ramsey 
wants to stress the cognitive significance of insight and 
imagination, their objective reference. The reason why he 
prefers to talk about models rather than metaphors is that 
'model' 'prejudices less the discussion and points more likely 
to logical, epistomological and ontological issues'.8 
Are the points of difference between Ramsey and Black such 
that Ramsey presents a better case for connecting metaphors 
and models than Black does, and consequently a better case 
for metaphors in theology? The central notion of his treatment 
is 'disclosure', so the question becomes whether 'disclosure' 
improves the interaction view, and, if so, whether it facilitates 
the transition from metaphor to model. 'Disclosure' is intro­
duced to explain the interaction of the contexts: the point of 
connection is rooted in and generated by a disclosure. Although 
this might be the case for metaphors, it does not constitute a 
sufficient explanation for the following three reasons. First, the 
term covers too broad a field of experience. The stories of the 
judge who recognizes in the accused an old schoolfriend and of 
David and Nathan are not metaphors - not even if they are 
reduced to one sentence - although they are examples of 
disclosures.9 Disclosures happen without the use of metaphors. 
But, secondly, even if disclosures were experiences that only 
happened in connection with a metaphor, that were only caused 
by a metaphor, there would still be the problem that a 
metaphor becomes a subjective phenomenon. Ramsey 
repeatedly says that a disclosure cannot be forced or guaran­
teed. This leads to the conclusion, undesirable in a theory of 
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metaphor, that the same sentence might be a metaphor to one 
and not a metaphor to another. Finally — and this is implied in 
the last objection - to consider 'disclosure' as an explanation 
for metaphor is to give an explanation in terms of function and 
not in terms of structure. So, disclosure does not improve the 
interaction view as an explanation of metaphors, and a recon-
sideration of the position reaches vis-à-vis the relation between 
metaphor and model is therefore not required. 
Like Ramsey, Ferré identifies models and metaphors.10 
Models share 'the logical essential characteristics of all 
metaphors, they are not supposed literally true of their 
referent, and they have a point, they are illuminating in some 
respect when created'." It is obvious that these two points are 
not sufficient to characterize metaphor, let alone to explain the 
structure of metaphor. The first point is concerned with 
structure, but covers mistakes and falsities, and presupposes 
that the notion of truth and falsity can be used in a theory of 
metaphor. The second point is concerned with function. The 
same conclusion can therefore be drawn as in the case of 
Ramsey. 
Barbour does not equate metaphors and models.12 He points, 
following Black and Hesse, to a series of similarities between 
the two: both have positive, negative, and neutral analogies; in 
both cases neutral analogies invite further exploration and 
prevent reduction to a literal paraphrase; and the interaction 
between metaphorical and literal language finds a parallel 
in the interaction between theoretical and observational 
language.13 Models differ from metaphors in that they do not 
evoke 'emotional and evaluational responses'; they are 
systematically developed, the positive and negative analogies 
are specified, and they lead to theories that can be tested.14 In 
his theory of metaphor as well, Barbour follows Black, and 
marks as the important structural characteristics the analogies, 
similarities, and dissimilarities between 'the normal context of 
a word and a new context into which it is introduced',14 and 
the fact that a metaphor is not literally true and is open-ended.15 
These remarks do not improve Black's interaction theory and 
even show a return to the word approach. So, none of the three 
philosophers has been able to make a convincing case for the 
identification of metaphor and models or for a connection 
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between metaphors and models. This also means that the 
purpose of our discussion has been achieved. But there remains 
the question whether or not it may still be helpful to talk about 
models in theology. 
2.3.2 Models in theology? 
When these authors use 'models' to describe typical procedures 
in theology, they presumably see enough similarity between 
the procedures in science and theology to validate the use of 
the same term. Do they mean to claim that the procedures in 
both cases are exactly the same, or do they point to some 
important points of difference as well? Ramsey, Ferré, and 
Barbour differ in the answers they give to these questions. 
Ramsey does not see fundamental differences between 
science and theology for 'all disciplines combine under-
standing and mystery, which means that we shall expect to 
find in every discipline words and phrases which witness to the 
insight as well as models which ensure literacy'.' He refers 
here to his notion of'qualifier', i.e., to words that are witnesses 
of the mystery, directives which prescribe a special way of 
developing a model.2 As examples in theology Ramsey cites 
terms from negative theology like 'impassable' where 'im-' is 
the qualifier, and from the attributes of God, like 'first cause', 
where 'first' functions as the qualifier. In theology the presence 
of qualifiers is 'an absolute sine qua non declaring the in-
adequacy of all models':3 the qualifier not only points to the 
mystery but is also a 'built-in stimulus' for the endless con-
struction of variants.4 In science, too, qualifiers can be found, 
because single words can combine in them model and 
qualifier,5 the ultimate basis of which is the claim that 'all 
language has its intimations of divinity as theology has its 
essays in literacy'.6 
While Ramsey does not see fundamental differences, 
Barbour does. He makes a distinction between the cognitive 
and non-cognitive function of models in comparing science 
and religion. With regard to the cognitive function, the 
difference is one of degree and not of absolute contrast.7 But 
with regard to the non-cognitive functions the difference is 
fundamental: one of the primary functions of religious models 
is to express and evoke attitudes, to recommend a way of life. 
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Models in science do not have similar functions.8 And Ferré 
mentions other points of difTcrence. First, he sees a diiference 
in the type of models used: while in science several types are 
used, in theology only the conceptual type is employed.9 The 
second diiference is a difference in scope: while in science 
models have a limited scope, in theology models have an 
unlimited scope. In science models belong to 'the order of 
limited theories', in theology to 'the order of metaphysical 
theories'.1" 'The role of theological models with respect to 
understanding is to help conduct a complete comprehensive 
conceptual scheme in which every possible event can be inter-
preted as exemplifying it'." Related to the difference in scope is 
a difference with regard to adherence to models and theories. 
In science models are changed or replaced rather easily, while 
changes on the highest level of theoretical constructions only 
occur when there is an absolute need for it. In theology the 
reverse is the case: models are changed less easily than theories. 
A change in 'prime theories' of science brings about a scientific 
revolution, a change in the key models of religion a religious 
revolution.12 The third point of difference concerns the status 
of the model: 'The model . . . is a necessary condition of 
theological theory. The dependence [is] not shared by scientific 
theories'.13 The basis of this difference is that 'cognitive assent 
cannot be given to theological theories alone, stripped of their 
models, as can be done (in principle at least) for scientific 
theories'.14 In the case of theology, the need for models is also 
related to 'the non-cognitive dimensions' of meaning. 'For it is 
without doubt the imagery of the models in theology which 
evokes communal adoration, obeisance, awe, ecstasy, 
courage.. Λ15 
All three positions require some comment. Ramsey seems to 
be too positive. Apart from the different aims of science and 
theology, there is a serious problem attached to his broad 
understanding of 'model'. This broad understanding is 
revealed in remarks like: 'Sometimes a single word, perhaps 
indeed most single words when they are used significantly, 
combine in themselves the possibility of models and qualifiers', 
or, '. . . we "see" what "energy" means when we pick up from 
the interaction of bodies at rest and bodies in motion some sort 
of "invariant"; when despite the changes and chances within a 
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system, something overall is disclosed'.16 This understanding 
of model and its combination with qualifiers differs consider-
ably from that of transcendental realism, where a sentential 
model is not just a word but a theoretical description. Another 
feature of Ramsey's broad understanding can also be found in 
Ferré's and Barbour's views: the application of 'models' to 
both religious and theological language.17 This is possible 
because of his broad understanding - and because of his identi-
fication between models and metaphors - but at the same time 
it questions the parallel with the use of models in science. The 
distinction between religious and theological language is 
similar to the distinction between ordinary language and the 
technical language of the sciences, philosophy, etc. Religious 
language is the everyday language of faith and it is the 
language of Scripture, prayer, sermons, catechesis, etc., while 
theological language is a technical language, developed and 
used by theologians for their scholarly, systematic, and 
methodical work. As in the case of ordinary language and 
(any) technical language, this distinction between religious 
and theological language implies neither a complete separation 
nor an exclusive one-way relation between the two. A failure, 
though, to distinguish the two can lead to dangerous con-
fusions, certainly if the same words are used in both types of 
languages.1" Only by employing a distinction like this is the 
right perspective gained for discussion of the question whether 
models are used in theology in a way similar to that of science. 
Moreover, the parallel between ordinary language and 
religious language casts doubt upon the introduction of terms 
like 'the religious model' or 'the model of religious language', 
for only in a very imprecise way can one talk about the use of 
models in ordinary language, and it is far from clear what is 
explained by such a use. 
The need for this distinction is shown by the confusion in 
Barbour's position. If one tries to find similarities and dis-
similarities between theology and science with regard to the 
use of models, it is beside the point to see the differences in the 
non-cognitive functions.19 The same criticism has to be made 
with regard to Ferré's views, for he, too, introduces non-
cognitive dimensions as a support for his claim that theology 
needs models. Despite terminological appearances, he does 
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not make a distinction between religious and theological 
language. Terms like 'metaphysical model', 'biblical model', 
'biblical model of reality', 'biblical metaphysical model', 
'theological model' 'models of theology', and 'models of 
theological theory'20 are all concerned with biblical language, 
with religious language. If we were to divide these terms as 
referring to either religious or theological language according 
to the word they use, Ferré's argument would become incom-
prehensible. Ferré is concerned with 'the vividness and 
immediacy' of biblical language.21 Moreover, Ferré's account 
of the use of models in science does not pay enough attention 
to the role of theory in the use of models. When he remarks 
that 'the physicist must not permit himself to become commuted 
to the point by point relevance of the theory of wave dynamics, 
when he is studying the behaviour of light, even though the 
theory is fully established in its own domain',22 he suggests 
that theory is not the most important part. But, of course, it is. 
It is precisely the possibility of using an already established 
theory which makes this process of thinking in terms of models 
more than adding a picture or some imagery to an abstract 
calculus. But it is this very view which Ferré suggests when he 
contrasts 'model' with terms like 'abstract' and 'theoretical'.23 
'Model' thus comes close to 'imagery'. The question whether 
'model' is used here in the same sense as, for instance, in the 
theory of transcendental realism, must be answered negatively, 
despite Ferré's own analysis of the discussion in the philosophy 
of science.24 An interesting feature of his broad understanding 
of 'model' appears when he talks about the 'metaphysical 
model'. It refers to the conception people have of what reality 
looks like. 'The function of this model [the biblical meta-
physical model of nature, man, and God], indeed, would seem 
to be that of laying down guidelines for what may be counted 
as being real!'25 It is not clear why such a metaphysical view 
should be called 'model', or why such a view should constitute 
a difference between theology and science.26 
In these accounts, therefore, we discover too broad an under-
standing of 'model' and a confusion between theological and 
religious language. The two are related, for the lack of 
distinction between the two types of language makes it 
necessary to broaden the meaning of 'model' to accommodate 
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(for example) biblical imagery. The interesting question that 
remains is whether models understood in the stricter sense can 
be used to qualify processes and procedures in theology. There 
seem to be no decisive arguments against a recognition of a 
structural or formal parallel between the two. In both cases 
material is organized and explained with the help of imagina-
tion; in both cases theories developed with regard to the source 
of the icon are imported; and in both cases these imported 
theories may have to be adjusted to explain the new pheno-
menon. In theology one can point to the development of 
dogma, as Auer does, to the Christological formulations of 
Chalcedon, to the dogma of the Trinity or to the dogma of the 
eucharist, which according to Auer employs 'the substance 
model'.27 But as is clear from these examples, the imagery that 
may or may not be present (cf'substance model') is not impor-
tant; it is the available theory which is crucial. And this means 
that, although it may make sense to talk about models in 
theology, it does not constitute an argument in favour of 
metaphors as central terms in theology. 
3. Thomas Aquinas 
As in the previous sections, two main questions are important 
with regard to Aquinas' view of the role of metaphor in 
theology: How does Aquinas explain the mechanism or 
structure of metaphor?, and What does he say about the 
function of metaphor in theology? On two occasions Aquinas 
explicitly discusses the function and role of metaphors in 
theology, but his view of the mechanism and structure of 
metaphors has to be distilled from remarks scattered through-
out his works. 
3.1 Aquinas'view of the structure of metaphor 
Thomas uses metaphora, metaphonce, etc. some five hundred 
times, and frequently a few other terms occur in the immediate 
context: similitudo, and the couple proprie-improprie.1 Aquinas 
uses similitudo to point out that in the case of a metaphor there 
is only a similarity with regard to one specific point. This 
makes it possible to use the same metaphor for two different 
things or persons or to use different metaphors for one thing or 
person.2 Improprie is used to qualify the metaphor and to 
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distinguish it from proper language. Although Aquinas refers 
only a few times explicitly to Aristotle's view of metaphor,3 one 
can conclude from this first observation that his view resembles 
that of Artistotle. The broader theoretical context will make 
clear how one has to understand Aquinas' appeal to similarity 
and to proper-improper, and how he places his own emphases.4 
Aquinas remarks that with regard to a term or a word two 
things have to be distinguished: its signification and its 
supposition, i.e., the meaning of a word and what it stands for 
given that meaning.3 For Aquinas, but not for him alone, a 
basic presupposition in the discussion about signification is 
that words do not signify things immediately, but that they 
signify them via intellectual concepts, also called the ratio 
nominis.6 Naming and knowing are related for we name things 
as we know them. This leads to the distinction in the ratio 
nominis between res significata and modus significandi, between 
the thing signified and the way it is signified. The way of 
signifying, expressing the way of knowing, is either abstract or 
concrete, that is, is either signifying the form or the composite 
of form and matter. E.g., 'humanity' and 'man' signify the 
same thing, but 'man' signifies it concretely while 'humanity' 
signifies it abstractly. This example shows also that this dis-
tinction between res and modus is not to be understood as if the 
res could be encountered or known apart from the modus: the 
distinction draws attention to the fact that we know things in a 
certain way and that other ways are possible as well.7 Suppositio 
indicates that a term given its meaning stands for something. 
It can do this in different ways: it can stand for itself, as in 
' "man" is a noun' {suppositio matenalis); it can stand for the 
nature it signifies considered as universal and common, as in 
'man is a species' (suppositio simplex), and it can stand for some-
thing in which the res significata is found, as in 'every man is an 
animal' (suppositio personalis), which is in most cases meant 
when suppositio is mentioned.8 
With the help of these notions the différence between 
univocal, equivocal, and analogical language can be explained 
and metaphors can be located with regard to these language-
uses.9 When things are said to be uni vocally named the same 
word and the same ratio nominis is used, as e.g. in 'man and 
horse are animals'.10 But when things are said to be named 
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equivocally they have only the name in common, and not the 
ratio nominis, as is the case with 'dog' referring to an animal and 
to a star." When things are said to be analogically named, the 
same word is used, and they also have the res significata in 
common, but they difTer in the way of signifying it. 'There is 
diversity because the name signifies different proportions or 
relations or references; there is unity because these proportions 
or relations or references are to one and the same thing'.12 This 
unity and diversity results in a certain order: in one of the 
analogous words the ratio propria, that is, the res signified in the 
primary and regulative way, is retained, while the others 
signify it in so far as they refer to what preserves the ratio 
propria perfectly. Aquinas' favourite example is 'healthy'. 
'Healthy' is used for urine, medicine, animal, etc. as in 'the 
urine is healthy', 'the medicine is healthy', and 'the animal is 
healthy'. In all these cases the same res (health) is referred to, 
but each sentence does it in a different way, for urine shows 
health, medicine restores it, and an animal has it. Among 
these, the way 'healthy' is used in 'the animal is healthy' 
expresses the ratio propria.13 Since equivocal, univocal, and 
analogical use of language belong to the level of significatio and 
not to the level of suppositie, a word like 'man' can be used for 
different individual human beings without becoming an 
equivocal term.14 
In the context of his discussion of analogy, Aquinas also 
uses the term ratio communis, and he refers then to the extension 
of meaning which makes the analogical use of words possible.15 
In the case of the 'healthy' examples, the ratio communis is 'with 
regard to health'. Aquinas uses this notion to distinguish 
analogy from metaphor, as a discussion about the question 
whether 'light' is properly used of spiritual things shows.16 
Aquinas starts with two opposite opinions: Ambrose and 
Dionysius hold that 'light', if used of spiritual things, is used 
metaphorically, while Augustine maintains that 'light' is used 
properly of spiritual things and even more properly of these 
than of corporeal things. Aquinas analyses the différence as a 
difference in understanding 'light'. If light is understood as 
that which makes things visible (ratio propria) it can only be 
used metaphorically of spiritual things, for nothing which is/от 
se sensible belongs to the spiritual except in a metaphorical 
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way. Ambrose and Dionysius understand 'light' in this way. 
But if light is understood as 'the principle of manifestation' 
(ratio communis) the reference to corporeal things is removed 
and 'light' is used properly of spiritual things. Augustine 
understands 'light' in this way. In a parallel text Aquinas uses 
the contrast between the first application and the usage of a 
term: if'light' is understood in its ordinary usage, it is under-
stood as having received an extended meaning in the course of 
time and as covering all cases of manifestation. And if this is 
taken into account, as Augustine does, 'light' applied to 
spiritual things is not a metaphor, but an example of analogical 
use. 
So, ratio communis plays an important role in distinguishing 
metaphor from analogy. In analogy the ratio propria is preserved 
only in one term, but the ratio communis is present in all. 
Because the difference between the ratio propria and the ratio 
communis lies in the way something is signified, and not in what 
is signified, and because there is a similitudo analogiae, analogical 
names are properly applied to something, and the thing to 
which these names are applied belongs to the proper 
supposition. In the case of metaphor, though, there is no 
question of a ratio communis: there is only a univocal term with a 
ratio propria, but the term is used improperly, that is, it is used 
for something which does not fall under its signißcatio. The 
basis of the metaphor is a similarity of effect or property which 
Aquinas qualifies as a similitudo proportionalis. But this effect or 
property is not mentioned: what is mentioned is the thing that 
has this effect or property.17 When a man is called 'lion' or God 
is called 'fire', this is done on the basis of the similarity in 
strength between man and lion, or the similarity in power to 
purify between God and fire. But since this effect or property is 
not named, but rather what has this effect or property, no new 
way of signifying the res is involved. Metaphor is a case of 
improper supposition. If all suppositions of lion and fire were 
collected, man and God would not be among them. On this 
account of metaphor it is impossible therefore to talk about 
analogy as a kind of metaphor and metaphor as a kind of 
analogy.18 
The development of analogy and its contrast with metaphor, 
the use of the distinction between signißcatio and suppositio form 
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differences with Aristotle's view, but these differences do not 
remove the grounds for the criticism voiced in Chapter II. On 
the contrary, they bring out - in an interestingly sharp way -
the problems attached to this rhetorical view. First, there is a 
problem in connection with the starting-point, namely, that 
the metaphor is a word applied or transferred to something 
which is not part of its signification. If a metaphor is a question 
of improper supposition, it is implied that a metaphor is a 
predication and that it belongs to the level of a sentence. For, 
as Mclnerny remarks, 'a term has a supposition, it would 
seem, only as used in a proposition'.19 But this means that 
there exists a discrepancy, which, if noticed, calls into question 
either the starting-point (the metaphor is a word) or the 
explanation (a metaphor is a case of improper supposition). 
Secondly, the contrast with analogy makes clear that no 
change of meaning or extension of meaning occurs in a meta-
phor. The consequences attached to this correct observation 
seem less correct, though, and puzzling, for what is left of the 
meaning of the word if it does not constitute the basis of the 
transfer? Why is this particular word chosen if not for its 
meaning? Moreover, Aquinas' remark that 'brave' does not 
mean the same if applied to God and lion, seems to undermine 
the explanation even further.20 
On the basis of this theory of metaphor no arguments about 
the role of metaphor in theology can be accepted. But, as in 
the case with narrative theologians, the question has to be 
asked whether Aquinas' argument about the role of metaphor 
in theology can be based upon the theory we proposed in 
Chapter II. An answer requires the outline of Aquinas' view 
on theology as far as it relates to the role of metaphor. 
3.2 Aquinas' view of the role of metaphor 
At first sight, on the two occasions on which Aquinas explicitly 
discusses the role of metaphor in theology - at the beginning of 
his commentary on Lombard's Sentences and in the first quaestio 
of the Summa Theologiae — he uses similar arguments, which 
suggests one consistent view can be constructed out of the two 
texts. But a closer look reveals important and crucial 
differences. According to Corbin, we approach these 
differences correctly and are able to explain the dissimilarities 
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if we consider these two texts as the beginning and the end of a 
life-long process of thinking and experimenting with ideas and 
solutions to the question what theology is - a question which 
had become especially pressing for Aquinas' generation 
because of Artistotle's so-called 'third entrance'. The two texts 
will therefore be analyzed separately.' 
3.2.1 The Scriptum 
Aquinas' task as a baccalaureus sententiarum (1254—1256) was to 
lecture on Peter Lombard's Sentences. The way these Sentences 
were used from 1152 when they were written, up to the middle 
of the 13th century, showed some important changes: while at 
the beginning of this period the commentators provided 
glosses and kept close to the text, later on they inserted 
quaestiones which had a fairly loose relation to Lombard's text 
and whose contents were mainly determined by more recent 
theological discussions. This is the case with Aquinas' 
Commentum in libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, which 
was the result of his lectures. It contains his first personal 
reflections and views on content and method in theology.' The 
first quaestio, discussing problems about the nature and the 
method of the sacra doctrina, is a good example of this personal 
approach. These problems do not occur in Lombard's 
prologue, and Aquinas' discussion is determined by the con-
temporary situation, by Artistotle's third entrance. 
In this first quaestio, Aquinas' view of the function of 
metaphors appears under the heading utrum modum procedendi sit 
artificialis and forms part of a further specification of the way in 
which theology proceeds. Aquinas' starting-point is the thesis 
that the way a sdentia proceeds is determined by its principles, 
by its material. He develops this in three sections.2 First, the 
principles from which theology proceeds are accepted by 
revelation, and since the acceptance of revelation can be 
divided into the way it is received and its content, Aquinas is 
able to connect to this a classification of the literary genres of 
Scripture: modus revelativus and modus orativus on the one hand, 
and modus narrativus and modus metaphoricus, symbolicus or 
parabolicus on the other. The modus revelativus considers the 
reception of revelation from the point of view of the giver 
(prophetic visions) and the modus orativus considers it from the 
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point of view of the recipient (psalms). The two other modi 
concerned with the content are embedded in epistemologica! 
arguments: since we grasp the principles via sensibilia, the 
narration of miracles is necessary, and since the principles are 
not proportioned to our earthly minds which always proceed 
from sensibilia, we have to be led to these principles via 
sensible likeness, i.e., via metaphors and symbolic language. 
Secondly, in theology we proceed from the principles with 
three aims: the refutation of error, the instruction of morals, 
and the contemplation of truth. For the refutation of error and 
the contemplation of truth one needs arguments. When ethics 
are mentioned, Aquinas refers to three biblical genres: the law 
(prescription), the prophets (promises), and the histories 
(examples). Thirdly, because of this, Scripture has four senses: 
historical, moral, allegorical, and anagogical. The historical 
sense is related to the truth of faith, the moral one to the 
instruction of ethics, the allegorical and anagogical ones to the 
contemplation of truth of things in this life and in the future 
life. The historical sense is the only adequate one for arguments 
and the refutation of error. 
In this article Aquinas makes two types of remarks about 
metaphors; one could be called 'epistemologica!', the other 
'logical'. The first type of remark is concerned with the dis-
proportionality between revelation and the human mind or 
reason. Revelation has necessarily to be couched in meta-
phorical language, i.e., in similes taken from sensibilia. 
Without metaphorical language we would not be able to 
understand revelation, for our minds take their point of depar-
ture in sensibilia. It is due to this fact of disproportionality that 
theology and poetics, although very different, have the modus 
symbolicus in common.3 The second type of remark is concerned 
with argumentation: metaphors cannot be used in arguments, 
and therefore cannot be used for the refutation of error. Since 
arguments have to be used for the contemplation of truth,4 we 
may conclude that metaphors cannot be used for the contem-
plation of truth either. Aquinas quotes a saying of Dionysius, 
'symbolic theology is not argumentative', which he uses later 
in the Scriptum and also in other works.5 The reason why 
symbolic theology is not argumentative is that symbolic or 
metaphorical language is not simply true, but true only with 
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regard to some point.6 But these remarks state two opposite 
claims, one about the necessity of the occurrence of metaphors, 
and one about the necessity of the non-occurrence of 
metaphors.7 It is not easy to reconcile these two claims, for this 
tension is part of a broader tension. 
The three sections on the modi, the aims of theology, and the 
four senses of Scripture that make up the solutio seem to be 
interlinked and to form a coherent whole, for the modi are 
recalled in the section on aims and the historical and literal 
sense is related to the aim of refuting error. But this appearance 
is deceptive: the transitions between the three sections are 
rather abrupt and it is not clear why the starting-point should 
lead precisely to these three sections. Corbin points to the fact 
that the title, the sed contra, and two of the four responses (2 
and 4) indicate that the central point of concern of this article 
is the argumentative way in which theology proceeds, but that 
this argumentative way does not receive much attention in the 
solutio. Despite the fact that theology as scientia, as argumenta-
tive discourse, provokes the discussion, argumentation is only 
one way - and not even a well developed way - among other 
equally possible ways.8 The tension of the solutio is one between 
traditional elements (sections 1 and 3) and new elements 
(section 2); the traditional elements are the grammatical, 
rhetorical, and dialectical tools and devices developed for 
reading and explaining Scripture, and they belong to the 
conception of theology as 'exegesis', while the new elements 
are related to the changing attitude towards reason and to the 
conception of theology as scientia. Because of the occurrence of 
these elements and because of their tensive relation, this article 
belongs to that development in theology that Chenu charac-
terizes as the transition from dialectics to scientia and to the 
process of specialization into biblical studies and systematic 
studies.9 This whole process is realized in the practice of 
teaching before it is clarified theoretically; the variety of terms 
and the imprecision of their meaning (sacra pagina, sacra doctrina, 
theologia) is a symptom of this.10 Aquinas' article reveals the 
features of that development and process. Reason is not just 
limited to apologetics, but is given an important place in the 
pursuit of truth; the term quaestio used in the fourth response is 
also an indication of the new ideas." But the ideas are not well 
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integrated in the rest of the solatio. This raises the question 
about Aquinas' conception of theology as presented in the 
preceding articles of this first quaestio: does it show similar 
tensions between traditional and new elements? According to 
Corbin it does.12 There are four other articles in the prologue: 
one on the need of the sacra doctrìna, one on its unity or 
plurality, one on its speculative or practical character, and one 
on its subject. 
The central question of the first article of the prologue shows 
the far-reaching consequences of Aristotle's third entrance: the 
whole system of physics, ethics, and metaphysics presents itself 
as a rival system to Christian doctrine and sets an ideal of 
knowledge (scientia) that seems unattainable for theology. In 
this situation it is not enough to point to the possibility of 
theology: it is required to argue for the necessity of theology." 
The objections express all the sufficiency of the philosophical 
scientiae with regard to action and to knowledge, with the 
consequence that faith and theology are reduced to arbitrary 
opinions without foundations. In his argumentation for the 
need of theology, Aquinas proceeds in two ways: in the sed 
contra he adduces an argument from Scripture about the 
necessity of faith, and in the solutio an argument from 'common 
sense' (omnes qui recte senserunt) about the contemplation of God 
as the aim of life. In both cases philosophical knowledge is said 
not to be sufficient. The argument from common sense is 
developed further by Aquinas saying that the contemplation of 
God is realized in two modes, namely, mediately via creatures 
and immediately via God's essence. The first mode of contem-
plation occurs in via, the second in patria. The doctrine that 
leads to contemplation is characterized by a similar double 
mode: philosophy and theology. But since the way via creatures 
or effects (philosophy) is imperfect, the other (theology) is 
necessary for achieving the aim of life. The relation between 
the two ways is then defined by Aquinas in feudal terms: 
principal and vassal. 
This first article shows two remarkable and related features. 
First, philosophy is taken seriously and not dismissed out of 
hand. The hierarchical structure of the relation between 
theology and philosophy implies in fact the proper and 
independent value of philosophy, for according to the subsidiary 
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principle of the feudal system, the vassal has freedom, respon­
sibility, and autonomy in his own region or on his own level. 
And the phrase 'the contemplation of God, though, is twofold"4 
shows that philosophy is a way that leads to the contemplation 
of God. Unlike some of his contemporaries, who treat the 
philosophical scientiae as introductions and merely instruments, 
Aquinas gives the philosophical scientiae a place within the 
whole movement towards God. He does not want to treat the 
whole of philosophy as previous generations had treated 
grammar and dialectics.15 The second feature is that because 
of this, philosophy is placed face to face with theology, which is 
expressed in a parallel between the two, based upon the parallel 
between in via and in patria. 
The dissimilarities and similarities implied in the parallel 
and further developed by Aquinas in the two following articles. 
Given this parallel, the plurality of the philosophical sdentiae, 
caused by the different topics and methods, seems to imply a 
plurality in theology as well. This suggestion is rejected 
by Aquinas, because the philosophical scientiae use rationes 
creaturamm, while theology uses the divina ratio?6 In other words, 
Aquinas now explores the difference between knowing in via 
and knowing in patria: the always-inadequate, partial, frag­
mentary knowledge of in via is contrasted with the all-embracing 
knowledge οι in patria. In the discussion of the question whether 
theology is a practical or a speculative scientia, both the similar­
ities and the dissimilarities between philosophy and theology 
are mentioned: both aim at the contemplation of God and 
both use arguments, but philosophy proceeds in a human way, 
while theology proceeds by divine inspiration. The similarity 
is further developed in a quaestimcula discussing whether 
theology can be called a scientia. Scientia in the Aristotelian 
sense is described as a movement from first principles to 
conclusion, and this discursive movement in which arguments 
are used can, according to Aquinas, be found in philosophy 
and in theology. 
Some commentators think that Aquinas establishes theology 
as scientia on this point, but Corbin argues that this part is only 
a development of the first article and that the first article 
contains the argument for theology as sdentia.11 For, if the 
jaVnfta-character of theology is established here, the previous 
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articles would not really have been arguments about the 
necessity and the unity of the theological saentia. Moreover, 
this section clarifies only three objections and does not give a 
separate argument, and as such it occupies a place only on the 
secondary level in the argumentation as a whole. The first 
sentence preceding the clarifying remarks - 'as is said' - refers 
to that separate argument and can only refer to article 1. 
Aquinas establishes the saentia character of theology by arguing 
for the need of another doctrine than philosophy, and the 
parallel between in via and in patria is the foundation for the 
claim that theology is a saentia."1 
But if this is the case, it is understandable that this could not 
be Aquinas' final answer, because there are at least two major 
problems attached to this view of theology. The first is related 
to the basic distinction in via — inpatna. The couples immediate 
Icnowledge — mediate knowledge, in via — in patria, and phil-
osophy - theology are central to the first quaestio, and Aquinas 
identifies philosophy with mediate knowledge in via and 
theology with immediate knowledge inpatria. But that identifica-
tion turns theology into something that is not human and not 
belonging to this world: theology is identified with divine 
knowledge. This returns in the discussion about the difference 
between theology and philosophy, where the difference is 
located in the origin of the arguments used: the arguments of 
philosophy are from creation, those of theology are from God. 
The diversity of philosophy and the unity of theology are 
based precisely on the multiplicity of creation and the unity 
and simplicity of God, i.e., on the difference between human 
and divine knowledge. The problematic aspect of the use of in 
via and in patria is reinforced by the positive parallel, namely, 
by the fact that both philosophy and theology have a discursive 
movement from principles to conclusions (saentia proper). This 
discursive movement is typically human. Aquinas does not 
recognize the incompatibility of this aspect with the divine 
status of theology. The two aspects of the parallel between 
philosophy and theology are not thematically related but are 
treated separately in the first quaestio. Corbin refers to this as 
the immediate character of the prologue.19 
The second problem is related to the development of the 
distinction in via — in patria. Aquinas locates the similarity in 
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the likeness of the discursive movement, but this is only a 
formal feature pointing to a logical procedure. That it remains 
a formal feature attached to a conception of theology already 
found in (e.g.) Anselm's writings becomes clear in the third 
quaestiuncula of article 3. It is an answer to an objection about 
the certainty of the principles in theology, which is faith. Faith, 
it is objected, is placed between scientia and opinio and does not 
have the degree of certainty required for a scientia. Aquinas' 
answer consists in three steps: the first two steps involve an 
analysis of two aspects of faith: the certainty, which has a base 
in God, and the incapacity of the human mind fully to capture 
what is given. This tension leads to a movement, indicated in 
Aquinas' third step, away from an initial, incomplete grasp, an 
initial obscurity, towards a better, although not complete, 
understanding of what was obscure.20 This process is the 
intellectus fidei, that is, theology as understood by e.g. Anselm 
and Richard of St Victor.21 The reason for saying that the 
parallel structure is attached to this traditional understanding 
of theology in a formal way without inlluencing it or changing 
it, is the following: Aquinas changes his perspective in the 
course of his answer to the objection about certainty. The 
certainty required for a sàentia, i.e., for reasoning, is an initial 
certainty, an initial intellectus. Aquinas' first step is in fact a 
sufficient answer to the objection. But he goes on and introduces 
an intellectus that is the result of the discursive movement. So 
there is a change from an initial prior understanding to a 
posterior understanding, and these are not the same: in the 
first case the conclusions do not illuminate the principles 
accepted by faith, while in the second they do." This argument 
shows two things. First, it shows that Aquinas limits the 
concept oí scientia to the discursive movement, i.e., to the use of 
arguments, to syllogism, which is a formal feature. While he 
starts in the first article with the problems caused by the 
discovery of the whole system of philosophy, and while he 
indicates that he wants to take the whole system seriously and 
to provide a redefinition of theology, his answer given in the 
parallelism of structure makes use of only one part of phil-
osophy, namely logic, which was known before Aristotle's third 
entrance. So, the redefinition of theology, made necessary by 
that third entrance, turns out to be a translation of a traditional 
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conception in a scheme which was known before that entrance.·" 
The mixture of old and new constitutes the ambivalent 
character of the first quaestio. But the argument of a. 3 q a . 3 
also shows — secondly - Aquinas' uneasiness about his solution, 
for the introduction of the intellectus fidei is not required for 
answering the objection. The first step, pointing to divine 
inspiration, suffices to answer the objection about certainty, 
and in fact the objection is answered earlier (qa . 2). The 
second step, pointing to the obscurity of faith, due to the 
weakness of the human mind, which leads to the intellectusßdei, 
is part of an analysis of faith, that cannot be done justice within 
the previous treatment of the principles. The complete analysis 
of faith as a mixture of obscurity and clarity cannot be done 
justice because of the way Aquinas uses in via and in patria: the 
identification of theology and in patria, of theology and vision 
and immediate knowledge, prevents him from incorporating 
the aspect of the obscurity of faith into reflection on theology. 
But since this aspect cannot be forgotten, it is introduced via 
the intellectus fidei™ 
So, Aquinas' first conception of theology is a somewhat 
uneasy old answer to a new question. Against this background 
the introduction of old material in the discussion on how 
theology should proceed and the tension between the two 
elements is understandable. Corbin sees a parallel between the 
introduction of the intellectus fidei in a.3 q a . 3 and the appeal to 
the theory of the modi and the senses to solve the problem of 
the method.25 It is also understandable that Aquinas can make 
such different and opposing claims with regard to the role of 
metaphors. The analysis also makes clear why a logical argu-
ment can occupy such an important place, for in the end 
Aquinas uses mainly the insights of logic. 
3.2.2 The Summa Theologiae 
The other place in which Aquinas explicitly discusses the role 
of metaphors in theology can be found in a.9 of the first quaestio 
of the Summa Theologiae, written around 1266. There are several 
differences between this and the article dedicated to the same 
problem in the Scriptum. Some of the ideas already present in 
the Scriptum are now developed more fully and are given a 
place of their own. While in the Scriptum literary genres, 
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metaphors, arguments, and the theory of the four senses were 
all discussed under one heading and in one article, the literary 
genres have disappeared completely, and the other elements 
are discussed in separate articles, namely 8, 9 and 10.' 
The ninth article deals with the question 'whether Holy 
Scripture should use metaphorical or symbolic language'. The 
argument Aquinas proposes is an argument from convenience, 
repeated a little later: it is convenient that Scripture treats 
divine and spiritual things under corporeal likeness, under 
corporeal metaphors.2 Two premisses lead to this convenience 
argument; first, God provides for all things according to their 
nature; and secondly, the nature of human beings is such that 
their knowledge starts from sensible things. A quotation from 
Dionysius - 'the divine ray cannot enlighten us unless wrapped 
in a variety of sacred veils' - expresses this too. The first 
argument is followed by a second argument from convenience: 
revelation is intended for everyone and because Scripture 
presents spiritual things under corporeal likeness, everybody, 
including the uneducated who cannot understand these things 
through reasoning, can understand Scripture. The contrast 
between metaphor and concept here introduced via the 
uneducated, does not imply a disqualification of the metaphor: 
on the contrary, it gives metaphors a crucially important place. 
In his answer to the objection that symbolic or metaphorical 
language obscures the truth, Aquinas returns to the distinction 
between metaphor and concept.3 Following Dionysius, he says 
that veiling by image and metaphor does not extinguish the 
divine light, since metaphors are not end-points but starting-
points. People are not meant to remain on the level of metaphor 
but have to move on to knowledge of the intelligible. This 
unveiling is only a relative one (expressius), however, and never 
complete, for, as Aquinas stresses in the next response (ad 
3m), in this life we are not able to have a complete knowledge 
of God. So the place and the function of metaphors is deter-
mined by this tension between necessary veiling (in revelation) 
and partial unveiling (in theology). 
As is clear, this argument is not about the role of metaphors 
in theology — or, at least, not only about the role of metaphors 
in theology. The use of S. Scriptura in the heading of this article, 
while in the previous articles Aquinas has used sacra doctnna 
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over and over again, is an indication that he is here talking 
mainly about the language of Scripture, about the language of 
revelation.4 A look at Aquinas' conception of theology as out-
lined in the other articles will make clear whether this observa-
tion is correct, and what the implications and consequences 
are. Of these articles, articles 1, 2, 3 and 8 are of special 
interest. 
The first article deals with the question whether, in addition 
to the seemingly sufficient philosophical sdentiae, another 
doctrina is needed. The responsio offers the thesis - that a divinely 
inspired doctrina is necessary for human salvation - supported 
by two arguments from convenience. The first argument states 
that God is the end, the aim of man, but that this end exceeds 
human comprehension and that man, in order to direct himself 
to God, needs thus some pre-knowledge, i.e., revelation. The 
second argument is a kind of nota bene: even when human 
reason is able to think about God, revelation is still necessary. 
In the second article Aquinas discusses the question whether 
the sacra doctrina is a scientia. The argument for an affirmative 
answer involves an analysis of the Aristotelian concept of scientia 
and an analysis of the structure of the sacra doctrina. The 
examination of the Aristotelian concept appeals to a distinction 
made between two kinds of sdentiae: some sdentiae proceed 
from self-evident principles, e.g., geometry, others from 
principles received from higher sdentiae, e.g., optics, which 
uses the principles of geometry. The difference between the 
two is that the first has evidence for its principles, while the 
second takes its principles on trust. These principles are not 
beyond the human mind, but they cannot be grasped within 
that particular scientia. The analysis of the sacra doctrina shows 
that it proceeds from principles, known in a higher sdentia, 
namely, the sdentia of God and the blessed. So, the sacra doctrina 
is a sdentia of the second type. 
In the third article on the unity of the sdentia, Aquinas uses 
a procedure similar to that of a.2: an analysis of a philosophical 
doctrine and an analysis of the sacra doctrina. This article is a 
continuation of the previous one. The Aristotelian theory 
Aquinas uses this time is part of the philosophy of mind. It is 
not the material, but the form, involved that determines the 
unity of the faculty of the soul: e.g., sight considers many 
182 The Concept of Church 
things (man, animals, stones, etc.) but sees them with regard 
to a form - say, colour. The unity is therefore the result of 
human organization. The analysis of the sacra doctrina is rather 
short: 'Since Holy Scripture considers certain things as far as 
they are divinely revealed, . . ., all things whatsoever, that can 
be divinely revealed, share the one formal reason of the object 
of this sdentia1 .ь The key to the understanding of this analysis is 
revelabilia — the things which can be revealed - a term that also 
occurs in the ad 2m. In the above quotation one can discern 
three couples: Scripture - sdentia, particular things - all things 
whatsoever (aliqua — omnia quaecumque), and revealed - that can 
be revealed (revelata — revelabilia). The first terms of these 
couples refer to Scripture and state in combination that Scrip­
ture presents in some statements what is revealed; the second 
terms refer to the sacra doctrina as sdentia, and in combination 
state that the sacra doctrina as sdentia relates everything what­
soever to the particular statements that are revealed, that is to 
say, treats everything whatsoever as revelabilia, as clarifiable by 
revelation. So, the unity of the sacra doctrina consists, despite 
the diversity of topics and despite the variety of the philoso­
phical disciplines, in the fact that all these topics are seen in 
the light of revelation and can be clarified by revelation. 
The questions discussed in these three articles resemble those 
of the Scriptum, but the treatment of the questions and the 
answers is rather different. The first article establishes the 
need of the sacra doctrina by showing the convenience of the 
revelation to man of his aim: without revelation he would not 
know it, since it surpasses his natural capacities. There is no 
distinction between in via and in patria, between a human and a 
divine mode of knowing God. The first article simply states the 
need of foreknowledge of the aim of man's life and therefore 
the need of revelation. It establishes the need of a sacra doctrina, 
but not of theology.6 Aquinas does not use the word theologia in 
this part of the Summa, while he employs it frequently in the 
Scriptum: in the Summa he uses sacra doctrina, which does not 
refer to Scripture, or tradition, or theology, but to the whole 
complex.7 While the Scriptum (a.l) treats the need of revelation 
as the need of theology, the Summa separates the two: a. 1 is 
about the need of revelation, a.2 is about theology, about the 
sacra doctrina as sdentia. The second article does not use the 
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theory of subalternation as a formal solution invoked on the 
second plan, but places it in the centre of the argument." This 
means that the previous attention to the parallel structure of 
the discursive movement is now replaced by a focus on the 
principles. This is more in accordance with Aristotle, for in his 
theory a scientia is a true, a real scientia not only because of its 
use of logic, but also because of its principles in which reality is 
encountered. This means that the jcziwft'û-character of the sacra 
doctrina no longer depends upon fulfilling formal requirements 
of the Aristotelian theory (the parallel structure) but that the 
revealed principles, revelation, form the basis of the sacra 
doctrina as scientia. The sacra doctrina is a scientia not because of 
an Aristotelian theory, but because of revelation, and the 
Aristotelian theory helps Aquinas to express this.9 And in the 
third article (cf. a.5) the philosphical arguments are not placed 
alongside the theological arguments: they are now completely 
integrated. In a.5 ad 2m Aquinas relates the use of philoso-
phical disciplines to the weakness of our minds, to our way of 
knowing, and in this context he uses the term manuductio. The 
knowledge obtained via natural reason is a 'guide' towards 
what is above reason. This upwards movement forms, together 
with the downwards movement expressed in the couple revelata-
revelabilia, one circular movement: natural knowledge, the 
philosophical sdentiae, are guides if seen as leading towards 
revelation, and are revelabilia if seen in the light of revelation.10 
Article 8, on the question 'whether this (sacred) doctrine is 
argumentative' discusses the relation between faith and reason, 
faith and proofs (see objections), and is related to article 2 on 
the sacra doctrina as scientia. The responsio starts with a short 
analysis of the role of arguments in scientia and the same role is 
recognized in the sacra doctrina: sdentiae do not prove their 
premisses, but argue from their premisses, principles, in order 
to show something else. The second part of the responsio is 
concerned with the question how to deal with people who deny 
the principles. In metaphysics, the highest of the philosophical 
sdentiae, Aquinas observes that one can start a discussion if an 
opponent accepts something in common, but that, if he denies 
all the principles, no discussion is possible, except an exposi-
tion of the weakness of his arguments. The same is the case for 
the sacra doctrina. 
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The first part of the responsio is often interpreted as the outline 
of a conclusion-theology: 'to argue from the principles in order 
to show something else' is then equated with setting up 
syllogisms. Corbin mentions two arguments against this inter-
pretation. First, one would expect Aquinas to use this type of 
deductive argument frequently in his Summa, but that is not 
the case." Secondly, there is a crucial distinction between logic 
and the real scientiae, for logic is a formal instrument and an 
abstraction from the real scientiae that are constituted by their 
principles, their object. This distinction is forgotten if Aquinas 
is interpreted as advocating a conclusion-theology. Moreover, 
this interpretation denies the insight expressed in article 2, 
where Aquinas locates the scientia- character of the sacra doctrina 
in the principles and not just in the use of reasoning (cf. the 
similarity in formulation between articles 2 and 8). In other 
words, this interpretation denies the difference and the 
development between the Scriptum and the Sümma.n 
How this 'proceeding from principles to show something 
else' has to be understood instead is indicated by the example 
Aquinas uses. Paul, he says, argues from the resurrection of 
Christ to the resurrection of all men. The resurrection of all 
men, though, is not a theological conclusion, but an article of 
faith, and that means that Aquinas sees the typical task of 
theology as to exhibit the internal coherence of the articles of 
faith.13 There is an important relation and similarity between 
the view Aquinas expresses here and his view on the articles of 
faith. When, later in the Summa, he discusses faith explicitly, 
he presents a picture of a whole complex of related and inter-
linked articles. 'Article', Aquinas explains means 'any sort of 
fitting together of distinct parts'.14 So, if one talks about 
'articles of faith' one sees the content of the Christian faith as 
an organic complex of distinct but interrelated and mutually 
linked parts.15 This unity-in-diversity is related on the one 
hand to the fact that all these articles are ultimately reducible 
to one, namely, that God exists and cares for man, and on the 
other to the fact that the number of articles has grown because 
in the course of time things that were implicit have been made 
explicit.16 This view of the content of the Christian faith as an 
organic complex is also presupposed in the second part of the 
responsio of article 8, when Aquinas mentions the possibilities of 
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discussion with opponents. If an opponent accepts a principle, 
the discussion takes the form of contrasting that accepted 
principle with the contrasted one; if the opponent denies all 
principles, there is no way of using this type of argumentation. 
This procedure only makes sense if there exists a whole 
complex of connected and interrelated articles, for only then 
can it be shown that the acceptance of one article or principle 
implies the acceptance of another. 
In the Scriptum discursive movement, reasoning, and 
argumentation were disjoined from the principles which led 
to the formal parallel between theology and philosophy, but 
here reasoning arises out of the principles. After article 2, in 
which Aquinas discusses the principles as the source of the 
шел/га-character of the sacra doctrina (procedere ex principiis), in 
article 8 he focuses his attention upon the development of 
these principles (procedere ex eis ad aliquid aliud ostendum). This 
close relation between principles and argumentation or 
reasoning accords with Aquinas' understanding of Aristotle as 
expressed in his theory of knowledge, which is part of the 
Summa's treatise on man, and in his commentary on the Posterior 
Analytics." Understanding, i.e., grasping the principles, and 
reasoning are not two separate powers, but two aspects of the 
same power. Aquinas compares it to movement which starts 
with a rest and ends with a rest: the beginning and end are 
formed by the principles.18 If there is complete understanding 
to start with, development or discourse is not necessary, and if 
there is no initial understanding whatsoever, discourse cannot 
begin. Arguments develop initial understanding towards a 
fuller understanding. It is not strange to find a strong similarity 
between these insights concerning the circularity between 
understanding and reasoning and the circularity between 
revelation and philosophical scientiae as revelabilia and guides 
(a.3 and a.5 ad 1m and ad 2m), for these circular movements 
reflect the workings of the human mind. In the Scriptum the 
distinction in via —in patria prevents Aquinas from acknowledg­
ing fully the human aspect of practising theology, but in the 
Summa there is no such barrier: he presents theology as a 
thoroughly human activity in which revelation and everything 
studied and discussed in the philosophical scientiae are related 
to each other, so that everything is clarified by revelation and 
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revelation is clarified by everything. It is an activity which has 
its source in revelation and receives its impetus from faith, for 
it develops and explores and interprets initial understanding 
and the internal coherence of faith. Theology is intellectus fidei. 
Corbin concludes that, with this conception of theology, 
Aquinas adequately responds to Aristotle's third entrance and 
that theology has again become intellectus fidei, precisely in 
comparison to the philosophical scientiae. The agreement with 
Aristotle is at the same time an agreement with Anselrn.'9 
If principles play such an important role - that is, if the sacra 
doctrina is a scientia because of its principles - and if reasoning 
arises out of the principles, it is understandable that, after 
completing the exposition of the sacra doctrina as scientia, 
Aquinas turns his attention to where these principles can be 
found: Scripture/1 Article 9 on the metaphors of Scripture sets 
out to show that development and interpretation and explora-
tion are possible and necessary, and article 10 on the theory of 
the senses to show how this development and interpretation is 
related to the spiritual interpretation of Scripture.21 
The earlier observation that Aquinas talks mostly about 
metaphors in the language of Scripture can now be developed 
further. Corbin points to the parallelism between articles 9 
and 1 that exists not just on the level of the type of argument 
(convenience), but also on the level of content.22 Both articles 
refer to the need of revelation, to the need of some fore-
knowledge: that this foreknowledge must be intelligible is 
presupposed in article 1 and thematized in article 9. Aquinas 
does this by invoking the human way of acquiring knowledge, 
namely, starting from sensible things. Metaphors that present 
spiritual things as corporeal and sensible things enable man in 
this way to understand revelation. But because metaphors 
present divine and spiritual things as sensible things, or 
because they present them improperly, the same aspect of 
obscurity and clarity that is characteristic of faith is character-
istic of the language of faith.2J It is these two aspects which 
make theology possible and necessary: because there is some 
understanding, further development and clarification is 
possible, and because this understanding is initial and not 
complete, a development and clarification is required. The 
two opposite claims of the Scriptum concerning the occurrence 
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and the non-occurrence of metaphors have now been reconciled 
by Aquinas acknowledging the difference between original 
language and interpretative language, between religious 
language and theological language. Moreover, the logical 
formulation has disappeared together with the external parallel 
in structure between philosophy and theology and the 
emphasis on logical technique. 
3.3 Reconstruction 
As in the case with narrative theology, the evaluation of 
Aquinas' arguments requires a reconstruction, for the theory 
of metaphor he uses is insufficient. Can Aquinas' argument 
against the use of metaphors in theology and his view on the 
role of metaphors in religious language be restated on the basis 
of the theory of metaphor proposed in the second chapter? 
A preliminary problem is raised by Corbin in his analysis of 
article 9 of the Summa's first quaestio. On the basis of the parallel 
between articles 1 and 9 Corbin concludes that the article on 
metaphor is not just discussing a problem concerning a part of 
the language of Scripture but is dealing with the whole of the 
language of Scripture. According to Corbin, this is not a minor 
issue, for, if Aquinas were here discussing only a part ofthat 
language, it would follow that there would be a type of 
language which is completely clear and unveiled, that 
metaphors would become inessential to revelation, and that 
the presuppositions of Aquinas' theory of knowledge would be 
undermined.' For the reconstruction this conclusion implies 
the question whether a completely metaphorical language is 
possible. 
Corbin's conclusion, however fascinating, is not correct, for 
it does not acknowledge Aquinas' important distinction 
between metaphor and analogy. Corbin alludes to that distinc-
tion by contrasting the metaphorical names of God with names 
like 'wise', 'good', etc.,2 but he interprets the distinction as one 
between 'veiling' and 'complete unveiling', between an indirect 
and a direct access to the spiritual realities.3 By so doing, he 
construes the problem in a confusing way, for Aquinas does 
not imply in his argument (or in the way he uses these names) 
that the names give a direct access or that they are completely 
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unveiling. On the contrary, he is at pains to point out that our 
knowledge of God is imperfect, because it is a knowledge of the 
cause via what is caused, namely, creation.4 The same confus-
ing construction leads Corbin to interpret Aquinas' remark in 
the ad 2m of article 9 that 'truths expressed metaphorically in 
one passage of Scripture are explained more expressly in other 
places',1 as referring, not to other scriptural passages where a 
complete unveiling takes place, but to that 'game of biblical 
images that interpret each other mutually'.6 'More expressly' 
(expressius) does not mean 'complete unveiling', and Aquinas' 
remark therefore does not constitute an argument in favour of 
'complete intelligibility'. And given the preceding remarks 
about metaphors as starting-points, the appeal to the mutual 
interpretations of metaphors or biblical images is not one that 
can and has to be made, as the formula used by Corbin already 
indicates: images do not interpret each other mutually, people 
interpret them. Expressius points to interpretation and theology 
as well. There is consequently no danger of undermining the 
theory of knowledge which emphasizes the sensible as the 
starting-point of knowledge. Aquinas does not argue that all 
knowledge is limited to the sensible, and he does not argue 
that every time knowledge occurs the whole procedure is to be 
repeated.7 Corbin's move to obliterate the difference between 
analogy and metaphor is not surprising or completely unintel-
ligible, however, for Aquinas does here emphasize an aspect of 
metaphor which also can be found in analogy: similarity.8 But 
as the analysis of Aquinas' theory of metaphor shows, the kind 
of similarity is not the same in both cases. As Mclnerny 
remarks: ' I t would be confusion confounded to equate the 
analogical name with analogy in the sense of proportional 
similarity, since the latter itself is not an analogous name'.9 In 
the evaluation of the theory of metaphor this notion appeared 
problematic: would the withdrawal of this notion and the 
introduction of the theory of metaphor we have proposed 
support Corbin's strong thesis? It is unlikely, for a complete 
metaphorical (religious) language is difficult to conceive of, 
not just on Aquinas' own theory, but also on the one proposed 
in the previous chapter.10 
The answer to the question whether Aquinas' argument can 
be restated on the basis of the proposed theory can be given 
Three Answers 189 
now, and it is a positive one. In fact, Aquinas' arguments are 
strengthened by a reconstruction. On his own theory - namely, 
the emphasis on proportionate similarity - the implication of 
the ornamental view and the possibility of an adequate replace-
ment endanger the importance of metaphors on the level of 
religious language, the need of interpretation, and initial 
intelligibility, the understanding already present. The central 
elements of the proposed theory - that words are used in their 
ordinary sense but that the concepts are presented in an extra-
ordinary combination - fits these last points well. 
But there is another remark by Corbin which seems to 
contradict this, namely, the argument that the theological 
interpretation of Scripture is necessary because of the lapse of 
time. Corbin makes this remark when he elaborates his 
conclusion that Aquinas, in his final conception of theology, 
presents theology as a way of reading Scripture. Referring to 
Aquinas' saying that the truth of faith is contained in Scripture 
'but diffusely, in diverse ways and sometimes darkly'," Corbin 
remarks that the greater the cultural distance between biblical 
times and the time of theology, the harder the work. The 
language of Scripture had become distant by the 13th century, 
and its already-present intelligibility had become obscure and 
for Aquinas an object of research.12 It is certainly correct to 
point to the cultural circumstances of the 13th century and to 
argue that Aquinas was able to clarify the relation between 
Scripture and its interpretation and to establish the status of 
theology as scientia by means of Aristotelian theories, as Corbin 
does.13 But that is not the same as locating the need of the 
interpretation or the problems of interpretation in the distance 
of time. In Aquinas' own view Scripture always need to be 
interpreted, for the language of revelation is always and to 
everybody a mixture of the plain and the obscure. The difference 
in time and culture is not irrelevant, but the difference and 
distance cannot be seen purely in negative terms. Aquinas 
acknowledges that in the course of time — and this is not just 
limited to the time up until the New Testament - an increase 
in understanding can occur.14 So, Aquinas locates the need 
and the possibility of an interpretation and explanation in the 
metaphors of religious language and in nothing else, and this 
argument is strengthened by the theory we have proposed. 
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The main point of criticism of the two reconstructions of 
narrative theology concerns the role and place of arguments. 
The criticism of radical metaphorical theology is obviously not 
applicable to Aquinas' view: he not only allows for arguments, 
he calls for them. But the criticism of moderate metaphorical 
theology is not applicable either: without saying that Aquinas 
presents a picture of an argumentative frame in which meta-
phors can be understood, his view of the interaction and the 
mutual influence of revelation and Scripture on the one hand 
and of human knowledge and the philosophical scientiae on the 
other evades in principle the criticism of a one-sided view of 
this complex relation - the criticism necessary in Metz's case. 
Moreover, the analysis shows that Aquinas, in the way he uses 
Aristotle, reveals the relativity of Aristotle's conception of 
scientia. This creates the situation in which it is not necessary 
to reject Aquinas' argument if Aristotle's conception, or 
elements in his theory, are no longer adequate. Finally, the 
way Aquinas discusses metaphors does not result in a replace-
ment view or in the conclusion that they are superfluous. On 
the contrary, they are allocated an important place and an 
irreducible role. The correct criticism on the part of narrative 
theology of the devaluation and disqualification of metaphor 
and religious language is not applicable to Aquinas, and the 
dangerous confusion of the different tasks of metaphors and 
concepts, which is the consequence of this criticism in (e.g.) 
TeSelle's case, is avoided by him. 
4. Conclusion 
One of the main conclusions of the exploration of these three 
different answers to the question whether metaphors should 
play a central role in theology is that a level of language other 
than that in which metaphors are central or a type of language 
different from the metaphorical is required. The criticism of 
the presuppositions of narrative innocence and pure narrative 
shows how pervasive and fundamental the 'analytical' and 
'argumentative' language is in the whole of language. A 
completely metaphorical language, and thus a completely 
metaphorical theological language, is not a coherent concep-
tion. The radical version of narrative or metaphorical theology 
appears to be dangerous as well, for by its rejection of the level 
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of reflection and argumentation and the corresponding 
language, it also rejects the possibility of answering questions 
about orthodoxy and orthopraxy, and disqualifies itself as 
ideological by so doing. Related to this distinction between the 
two levels is the distinction between religious and theological 
language. The lack ofthat distinction results in some confusing 
claims with regard to the emotional quality of theological 
language, as becomes clear in the discussion about models. 
These confusing claims again underlie the criticism of system-
atic theology which is a part of narrative theology. 
Another conclusion is that two suggestions about the relation 
between these two levels of language do not prove correct or 
sufficient. The moderate version of narrative or metaphorical 
theology presents an overall narrative or metaphorical structure 
with some argumentative elements inside that structure. This 
view appears to present a picture which does not sufliciently 
interpret the mixed character of language and the fundamental 
complexity of the relation between language and reality. 
Moreover, it does not give an adequate picture of what a 
theology that claims to be a justification of hope in fact does. 
Aquinas' final conception of theology, in which everything is 
related to Revelation and Revelation to everything, is able to 
give a better explanation. The attempt to link the two levels 
via an identification of metaphors and models is not successful 
either, since the identification rests upon incorrect suppositions 
and explanations of metaphors, or upon too broad an under-
standing of 'model' which does not pay enough attention to 
the role of theories in this way of thinking. 
How, then, should the relation between the two levels be 
seen? How is it possible to avoid the danger of defacto reduction 
of religious metaphors to emotional ornaments, a denial of the 
important insights of modern theories of metaphor? How is it 
possible to determine the specific task of theology with regard 
to these religious metaphors? Can the suggestion implied in 
Aquinas' view of theology be further developed? 

Chapter IV 
Methodological Considerations 
In this final chapter the results and insights of the two previous 
chapters have to be related to the analyses of the first chapter. 
First, the conclusions of the arguments and criticisms of the 
previous chapter are developed and the relation between 
metaphorical language and theological language is specified. 
In the writings of the theologians analyzed in the first chapter 
we can find two types of arguments that prevent a hasty 
application of this view of the relation to the problems dis­
covered in the first chapter. The first type of argument appears 
in relation with 'the linguistic status' of 'people of God' and 
'body of Christ' and can be centred around the question 
whether a definition of the church is possible. Apart from the 
fact that an appeal to metaphors plays a role in the question of 
the definition, an important point of consideration too is that, 
if a definition were impossible, the development of a systematic 
theological treatment would be severely hampered. A second 
type of argument is the way theologians proceed and actually 
make use of metaphors in their theology. After a discussion of 
these counter-arguments (2 and 3) the way is open for us to 
propose a central term or a basic statement that can take full 
advantage of the perspective opened up by Lumen Gentium and 
Vatican π. 
1. Two levels of language 
1.1 The fear of reduction 
The analyses of Chapter III point to the need for a level of 
language in which metaphors are not central. A clarification 
and determination of the relation between the metaphorical 
and non-metaphorical level, and especially of the specific task 
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of theology with regard to religious metaphors, must take into 
account an element of the theory of metaphor that returns in 
the fears expressed by narrative (and non-narrative) 
theologians. That element is the discovery of the cognitive 
value of metaphor, which is the other side of the criticism of 
the traditional, rhetorical, ornamental view of metaphor - the 
fear that acceptance of a non-metaphorical, theological level 
leads to an impoverishment and a reduction. The original 
richness of religious language, its evocative and emotional and 
cognitive power would disappear. And there is also a fear that 
the need for such a level would further suggest that what is 
really meant by metaphor is revealed on that non-metaphorical 
level, reducing the original language to a transitory stage, or 
even calling into question the need for such a language at all. 
These fears resemble remarks that are made in the dis-
cussion about the possibility of an adequate paraphrase of the 
metaphor. In that discussion two main arguments can be 
found, one in the context of the word-approach and one in the 
context of the sentence-approach. The first one presupposes 
that a metaphor is a word used to replace another word, and 
since this word can be put back, the metaphor word is an 
ornament. If a metaphor is seen this way, a replacement is 
easily considered to be an improvement: it means properly 
what the metaphor word meant improperly, and it presents 
clearly what the metaphor hinted at in disguise. If applied to 
theology and religious metaphors, the acceptance of another 
level of language implies the exposure of the original religious 
language as serving some kind of (ideological) function. But 
since it was shown that upon this presupposition no explana-
tion can be given of metaphors as metaphors (metaphorical 
use), the basis for this argument collapses. 
In the other argument the two parties agree that a loss of 
evocative power occurs when a metaphor is paraphrased, and 
the disagreement is about the eventual cognitive loss. Those 
who defend the thesis that a paraphrase necessarily results in 
an evocative and cognitive loss can argue that in the case of 
religious metaphor a paraphrase leads to a reduction of cog-
nitive content, and those who argue against the strong thesis 
can defend a position similar to that of the rhetorical approach: 
a paraphrase states exactly the same as the religious metaphor 
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and difTerent answers are then possible to the question why 
metaphors are used at all. The analysis of the discussion about 
the 'indispensability thesis' shows, however, two things: first, 
that when the incorrect presuppositions and inconsistencies 
are removed, the two parties agree on the semantic indeter-
minacy of metaphors; and secondly, that the characteristic 
features of the metaphor-paraphrase are not sufficiently 
recognized. These two elements are connected. The semantic 
indeterminacy is the result of the extra-ordinary combination 
that is made in a metaphor, and because of the kind of 
combination that is made not all the connections and the 
implications are immediately clear. The semantic sketch given 
in the metaphor cries out, so to say, for development and 
interpretation.1 A paraphrase of a metaphor tries to explore 
the implications and tries to present a coherent interpretation. 
The resemblance between arguments in the paraphrase 
discussion and the fears of some theologians suggests that 
theology, when dealing with metaphors in religious language, 
can best be seen as a form of metaphor paraphrase. The fear 
that a theological treatment necessarily implies a reduction, or 
that it necessarily makes the original language redundant, is 
then clearly without foundation. On the contrary, seen in this 
light the dependence in a certain sense of theology on religious 
language is quite clear. The loss of evocative power, though, is 
not solved by talking about theology as a form of paraphrase. 
This loss is accepted by both parties in the paraphrase 
dispute, and there is no reason to suppose that such a loss 
would not occur in the case of the paraphrase of religious 
metaphors. But since the paraphrase is not meant to replace 
the original, but to create a better understanding of it, the 
rejection of a paraphrase solely on grounds of this loss of 
evocative power is an unnecessarily negative attitude confusing 
the different tasks of the different types of lahguage. This 
suggestion that the relation between the two levels can be seen 
in terms of a paraphrase has to be developed further. How 
helpful is it? And how is the form of paraphrase to be under-
stood in the light of the analyses of the previous chapter? 
1.2 Theology: a form of paraphrase 
There are three elements that shape the paraphrase: inter-
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prêtation, understanding, or explanation of a metaphor. First, 
it is a paraphrase of a metaphor; secondly, it is an answer to some 
question about the meaning of the metaphor; and thirdly, it is 
given in a certain way. 
As mentioned in the discussion on the possibility of an 
adequate paraphase of metaphors, a metaphor-paraphrase is 
not like a paraphrase of another kind of sentence, for it does 
not consist in one sentence capturing exactly the cognitive 
content of the metaphor. A metaphor-paraphrase attempts to 
reveal the implications of the extraordinary combination, to 
explain the connections, to interpret the associations, to 
explore the consequences, and to reach a coherent under-
standing of the metaphor overall. 
Paraphrases, interpretations, and explanations are normally 
asked for or given when something is not clear or self-evident. 
Up till now, 'paraphrase', 'interpretation', 'understanding' 
and 'explanation' have been used rather indiscriminately, but 
in discussion about the methods of natural sciences and the 
humanities some of these terms have received a technical 
sense, referring to specific procedures and methods. This 
discussion can clarify further how theology as paraphrase 
should be seen.' Some of the participants in this discussion 
defend the ideal of a unified science and try to show the 
universal validity of one particular method. This method 
consists in explaining an event or state of affairs (the 
explanandum) by pointing to other events or states of affairs 
and to one or more general laws (together forming the 
explanans).2 This is called the covering-law theory or the 
subsumption-theory, for an individual case is subsumed under 
a general law. Others resist this methodological monism and 
claim an independent, different, and equally 'scientific' 
method for the humanities. The first method, the causal one, is 
characterized by the term 'explanation' (Erklären) while the 
second, or teleologica!, method, by the term 'understanding' 
(Verstehen). 
An interesting feature in the discussion is that the defenders 
of methodological monism take 'to explain' and 'explanations' 
as answers to 'why-questions', or to causal why-questions.3 
G. von Wright does question the limitation of the causal 
explanations to 'why-necessary-questions', for he thinks that 
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'quasi-teleological explanations', answering 'how-possible-
questions' have a 'distinct causal character'.4 He argues, more-
over, that in sciences that try to explain human actions, like 
history and social sciences, causal explanations play only a 
minor and subordinate role: the major role is played by a type 
of explanation that employs the practical syllogism.5 In a 
practical syllogism the major premiss includes what is aimed 
at, or intended, the minor expresses some action to reach that 
aim, and the conclusion consists in the decision to perform 
that action in order to achieve the aim or intention. In a 
teleologica! explanation the order of this type of argument is 
reversed: one starts with the action and the premisses serve as 
the explanation. This is a genuine alternative to the causal 
explanation since 'intentions', which are crucial to actions, 
cannot be called 'causes' in the same sense as the term is used 
in 'causal explanation'. In causal explanations, cause and effect 
are logically independent, while in the case of action and 
intention the relation between action and intention is a logical 
one. 'Nothing can be an act of volition that is not logically 
connected with what is willed - the act of willing is intelligible 
only as the act of willing whatever it is that is willed'.6 In 
discussing the question whether for the same 'explanandum' a 
causal and a teleologica! explanation can be given, von Wright 
turns his attention towards the description of the explanandum 
and remarks that behaviour must be 'intentionally under-
stood', otherwise it does not become 'teleologically explicable'.7 
In the case of a causal explanation, intentionalistic language 
may be used, but it is irrelevant to the answer.8 'The 
explanandum of a teleologica! explanation is an action, that of 
a causal explanation an intentionalistically noninterpreted item 
of behaviour, i.e., some bodily movement or state'.9 And he 
remarks also that 'the mere understanding of behaviour as 
action, e.g. button pressing, without attributing to h a remoter 
purpose, e.g. making a bell ring, for the attainment of which 
the action is a means, is itself a way of explaining behaviour. 
Perhaps it could be called a rudimentary form of a teleologica! 
explanation'.10 But he adds that it might be better to distinguish 
this from the explanation proper. In this line, he makes another 
distinction, namely, a distinction between interpretation and 
understanding on the one hand and explanation on the other. 
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Interpretation and understanding belong to the level of 
description, or, are answers to the question what something is, 
while explanation is then the answer to why- and how-
questions. Intepretation in this sense is an explicative activity. 
But since interpretation and explanation are interconnected in 
the sense that an explanation can lead to another interpre-
tation, one can discern layers of interpretation and under-
standing. For example, somebody dies and subsequent 
investigations show that he is killed intentionally by a certain 
group, and that the group calls it an execution, while others 
call it murder and qualify it as an act of terrorism. This line of 
thought has some consequences for the opposition between 
understanding and explanation. If understanding is the same 
as grasping what something is, understanding is a prerequisite 
for every explanation, but as von Wright observes, this is 
trivial. Understanding has to be further specified as 'under-
standing what something is like', which is the beginning of a 
causal explanation, and 'understanding what something 
means or signifies', which is the start for a teleologica! 
explanation. 'It is therefore misleading to say that under-
standing versus explanation marks the difference between two 
types of scientific intelligibility. But one could say that the 
intentional or non-intentional character of their object marks 
the difference between two types of understanding and of 
explanation'." 
Von Wright talks here about understanding in a somewhat 
ambivalent fashion: on the one hand he seems to limit under-
standing to a heuristic phase - albeit not in the trivial sense -
prior to an explanation, and on the other he lifts this restriction 
by recognizing the interrelation between understanding and 
explanation. By accepting that an explanation 'at one level 
often paves the way for reinterpretation of the facts at a higher 
level"2 explanation becomes a process between two forms of 
understanding.13 But because he does not thematize this, the 
ambivalence towards 'understanding' goes unnoticed and the 
validity of the distinction between 'explication' and 
'explanation' is not questioned. The point is not so much that 
there is no difference between what he calls 'explication' and 
the two ways in which an explanation can be given, but that, if 
there is a reason to call both the causal and the teleologica! 
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procedure 'explanation', the same label can be applied to 
'explicative' procedures. In all three cases there is a process 
leading from some form of understanding to a fuller under-
standing. 
In Pannenberg's view of the relation between 'explanation' 
and 'understanding' this ambivalence towards understanding 
is not present. He rejects the division between two types of 
science on the basis of explanation versus understanding, but 
he does not defend the supremacy of the covering-law theory. 
On the contrary, he argues that this type of explanation 
requires a broader 'systematic theoretical concept' of explana-
tion to make sense. Every attempt to explain arises out of the 
experience that something docs not fit the understanding of 
reality and every explanation consequently consists in 
providing a new context or frame in which this particular 
event, behaviour, action, etc. makes sense. The procedure of 
subsuming a case under a general law becomes only an 
explanation in the situation that an explanation is required.14 
Given that the general structure of explanation consists in 
providing a context or placing something within a whole, the 
various procedures can be seen as special cases of this general 
pattern.13 Explanation thus appears as the link between, on 
the one hand, an original understanding which is related to an 
undetermined, unshaped horizon, and, on the other, an under-
standing that is related to an especially provided frame of 
sense.16 
Pannenberg and von Wright agree in points that are helpful 
for the present discussion about theology as paraphrase, 
although these points have to be developed." They both reject 
the presupposition that only why-questions are relevant to 
scientific explanation and agree that explanation can take place 
in a number of ways. They both recognize, too, the importance 
of the description or the understanding that is presupposed for 
any explanation, and realize the complex relation between 
understanding and explanation. These points of agreement 
open up the possibility of taking into consideration another 
kind of question and answer. Apart from the question about 
the meaning of words used in a description which can be asked 
for any sentence whatsoever, and apart too from questions 
about causes and purposes, there is another type of question: 
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questions about presuppositions and conceptions of those 
things, processes, states of affairs, etc. which are referred to in 
the starting-descriptions of the explanations. In contrast to the 
why- and how-questions these can be called 'what-questions'. 
And since these questions do not consider things, processes, 
states of affairs in their historical or empirical dimensions, but 
consider their ultimate grounds and foundations, these what-
questions can be further specified as 'transcendental', while 
the why- and how-questions can be called 'categorical'.16 And 
since these what-questions are not so much concerned with 
causal or teleologica! mechanisms, but with concepts and 
conceptual systems, their answers can also be specified as 
'conceptual explanations'. As is the case with causal and 
teleologica! explanations, the starting-point is some under-
standing, but the direction, so to speak, is a different one: it 
aims at discovering the conception of something, the pre-
suppositions that are implied in understanding what some-
thing is like and in understanding what something signifies. 
Given Pannenberg's and von Wright's views, there does not 
seem to be a reason for not calling this kind of answer an 
'explanation'. Pannenberg does not explicitly discuss this kind 
of question, but since it shows the general pattern of explana-
tion as outlined by him, a positive answer may be supposed. 
And von Wright's argument for distingushing between explica-
tion and explanation, which might be invoked here as a 
counter-argument, does not appear strong enough. 
In the case of metaphors, the need for and the importance of 
such what-questions and conceptual explanations is especially 
conspicuous because metaphors challenge by their extra-
ordinary combination, or by being proposals to redescribe 
reality, the conception of how things are and the presupposi-
tions of what reality looks like. In paraphrasing and explaining 
metaphors conceptual explanation is likely - at least at first 
sight - to feature more prominently than the other types. 
Moreover, the need for a conceptual explanation becomes 
apparent in the discussion about the possibilities of a meta-
phorical theology, for without conceptual explanation no 
criterion can be found as to what is and what is not a correct 
conclusion or consequence, and no reason can be given to 
support the decision to accept or to reject a (new) metaphor. 
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But the need and the importance of conceptual explanation 
can also be seen in other cases. The theory of transcendental 
realism shows that a realm beyond experience is presupposed 
in the practice of the scientists and that reflections about that 
realm are required for a complete and coherent theoretical 
account. Harre does this by means of an analysis of the 
concepts 'power' and 'structure'.19 Gilkey reaches a similar 
conclusion with regard to history. On the basis of a pheno-
menological analysis of the current awareness of history and of 
an examination of tendencies in the philosophy of history he 
concludes that ontological categories like freedom, destiny, 
and ultimacy are presupposed, and that a coherent acccount 
requires a reflection on these categories.20 These examples 
show, too, that Pannenberg is not completely correct when he 
argues that the need for an explanation is only felt when a 
contradiction occurs in the available theory or theories: the 
need for a conceptual explanation can also arise out of the 
realization or discovery that for the construction of a coherent 
theory reflection upon and development of the presuppositions 
are required. 
If this kind of conceptual answer is a kind of explanation, 
the question arises whether this can be further specified. This 
leads to the third element shaping the paraphrase: the way it is 
done. Although it is possible to consider Picasso's Guernica as 
an interpretation of 'homo homini lupus' and Ravel's La Valse 
as an exposition of 'I live in the autumn of the world', the 
previous reflections point to a 'scientific' way in which the 
semantic sketch of the metaphor is further developed by 
conceptual analysis and explanation, and in which its 
intensions are brought to light via a system of termini.21 
'Concept' refers to a fundamental feature of language. To 
speak a language and to understand it requires the ability to 
use words that are learned in a certain situation again in 
different but appropriate situations, including those in which 
no example of the concept is at hand. 'Concept' is not limited 
to substantives, but covers all kinds of words that can be used 
to complete 'that is . . . ' like 'dog', 'hilarious', 'to weep'. To use 
a language requires the ability to employ concepts according 
to the rules specifying their place and role in the language as a 
whole. In Chapter II 'concept' is used in this sense when 
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language is described as a system or web or interrelated con-
cepts and sets of concepts, and metaphor is described in terms 
of the extraordinary combination of sets of concepts. The 
analysis of how a concept is employed can result in two 
different types of descriptions. One kind of description consists 
in the registration of the actual use, and the second in the 
legislation of how a certain word should be used or is going to 
be used. The registration of how concepts are used in the 
ordinary, everyday language shows the elasticity and the rich-
ness of that language. This richness is related to the context-
dependence or context-openness of words and to their 
polysemy. The context - i.e., the sentence functioning in a 
whole communication situation - determines the selection from 
the available word-meanings. The other side of this aspect of 
language is that it is rather vulnerable to misunderstanding, 
for the context does not always determine sufficiently, or does 
not reduce the polysemy fully. Such an analysis shows also 
that ordinary language is mixed with fragmentary comments 
and residues of reflection and theory. An example of this is the 
way 'metaphor' is used by the theologians mentioned in 
Chapter I, which shows also that, however revealing a regis-
tration is, it is not adequate for the creation of a type of 
language that is both precise and critical. Since such a 
language is necessary (cf. again the use of 'metaphor') apart 
from registration, there has to be legislation. This can happen 
ad hoc and for one specific concept, but it can also happen more 
systematically by moving from ordinary language to 'scientific' 
language, i.e., by developing concepts into termini. When the 
use of a concept is agreed upon by explicit argument or by 
stipulation and the rules are so specified and tightened that 
the context-dependence is minimal, the concept becomes a 
terminus. Although the explicitly specified rules make the 
terminus already independent of the actual communication 
context, this independence is further strengthened by a 
'terminology', by other termini that form together a coherent 
system or theory in which the termini influence and support 
each other and which also can be used in the formulation of 
rules.22 Such a terminology can be specially developed, or it 
can be an already existing system that is used with or without 
modifications. In a terminology one can distinguish between 
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formal and substantial terms: understanding and explanation 
are concentrated in the substantial terms, while the formal 
terms structure the original and the secondary language. 
Formal terms can be general terms like 'concept', 'terminus', 
'metaphor', or specific to a certain field of research like 
'ecclesiology'.23 
The discussion of metaphor and metaphor theory in Chapter 
II is an example of describing the precise use of a concept and 
of relating the terminus 'metaphor' to other termini and 
locating it within a terminology. Since 'metaphor' is a formal, 
metalinguistic concept, the starting-point is formed by a series 
of examples of what are commonly called metaphors. The 
analysis of these sentences reveals some features that are not 
adequately captured by the rhetorical descriptions in their 
unsophisticated and sophisticated forms. The explanation in 
terms of rules and sets of concepts and the discussion of 
alternative theories aims at relating this terminus to other 
termini in a coherent system, in an already existing terminology. 
The transition from a relatively loose concept to a much 
stricter terminus can be expressed by the choice of a specially 
coined word (e.g., eschaton), but need not (e.g., 'hope', which 
occurs in ordinary language, in religious language, and in 
theological language). In the latter case the danger of 
confusing the different levels or shifting unwittingly from one 
level to the other is greater than in the first case. The transition 
from the level of loose concepts to the level of termini 
encounters some special problems where metaphors are 
concerned. While in other cases the rules of the relevant 
concept can be tightened and another word may be chosen 
which forms some kind of continuation with the ordinary one, 
the application of such a procedure to metaphors would deny 
the specific character of metaphors. If, for example, 'life is a 
tale told by an idiot' was the starting-point, then 'tale' would 
not do as the central terminus, for it would direct attention to 
the 'metaphorical word' and not to the sentence, to the meta-
phorical combination, and thus imply a rhetorical view of 
metaphors. Moreover, in religious language, but not only 
there, various different metaphors are used for the same 
person, thing, group, etc. (the church is 'the people of God', 
'the body of Christ', 'the bride of Christ', 'the temple of the 
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Holy Spirit', etc.). The selection of one - e.g. 'body' - plus a 
specification and tightening of the rules would create severe 
additional problems about selection and the relation to the 
various metaphors. So, thç transition from metaphor to an 
explanation by means of terminology, to a precise conceptual 
explanation, requires another method - namely, the selection 
of a terminus that in combination with (e.g.) 'church' forms a 
basic statement that is open enough to elicit and reveal the 
myriad of connections, if present, and prease enough to deter-
mine which of the possible interpretations and explanations is 
coherent and thus possibly correct or not. The first require-
ment is obvious, but the second needs some clarification. 
The question about truth or falsity, about correctness or 
incorrectness, can be asked of a statement that is coherent, i.e., 
a statement 'which it makes sense to suppose is true; one such 
that we can conceive of or suppose it and any other statement 
entailed by it being true; one such that we can understand 
what it would be like for it and any statement entailed by it to 
be true', as Swinburne puts it.24 It does not seem to be erroneous 
to require the establishment of coherence in the case of metaphor 
explanations as a preliminary to the attempts to answer the 
questions about their correctness. Swinbume states as a formal 
condition of coherence that a statement should neither express 
nor entail a contradiction, for a statement is incoherent if it 
expresses or entails a contradiction. If the status of a certain 
statement is doubtful, its incoherence can easily be shown by 
revealing that it entails a contradiction, but its coherence 
cannot so easily be shown by means of the same procedure. 
'Generally, we cannot prove a statement p to be coherent by 
proving what it entaih. The fact that it entails many coherent 
statements would not show it to be coherent; for all statements, 
coherent or not, entail many coherent statements. "Some 
squares have five sides" is incoherent, but it entails "some 
squares have sides" which is coherent. Our only hope of 
proving a statement p to be coherent is by showing that it ¿r 
entailed by some other statement r, and that would prove it to be 
coherent if and only if г was coherent'.25 The reason for this is 
that, since r is coherent, no contradiction follows from it, and 
'since p deductively follows from τ and so is involved in the 
claim that τ,ρ m,ust also be coherent'.26 Swinbume remarks that 
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the success of this procedure depends on the assumptions about 
the coherence of the other statement (or combination of state­
ments) and about entailment, and this may require some 
discussion.27 And he adds that, apart from deductive arguments, 
inductive arguments may sKow the coherence or the incoherence 
of a statement.28 
Swinburne's remarks suggest a way of dealing with metaphor 
paraphrases, a way of judging which ones qualify for further 
investigation. Suppose/», q and rare metaphor-paraphrases and 
all concern the same object A, and suppose their coherence is 
not obvious or doubted. Then a statement J, also about A and 
obviously coherent, must be found, and if p,q and r can be 
shown to be entailed by s or if s counts in favour ofp,q and τ, p,q 
and r are coherent and the discussion about their correctness 
can start. It is clear that s should not be a metaphor, for that 
would push the problems away, not solve them. This aspect, 
together with the first aspect, can be captured in the formula 
that for the transition from the metaphorical level to the termi­
nological level a basic statement is required that can function as 
an interpretation-key and a coherence-criterion. Such a state­
ment makes the extraordinariness fruitful and available for 
further reflection. 
These three elements together and understood in this way 
determine theology as paraphrase of the metaphors that can be 
found in religious language. And although at first sight the 
suggestion of theology as paraphrase may seem to lead to a view 
like Metz's, in which argumentation occupies a minor role within 
an overall story-frame or metaphor-frame, the specific character 
of the metaphor and the kind of explanation it provokes originate 
a paraphrase that does not remain 'inside' the metaphor, but 
that, due to the presence of the basic statement, has a foundation 
Outside' the metaphor. 
2. The definition of'Church' 
Before these ideas can be applied to ecclesiology two preliminary 
problems have to be resolved. The theologians discussed in 
Chapter I present both in their practice and in their arguments 
an alternative to what is proposed in the previous section, and 
the strength of it has to be tested. Their arguments can be 
grouped around the question whether a definition of the church 
206 The Concept of Church 
is possible. Some think it is possible and argue in this context 
against the use of metaphors, while others deny such a possibility 
and accept metaphors, and in most cases a number of 
metaphors, as necessary in any fundamental description of the 
church. Apart from the various presuppositions about metaphor 
which influence these arguments, both parties share some 
presuppositions about definition, and these presuppositions 
require further examination. In the light of this examination the 
arguments against the possibility of definition have to be 
restated and can then be judged. 
2.1 The arguments 
The thesis that the church cannot be defined in principle is 
often implied, sometimes mentioned, and occasionally discussed 
explicitly.' The distinction between nominal and real definition, 
mentioned by Congar in an article dedicated to this question, is 
a first indication of what is declared to be impossible.2 A nominal 
definition is concerned with words and its purpose is to settle or 
to state the meaning of words.3 A real definition is concerned 
with things, with reality. The discussion among the theologians 
is about real definition, about the possibility of stating and 
establishing the essence of the church by citing those features 
that constitute the church as church. Congar questions the 
possibility of a real definition according to the rules of formal 
logic and he supports this with two arguments: 'the reality we 
now call church is too rich to be captured by one concept and to 
be called by one name'; and, the church is not just a human, 
social reality with some Christian addition, the species 
'supranatural' of the genus 'society', but a substantially 
supranatural reality.4 
These arguments return repeatedly in the discussion and are 
in fact two aspects of the one central argument: the church is a 
mystery and can therefore not be defined. In a book by 
Gommer on the essence of the church, to which Congar refers 
for his second argument, and which is quoted by other 
theologians as well, the relation between the two aspects can be 
seen clearly.5 According to Commer, no logical definition of the 
church can be given for logical definitions are about natural 
things and the church is not a natural thing: the church consists 
of spiritual and corporeal elements. And even a 'quasi-definition' 
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of the church is impossible, for the church does not have a 
higher genus in common with other things: because of its 
uniqueness and infinite and divine character it cannot be listed 
among the finite and non-unique natural things. The impossi-
bility of the definition is not due to a deficiency of being, but to 
an excess that defies all categorization by finite concepts and 
distinctions. God and Christ cannot be defined, and neither can 
the church, for Christ and the church are in a certain sense 
identical. The only way one can talk about the church is in 
images derived from Scripture.6 And in a later article he writes 
that if one were able to know the mysterious essence of the 
church completely, one would have to show this by capturing 
all its properties exactly in a formal concept. But all attempts so 
far do not fulfil the logical requirements and are not without 
metaphors.7 Commer's views are an important source for other 
theologians, e.g., Holböck and Schmaus. According to Holböck 
'the church in its proper essence participates in the incompre-
hensibility of God and Christ'.9 The church is a mystery and 
that implies that its essence can only be captured in faith and 
that no proper definition can be given, but only a description. 
Referring to Commer, he qualifies this further by saying that 
not even a description, but only a 'circumscription' by means of 
images, is possible.10 And following Semmelroth he stresses the 
dangerous illusion of mastery given by concepts." Schmaus, 
too, quotes Commer with approval on the question about the 
possibility of a definition of'church' in the strict sense. And in a 
later work he adds that for such a definition of the church a 
complete knowledge of the church, including its future to the 
end of time, is required; since that knowledge is not available 
such a definition cannot be given.12 But Schmaus allows for a 
definition in the broad sense, an 'essence-description' employing 
analogical language. 
Although Dulles uses a somewhat different terminology, he, 
too, mentions that the church is a mystery and in that connec-
tion makes remarks about definitions and images. When 
'mystery' is used for the church, it signifies that the church is 
'not fully intelligible to the finite mind of man', that the church 
'pertains to the mystery of Christ', and that the church cannot 
be fully objectified because of our involvement in it.13 This has 
methodological consequences: 'the proceeding from clear and 
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univocal concepts, or from definitions in the usual sense of the 
word' is ruled out. One can nevertheless talk about the church 
indirectly, that is, via images.14 
Of these arguments Schmaus' remark about the lack of 
knowledge of the future and Dulles' remark about the lack of 
full objectivity, if taken seriously, do not only apply to the 
church or to theology in general, but also to such different 
phenomena as nature, man, marriage, history, time, space, and 
state. Valid or not, these points do not have a special force in 
ecclesiology and can be left out in the following discussion. That 
means that the following elements are relevant: the type of 
definition that is declared impossible is the real definition; such 
a definition has to fulfil certain requirements and obey certain 
rules - it has to indicate, e.g., the genus and to specify the 
differentiating features, and it should not contain metaphors, 
but because of the mystery-character of the church these 
requirements cannot be fulfilled.15 Moreover, a number of 
metaphors and images are better equipped to express the 
mystery, than just one metaphor or image alone. 
A special problem in this discussion consists in the declara-
tion of the encyclical Mystici Corpons that 'to define and to 
describe' the church 'no more noble, no more excellent and no 
more divine' expression can be found than 'the mystical body 
of Christ'.16 Holböck tries to solve the discrepancy between 
this declaration and his own position by distinguishing between 
a 'descriptive definition' and a 'defining description', between 
a descriptive determination of a concept and a conceptual 
determination of a description. According to Holböck, Pius xn 
proposes a defining description: it is defining insofar as 
'mystical body' is given prevalence above other descriptions 
that are possible, and it is description, because it does not 
become a definition, but remains a description.17 Semmelroth 
maintains that the declaration of the pope does not mean that 
one has to analyze the components of 'the church is the 
mystical body of Christ' with the help of natural logic and so 
find the essence of the church. The exposition the encyclical 
gives is not intended as a word analysis, although the encyclical 
proceeds in this way, for it is a magisterial proclamation of the 
faith of the church and it is the only valid interpretation, 
inspired by the Holy Spirit.18 And Congar quotes Pius' 
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declaration and accepts it without relating it to his previous 
doubts about the possibility of definition.19 These reactions are 
not adequate. Holböck's distinction is not clear and the inter-
pretation of 'defining' as 'giving prevalence above' does not 
have much foundation in either ordinary or technical language. 
Semmelroth's argument opposes magisterial teaching to 
analysis, but such an opposition is not necessary and leads in 
the end to a position of the teaching of the church outside the 
frame of common human language, understanding, and analysis. 
And Congar does not even try to solve the discrepancy.20 
Koster criticizes the formal counter-arguments within his 
own defense of the possibility of a definition in 'Ekklesiologie im 
Werden'.21 He defends the thesis that the (German) ecclesiology 
of that period still belongs to the pre-theological level and he 
points to those arguments against the possibility of a definition 
on principle and to the connected arguments about metaphors 
and images as symptoms of the pre-theological state. He rejects 
the various arguments that are given in support: the historical 
argument that since up to now no adequate definition is given, 
no definition is possible at all, and the argument that the 
mystery of the church cannot be known and defined. The first 
argument concludes incorrectly from the fact that a definition 
never has been given to that it never can be given, and the 
second does not acknowledge the analogical character of 
theological definitions, statements, and conclusions. This 
second argument Koster develops further by analyzing the 
presuppositions about the analogy of faith and the theological 
analogy that determines the radical negative position. It is 
said that the church is without any analogy or comparison, 
but, Koster remarks, this contradicts Scripture and the 
teachings of the church in which the church is presented by 
means of several comparisons. Moreover, without analogy no 
conception of the church would be possible and in consequence 
no faith could be asked for. Another point he criticizes is the 
deification and idolisation of the church and the identification 
with Christ: this rests upon neglecting the analogy between 
the order of the supranatural and certain things in the order of 
the natural.22 And he points also to the strange phenomenon 
that the defenders of the impossibility-thesis suddenly leave 
their 'theological agnosticism' by accepting metaphors about 
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the church in theological language. They consider these as 
second best, degrading by this evaluation the language of 
Scripture to the second rate.23 In his criticism of attempts to 
see 'mystical body' as the real definition of the church, Koster 
reveals his own views on what a definition should be and what 
kind of tasks it must be used for.24 A definition should not be a 
mere 'fixing of the use of the word' (Festsetzung) but an 
'essence-determination' (Wesensbestimmung), and it should 
present the 'conceptual determination' and the 'linguistic 
expression' of the essence named by means of such a fixing of 
the use of a word. The test-case for deciding whether a proposed 
definition is merely fixing the use or determining the essence, 
is the truth-question, for there is only one essence-determination 
possible. 'The definition of the church is thus the true con-
ceptual expression of the essence, understood in a human way, 
of what God has let Paul name "Body of Christ'".25 The 
functions such a definition has to fulfil are fourfold: it has to 
explain the essence of the church and to distinguish it from 
other things; it has to explain the essential properties that can 
be deduced from the essence; it has to indicate and reject 
theological errors; and it has to evaluate other theories.26 
Metaphors and images also play a role in Koster's understand-
ing of definition. Another element in his analysis of contempor-
ary ecclesiology is the 'theological ethos' and the way of 
thinking related to it. He refers here to the positive evaluation 
by certain people of the pre-theological level for pastoral or 
other reasons. On that pre-theological level metaphors and 
images dominate, and these are more helpful for preaching, 
etc. But for the theological level metaphors are not sufficient.27 
This means, though, that despite criticism and differences 
in the evalution Koster does share important presuppositions 
with (e.g.) Gommer whom he criticizes: both parties agree 
about the nature of the definition and about the implications 
of this nature, namely, that a definition should not contain 
metaphors or images. This disagreement is about the possibility 
of an essence-definition in a particular case - the church - but 
not about the possibility or the feasibility of a real definition as 
such. Yet philosophers have called the correctness and the 
coherence of such an enterprise into question: some have 
declared it a totally misguided undertaking, while others have 
Methodological ConsideTatìons 211 
distinguished various activities, of which some are important 
and valuable and others are incorrect, all confusingly combined 
under the same label. A look at these analyses is necessary 
before a decision can be taken as to whether a definition of the 
church is possible or impossible. 
2.2 Real definitions 
Definitions, both nominal and real, are normally given and 
asked for when a speaker or hearer is not certain or clear about 
a word that is being used or about something that is being 
mentioned. Real definitions can be understood as answers to 
'what is . . .' questions. To see what kind of answers a real 
definition cannot give, the remarks about the relation between 
language and reality made earlier in the context of metaphor-
theory have to be recalled. Language has a conventional 
character, i.e., cannot be conceived of as merely reporting or 
mirroring a pre-existing structure of reality. The conceptual 
structure of a language is not necessitated by reality. 
Consequently, it is not possible to point to reality as supporting 
evidence for certain concepts - nor is it possible to use sentences 
like 'but there are really four primary colours' or 'but all 
triangles are really rectilinear' as backing for certain state-
ments. Such appeals are, in Wittgenstein's words, 'justifying a 
sentence by pointing to what verifies it'.' Moreover, they do 
not take into account that the conceptual structure of a language 
is the result of human activity.2 The relevance of these general 
remarks for a discussion of real definitions is that if real defini-
tions are understood as stating what makes something what it 
is, the definitions neither state, nor report, nor establish 
something completely independent of human structuring, but 
state how language is used to structure reality. In other words, 
real definitions give an answer to a what-is question by stating 
the defining characteristics. 
But if this remark is taken as the only remark that can or 
should be made in connection with what is traditionally called 
'real definition', the complexity of the 'what-is . . .' question is 
overlooked and the possibility of discovering a number of 
valuable activities is blocked. It would also mean that what 
theologians in fact do when they discuss the church does not 
receive enough attention: it is too easy to dismiss their disagree-
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ment as purely disputes about words.3 Apart from stating the 
defining characteristics, there are several other answers that 
can be given to 'what-is . . .' questions, since questions like 
'what is music?', 'what is art?', 'what is time?', 'what is man?', 
etc, are vague and general. The type of answer expected is not 
specified in the question itself- although it may be clear from 
the context. This means, though, that several correct answers 
can be given to the one question, and that one should expect 
this variety to be reflected in what is normally offered as a real 
definition.' 
A real definition can state a key-element which structures 
the whole and from which other elements follow, e.g., 'music is 
melody'. It can present a rejection or recommendation of a 
certain ideal, as (e.g.) in 'music is the art of making pleasing 
combinations of sounds in rhythm and harmony'.5 That is to 
say, a real definition can be a 'persuasive definition'; if it is, it 
is often formulated with the help of terms like 'true', 'real' or 
'really' as in 'true music is . . .' or 'the real function of music 
is . . .' A real definition can point to the cause or the conditions 
of something as (e.g.) in 'music is the noise produced by man 
by means of his vocal chords or by means of an instrument'. 
And finally, a definition can give some kind of analysis, and 
'analysis' covers here a number of activities. First, it is used to 
refer to processes of abstraction and naming, e.g., to the process 
of becoming aware of a certain pattern within noises and 
naming it 'music'. Secondly, it can refer to the activity of 
realizing the complexity of a general element by acknowledging 
its parts, as (e.g.) in the case of music distinguishing between 
melody, scales, major-minor, rhythm, etc. Thirdly, analysis 
can also refer to the activity of placing something in a greater 
whole, defining something in terms of something else (music as 
one of the expressions of man's emotions) or by classifying it 
(music as man-made noise opposed to noises caused by brooks 
and birds). Fourthly, analysis can also mean the improvement 
of an idea or concept.6 Of these four kinds of analyses, the first 
type - abstraction and naming - should not be called a defini-
tion.7 This activity is presupposed in all of the others, for 
without abstraction and naming the question would not arise 
and an answer would not be possible. 
So, what is traditionally called definitio realis can be one of 
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these activities, but quite often such a definition is a mixture of 
more than one of them: the persuasive definition quoted 
presents a key-element as well. Further, it may not always be 
possible to tell whether a definition presents a key-element or 
an improvement of the idea. Another complication is that a 
real definition can entail some kind of nominal redefinition. In 
the case of definition as analysis, the realization of the 
complexity can lead to the improvement of the concept and 
this often entails a stipulation about how the word should be 
used in the future, resulting in a refining of the defining and 
accompanying characteristics. If the complexity of music is 
analyzed, it may lead to an improvement by making it more 
general and to the stipulation that 'music' should not be 
restricted to certain man-made noises, but that it should 
include bird noises as well. Or it may turn out that the search 
for a key-element requires a more precise delineation. Of these 
different types of answers, the persuasive definition is 
commonly judged to be an undesirable one. The correct 
argument for its rejection cannot be that it expresses a value 
judgement instead of facts, for this would imply an over-
simplistic view of factual language. The correct argument 
should be that such an answer does not clearly or openly show 
that it recommends or rejects an ideal. The recognition or 
exposure of this deceptive feature of a particular definition 
may be sufficient and a complete rejection of the answer not 
necessary.8 
Traditionally, too, a number of rules or requirements are 
cited that an adequate definition has to fulfil: some of these 
rules have been mentioned by the theologians in their argu-
ments. For present purposes, three such rules are relevant. 
First, a definition should establish the essence of what is defined 
and not state accidental properties; secondly, a definition must 
state the genus and the differentiating species; and thirdly, a 
definition should not use metaphors or figurative language.9 
Of these rules the first one becomes rather obvious when the 
misunderstanding based upon an incorrect view of the relation 
between language and reality is removed. If the definition is a 
nominal one, the rule merely says that a definition should state 
the defining characteristics, i.e., should define, and if the 
definition is one of the types of answers distinguished the rule 
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has to be translated to bring it into accordance with the type of 
question asked. This implies that it is rather diflicult to 
formulate rules about definitions since context, purpose, etc. 
cannot always be specified. This is even clearer in the case of 
the two other rules. If the second rule is applied to nominal 
definitions, 'genus' has to be interpreted rather loosely, e.g., in 
terms of grammar indicating the possible combinations with 
other words (Ryle, Wittgenstein).10 And even then, the rule 
cannot be used to exclude other ways of defining a word, for 
the rule would mean that a word can only be defined analytic-
ally when it may be perfectly adequate to define it by osten-
sión, by denotation, or by giving a synonym. If applied to real 
definition, 'genus' has again to be understood broadly, for 
such a real definition is not limited to questions about natural 
species or objects, nor is it limited to one particular type of 
analysis as is implied in the rule. The rule forbidding figurative 
language or metaphors cannot be maintained in its generality. 
'Life is a tale told by an idiot', or 'man is a thinking reed', or 
'architecture is music turned into stone' can be perfectly 
adequate answers to a 'what is . . .' question, depending on the 
context and the purpose. Moreover, such a metaphorical 
definition can be the starting-point of an analysis, for it may 
suggest a line of thought which results in a refinement or 
improvement of the idea and in a stipulation of how a word 
should be used in the future. 
2.3 The arguments reconsidered 
In the light of these reflections about the nature of real defini-
tions, the arguments of the theologians have to be considered. 
Both parties maintain a view on real definitions that supposes 
a possibility of circumventing language and that denies the 
human participation in structuring reality. Insofar as theo-
logians understand essence-descriptions or real-descriptions as 
attempts, to reach the essence without language or as ways to 
determine the essence separated from naming, their arguments 
are signs of a misguided concern. The way (e.g.) Koster 
employs the distinction between 'fixing the use of a word' and 
'essence-determination' and the remarks made by him and 
other theologians that the name does not matter so much, is an 
illustration of this attitude. If this misunderstanding is removed, 
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the negative argument can be restated either as an answer 
about defining characteristics or as an answer to a 'what is . . . ' 
question. Are there arguments in favour of declaring either 
answer impossible in the case of the church? 
A denial of the possibility of giving an answer to a question 
about the defining characteristics amounts to saying that no 
rules whatsoever can be specified for the use of the word 
'church'. But only if a word is meaningless can no rules, no 
defining characteristics be given.' The negative argument 
interpreted this way results in saying that 'church' is a word 
without meaning, without a place in language as a whole, and 
this conclusion is clearly not intended by the theologians. 
With regard to the real definition as an answer to a 'what 
is . . .' question there is, apart from a possible negative judge-
ment about persuasive definitions, no argument on general 
grounds for denying the possibility of such an answer. But are 
there arguments in the case of the church which makes such 
an answer impossible? The central argument is 'the church is 
a mystery and can therefore not be defined' and this argument 
could be used here. But how is 'mystery' to be understood? 
The theologians mentioned do not always clearly indicate how 
they understand 'mystery' and their views contain elements 
that are incompatible, as Koster observed.2 For the sake of 
argumentation and clarity the different interpretations and 
elements are presented schematically in what follows.3 
There is first of all 'mystery' as it is used in ordinary language, 
and there are two notable features to this understanding: we 
can express intelligibly why something is puzzling or mysterious, 
and the mystery can in principle be solved.4 When the church 
is called a mystery, this type of understanding is not commonly 
used. Two other interpretations are discernible in the case of 
the church: one in terms of the supra-natural, and one in terms 
of God's plan for mankind. 
The first theological interpretation defines mystery as a 
revealed truth that cannot be found out by human reason and 
that, even if believed, remains obscure and beyond human 
reason and human concepts. There is some ambiguity in this 
formulation for it can imply either no grasp whatsoever, or a 
partial grasp.5 If understood in the strong sense, 'the church is 
a mystery' does not allow a definition, but neither does it allow 
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any predication and forbids sentences like 'the church is the 
most real relation of people with the God-man',6 or 'the church 
is the mystical body of Christ'.7 It blocks the development of 
any ecclesiological thought, and it means that 'church' becomes 
a meaningless and vacuous term. If understood in the weaker 
sense, however, 'the church is a mystery' allows some grasp 
via analogous concepts. The combination between mystery 
and analogy is a somewhat awkward one: a strong emphasis 
on the difference undercuts the whole procedure, since a certain 
similarity is required. The example given by Scheeben of an 
explorer reporting about a flower whose colour, blossom, and 
smell hardly resemble those of the flowers we know shows this 
problem in an interesting way. Why should the explorer call it 
a 'flower' except for some similarity?" This classification may 
turn out to be incorrect, for subsequent research may reveal 
that it is in fact an animal or something that belongs to another 
category of vegetation (cf the case of the whale) or that it is 
something that requires a category of its own. But in all those 
cases it is related to things we know and fits into our system. 
Moreover, there has to be some understanding of the subject 
of the analogous predication itself, or it would not be possible 
to say that these predicates are analogical or to what degree 
they are analogical, nor would it be possible to say which 
predicates are allowed and which not. That this knowledge is 
presupposed is clear from the fact that disagreements occur 
and are discussed. That is to say, as soon as analogical 
predicates and concepts are allowed the appeal to 'mystery' 
loses much of its initial force. The appeal to the mystery of the 
church then becomes a comment upon the limitations of all 
human knowledge and it is not surprising to find Scheeben 
claiming that one cannot know the essence of things.9 Such a 
comment may be correct in the case of theology, or even in the 
case of all human knowledge, but it requires some specification 
or indication that the other approach to something or to every-
thing is presumptuous and an overstatement of human 
capacities. The introduction of the appeal to the mystery of the 
church in the ecclesiology of the 19th century forms a good 
example of this further specification: it was the reaction to a 
treatment of the church which only paid attention to the 
external structure and which was thought to be a reductionist 
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treatment. It was an appeal to realize the complexity of the 
church (visible-invisiblç, the relation to Christ, the importance 
of grace) and was made in order to reach a better understand-
ing of the church. 'The church is a mystery' does then not 
exclude any of the procedures and analyses that form an 
answer to the 'what is . . .' question. On the contrary, the 
appeal uses and points to precisely those procedures. 
The second theological interpretation of 'mystery' is given 
in terms of the history of salvation. God's plan for mankind is 
called 'mystery' by Paul, but is not something secret or 
inexpressible for it is revealed and preached.10 In the course of 
the early centuries of our era the original meaning of God's 
plan was further developed by canonical and other writers and 
by the end of the second century it covered either God's plan 
revealed in Jesus, or Jesus himself, or the prophecies and 
préfigurations in the Old Testament of the mystery of Jesus." 
T h e change within the Pauline letters from 'mystery' as the 
revealed plan of God towards Jesus as the summary and the 
revelation and the realization of God's plan implies a change 
in emphasis: the change is concerned with the way God's plan 
is realized and has become accessible.12 Nor does this under-
standing of mystery contain arguments for denying the 
possibility of a definition, for mystery is closely related to 
revelation and preaching. Or, as Pope Paul VI expressed it in 
his opening address of the second session of the Council: 'The 
Church is a mystery. I t is a reality imbued with the hidden 
presence of God. It lies, therefore, within the very nature of the 
Church to be always open to new and ever greater explora-
tion'.13 Precisely because it is 'open to new and ever greater 
exploration', this understanding cannot be used to defend the 
thesis that the church cannot in principle be defined. 
Related to the appeal to mystery is the argument that only 
images, and even only a number of images, can be used to talk 
about the church, and this argument is brought forward 
against the possibility of defining the church (cf. the synthesis 
view). Can these positions be maintained? The rule forbidding 
metaphors to occur in definitions appears to be less obvious 
and that does call into question the positiveness of this thesis. 
But since an answer in metaphorical language to a 'what i s . . . ' 
question can be an adequate answer, these theologians could 
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appeal to this line of argument and still claim that the church 
can only be discussed by means of metaphors or even by a 
number of metaphors. If such a conclusion could be reached 
the development of an ecclesiological terminology would be 
prevented, for a systematic treatment requires more than a 
definition that may indicate a line of research or that is only a 
semantic sketch. The transition from metaphorical language 
to the terminological level requires a definition or basic descrip-
tion that can be used for discovering the possible paraphrases. 
(See the previous section.) 
There are several aspects to this argument that for talking 
about the church metaphors are better suited than concepts. 
Dulles and Mühlen apply the distinction 'directly-indirectly' 
to conceptual as opposed to metaphorical or analogical 
language, albeit with contradictory evaluations added: about 
mysteries one cannot talk directly, but only indirectly via 
images (Dulles), and metaphors express only one aspect of the 
mystery, while conceptual formulations express the mystery 
itself immediately (Mühlen).14 Apart from the problem in 
Dulles' case — that to know predicates are used indirectly 
implies some direct knowledge - the formulation of the differ-
ence between metaphorical and conceptual language in terms 
of 'indirectly' and 'directly' points to the conception of the 
relation between language and reality that was criticized earlier, 
and to the rhetorical conception of metaphor that proved to be 
inadequate. There is no reason to disqualify metaphorical 
language as less related to reality and therefore less suited for 
definitions. Besides, Koster has already correctly observed 
that it is rather awkward to hold that metaphors are second 
best in view of their use in Scripture, and the qualification 
'indirectly' suggests precisely this.15 
Another aspect is the suggestion that concepts, unlike 
metaphors, give the illusion of mastery and that metaphors are 
thus better protectives for the mystery. Is it clear though that 
in its generality this cannot be maintained. For example, 
Ramsey points out that often the metaphor, or the model, is 
seen as a picture and that this creates severe problems and 
misunderstandings, because people have not been sufficiently 
aware of the metaphorical character.16 Mühlen, putting forward 
a view similar to Aquinas', warns about the danger of 
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metaphors,17 and the criticism of the radical version of meta-
phorical theology also reveals the problematic side of the use of 
metaphors. Even the proviso that a number of metaphors 
should be used is not enough, for the danger lies not so much 
in the metaphor or in the concept, but in the people who use 
the language and in the conception they have of language. In 
the case of both metaphor and concept the illusion of mastery 
is possible or not possible, but is not necessarily linked to 
either. And the argument about the number of metaphors as 
better expressing the mystery is not valid either in the case of 
metaphors only, for the same can be said of concepts. More-
over, the complementarity is not necessarily the final stage, for 
there seems to be no a priori argument that a more encompass-
ing mfetaphor or concept cannot be found.'" It is because the 
thesis that only images can be used occurs in the context of the 
appeal to a mystery that surpasses all knowledge that another 
aspect of these arguments is the contrast between cognitive 
(concepts) and non-cognitive (metaphors). But in metaphors 
as in most other sentences, one can discern a cognitive element. 
This content aspect is precisely the aspect which is responsible 
for the peculiar feature of the metaphor, and it is precisely this 
aspect which makes a conceptual development possible, if 
required. So, instead of a sharp contrast between metaphor 
and concept on this point, there is more of a link, continuation, 
or transposition. So this line of argument employing various 
differences between metaphorical and conceptual language in 
support of the claim that only metaphors can be used in talking 
about the church proves to be unsound because these differ-
ences rest upon confusions. 
The only argument left is the one that appeals to the rule 
that a definition should state the genus proximum and the differ-
entia specifica. This rule has become less important since this 
analysis has been shown to be relative to other types of analysis. 
But the arguments against the application of this kind of 
analysis that could be drawn from (e.g.) Commer's view are 
not correct either. It is only by making the church part of the 
Trinity (cf. Koster's criticism), or by calling the church a 
mystery in the incoherent way, that an argument can be made 
against this type of analysis. The points raised by the appeal to 
'uniqueness' are not decisive either, for the statement that 
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something is unique presupposes some kind of classification: 
complete uniqueness, like complete newness, can neither be 
noticed nor conceived.19 
So, the overall conclusion is that the arguments from the 
mystery of the church are not convincing and are not sufficient 
for a denial of the possibility of a real definition of the church, 
if'real definition' is understood in the sense outlined earlier. 
3. The practice of the theologians 
Several theologians who argue against the possibility of a 
definition of the church present, nevertheless, some kind of 
formula or description that forms the basis or direction for 
their further reflections on the church. What are they doing? 
Does their practice constitute a counter-argument? Does it 
present an alternative to the conclusions of the previous 
section? Do these theologians propose a type of basic state-
ment argued for in the first section of this chapter? And what 
are the theologians who accept the possibility of a definition 
actually doing about it? The various solutions to the problem 
created by Lumen Gentium that were analyzed in Chapter I, 
including those by theologians who do not explicitly discuss 
the issue of definition, can be evaluated here from a method-
ological point of view by means of answers to these questions. 
Some of the theologians who argue against the possibility of 
a definition of the church defend the synthesis-view (Schmaus, 
Congar). As the analysis of Chapter I shows, they and other 
synthesis-proponents proceed along the same lines: they 
analyze the advantages and disadvantages of certain images 
used for the church and cancel the disadvantages via a 
synthesis. Schmaus proposes basic formulas like 'the church is 
the people of God living and acting as the body of Christ', 'the 
church is the New-Testament people of God . . . existing as 
Christ's mystical body', or 'the church is the people of God 
because and insofar as it is the body of Christ'.1 With regard to 
the last formula he remarks that 'people of God' is the 
encompassing and 'mystical body of Christ' the determining 
concept.2 Congar formulates it as follows: 'Under the new 
dispensation . . . people of God receives a status that can only 
be expressed in categories and theology of the body of Christ'.3 
Dulles proceeds like Schmaus and Congar, although he starts 
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with some remarks about models which seem to lead to a pure 
pluralism. In order to talk about the mystery of the church, he 
says, we have to use models, and unlike aspects, models cannot 
be integrated 'into a single synthetic vision on the level of 
articulate categorical thought. . . we must work simultaneously 
with different models. By a kind of mental juggling act, we 
have to keep several models in the air at once'/ But in his 
evaluation of the models he discusses, he advocates some kind 
of harmonization. The pluralism of the models provokes 
questions about compatibility, adequacy, and correctness; 
since each of these models has certain values and, when taken 
in isolation, disadvantages, the solution of a super-model 
suggests itself. But Dulles, referring to the mystery-character 
of the church, is sceptical about the possibility of finding such 
a super-model and concludes: 'we are therefore condemned to 
work with models that are inadequate to the reality to which 
they point'.5 He proposes instead a method of harmonization 
in which the different models become 'complementary rather 
than mutually repugnant'.6 This means that one model can be 
taken as the starting-point and that the values of the others 
can be integrated into it. Of the five models he discusses and 
analyzes - the church as institution, as community, as sacra-
ment, as herald, and as servant - he excludes the church as 
institution as a model that can function in such a primary way 
for 'of their nature . . . institutions are subordinate to persons'.7 
Of the five, Dulles himself prefers 'the church is a sacrament', 
not only because it can integrate the values of other models -
as he shows, 'the church as servant' can do that too - but also 
because it is the 'theologian's model', so to say. It proves 
fruitful for theological systematics enabling an integration of 
different themes into a 'single overarching unity'.8 
These formulas are as such adequate answers to the question 
'what is the church?'. Points mentioned in the enumeration of 
the various types of answers to 'what is . . .' questions can be 
recognized in this procedure: the starting-point is formed by 
two or more descriptions of the church, each indicating a key-
element from which other elements follow; the concept of the 
church is then improved by making one key-element, people of 
God, more specific and precise via the other, body of Christ, or 
in Dulles' case, by taking one model and by integrating into it 
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the values of other models. But there are also theologians who 
follow a somewhat different procedure: while the proponents 
of the synthesis-view use the terms of the starting descriptions 
in their final formula, Semmelroth, Holböck and Mühlen 
propose a new term. 
Semmelroth's starting-point is that important biblical 
images for the church - people of God, body of Christ, and 
bride of Christ — seem to contradict and not to supplement 
each other.9 How can the church, he asks, appearing as a state 
with juridical structure (people) at the same time be called 
'bride', i.e., a person drawing its life from love and not from 
structures? And how can the church be called 'bride', indicat-
ing a separate identity from Christ, and at the same time 
'body', not indicating a separate identity? As the way 
Semmelroth poses the problem already shows, he sees 'people 
of God' as the scriptural basis for the organizational and 
juridical view of the church, and he remarks that when 
Scripture and the early Christian tradition apply this term to 
the church, they envisage primarily, and correctly, the external 
juridical and societal reality of the church. The genitive 'of 
God' is too vague, though, to determine the underlying divine 
reality.10 'Mystical body' is interpreted as pointing to that 
inner side, or seen as the invisible soul of the visible body. But 
Pius XII rejects this solution in Mystiti Corporis, which raises 
the question about the relation between the two concepts 
'people of God' and 'mystical body'. The two sound so different 
that we cannot readily suppose they mean the same: neverthe-
less, they are said to be referring to the same reality. The 
problem is even aggravated by 'bride', for it implies the 
opposite of 'body'." Semmelroth's solution is to propose 
'primordial sacrament' (Ursakrament), not as a church-concept 
alongside others, but as a 'reflection upon the supranatural 
ontology expressed in the revealed statements about the 
church . . . To see the church as sacrament means to explain 
the nexus between the different partial aspects of the church, 
especially between its meta-empirical divine reality and its 
societal human outer reality'.12 'Sacrament' indicates a complex 
connection of inner and outer, of divine and human, related as 
sign and signified, cause and result. (Cf. Trent's formulation of 
sacrament as the 'visible form of an invisible grace'.)13 
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Holböck qualifies his basic formulation as a quasi-definition: 
it is neither a definition nor a figurative circumscription. Like 
Semmelroth he starts with people of God, body of Christ, and 
bride of Christ. He extracts these biblical images from the 
schema on the church that was not fully discussed at the first 
Vatican Council and examines their respective advantages for 
the quasi-definition. Although 'bride of Christ' contains in a 
sense the whole of ecclesiology, it is not very helpful for reaching 
a precise quasi-definition, while 'people of God' and 'body of 
Christ' are very useful in this respect.14 In the notion 'body of 
Christ' Holböck discerns two aspects: the external aspect 
(visible organization founded by Christ and managed by 
Christ through his vicar) and the internal aspect (vivified by 
the invisible principle).15 In 'people of God' understood in its 
special meaning distinct from the ordinary and the Old-
Testament meaning, the important point is the relation to and 
the difference from the Old Testament people of God. He 
introduces another element which he thinks important for a 
quasi-definition and which cannot be found in those images, 
namely, the cultic task of the church. The result is the following 
quasi-definition: 'the church is that Christ-shaped hierarchically 
ordered universal society, which through, with, and in Christ, 
in unity with the Holy Spirit brings all honour to God the 
Father and truth and salvation to the world'.16 The central 
concept here is that of'society' (Gemeinschaft)" which according 
to Holböck is implied in both 'mystical body of Christ' and 
'people of God', the former indicating the solidarity of all 
members, the latter the individuality of the members. The 
images themselves do not appear in the quasi-definition, for 
they should not appear in a scientific definition.18 
Mühlen proposes a dogmatic basis-formula, which is neither 
a definition nor an essence-description, but a 'formal' summary 
containing all elements of revelation concerned with the 
church. A definition — i.e., a definition per genus proximum et 
differentiam specificam — is not possible and an essence-description 
has two disadvantages: it enumerates only the essential 
properties by which the church is distinguished from other 
human communities and it contains metaphors. Enumeration 
of the essential properties alone though does not express the 
essence of the church completely, and metaphors illuminate 
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only one side precisely because they are graphic representa-
tions. Bellarmine's and Möhler's essence-descriptions are the 
ones mostly quoted and both are dominated by an image: 
Bellarmine's by that of'people of God' and Möhler's by that of 
'body of Christ'. As basis-formula Mühlen proposes: 'one 
person (the one Spirit) in many persons (Christ and us)'.19 
This is a further specification of una persona mystica, a term 
found in tradition from Augustine up to modern times (Mystid 
Corporis) and based upon the Old-Testament concept of cor-
porate personality. It is this concept which is the common basis 
of understanding for 'people of God' and 'body of Christ': both 
metaphors express different aspects of the reality of the cor-
porate personality which is the church.20 
Although Semmelroth, Holböck, and Mühlen each propose 
a different central term, the way they proceed is the same and 
it reveals elements mentioned in the discussion of the definitio 
realis: they improve the concept of the church by indicating a 
notion that is more basic or fundamental than those used in 
the starting descriptions.21 Aymans, who does not discuss the 
definition issue, indicates the same procedure when he writes 
that it is justified to look for the common background of the 
image concepts 'people of God' and 'body of Christ' and that it 
is a typical theological task to do so.22 
Those who propose yet another solution - i.e., either 'people 
of God' or 'body of Christ' as their central term - follow a 
somewhat different procedure: namely, an analysis which 
shows that the various elements thought to be important can 
be developed from or placed within this central notion, 
resulting in a redefinition of the term used. The encyclical 
Mystid Corporis exhibits this structure, for it analyzes 'body', 
'Christ', and 'mystical' and determines and redefines the 
meanings of these terms.23 And Hamer, although he gives a 
different interpretation to 'mystical body of Christ', proceeds 
in the same way.24 In his article on the leading image of the 
church, Koster employs the following method: he starts from 
descriptions found in Scripture and liturgy in which the terms 
'ecclesia', 'people of God', and 'body of Christ' occur and 
argues that they have the same 'meaning and content', namely, 
the people of God and Christ.25 In developing this central 
notion he appeals to two more biblical images: bride of Christ, 
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and family of God. The problem with Koster's arguments 
mentioned earlier reappear here in the choice of two different 
types of procedures that both fit his strategy: the improvement 
of the concept by showing first that some of the descriptions 
can be reduced to one of the descriptions (people of God), or 
secondly, that a more basic description can be found (people 
of God and of Christ). The problems noted with regard to 
Luneau's exposition can also be found in the different types of 
procedures. On the one hand, he analyzes the notion 'people 
of God' and shows its complexity and that it contains all 
important elements; on the other, he follows the type of analysis 
used by the synthesis-theologians.26 
The various procedures the theologians follow are like the 
procedures that lead to the different answers covered by the 
broad label deßnitio realis, and their proposals are thus 
adequate answers to the question 'what is the church?' That 
this is not recognized by them, especially when they criticize 
other types of solutions and answers, is due to their confusing 
presuppositions. The fact that the various proposals are 
adequate answers, though, is not a sufficient condition for 
their being basic statements central to the systematic develop-
ment of an ecclesiology. Such a basic statement should not 
contain metaphors, for if it contains metaphors it cannot serve 
as the interpretation-key and coherence-criterion that is 
required for the ecclesiological, terminological development of 
metaphors in religious language. The presence of metaphors 
would start a regressive search for interpretation-keys and 
coherence-criteria. 
An over-hasty and too-easy verdict that the first type of 
basic statements used by the synthesis theologians, and the 
third type, containing either people of God or body of Christ, 
do not fulfil this condition, but that the second type does, is 
obstructed by the variety of terminological qualifications that 
are used by these theologians. As we remarked in the analysis 
of Chapter I, most theologians use 'metaphor', 'concept', and 
'image-concept' indiscriminately when they refer to 'people of 
God' and 'mystical body of Christ'.27 Only at the price of a 
fundamental confusion can it be maintained that a word is at 
the same time a metaphor, a concept, and an image-concept. 
T h e combination 'image-concept' aggravates the confusion by 
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its suggestive ambivalence. It is not clear why such a hybrid is 
introduced. It seems to indicate that the term is basically a 
concept, while the prefix 'image' points to the origin of the 
concept, or to the possible occurrence of some mental image or 
picture; both possibilities, however, are irrelevant to the 
present meaning of the concept. It seems better, therefore, to 
dismiss 'image-concept' from further reflections. An additional 
complication is the incorrect presupposition that a metaphor 
is a word. This means that an evaluation has to examine the 
various possible interpretations with regard to the status of the 
proposed formulas. 
If the synthesis formula is taken as a metaphor, or as 
containing metaphors (as the phrasing is when metaphors are 
seen as words), the synthesis formula cannot supply the basic 
statement which would be able to function as an interpretation-
key and coherence-criterion, since it would require another 
non-metaphorical statement. The awkwardness of the situation 
becomes clear when we realize that, on this interpretation, the 
metaphor can become its own interpretation-key. If'people of 
God' and 'body of Christ' are taken as precise concepts, there 
are two possibilities: first, that the synthesis is still a metaphor, 
and secondly, that it is a thoroughly conceptual statement. On 
the presupposition that a metaphor is a word the preciseness 
of a term may suggest it is not a metaphor, but the discussion 
of metaphor on the sentence-level shows that the preciseness of 
the concepts used is not decisive for the metaphorical use of 
language. In most cases the concepts used in a metaphorical 
combination are loose ones, but 'life is a tale' remains a 
metaphor when 'tale' is made more precise by adding 'fairy' or 
'horror'. If the synthesis-formula is taken as such a 'precise 
metaphor' the same problem arises as when it is taken as a 
'loose metaphor'. But the stipulation of the meaning of the 
concepts or one of the concepts can be such that the formula 
becomes a thoroughly conceptual statement. Such a move 
normally requires a rather drastic departure from the ordinary 
meaning. In this case there is first of all a difference with the 
original, which makes an appeal to (e.g.) Scripture less obvious 
and possibly even incorrect, and, secondly, the problem that 
such a stipulation does not yet turn the metaphor into an 
interpretation-key and coherence-criterion. As argued in the 
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first section of' this chapter, the transition from metaphor level 
to conceptual level cannot take place by just tightening the 
rules of one element in the metaphor. This may constitute an 
important phase in the whole process but does not solve the 
problems about coherence and correctness. These critical 
remarks about the synthesis-view are also applicable to the 
proposals in which either 'people of God' of'body of Christ' is 
taken as the central term. Whether the basic formula is thought 
to be or to contain a metaphor, or whether it is thought to be a 
conceptual statement, either position runs into the problems 
just mentioned. 
Against this background the problems about the way 
'mystical body of Christ' is used in the first schema of Lumen 
Gentium, and 'people of God' is used by some theologians, can 
be clarified. Inspired by the encyclical Mystici Corporis the first 
schema uses 'mystical body of Christ' as its central term. But 
the thesis that the mystical body of Christ does not consist at 
all of equal members contradicts the biblical data and the view 
that the illness of the members does not affect the health of the 
body renders the image unintelligible.28 The encyclical itself 
introduces elements into its analysis of Christ's role that do not 
follow organically from the image (e.g., founder of the body).29 
These elements are related to or part of current ecclesiastical 
practice or theory, and a similar feature can be discovered in 
Koster's arguments. He presents, both in his book and in his 
article, a juridical and hierarchical conception of 'people of 
God', as is shown by his discussion of membership and by his 
statements that anyone who goes against the juridical order of 
the church goes against the church as people of God, that the 
people of God is an ordered people, and that the fundamental 
and unchangeable distinction between apostles (and thus 
bishops) and other faithful is given with the appearance of the 
church at Pentecost.30 Apart from the already-mentioned 
mistakes with regard to biblical data, this understanding 
misrepresents the biblical concept of God by leaving out 
completely the constitutive element of the history of salvation.31 
It is here that we find the basis for Koster's claim that 'the 
church is the people of God' is not a metaphor. Luneau's 
argument in favour of 'people of God' is ambivalent and rests 
in the end (cf. Koster) upon the practical argument that it has 
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some appeal at the present time, and this implies that he uses 
a contemporary understanding of the phrase. The problematic 
point in these attempts is not that contemporary theories play 
a role in the explanation and understanding of'people of God' 
and 'body of Christ', or that the selection criterion and the 
interpretation-key are found outside the metaphors. The 
analyses and evaluations of the previous chapter and of this 
chapter have argued for the acceptance of these elements. The 
problematic points are the fact that a choice is made with 
regard to such a principle and yet is not explicitly discussed, 
that the choice is not defended on proper grounds, and that 
the theories play such a decisive and dominating role that we 
cannot speak of an influence from both sides, i.e. from 
metaphor and theory. The process of explanation and under-
standing is not concerned with eliciting the richness of the 
metaphor but with employing the metaphor as a formula 
capturing what is already known; it is not questioned, or is 
considered as beyond questioning.32 Because of this strong 
decisive influence of the theory, the illogical and incompre-
hensible account of metaphor and the contradictions with the 
data of faith are neither noticed nor used as a criticism ofthat 
theory. 
In the case of'body of Christ' the intrusion of alien concepts 
is usually easier to notice, but Koster's distinction in the 
degree of membership is an example of such an imposition 
in the case of'people of God'. The problem is not only to be 
found among these theologians, however: the arguments from 
content that other theologians put forward in the defence of a 
synthesis of 'people of God' and 'body of Christ' prove to be 
insufficient on similar grounds. Especially on institutional 
issues, the strong influence of the theory and of the current 
ecclesiastical practice and situation reveals itself and results in 
this type of imposition and intrusion.33 
The conclusion is that these two types of proposals are 
inadequate for the systematic purpose that the central state-
ment has to serve and that consequently the other type of 
solution - namely, the selection of another term - escapes this 
criticism.34 The next question is whether these formally 
adequate proposals in fact can be used as the central state-
ment in ecclesiology. 
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4. The basic statement in ecclesiology: a proposal 
The requirements which a central ecclesiological terminus has 
to fulfil have been stated and used in the course of the 
preceding arguments. The necessary transition from a meta-
phorical to a terminological use of language about the church 
can only take place if a terminus is found that in combination 
with 'church' forms a basic statement that can function as an 
interpretation-key and coherence criterion. (See section 1.) 
The previous section shows that a metaphor cannot function 
as such. A reflection upon the systematic place of such a 
formula can give a further determination in a more positive, 
albeit formal, way. The ultimate aim is ecclesiology, a system-
atic theological treatment of the church. 
Any scientific systematic treatment of a topic relates the 
topic it deals with to other topics also discussed within that 
science and focuses on the approach quintessential to this 
particular topic. It is not enough to be concerned with the 
location alone, for it is not an uncommon feature that within a 
science the same topic is discussed within different contexts: it 
is therefore necessary - if possible - to indicate the individual 
typical context of the topic as well, or to specify the quintes-
sential approach as well. That is to say, when and how a topic 
is discussed depends not only upon the overall structure and 
the relations of the topic to others, but also on the proper 
nature of the topic, upon the characteristic features of the 
topic. This implies that decisions have to be taken as to 
whether a certain topic is an irreducible element which merits 
an individual approach or whether it is part of something else. 
A lack of awareness of this point can easily lead to serious 
misunderstandings, for characteristic features, if any, are 
obliterated when the topic is reduced to something else on 
incorrect grounds. 
The narrow apologetic purposes for which the first separate 
expositions and treatises on the church were written and the 
subsequent development, heavily influenced by similar 
apologetic motives, have for a long time determined the way 
the church is treated in theology.' The analysis of the genesis 
of Lumen Gentium shows a growing general awareness and 
recognition of the deficiency of this narrow approach.2 From 
the moment the insufficiency of this type of apologetic treat-
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ment — with its often exclusive emphasis on juridical and 
institutional issues - becomes clear, the problem is not so 
much the fact that the church is thematized but the way in 
which the church is thematized. Against this background and 
against the background of the points raised with regard to a 
systematic treatment, it is not enough to locate the church in 
the whole range of theological topics in order to establish an 
ecclesiology: the question whether the church has its own 
context, whether an approach quintessential to the church is 
possible and necessary, has to be discussed explicitly. 
An indication of tasks and functions only, or a statement 
that amounts to giving just a further specification, cannot be 
accepted as a final answer to this question about the approach 
quintessential to the church, for who or what fulfils these tasks 
and functions, or who or what is further specified, has to be 
named. An indication of tasks or of the further specification is 
not decisive for acknowledging the quintessential approach; 
only what fulfils the task, or what is further specified, can 
establish the need for such an approach. This means that 
'sacrament' cannot be the terminus looked for. Semmelroth, 
who proposes this term, admits that 'sacrament' is not a basic 
or final term when he remarks - referring to the Council - that 
'the church is a sacrament' is a functional qualification, 
although it has the form of an essence-description. While 
'people of God' and 'body of Christ' state what the church is, 
'sacrament' indicates the way the church works. But, 
Semmelroth continues, the two aspects are interrelated: the 
way the church works implies a statement about its essence, 
and what the church is points to the way it functions.3 
Semmelroth's appeal to 'modern man' who is more interested 
in the way an organization reaches its aim than in the 
organization itself, is not convincing in this context.4 Apart 
from the problems of vagueness attached to every appeal to 
'modern man', the evasion of any discussion of the presup-
positions cannot be accepted in view of the demands of a 
systematic explanation and understanding (see section 1). And 
if various types of explanations are called for in a systematic 
treatment, it seems appropriate to look for a terminus that is so 
basic that it can function as a pivot and can be used in these 
various types. 'Sacrament' cannot be such a pivot-terminus 
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since it specifies the task and the function of the church.5 This 
point remains valid even if the appeal to modem man is 
replaced by a more profound argument, as is the case in BofFs 
study of the church as sacrament. That argument is related to 
his point of departure and aim.6 His starting-point is the fact 
that the obvious character of Christianity and of the church 
has disappeared, and he sets out to provide an adequate form 
of legitimation for the church. Under the influence of the 
historical awareness of the Enlightenment the question about 
the meaning, function, and essence of the church became the 
centre of theological reflection.7 In the present situation the 
historical awareness is even more all-pervading, and the 
relativity of the church is further emphasized by the emergence 
of a secular, pluralistic society. The changes in society which 
provoke a constant reflection upon the function of institutions, 
and the disenchantment with ideologies, urge people not so 
much to ask questions about the nature and the essence of the 
church, but to turn their attention to the function of the 
church.8 This analysis and interest also determine his dis-
cussion of the conditions a central statement has to fulfil. 
Among these there is only one concerned with the systematic 
and methodological points discussed here: namely, the con-
dition that the basic statement should express the internal link 
between the various images used for the church.9 But, as 
argued in section 1, the argument in favour of a functionalist 
approach over and against one in which 'the nature and the 
essence' of the church is discussed, cannot be of a principal 
character. And however correct Boff's argument that in the 
present situation the church can only be legitimated function-
ally may be, from a systematic point of view a pivot-terminus 
is required and presupposed for such an attempt. And 
Miihlen's proposal, una mystica persona, or 'one person in many 
persons', cannot be that pivot-terminus either, for the concept 
of corporate personality that is fundamental in his analysis -
the church is a corporate personality - is a further qualification 
of a group.10 
A way of finding such a pivot-terminus is indicated earlier in 
section 1 of this chapter; namely, to register the use of'church' 
and, if necessary, to legislate a more strict use. Looking at the 
way 'church' is used both in ordinary and religious language 
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we may observe that 'church' is not used in a strict sense but 
that it is not used in a completely undetermined sense either. 
'Church' is used to refer to a group of Christians, ranging from 
a few to a very large number, to the place or building where 
this group congregates and worships, to the time they gather, 
and to the leaders or representatives of this group. It is not 
used for just one Christian, for creation, for sin or grace, for the 
Trinity or for one person of the Trinity. This does not mean 
that the church is not related or not normally related to these, 
but that the church is not said to be identical with any of these. 
These points reveal that there is a common element in this 
usage, namely, that the church is a group of believers, not just 
a number of individuals, but a number of believers forming 
some kind of unity. In the more technical language of theology 
we can find a confirmation of this last observation. 
But this registration does not need to be the final word. 
Moreover, there are indications that some theologians tend 
towards a form of an identification between Christ and church, 
or to an assimilation of ecclesiology to christology. Is Commer 
correct when he states that in a certain sense Christ and the 
church are identical? Can the Christian be called 'Christ'?" 
Are there adequate reasons for reducing the church to any 
other topic studies in theology? The claim of identity would 
contitute a necessary and sufficient condition for such a 
reduction. But it is unlikely that any theologian would be 
prepared to accept the consequences of such an identity, such 
as the interchangeability of 'church' and 'Christ' of 'Holy 
Spirit' in the New Testament or the Symbolum. This reductio 
ad absurdum suggests that the communal aspect of the church, 
i.e., the fact that it is a fellowship of believers, is irreducible to 
something else. This indicates what the quintessential 
approach is: the thematization of the church as the community 
of Christian believers. 
Which terminus should be chosen in concreto to express this 
approach depends on several considerations and conditions. 
The terminus must be precise, i.e., must indicate this 
communal aspect, and must be open. This means that two 
extremes have to be avoided: a completely empty term and an 
already highly determined term. A terminus can avoid these 
extremes by being able to be developed into a formal system of 
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relations, a network, which structures and determines the 
discourse to a certain degree, but which needs to be filled in as 
well. A completely empty terminus will not be able to lead to 
such a formal system, while a strictly determined terminus will 
not leave enough room for subsequent filling in by (e.g.) 
metaphors. Another point is the clarity of the terminological 
status of the terminus. If possible, any occasion for misunder­
standing and confusion should be avoided, and this means 
that the formulation itself should reveal that it is a technical 
term. A final point is that such a terminus cannot be chosen 
with disregard to terms used in ecclesiological writings of the 
past and present. These last two points are considerations of a 
practical kind and do not have the weight of the first condition, 
but they can play a role if diiferent terms are found to fulfil 
that first condition. 
A number of terms are available to express the communal 
aspect: 'community', 'fellowship', 'society', 'union', 'congre­
gation' (or their equivalents in Dutch, Spanish, French, 
German, etc.), сое tus, societas, communi tas, koinonia, and communio. 
Given the second point, terms like 'community', 'fellowship' or 
their equivalents should not be chosen, for they do not express 
sufficiently the terminological status of the central term. Nor 
should societas or coetus, since they are closely linked with the 
narrow apologetic approach. A preference for societas would 
not do justice to the developments in ecclesiology and would 
imply a criticism of those developments without proper 
argumentation. Communio is the translation of koinonia and 
both are interchangeable. Our ultimate option for communio is 
based upon an initial understanding due to the links with 
terms like 'community', 'communion', 'communication'; 
koinonia lacks this. Moreover, Vatican π uses communio quite 
often, and the term enjoys some popularity in modem ecclesio­
logical writings. By selecting communio a critical development 
and evaluation is facilitated. To express clearly the quintes­
sential approach the complete basic statement should then be: 
the church is the communio of the faithful. 
The systematic possibilities of'communio of the faithful' are 
formed by what this terminus necessarily suggests and 
presumes, by the formal network which follows from it. The 
terminus itself indicates the relationship of the faithful as a 
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whole to God, Father, Son and Spirit. This is a constitutive 
element, for without this relation it would not make sense to 
use a terminus like 'communio of the faithful'. Because in 
ecclesiology this relationship is studied in the context of the 
communal human aspect, those elements that are characteristic 
of relationships in which people are involved are part of the 
formal network. Communal relations have a temporal 
dimension, for relationships communal or individual imply 
some duration and normally cover a more or less substantial 
period of time. Communal relationships also have a spatial 
dimension, in the sense that they are expressed in some visible, 
localized form. It might be possible to talk about individual 
relationships lacking this dimension, although this seems to 
imply a relationship in which at least one pole is not conscious 
of the relationship. The question whether this possible element 
of individual relationships, with its problematic implications, 
is also applicable to communal relationships has to be 
answered negatively. It does not make sense to talk about a 
relationship in which a group or community as group of 
community is involved without expressing it, and certainly not 
if the communal relationship to God is a constitutive element. 
This means that the way the faithful as a community express 
the relationship becomes relevant to ecclesiology. Because it is 
not an individual or a number of separated individuals, but 
the faithful as a whole, that is in the focus of attention, the 
structure of that whole becomes a significant issue as well, for 
some form of internal organization is the characteristic feature 
of communal human behaviour, certainly if it extends over 
some period of time. In human relationships one can discern a 
purpose: the purpose of a communal relationship can lie inside 
the relationship, that is to say, the relationship can be its own 
purpose, or it can lie outside the relationship, or a relationship 
can have both types of purposes. Linked to this, but also to the 
previous point, is the element of the relationship between 
church and 'non-church', which also becomes a necessary part 
of ecclesiological discourse. 
As a formal terminus 'communio of the faithful' cannot be 
expected to indicate more than a network which determines 
the coherence of a possible ecclesiological discourse. The 
correctness of the discourse which is made possible by this 
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framework, and which consists of filling in the bare structure 
with biblical and other insights derived (among other sources) 
from metaphors, is not decided by it. This means that the 
formal statement 'the church is the communio of the faithful' 
has a limited but crucial function: it determines which issues 
can and have to be discussed and which not, which questions 
are proper and germane and which not, whether it makes 
sense or whether it is coherent to raise a certain problem. It 
makes clear where arguments are used and have to be used, 
and over which points disagreement can therefore arise. So, 
because the communio of the faithful is related to God, Father, 
Son, and Spirit, it makes sense to ask questions about Christo-
centric or pneumatocentric ecclesiologies, that is, ecclesiologies 
in which either the relationship to Christ or to the Spirit plays 
the most important role. But it does not make sense within this 
framework to consider ecclesiology as either a part of Christo-
logy or a part of pneumatology. Consequently, the employment 
of termini belonging to these other fields and specially coined -
e.g., 'incarnation' — within ecclesiology becomes highly 
questionable. On the one hand, an ecclesiology which did not 
discuss the constitutive relation to God would be incoherent. 
On the other hand, because of its temporal dimension, it 
makes sense to apply categories like change, development, and 
— in combination with the purpose — categories like decline 
and progress, success and failure. But, because of this 
dimension, it would also be incoherent to present an 
ecclesiology in which the church appears as an a-temporal, 
a-historical, unchangeable entity. Any hypostatization of the 
church becomes impossible.12 
A salvation-historical approach to the church is thus not 
only possible, but also necessary, for it is the result of this 
temporal dimension combined with the constitutive relation to 
God. But this does not imply that the history of salvation has 
to be seen as an automatic process leading to the eschatological 
fulfilment.13 Again, because of its form, it makes sense to talk 
about sacramental and other types of realization of this form 
and about organizational structure, but it does not make sense 
to present an invisible, unstructured church. But it is too quick 
a move to conclude on the basis of 'communio of the faithful' 
alone to any specific expression or structure. The correctness 
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of either the decentralized and democratic understanding of 
'communio' or the hierarchical understanding of it is not 
established by merely referring to 'communio'.14 
A final aspect of this formal structure is its consistency, both 
internally and externally. That is to say, the way one particular 
element is filled in influences and is influenced by the con-
cretization of others: the way the purpose is determined 
influences the way the relation to 'non-church' is seen (e.g., in 
terms of'state' or in terms of'world'), the degree of importance 
attached to the organizational structure and the way that 
structure is envisaged. Similarly, there are relations and links 
with other fields and approaches in theology. The way God is 
seen colours the way the relation between church and God is 
seen and can be seen, and determines (e.g.) whether the use of 
categories like 'initiative-response' are proper for the further 
description of this relation. 
This formal structure thus makes a coherent and consistent 
ecclesiology possible. But the central terminus or central 
statement should also enable the development of the various 
types of explanation discussed earlier, or should occupy a 
pivotal position in the whole of ecclesiology. It is because of 
the network arising out of 'communio of the faithful' that this 
terminus can occupy that pivotal position, for there are 
starting-points in the structure itself for these various types of 
explanation. The temporal and spatial dimensions not only 
allow other sciences a place within ecclesiology, but make it 
necessary to use them. These investigations lead to 'what is 
. . .' questions, but the communal relationship to God, Father, 
Son, and Spirit, makes these questions even more obviously 
unavoidable and a necessary part of ecclesiology. 
Thus, 'the church is the communio of the faithful' can stand 
as the central statement in ecclesiology. With the help of this 
terminus, this basic statement, the richness of religious 
metaphors and of biblical and other insights can be made 
fruitful, and the opportunities created by Vatican и can be 
used to develop a truly theological vision of the church. 
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2. Congar, L'Eglise, 411-24, 435-37; Nédoncelle (ed.), L'ecclésiologie au 
XIXe siècle (especially the articles by R. Aubert, J. Geiselmann, and H. 
Davis); Jaki, L« tendances nouvelles de l'ecclésiologie; Keller, 'Volk Gottes'als 
Kirchenbegriff; Valeske, Votum Ecclesiae. 
3. Horst, Das Schema über die Kirche auf dem I. Vatikanischen Konzil. See also: 
Mersch, L· Corps Mystique du Christ II, 350-57; Koster, 'Ekklesiologie 
im Werden', 251; Beumer, 'Das für das Erste Vatikanische Konzil 
entworfene Schema De Ecclesia im Urteil der Konzilsväter'. See 
further: Valeske, 206; Keller, 65fr. 
4. Pius XII, Aiystici Corporis (ed. Tromp). See also the thesis of the identity 
repeated in Humani Generis (quoted by Tromp, 68). For the situation 
leading up to the encyclical, see: Congar, L'Eglise, 469-72; Valeske, 
196f; Jaki; Lialine, 'Une étape en ecclésiologie'; Przywara, 'Corpus 
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Notes to Chapter I 
1.1 
1. Acta Synodalia Sacrosancti Concilii Oecumenici Vaticani Secundi. See I.iv 
121-61, 172-212, 218-62, 290-315, 327-60, 369-91 for the speeches on 
the first schema, and 397-639, ILL 467-604 for other comments. See 
11.i 282-300 for written comments on chapter 1 of schema 2, version 3; 
see also 605-801. See 324—9 for the proposal to change the order of the 
chapters; 343-62, 366-86 for the reaction to the schema as a whole; 391 
for the vote on the question whether the schema as a whole was accept-
able for further discussion. For the discussion of the introduction and 
chapter 1, see 391-5 and II.ii 9-63, 68-82; for written comments on 
these parts, see 129-218 and also III.i 547-796. For the procedure and 
voting with regard to the relevant parts of Lumen Gentium, see III.i 395, 
458,497, and 516. 
For the general history of Vatican II - its preparation, organization 
and daily routine, and the development of its main ideas and themes -
see: Katholiek Archief, Het Concilie; Congar, Vatican II. L· concile au jour 
le jour; Fesquet, L· Journal du Concile; Laurentin, L'Enjeu du Concile; 
Ratzinger, Die Erste Sitzungsperiode des Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzils; 
Ratzinger, Das Konzil auf den Weg. Rückblick auf die Zweite Sitzungsperiode; 
Ratzinger, Ergebnisse und Probleme der dritte Konzibperiode; Ratzinger, Die 
Letzte Sitzungsperiode des Konzils; Butler, The Theology of Vatican II; 
Rynne, Vatican Council II; Schillebeeckx, Het Tweede Vaticaans Concilie. 
For the history of Lumen Gentium, see: Betti, 'Geschiedenis van de 
Constitutie'; Congar, 'D'une "Ecclesiologie en gestation" a Lumen 
Gentium chap. I et II'; Moeller, 'Het rijpen van de ideeën bij de 
voorbereiding van de Constitutie'; Philips, G., Dogmatische Constitutie 
over de Kerk Lumen Gentium. 
For commentaries on Lumen Gentium, see (e.g.): Barauna (ed.), De 
Kerk van Vaticanum II; Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil I, 137-359; Hampe 
(ed.), Die Autorität der Freiheit I, 291-372. 
2. Acta I.iv 121. 
3. See Betti, 136f. This might well have been the only possible solution, 
given the differences between the theological schools and the powerful 
position of the 'Roman' theologians. See also: Tavard, The Pilgrim 
Church, 34f; Congar, 'D'une Ecclesiologie', 370; and Ratzinger, Zweite 
Sitzungsperiode, 25: 'In order to characterize the text offered by the 
Council fathers it may be useful to realize that in all essentials it 
emerged from the work of the Belgian theologians close to Cardinal 
Suenens, and that the standpoint of these theologians represented a 
balanced middle position between the scholastic treatises of a Roman 
or Spanish stamp on the one hand, and, on the other, the decidedly 
modem works of German and French theologians'. 
4. For the texts, see Alberigo and Magistretti (edd.), Constitutionis 
Dogmaticae Lumen Gentium Synopsis Historica. See also: Geremia, I primi 
due capitoli della 'Lumen Gentium', who includes in his analysis relevant 
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speeches and interventions by the Council fathers. See further: 
Sigurbjömsson, Ministry within the People of God; and Anton, 'Estructura 
Teandrica de la Iglesia'. In these two works the focus is not so much 
the question of the central term: Anton concentrates on the first part of 
section 8, while Sigurbjömsson's main concern is whether Lumen 
Gentium 'signifies a break with the pre-Conciliar societas conception' 
(29). 
1.1.1 
1. Katholiek Archief 1,9, 11 f. 
2. Acta I.iv, 12-91 (esp. 12-17); Alberigo, 2:4-8:223. 
3. See Acta I.iv 122 for the comment on chapter 1 in Franic's relatio. 
4. SeeValeska, ІШГ. 
5. For occurrences of corpus and corpus Christi in the rest of the schema, see 
Alberigo, 14: 46f, 52, 83, lOOf, 125-7, 141; 15: 65, 70, 80, 84, 113; 23: 99, 
118f, 121; 30: 51, 53, 63f, 80, 92; 32: 112, 121; 33: 14, 36, 43f; 35: 57; 38: 
б . І З ^ З В Г , 128. 
6. In chapter I; Alberigo, 2: 54, 66; 3: 41, 54, 83. The other occasions on 
which populas occurs can be found in the chapter on the laity (chapter 
III); Alberigo, 30: 50; 31: 13, 29; 32:95, 102, 125, 131; (32: 91). 
7. Section 5 (end); Alberigo, 7: 357-67. 
8. For this discussion, see also Ardelt, 'Anmerkungen zur 
antimodemistischen Ekklesiologie'. 
1.1.2.1 
1. For the distribution of material and chapter-headings, see Alberigo, 
xxvii-xxxvi; for the text, see Alberigo, 1: 1-27, 213. 
2. 'Suadetur ut servetur textus a Commissione propositus, qui pluribus 
placet.. . ' ; Alberigo, 30: 29. 
3. New are: Alberigo, 16: 6f, 16, 101; 21: 153-5. Also new are the following 
passages in which corpus, etc. is used for bishops and pope: 20: 107, 110; 
22: 142; 23: 45-62, 79; 24: 3; 25: 245; 27: 51. Quoted from the first 
schema are: 14: 127, 142; 15: 79f, 84; 23: 99-101. From 30: 1 onwards 
the text quotes the first schema in full (see note 5 of Section 1.1.1 
above). 
1.1.2.2 
1. Betti, 136f; Alberigo, xxiiif. 
2. See Alberigo, 1:1-29:53. 
3. 'De unitale Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti plebs adunata'. 
4. Alberigo, 8: 29^5; see also 8:11 Off. 
5. New are: Alberigo, 18: 8 (see note 6), 18; 22: 137; (24: 33). Quoted from 
the previous version are: 21: 157; (26: 55; 27: 192). 27: 192 adds/ю/го/иг 
to a phrase from the first schema. 
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6. New are: Alberigo, 18: 9 (see note 5), 17; 22: 24 (section heading). 
Quoted from schema 1 are: 14: 110 (membra Ecclesiae becomes Ecclesiae 
soaetatem incorporantur), 125 (also in version 1 of schema 2); 23: 100 (also 
in version 1 of schema 2), 118. Quoted from schema 2 version 1 are: 16: 
3, 19, 101; 21: 153-5; and, in the context of bishops and pope: 18: 76; 
20: 107; 22: 102, 109, 139f, 148; 23: 79, 127; 25: 210, 252 (see schema 1). 
1.1.2.3 
1. Acla 11. i 339 (Cardinal Browne's relatio). 
2. The official commentary divides the text into three parts, taking 
sections 7-10 together: Acta II.i 229-31. For the text of the schema, see: 
Acta ІІ.І 215-28 (chapter 1); Alberigo, 1: 1-16: 176. 
3. Ada 11.i 230. 
4. The importance of 'body of Christ' is also clear in the rest of the 
schema. The third version quotes the second version on this point and 
adds: Alberigo, 32: 6, 13, 30, 87f; 33: 5, 8; 35: 58; 38: 6, 13. Of these, 32: 
87; 33: 5, 8; 35: 58; 38: 6, 13 are quotes from the first schema. The 
following are concerned with bishops and pope: Alberigo, 22: 78, 193. 
5. Alberigo, 3:90; see also 32: 95 and the parallel text in the first schema. 
6. Alberigo, 16: 24 (refers to the Jews); 25: 20 (the second version gives 
fidelibus suis, i.e., of the bishops); 30: 5 (title), 12, 23; 32: 10 (connected 
with body of Christ), 48, 55Γ, 80-82, 102 (quoting 1 Pet); 33: 4 
(connected with body of Christ); 41: 22; 45: 10. See also 19: 24. Of 
these, 32: 80, 95, 102; 33: 4 are quotations or near-quotations from the 
first schema. The other occasions on which populus occurs are all 
quotations from the second version (see note 5 to section 1.1.2.2 above). 
1.1.2.4 
1. i4ciöll.i229. 
1.1.3 
1. Dufort, 'Histoire et theologie du Vile chapitre de la constitution 
Lumen Gentium'; Philips I, 57-60; Betti, 148ίΓ. 
2. Acta 111.i 395, 458, 497, 516. See also Kloppenburg, 'Stemmingen over 
de laatste verbeteringen aan de Constitutie', 193-7. 
3. Acta Hl.i 158-70 (chapter 1), 181-92 (chapter 2); Alberigo, 1: 1-17: 37. 
4. ЛгіаІІІ.ІШ. 
5. Л<:/аІІІ.І209Г. 
6. Acta III . l 209: 'Si autem haec materia in ipso Capite I reponetur, 
moles huius Capitis I nimis exeresceret'. 
7. Acta III.i 210: 'Aptior distnbutw materiae obtinetur si in Capite I de 
Ecclesiae mysterìo agatur de Ecclesia in tota sua amplitudine ab initio 
creationis in proposito Dei, usque ad consummationem coelestem. 
Deinde in Capite II, de eodem ipso mysterio quatenus "inter 
tempora", scilicet Ascensionis Domini Eiusque Gloriosae Parousiae, ad 
beatum finem progreditur'. 
8. incorporare: Alberigo, 11:11; 14: 110, 150, 185; 17: 16; 21: 21; see also 31: 
12. membrum: Alberigo, 21: 21; 23: 101; 31: 7; 32: 5-9 (quoting Rom 
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12:40, 13; 33: 8; 36: 52; 44: 113. corpus (mysticum): 23: 99f, 118; 26: 17; 
28: 68, 75, 202; 30: 94-103 (quoting Eph 4:150; 32: 5-9 (quoting Rom 
12:40, 46, 60; 33: 56; 43: 88; 45:31. See also, in chapter 2, '4: 17; 17:23, 
28. It is remarkable that the whole discussion of collegiality is 
conducted in terms of 'body'. In view of these data, Congar's remark 
that 'the subcommission and the theological commission had 
deliberately avoided speaking in terms of "members'" ('D'une 
Ecclésiologie', 375) is only partially correct. The replacement of 
membrum by incorporare does not eliminate the associations or problems 
evoked by membrum. 
The final version: corpus: Alberigo, 48: 34; 49: 101; 50: 8; see also 49: 34, 
75f; populas: 50: 179 (which is an allusion to Mystici Corporis^). 
The commission quotes, in favour of the insertion of the second chapter 
in the schema, the remark: ' "Populus" est terminus biblicus, cum aliis 
imaginibus connexus. In ilio clarescit continuitas historica Ecclesiae' 
(і4гі<2ІІІ.і209). 
For the use of corpus, etc., see the passages cited in notes 8 and 9 above, 
and see also: Alberigo, 18: 17; 21: 92, 135; 22: 64, 79, 103, 130, 147, 193; 
23: 79, 127; 25: 203, 253, 266; 28: 208; 31: 31. F'or populus, see Alberigo, 
18: 8, 25; 22: 137; 24: 43; 25: 20; 26: 12, 34, 55; 28: HI, 227; 29: 9; 30: 
67; 31: 13; 32: 10, 47; 33: 4; 40: 61; 44: 117; 45: 10. 'People' is not always 
used in the full biblical sense: see, e.g., 25: 20; 26: 34, 55. 
See Sigurbjomsson, 120(1 for ambiguities in the chapter on the bishops; 
see also 1481Γ. Mühlen, Una Mystica Persona, 360-65 recognizes the 
'broadness' of the text and the problems this causes for finding out the 
basic intentions of the Council. Although indications can only be found 
in the text with difficulty, the importance of certain statements, the 
inner structure, and the comments of the theological commission 
together show, according to Mühlen, that section 8 - and especially the 
analogy between incarnation and church - is to be considered as the 
centre of gravity of the first chapter. 
McDonnell, 'The Ecclesiology of Calvin and Vatican H'; Persson, 'Die 
Endzeitliche Character der pilgernden Kirche und ihre Einheit mit der 
himmlischen Kirche'; Skydsgaard, 'The Church as Mystery and as 
People of God'. See also: Lindbeck, 'Die Kirchenlehre des Konzils ist 
ein Uebergang'; and Gilkey's analysis of history in his Reaping the 
Whirlwind. 
Since Lumen Gentium is our central starting-point, the emphasis in this 
section lies on theology during and after the Council: the pre-conciliar 
period is only mentioned insofar as it illuminates these later arguments. 
This explains why (e.g.) Mersch, Tromp, and the theology reacting 
upon Mystici Corporis are not discussed explicitly. Moreover, since our 
analysis focuses on the arguments used, theologians who merely 
mention the synthesis in passing are not discussed explicitly either. 
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1.2.1.1 
1. Congar, 'The Church as the People of God'; Beumer, 'Die Kirche, Leib 
Christi oder Volk Gottes'; Harvey, 'Le Peuple de Dieu, sacrament du 
dessein de Dieu'; Küng, Die Kirche, 131-80; McNamara, 'The Idea of 
the Church: Modern Developments in Ecclesiology'; Ratzinger, Das 
Neue Volk Gottes, 75-104; Ratzinger, 'Kirche', part III; Ratzinger, 
'Demokratisierung der Kirche'; Schmaus, Der Glaube der Kirche I, 8fF, 
411Г; Schmaus, 'Das Gegenseitige Verhältnis von Leib Christi und Volk 
Gottes im Kirchenverständnis'. 
2. Congar, 'People of God', ЮГ. See also: Congar, 'L'Eglise de Hans 
Küng', 695, 702; Beumer, 'Die Kirche', 261, 264; Harvey, 92 (and see 
too 104 and 106, where Harvey says that the use of'people of God' 
implies a real continuity); Küng, Die Kirche, 151-6, 160-80; 
McNamara, 108; Schmaus, Glaube, 9; Schmaus, 'Verhältnis', 27. 
3. Congar, 'People of God', llf; Küng, Die Kirche, 156-8; Schmaus, 
Glaube, 56. 
4. Congar, 'People of God', 1 If; Harvey, 107; Küng, Die Kirche, 158-60. 
5. Congar, 'People of God', 12; Küng, Die Kirche, 139-41; McNamara, 
107f; Ratzinger, 'Demokratisierung', 27; Schmaus, 'Verhältnis', 24. See 
also Backes, 'Gottes Volk im Neuen Bund', 92 for a critical remark on 
Schmaus, Katholische Dogmatik III/l: Die L#A« non der Kirche, where 
Schmaus argues similarly. 
6. Congar, 'People of God', 12f; Küng, Die Kirche, 269f; McNamara, 110; 
Ratzinger, 'Kirche', part III . 
7. Congar, 'People of God', 13f; Beumer, 'Die Kirche', 265; Harvey, 92; 
Ratzinger, 'Demokratisierung', 27-9. See also: Ratzinger, Neue Volk, 84; 
Schmaus, Glaube, 9. 
8. Beumer, 'Die Kirche', 261; McNamara, 106f; Schmaus, 'Verhältnis', 
25f. 
9. Congar, 'People of God', 12; Beumer, 'Die Kirche', 264; McNamara, 
108; Schmaus, 'Verhältnis', 24. 
10. Congar, 'People ofGod', 14-16. 
11. Ratzinger, Neue Volk, 84,97; 'Demokratisierung', 28Г. 
12. Schmaus, Glaube, 43; 'Verhältnis', 16,27. 
13. Philips, G., II, 322. 
14. Küng, Die Kirche, 269. 
15. McNamara, 108. 
16. Beumer,'Die Kirche', 264. 
17. Harvey, 104—6. There are also other theologians who mention or 
employ a synthesis view or quote Congar, but who do not present an 
extensive analysis or argument. Bouyer (e.g.) takes Vatican II as the 
starting-point for the synthetic part of his L'Eglise de Dieu. He sets out 
to answer problems not settled by the Council, but the problem of 
which term is central is not mentioned among these (207-11). From the 
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way in which Bouycr argues and uses 'people of God' and 'body of 
Christ' one may conclude that he works within the synthesis, although 
there are strong indications that 'mystical body of Christ' eclipses 
'people of God'. He understands 'people of God' as an Old Testament 
concept and as referring to a certain phase, now past, in God's plan: 
there is a transition from people of God to body of Christ, people of 
God has become body of Christ (196f, 293). The title of his book is an 
allusion to Lumen Gentium 17, but Bouyer has changed 'people' into 
'church': given his understanding of 'people of God', this change does 
not appear accidental. 
Bctz, 'Die Theologie und das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil' sees 
'people of God' as referring to the sinfulness and provisional character 
of the church - as a corrective to a possibly triumphalistic interpreta-
tion of 'body of Christ', which refers to the inner aspect of the church 
(98). Similar remarks are made by Courth, 'Kirche als Gottesvolk 
unterwegs', who sees 'people of God' as a corrective to Bellarmine's 
view, and as complementary to and a further development of 'body of 
Christ' (274). 
See also: Fransen, 'L'Eglise comme peuple de Dieu', 106; Schillebeeckx, 
De Zending van de Kerk, 21; Willems, 'Der sakramentele KirchenbegrifT, 
283; Malmberg, Eén Lichaam en één Geest, 63, 89(Γ (see also 23f) (there is 
a close resemblance between Congar's and Malmberg's formulations). 
See further Keller, 27611. 
18. Mystia Corporis n. 13, p. 15. 
19. Schmaus,'Verhältnis', 27. 
20. Congar, Sainte Eglise, 43f; Congar, Le Mystère du Temple; Schmaus 
Dogmatik 111/1,46,202-4, 239f. 
21. Beumer, 'Die Kirche', 261. 
22. Keller, 276. 
23. Congar, 'People of God', 14f. He mentions Deuteronomy, Jeremiah, 
Isaiah, Proverbs, Psalms, and Lamentations. 
24. Congar, 'People of God', 15. He refers to his own Mystère, in which he 
devotes a chapter to the Christian as a temple (1811). 
25. This remark in particular reveals why Congar insists upon 'body of 
Christ' as a necessary complement. For him, the difference between 
'people of God' and 'body of Christ' is related to the difference between 
the church as congregation of sinful men and the church as a 
suprapersonal and infallible institution (see his earlier remarks in the 
context of 'people of God'; see also his more recent article 'Die 
Wesenseigenschaften der Kirche', 458-77). 
26. For tertium genus, see: Damme, 'Gottesvolk und Gottesreich in der 
Christliche Antike'; Mohrmann, '"Tertium genus": Les relations 
judaïsme, antiquité, christianisme reflétées dans la langue des 
chrétiens'. For developments in the understanding oîcorpus (mysticum), 
see Lubac, Corpus Mysticum. 
27. See Keller, 249ff. 
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28. See also McNamara, 107-9, who follows Congar and presents similar 
arguments. On p. 110 he provides a description of the church (of'what 
the church really is') in which 'body of Christ' does not occupy a 
central place. 
29. Schmaus, 'Verhältnis', 27. 
30. Mystia Corporis, esp. 16f. The change from 'organic' to 'organizational' 
in Schmaus' own writing is particularly interesting in this context 
(C/au*#,5ir.). 
31. Schmaus, 'Verhältnis', 26f. 
32. Ratzinger, 'Kirche'. See also: Ratzinger, Neue Volk, 97; Beumer, 'Die 
Kirche', 267f. 
33. Küng, Die Kirche, 244,253, 269; see also 133-5. 
1.2.1.2 
1. Koster, 'Zum Leitbild von der Kirche auf dem II Vatikanischen 
Konzil'. 
2. Koster,'Leitbild', 176-8. 
3. Koster, 'Leitbild', 178-80; see also 175. 
4. Koster, 'Leitbild', 193. 
5. Köhler and Baumgartner (edd.), Hebräisches und Aramaùches Lexicon zum 
AT; TWATs.x. got; THAT s.v. am/goi; Lohfink, 'Beobachtungen zum 
Geschichte des Ausdrucks (amJHWH)'. 
6. Koster,'Leitbild', 178. 
7. Koster,'Leitbild', 177Г. 
8. Koster,'Leitbild', 179. 
9. Koster,'Leitbild', 176, 179. 
10. Frege, 'Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung'. 
11. For a criticism of Koster's understanding of'people of God', see Keller, 
131-4. 
12. Luneau and Bobichon, Eglise ou Troupeau?. 
13. Luneau 1,20. 
14. These are the elements relevant to our discussion. He and Bobichon 
deal also with scripture and tradition. 
15. Luneau I, 7-10. 
16. Luneau II, 13-17. 
17. Luneau 1,11-21; II, 11-19. 
18. Luneau II, 21. 
19. Luneau II, 22f. 
20. Luneau II, 23-8. 
21. Luneau II, 28-32. 
1.2.1.3 
1. Aymans, '"Volk Gottes" und "Leib Christi" in der communio-Stmktur 
der Kirche'. 
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2. Aymans, 321 Γ, 324. Despite his repeated statements that 'people of 
God' is the leading image, he also refers to Lumen Gentium 8, 1 as 'the 
central passage for the description of the nature of the Church' (331). 
3. Aymans, 323, 332. 
4. Aymans, 322-7. 
5. Aymans, 327-9. 
6. Aymans, 331, 332—4. See also Saier, 'Communio' m der khrt des Zweiten 
Vatikanischen Konzils. 
7. King, 'Towards an adequate concept of the Church'. 
8. King, 11. 
9. King, 15. See also Keller, 249ff. 
10. King, 13f. 
11. King, 15-18. 
12. King, 19. 
13. King, 23. 
14. King, 24. 
15. Feiner and Löhrer (edd.), Mysterium Salutis IV: Das Heilsgeschehen in der 
Gemeinde I, 17. Later in this work, Fries, 'Wandel des Kirchenbilds und 
dogmengeschichtliche Entfaltung' says that 'people of God' is the 
leading image of Lumen Gentium (276). 
16. Semmelroth, 'Um die Einheit des Kirchenbegrides'. 
17. See Chapter IV, section 3 for a fuller discussion. 
18. Semmelroth, 'De kerk, het nieuwe Godsvolk', 4581Γ. 
19. Dulles, ModeL· of the Church, 48f. 
20. Dulles, 49-51. 
21. Dulles, 51. 
22. Mühlen, Una Mystica, Introduction viiir(lst edition). Unless otherwise 
indicated, the 2nd edition is referred to. 
23. Mühlen, Una Mysttca, 72f. 
24. Mühlen, Una Mysttca, 104-9. 
25. Mühlen, 'Der KirchenbegriíTdes Konzils', 309. 
26. Mühlen, Una Mysttca, 386. 
27. King, 29. 
1.2.2 
1. Koster, 'Ekklesiologie', 199, 203, 208, 210f, 223, 225f, 241f, 247, 254, 
262f, 265ίΓ; 'Leitbild', 176,179,193. 
2. LuneauII,26. See also Betz, 98. 
3. Philips, G., I, 105. See also Arietta, 'Die Heilsgeschichdiche Schau der 
Kirche auf dem Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil', who makes a similar 
remark when he writes 'if we may call it (i.e. the people of God) a 
metaphor and no longer a reality' (335). See further Ratzinger, Neue 
Volk, 83 for a similar remark concerning 'body of Christ'. (See also note 
4 to section 1.1.3 above). 
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4. Philips, C , 1,105. 
5. Ratzinger, 'Kirche', part HI; Neue Volk, 84. 
6. Beumer, 'Die Kirche', 264. See also Malmberg, 24. 
7. Mühlen, Una Mystica, 12-14. Bouyer, however, seems not to fall in with 
this consensus, since he argues that in Paul's letters 'body of Christ' 
becomes less metaphorical and more real (L'Eglise, 197, 360Í); see also 
his 'Où en est la théologie du Corps Mystique', 328f. See further 
Ratzinger, Neue Volk, 83 (note 3 above). 
8. Schmaus, Glaube, 9, 43, 51, 57; 'Verhältnis', 13, 27. 
9. Dulles, 50. 
10. Semmelroth, 'Einheit', 320, 324f; 'De Kerk', 455-7. 
11. Aymans, 321 ; see also 324. 
12. Mühlen, Una Mystica, 12-14. 
13. Koster, 'Ekklesiologie', 241-3, 262-3. 
14. Koster, 'Ekklesiologie', 266. 
15. Beumer, 'Die Kirche', 258. 
16. Philips, G., I, 99f (see the discussion in Chapter III, section 3). 
17. Semmelroth, 'Einheit', 320; 'De Kerk', 45If. 
18. Aymans, 321. 
19. Dulles, 7Γ, 16. 
20. Koster, 'Ekklesiologie', 244-55. 
21. Beumer's link between analogy and graphical language is, at least on 
Aquinas' understanding of analogy, incorrect. 
1.2.3 
1. See (e.g.) Lindbeck, 361 and Przywara, 131. Przywara criticises 
Scheeben for starting with 'mystical body of Christ' rather than, as he 
should have done, with the church. 
Notes to Chapter II 
II.1.1 
1. For the following, see Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, esp. 87—100. An 
extensive bibliography on metaphor can be found in Shibbles, Metaphor: 
An Annotated Bibliography and Hhtory. For a survey of the recent 
appreciation of metaphor in philosophy, see Bücher, 'Die heutige 
Einschätzung der Metaphor in der Philosophie'. 
2. For accounts of different conceptions and theories, see: Stutterheim, 
Het Begrip Metaphoor; Lieb, Der Umfang des historischen Metaphtmbegnffs; 
Lieb, 'Was bezeichnet der herkömmliche Begriff "Metapher"?'; and 
Hawkes, Metaphor. 
3. Some writers (e.g., Black, Mooij) use this procedure. A justification 
can be found in the so-called 'constructivist' theory: Kamlah and 
Lorenzen, Logische Propädeutik, esp. chapter 3. See also the discussion in 
Chapter IV, section 1 below. 
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4. The examples are taken from poetry and drama for the sake of clarity; 
this does not imply that metaphors are only to be found in literature. 
The quotations are as follows: (a) Shakespeare, Anthony and Cleopatra, 
III, x; (b) Shakespeare, Macbeth, V, v; (c) Dylan Thomas, Especially 
when the October wind; (d) T. S. Eliot, The Love Story; (e) T. S. Eliot, Burnt 
Norton IV; and (f) T. S. Eliot, Morning at the Window. 
Black, 'More about Metaphors' remarks that the discussion of 
metaphor is 'thwarted' by the use of 'relatively trivial examples' or 
'excitingly suggestive but obscure examples from Shakespeare, Donne, 
Hopkins, or Dylan Thomas'; and he concludes that 'it may well be a 
mistaken strategy to treat profound metaphors as paradigms' (434). 
Although some of my examples are drawn from works by these 
proscribed authors, they do not appear too profound or too obscure. 
The remarks provoked by them hold for so-called 'trivial' metaphors as 
well. The advantage of starting with non-trivial metaphors is that the 
important distinction between metaphorical sense and metaphorical 
use is not obscured from the very beginning. 
5. See Charlton, 'Living and Dead Metaphors'; Yoos, 'A Phenomenological 
Look at Metaphor', exp. 84f; Stewart, 'Metaphor and Paraphrase', esp. 
112-4; and Erwin, The Concept of Meaninglessness, chapter 5. 
II.1.2 
1. Culler, Saussure, 79. 
2. Culler, 29. 
3. Chomsky, Current Issues in Linguistic Theory, 23. 
4. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, 4. 
5. Chomsky, Aspects, 4. See also Schlesinger, 'On Linguistic Competence'. 
6. Bickerton, 'Prolegomena to a Linguistic Theory of Metaphor'. 
7. Bickerton is here correct (see later). See also Reddy, 'A Semantic 
Approach to Metaphor'. 
8. Bickerton, 41. 
9. Bickerton, 42. 
10. Bickerton, 48. 
11. Matthews, 'Concerning a "Linguistic Theory" of Metaphor', 413. 
12. Matthews, 415. 
13. Bickerton, 50. 
14. Matthews, 415. 
15. Matthews, 417. 
16. Matthews includes the violation of subcategorial rules in this general 
term. 
17. Matthews, 419. 
18. Bickerton, 41. 
19. Bickerton, 34. 
20. Bolinger, 'The Atomization of Meaning', 566f. 
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21. Bickerton, 42. This concern also explains why he lists among the false 
asumptions of non-linguistic writers on metaphor the assumption 'that 
words have fixed and definite meanings' (36). 
22. The metaphors are all quotations, and that explains why he can use 
them, although no metaphorical meaning is involved: they have a 
marked sign. 
23. Matthews, 424. 
24. Price, 'Linguistic Competence and Metaphorical Use', 254. 
25. Loewenberg, 'Identifying Metaphors', 325f. 
26. Loewenberg, 'Identifying Metaphors', 328. 
27. See note 1 of this subsection above. 
28. Loewenberg, 'Identifying Metaphors', 324. 
II.2.1 
1. See: Austin, How to do Things with Words; and Searle, Speech Acts. 
2. Austin calls these the phonetic and phatic aspects respectively (94). 
3. Searle, 24. 
4. Searle, 24. 'Frame' is not used here in the sense that Black uses it (see 
section 3.2 below). 
5. Warner, 'Black's Metaphors', 370. 
6. Warner, 370. 
7. Wamer, 370. This reveals another point which will be discussed more 
fully in section 3.2 below: Warner's criticism of Black fails because he 
shares the same explanation of metaphor. 
8. Warner, 370. 
9. The first of these examples is taken from William Blake's The Tyger. 
The second and third refer back to the examples quoted in section 1.1 
above (see note 4 ofthat subsection). 
10. Manns, 'Metaphor and Paraphrase' makes a similar point when he 
talks about the ground of the illocutionary force, 'that is, the manner in 
which it manages to exert the force it does' (362). 
11. For this reason 'metaphorical expressions' are not mentioned separately 
in the rest of the argument. Predication is not to be understood in terms 
of universals, but in the way Searle understands and uses it (26). See 
also Ricoeur, 92ίΓ. If predication is understood in this way, there is no 
need for a discussion about indication-metaphors and description-
metaphors (Mooij, A Study of Metaphor, 130-32). 
12. Goodman, Language of Art makes a similar point when he says that 
'metaphor typically involves a change not merely of range but also of 
realm' (72). 
13. See the discussion in section 3.1 below. 
14. See Warner's earlier-mentioned suggestion. The criticism there was 
not concerned with this point, but with the confusion of the two main 
questions. See also Loewenberg, 'Identifying Metaphors', 331-8. 
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11.22 
1. See Wittgenstein, The Blue and Впит Books; Wittgenstein, Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics; Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations; 
Wittgenstein, Zettel; Wittgenstein, On Certainty; and Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Remarks. See also: Hacker, Insight and Illusion; and Kamlah, 
chapter 2. 
2. The possible objection that this criticism obliterates the distinction 
between natural and social reality employs a rather limited conception 
of reality. 
3. This argument is borrowed from S. Stenlund, who uses it in an 
unpublished paper 'Remarks on Some Problems of Meaning'. 
4. See (e.g.): Henle (ed.), Language, Thought and Culture, chapter 1; and 
Brower (ed.), On Translation (especially the contribution by Nida). 
5. Hacker, 150-53. 
6. Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown, 24. 
7. Hacker, 153-66. 
8. Wittgenstein, Zettel, 331. 
9. Wittgenstein, Philosophical RemarL·, I, 7. 
10. Hacker, 163. 
11. Wittgenstein, Investigations, 230. 
12. See Pitkin, Wittgenstein on Justice; and Philips, D. C , Wittgenstein and 
Scientific Knowledge. See also (e.g.) Kamlah, 46 for similar remarks. 
13. Wittgenstein, Investigations, 415 (Foundations, I, 141). See also Philips, 
D. C , 80fr. 
14. Wittgenstein, Certainty, 558. 
15. Wittgenstein, Investigations, 206; see also 241f; and Foundations, VI, 39. 
16. Wittgenstein, Investigations, 174; see also 466fr, 650. See further: Hallett, 
A Companion to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (on Investigations, 
650); and Wittgenstein, Zettel, 469. 
17. Wittgenstein, Certainty, 204; see also 541. 
18. Part of this aspect is the role of tradition: one leams an already existing 
language. (See below.) 
19. Wittgenstein, Investigations, 312. See also Strawson, 'Review of 
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations', 47f. 
20. Wittgenstein, Foundations, I, 148. See also I, 147: 'And why should they 
not hand it over for a price which is independent of all this; each buyer 
pays the same price however much he takes (they have found it 
possible to live like that)? And is there anything to be said against 
giving the wood away?'. 
21. Wittgenstein, Zettel, 383f. 
22. Wittgenstein, Zettel, 387f. 
23. Wittgenstein, Zettel, 390. 
24. Hallett, 242. 
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25. See Wittgenstein, Foundations, I, 22. 
26. Wittgenstein, Investigations, 185f. See also Blue and Brown, 142: 'Your 
idea really is that somehow in the mysterious act of meaning the rule you 
made the transitions without making them. You crossed all the bridges 
before you were there.' 
27. Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown, 130. 
28. Wittgenstein, Investigations, 186. 
29. Wittgenstein, Investigations, 201. 
30. Wittgenstein, Investigations, 201. 
31. See Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown, 33. 
32. Wittgenstein, Investigations, 217. 
33. Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown, 14Γ; see also 1 lOf. 
34. Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown, 143. 
35. Wittgenstein, Certainty, 110. 
36. Wittgenstein, Zettel, 355; see also Investigations, 185. 
37. In the case of a lexical gap, not all the consequences might be considered, 
since the word receives another meaning. 
38. Wittgenstein, Certainty, 262. 
39. See Ricoeur, 13-61 (esp. 13-18); and IJsseling, Retoriek en Filosofie, who 
presents a historical survey of the tensive relation between philosophy 
and the art of persuasion, rhetoric, in which metaphors play an 
important role. 
II.3 
1. These three headings are not intended as a classification scheme into 
which all theories of metaphor can be put: they could not be used for 
such a purpose, since they are of unequal value. The category-mistake-
approach can be used within a word-approach and within a sentence-
approach. The category-mistakc-approach is discussed here since at 
first sight it resembles the theory proposed in section 2 above. 
II.3.1 
1. For this subsection, see: Lucas, Aristotle Poetics; Ricoeur, 13-61; and 
Jüngel, 'Erwägungen zur theologischen Relevance der Metapher als 
Beitrag zur Hermeneutik einer narrativen Theologie', 86-103. 
2. Aristotle, De Poetica, 1457b 6-9. The translation is Bywater's. See also 
Aristotle, Ars Rhetorica, Book III. 
3. Lucas, 109. 
4. See Lucas' commentary for placing arthron here, and for an explanation. 
5. See also Aristotle, De Interpretatione, 16f. 
6. Ricoeur, 22Γ provides a slight modification of the observation that the 
sentence does not occupy a privileged place. See also Jüngel, 87. 
7. Lucas, 204. 
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8. See Aristotle, Poetica, 1457b 31 Jüngel's interpretation (88f) does not 
appear to be correct: Aristotle does not talk about 'acceptance', but 
about the usefulness of particular words, about the types of words one 
ought and ought not to use. The cntenon here is the type of words 
everyone uses, i.e., current words and metaphors The 'acceptant e' 
Jungel talks about is related to other entena, such as aptness 
9. Anstotle, Poetica, 1458a 23; 1458b 3 
10. Ricoeur, 27. 
11. The metaphor definition also contains a classification see Ricoeur, 
30-34. 
12. Ricoeur, 63-86. 
13. Ricoeur, 64-6 
14. Ricoeur, 173-220. 
15. Ullmann, The Pnnaples of Semantics, and Ullmann, Semantics. An 
Introduction to the Science of Meaning. 
16. Ullmann, Semantics, 57. 
17. See Ricoeur, 150ίΓ for a discussion of other points connected with 
Ullmann's view of metaphor, and 155-61 for a discussion of the 
influence of the theory of metaphor on the Saussunan postulates 
18. E.g , Henle, 173-95 takes the Anstotehan position as his starting-point 
and then modifies it somewhat. According to him, the metaphorical 
word appears in a double role, in its conventional or literal sense, and 
in its metaphoncal or figurative sense (174). In Henle's theory, 
Aristotle's transference becomes the shift from literal to metaphoncal 
or figurative sense, the basis for this shift is an analogy, or parallelism 
(175-7). Henle also believes that a complete paraphrase is possible, 
albeit with a loss of effect (194) 
Alston, Philosophy of Language agrees with Henle, and finds his analysis 
illuminating Another example is Weinrich, who employs two rather 
different definitions in his 'Semantik der kühnen Metapher': 'the 
metaphor is a contradictory predication' (337), and 'a metaphor - and 
this, at the bottom, is the only possible definition of metaphor - is a 
word in a given context by which it is determined in such a way that it 
signifies something other than what it means' (340). The translation is 
by Henel, 'Metaphor and Meaning', 94f: Henel points to several 
problems connected with Weinnch's semantics (or logic), and himself 
chooses the latter definition, which he calls 'true' (95). 
19. Ryle, Collected Papers, 11,311,313. 
20. Frege, Du Grundlagen der Arithmetik, par. 60: 'We must always keep the 
whole proposition in view. Only in that do words properly have 
meaning'. See also p. x: 'the meaning of a word must be sought, not in 
its isolation, but in its context within the proposition'. 
21. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, 3. 
22. Dummett, 4. 
23. Dummett, 4. 
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24. Dummeit, 4. 
25. Frege saw this explanation in terms of truth-conditions. Whether stating 
the truth-conditions will suffice for every sentence is a matter of debate. 
See (e.g.) Platts, Ways of Meaning, esp. chapters 1 and 2. 
26. See Ricoeur, 167: 'The movement of a word from potential sense to 
actual sense requires the mediation of a new sentence, even though the 
potential sense emerges from the sediment and institutionalization of 
the values endued by past uses'. 
27. See Ricoeur, 168. See also the discussion of Richards in the next 
subsection (II.3.2). 
28. See Wittgenstein, Investigations, 199. 
29. See Charlton, 173. See also, Ryle, Collected Papers, II, 408: 'Sentences 
are not things of which I have a stock or fund'; and 312: 'Words and 
phrases are there in the bin, for people to avail themselves of when they 
want to say things. But the saying of these things is not some more 
things which are there in the bin for people to avail themselves of, when 
they want to say things'. 
30. Ricoeur, 92f: 'all discourse is produced as an event... ' ; see also 127. 
II.3.2 
1. Mooij, 72f considers that Hermogenes of Tarsus was the first author to 
advance the interaction view. 
2. Richards, TTu Philosophy of Rhetoric. See the theories of Black and 
Beardsley; see also Ricoeur, 100-09. 
3. Richards, 23. 
4. Richards, 11. 
5. Richards, 51. 
6. Richards, 34. 
7. Richards, 9. 
8. Richards, 39. 
9. Richards, 35. 
10. Richards, 57ff. 
11. Richards, 55. 
12. Richards, 93. 
13. Richards, 97. 
14. Richards, 100. 
15. Richards, 100. Similar statements are made by other authors: Jüngel, 
77; Bücher, 727-37. 
16. Richards, 93. 
17. Richards, 92; see also 90,94,116f. 
18. Richards, 102. 
19. See Ricoeur, 100-09 for a different analysis. 
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20. The emphasis on the difference between tenor and resultant meaning is 
correct is resultant meaning is understood as 'sentence meaning'. 
21. See Richards, 105, 121 (the examples). See also: Black, Models and 
Metaphors, 47 n.23; Beardsley, 'The Metaphorical Twist', 295; and 
Beardsley, 'Metaphor' for remarks about the terminology. 
22. Black, Models; see also his later 'More about Metaphors'. 
23. Black, Models, 27. 
24. Black, ModeL·, 39-42. 
25. Black, Models, 40f. 
26. For a development of this suggestion, see the discussion of Beardsley 
below. 
27. Black, Models, 41, 44: 'If to call a man a wolf is to put him in a special 
light, we must not forget that the metaphor makes the wolf seem more 
human than he otherwise would be'. 
28. Olscamp, 'How Some Metaphors may be True or False' maintains 
this. 
29. Black, Modeb, 27. 
30. Black, ModeL·, 39. 
31. Black, 'More', 422. There are other differences as well (441-3); and see 
439f for 'emphasis' and 'resonance'. 
32. Black, 'More', 446. 
33. Black, 'More', 442. 
34. Black, 'More', 448; see also 451 and 443. The introduction of'creative 
rule violations' (336, 338) does not improve the theory. Black, who read 
a draft of this subsection, probably still thinks that this account does 
not adequately express his theory. Black's Models and Metaphors has 
exercised great influence (see also the next chapter), and most who 
quote and use his article 'Metaphor' {Models, 25—47) - even those who 
are critical of some aspects of his analysis or of his own view - share his 
basic definition and explanation. See, e.g., Khatchadourian, 
'Metaphor'; Berggren, 'The Use and Abuse of Metaphor'; Martin, 
Language, Truth and Poetry, esp. 203Γ (his reference to G. Stem in the 
context of 'change of meaning' is revealing: see Bickerton, 40); and 
McCormack, Metaphor and Myth in Science and Religion, who strongly 
emphasizes the change in meaning, treats the metaphor as a word (see, 
e.g., 74, the discussion of 'particle'), and shifts constantly from a 
synchronic to a diachronic study. 
35. Apart from the literature cited in note 21 above, see: Beardsley, 
Aesthetics; and Beardsley, 'Metaphorical Senses'. See also Ricoeur, 
116-28. 
36. Beardsley, 'Twist', 293. 
37. Beardsley, 'Twist', 295. 
38. Beardsley, 'Twist', 295. 
39. See Mooij, 55f. 
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40. Beardsley, Л«<А<;/!а, 138Г. 
41. Beardsley, 'Twist', 299: his own summary of his original version. 
42. Beardsley, 'Twist', 294. See Ricoeur, 126f for a criticism of the origins 
of the new intensions. 
43. Beardsley, 'Twist', 299. 
44. Beardsley, 'Twist', 300. In the first revised version he adds further a 
distinction between kinds of metaphors. 
45. In fact Beardsley refers to the central meanings, but this shows how 
incoherent or impossible his notion of shift is. See also the discussion 
about 'inconstant' ('Twist', 301Í). 
46. Beardsley, 'Twist', 294. 
47. See Beardsley's remark: 'properties that a speaker can, in appropriate 
contexts, show that he attributes to an object by using that term without 
claiming to follow a rule that he would not apply the term to that kind 
of object if it did not have that property' ('Twist', 299). See also 
Beardsley, 'Metaphor', 286, where he raises this objection to his own 
theory, but does not answer it. 
48. Beardsley, 'Twist', 299 (italics added). 
49. Mackie, 'A Structure of Aesthetically Interesting Metaphors', 42 n.2. 
50. Beardsley, 'Senses', 5. Beardsley uses this formulation to characterize 
'conversion theories'; the theories which 'hold that when an expression 
enters into a metaphorical combination as a metaphorical segment, it 
brings along one of its standard senses and retains it in that 
metaphorical posture' are called 'constancy theories' by Beardsley (5). 
This distinction is a revision of Mooij's distinction between dualistic 
and monistic theories (Mooij, 31). Given the diflerence between 
constancy and conversion theories, one has to suppose that the 
standard sense (or one of the standard senses) is not 'brought along' 
and 'retained' in the conversion theories. 
51. Beardsley, 'Senses', 8. 
52. Beardsley, 'Senses', 8; Mackie, 41Г. 
53. Beardsley's remark that his second revision is clearly a conversion 
theory ('Senses', 8) is therefore not correct. (See note 50 above.) 
II.3.3 
1. Ryle, 'Categories' (Collected Papers, II, 170-84); Ryle, The Concept of 
Mind, 10, 19ff. 
2. KyXe, Papers, II, 179. 
3. Ryle, Papers, 11, 179; see also Concept, 19. 
4. Ще, Papers, II, 179. 
5. Turbayne, The Myth of Metaphor, esp. chapter 1. For his judgement of 
the Aristotelian definition, see 18. 
6. Turbayne, 22. Ryle of course does not regard metaphors as mistakes; 
he does not even connect metaphors to category mistakes. 
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7. Turbayne, 15. Duality of sense is not something special that occurs 
exclusively in metaphors: tropes such as metonymy and synechdoche 
are also sort-crossings, and also have a duality of sense. Turbayne calls 
these tropes 'potential metaphors'; they only become actual metaphors 
if the user fuses the two senses 'by making believe there is only one 
sense'(18). 
8. 'The use of metaphors involves both the awareness of the duality of 
sense and the pretence that the two different senses are one' (Turbayne, 
17). 
9. 'When one of the different senses confused is metaphorical and this is 
taken for the literal' (Turbayne, 23). 
10. Turbayne, 23f. 
11. Drange, Type Crossings. 
12. Drange, 135; see also 97. 
13. Drange, 142. 
14. Drange, 13f. 
15. Drange, 212. See Bickerton, 36 n. 3, for some critical comments on 
'unthinkability'. 
16. See also Beardsley, 'Twist', 299, and 'Senses', 7 (concept of'barring'); 
Berggren, 239-41 (see the discussion in the following section, 4.1); 
McCormack, 72-101, esp. 80f. Yoos, 83 does not consider this view 
correct: 'it is not the case that we usually first grasp it as false or 
paradoxical. It requires some effort to see alternative meaning in 
metaphor.' 
17. See Yoos, 83-6. 
18. Erwin, 115f is sceptical about the change of meaning in metaphors, and 
thinks it wrong to define metaphors in terms of category-mistakes 
(109). His own solution - viz., that the same sentence is used for 
making two statements — turns interpretation around, and is thus open 
to the above criticism. 
II.4.1 
1. Berggren, 244. 
2. Berggren, 253. 
3. Berggren, 244. 
4. Berggren, 243. 
5. Olscamp, 8If. Olscramp's own discussion rests upon a misconstruction 
of what the interaction-theorists intend, and he does not deal with 
metaphor (see, e.g., his use of Wheelwright's distinction diaphor-
epiphor and his appeal to two layers of meaning). See also the criticism 
of Loewenberg, 'Truth and the Consequences of Metaphor', 33-36. 
6. Loewenberg, 'Truth', 41. In her 'Identifying Metaphors', 333(Γ she 
maintains that metaphors are false — she discusses 'metaphorical 
statements which look like assertions' — and employs a two-stage 
procedure. 
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7. Ricoeur, 312f; see also 320. 
8. Ricoeur, 320. 
9. 'False' on its own is as helpful as 'deviant'. 
II.4.2 
1. Paul, 'Metaphor and the Bounds of Expression'; Manns: Stewart; 
Warner. 
2. Black, Modtls, 46. 
3. Berggren, 243f; see also 250. 
4. See Richards' earlier quoted statement that 'the co-presence of the 
vehicle and tenor results in a meaning . . . which is not obtainable 
without their interaction' (100). 
5. This formulation removes the ambivalence of'loss', which might imply 
that there is not cognitive content whatsoever in the paraphrase. 
6. Wamer, 368. 
7. Wamer, 368. 
8. Wamer, 368. 
9. Wamer adds later (372) that sentences embodying metaphors do not 
have assertive force, and that this is the reason why the thesis about the 
cognitive content cannot be sustained. See also the discussion of his 
suggestion in section 2.1 above. 
10. Manns, 359-62. 
11. Black, ModeL·, 46. 
12. See Warner's conclusion: 'with rich metaphors one can never know 
that one has exhausted them and hence be sure one has grasped all 
their potential "cognitive content"'. 
13. Paul, esp. 145-51. 
14. Paul, 145. 
15. Paul qualifies 'consensus' by allowing for degrees of it, and by 
admitting that consensus among the 'literate and sensitive is more 
significant than consensus among the illiterate and insensitive' (146). 
16. Paul, 148. 
17. Paul, 150. 
18. Paul, 150. See also the discussion of Beardsley in section 3.2 above. 
19. Paul, 151. 
20. Paul, 151. 
21. See also section 2.2 above. 
22. Loewenberg, 'Truth', 42. 
23. Manns, 363. 
24. Stewart, 115. 
25. Stewart, 115-17. 
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Notes to Chapter III 
III. l 
1. See Stroup, 'A Bibliographical Critique'. 
2. See, e.g.: Wilder, Early Christian Rhetonc: The Language of the Gospel; 
Funk, Language, Hermeneutics and the Word of God; Via, The Parables: Their 
Literary and Existential Dimension, Beardsley, Literary Criticism of the New 
Testament; Weinrich, 'Narrative Theology'; TeSelle, Speaking in Parables: 
A Study in Metaphor and Theology. 
3. See: Dunne, A Search for God in Time and Memory; Dunne, The Reasons of 
the Heart; Novak, Ascent of the Mountain, Flight of the Dove; McClendon, 
Biography as Theology: How Life Stones can Remake Today's Theology; Metz, 
Glaube m Geschichte und Gesellschaft. 
4. Grites, 'The Narrative Quality of Experience', 291. Grites discusses the 
three modalities with reference to Augustine's Confessions, XI, 20. See 
Jones, 'The Concept of Story and Theological Discourse', 429. See also 
Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History. See further Khever, 'Story and 
Space: The Forgotton Dimension', who argues that, as far as narrative 
is concerned, space is more important than time. 
5. See: TeSelle; Cone, 'The Story Context of Black Theology', 145; 
Wachinger, Епппетп und Erzählen. Reden von Gott aus Erfahrung. 
III . l . l 
1. See note 2 to section 1 above. 
2. TeSelle, 1. 
3. TeSelle, 4. 
4. TeSelle, 50. 
5. Teselle, 64. 
6. TeSelle, 50. 
7. TeSelle, 58. 
8. TeSelle, 59. 
9. TeSelle, 60. 
10. TeSelle, 62. 
11. TeSelle, 62f. 
12. TeSelle, 58. 
13. Another consequence of the imprecision of this definition of metaphor 
can be seen in a comment such as: 'This is technically a simile, not a 
metaphor, for it has the "as . . . so" construction; but that is really 
incidental, because metaphorical power is present' (49). 
14. TeSelle, 88. 
15. TeSelle, 83. 
16. TeSelle, 23. 
17. TeSelle,?. 
18. TeSelle, 86. 
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19. TeSelle, 84; see also 139. 
20. TeSelle, 83-5. 
21. TeSelle, 87f. 
22. TeSelle, 38, 87f, 139; see also 21. 
23. TeSelle, 2. 
24. TeSelle, 1 f, 82; see also 39, 64. 
25. TeSelle, 1. 
III.1.2 
1. Metz, Glaube, 187. 
2. For the presentation which follows, see Metz, Glaube, 3-74. Metz here 
corrects his earlier views on some points (see 15, 45). For a chrono­
logical survey, see Bauer, Christlicfur Hoffnung und menschlicher Forschntt; 
Lehmann, 'Wandlungen der neuen "politischen Theologie" '; and 
Lehmann, 'Emanzipation und Leid'. 
3. Metz, Glaube, 29-43. 
4. Metz, Glaube, 1^-28. 
5. Metz, Glaube, 44-74. 
6. Metz, Glaube, 102,110-12. 
7. Metz, Glaube, 47f. 
8. Metz, Glaube 48. 
9. Metz, Glaube, 48Γ. 
10. Metz, Glaube, 136-48. 
11. Metz, Glaube, 145. 
12. Metz, Glaube, 145. 
13. Metz, Glaube, 145Г. 
14. Metz, Glaube, 147. 
15. Metz, Glaube, 188f. 
16. Metz, Glaube, 118; see also 192f. 
17. Weinrich, 'Narrative', 51f. See also Steendam, 'De nacht van duizend­
en-één verhalen', 6-8 for a summary of Weinrich's Tempus: Besprochene 
Zeit und erzählte Welt. 
18. It is therefore not surprising to find Wcinrich arguing that theology is 
too preoccupied with historical scholarship, i.e., that it is only interested 
in stories that are true rather than just relevant to one individual. The 
important feature of a biblical story is that it evokes a response in its 
hearers to that they become 'doers of the Word' ('Narrative', 56, 50). 
Nor is it surprising to find Weinrich arguing that the 'unholy alliance' 
between theology and the sciences, between theology on the one hand 
and argumentation and scholarship on the other, should be brought to 
an end ('Narrative', 54f, 50f). Christianity began as a story-telling 
community, but lost its narrative innocence when it was invaded by a 
Hellenistic culture dominated by the bgos, i.e., by reason and argument. 
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Doctrine therefore is not necessary in theology, and even appears a 
diversion; whereas narrative and practical (political) theology is 
concerned with what is necessary, i.e., with action ('Narrative', 55f). 
19. See Metz, 'Introduction'. See also Metz, Glaubt, 174 and Steendam, 
11-14. 
20. Metz, Glaube, 183. 
21. See Steendam, 14-20. 
22. Metz, Glaube, 118f; see also 147. 
23. Metz, Glaube, 48; see also 63f. 
24. Metz, Glaube, 190. 
25. Metz, Glaube, 190. 
26. Metz, Glaube, 193. 
27. Metz, Glaube, 190; see also his insistence on the cognitive primacy of 
narrative. 
28. It is therefore understandable that some authorities take Metz as 
advocating a radical view: see, e.g., Steendam, 23 and Mieth, Moral and 
Erfahrung, 60-90. 
III.1.3 
1. TeSelle,62f. 
2. For an internal discussion, the terminological and conceptual 
vagueness of'narrative' (see, e.g., the difference between Weinrich and 
Metz) would be a normal subject of critical inquiry. For the recon­
struction of a metaphorical theology, however, this subject is not 
relevant. What is relevant is the vagueness of the definition and theory 
of metaphor employed by TeSelle, but that has already been discussed. 
See Steendam, 21 f for more interpretations of 'narrative'. See also 
Mieth, Dichtung, Glaube and Moral, who calls a statue a narrative (49). 
III.1.3.1 
1. Weinrich, 'Narrative', 49. Paul does not mention stories, however. 
2. Weinrich, Literatur fir foser, 137-49. Mieth, Dichtung, 41 η. 4, also refers 
to Cancik, Mythische und Historische Wahrheit. 
3. Weinrich, 'Narrative', 50. 
4. Weinrich, 'Narrative', 54. 
5. TeSelle, 140f. 
6. TeSelle, 141. Later, however, she uses the order argument against S. 
Keen (172). 
7. The novel is not a particularly old form in the history of literature. 
Theologians who wish to make use of the form should carry out an 
investigation into its origins. 
8. Estess, 'The Inenarrable Contraption: Reflections on the Metaphor of 
Story', 431. 
9. Estess, 432. 
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10. Estess,433. 
11. Mieth, Moral, 641; see n. 18 for other literature. 
III.1.3.2 
1. TeSelle, 126; see also 96, 97, 1161", 145, 177; see further 23, 86Γ. See 
Mieth, Moral, 62 for remarks on theology and literature. 
2. TeSelle, 104. 
3. The sentence that follows the last quotation (TeSelle, 104; see я. 2 
above) reads: 'But the problems of discriminating between what is and 
what is not Christian are less acute than the problems of the desiccated 
imagination'. 
4. Weinrich, 'Narrative', 50. 
5. The ambivalence is nicely illustrated by Metz's own use of the 
hedgehog tale: he acknowledges that he reads it against the grain 
(Glaube, 143). See Mieth's use of the same story (Moral, 138f). 
6. TeSelle, 111. 
7. See Het Utrechts Theologencollectief, Wat hier gebeurt is macht, 11-24. 
8. Metz, Glaube, 118. 
9. This is not to say that a (speculative) argument may not influence or 
facilitate the way one goes about solving the problem. 
10. Metz, Glaube, 48. 
11. See, e.g.: Stroup, 140; Weinrich, 'Narrative', 52-4; Mieth, Moral, 67ίΓ. 
III.1.3.3 
1. See: Gallic, Philosophy ami the Hutorical Understanding: Danto; Louch, 
'History as Narrative'; Mandelbaum, 'A Note on History as Narrative'; 
Ely, Grüner, and Dray, 'Mandelbaum on Historical Narrative: A 
Discussion'; Dray, 'On the Nature and Role of Narrative in Historio-
graphy'. See also Jones, esp. 422-7. 
2. See, e.g., Gallic, 71. See also Grüner (in Ely, Grüner and Dray, 285) for 
the argument which follows. 
3. Louch, 59. 
4. Danto, 141. 
5. Danto, 11. 
6. Danto, 143. 
7. Tuchman, The Guns of August, 489. 
8. Danto, 12. 
9. Danto, 142. 
10. Danto, 142. 
11. Mandelbaum, 417 
12. See Ely (in Ely, Grüner and Dray, 278). 
13. Mandelbaum, 416. 
14. Mendelbaum, 415, see Ely, 278ff. 
15. Ely,278ff. 
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16. Danto, 7. 
17. Danto, 14. 
18. Danto, 9. 
19. 'Theologisch gesehen wird die Geschichte eigentlich wenn sie Hoffnung, 
wenn sie Zukunft hat' (Mieth, Moral, 109). See also Mieth, Moral, 
69-72. See further Weinrich, 'Narrative', 52-4. For a conceptual 
criticism of the nature of historical explanation as defended by (e.g.) 
Danto, see Gilkey, 91-114. 
20. Baumgartner, Kontinuität und Geschichte, 269-94 prefers 'construction' to 
'organization', since it more clearly expresses the fact that the 
coherence is read into the data. 
21. Jones, 426f. Jones discusses 'story' in reference to works by Barr and 
Wharton. Compare Jones's comment 'It may be that even confessional 
stories like those in the Bible were often argued into acceptance' with 
Metz's plea for a reconsideration of the distinction between canonical 
and apocryphal stories ('In Defence of the Story', 96). This plea is not 
repeated in Glaube. 
22. Metz, Glaube, 5. 
Ш.2 
1. Apostel, 'Towards the Formal Study of Models in the Non-formal 
Sciences', 4. 
2. Harré, The Philosophies of Science, 174. 
3. Black, ModeL·, 219-43. 
4. Black, ModeL·, 220. 
5. Black, ModeL·, 222. 
6. Black, Models, 229. 
7. Bertels and Nauta, Inleiding tot het modelbegrip, esp. 114—44. 
III.2.1 
1. Black, Models, 228, 236. Black refers in this context to Hutten, 'The 
Role of Models in Physics'. See also Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science, 
38f. See further Bertels and Nauta, 36f: on page 167 they refer to 
chapter 17ofRapoport, Operational Philosophy. 
2. Black, ModeL·, 228. 
3. Black, ModeL·, 228. 
4. Black, ModeL·, 235f. 
5. Black, ModeL·, 237. 
6. Black, ModeL·, 238. 
7. Hesse, ModeL· and Analogies in Science, 161f. 
8. Hesse, 162. 
9. Black, ModeL·, 239. 
10. Hesse, 170. 
11. Hesse, 161f. 
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III.2.2 
1. For the following, see: Harre, Philosophies; Harre, 'Images of the World 
and Societal Icons'; Harre, 'Metaphysics and Science'; Harre. 'The 
Constructive Role of Models'. 
2. Harre, 'Images', 268-71; 'Metaphysics', 82-1·. 
3. Harre, 'Metaphysics', 84. 
4. Harre, 'Metaphysics', 79-81 The quotation is from S. T. Coleridge, 
Biographia LiUrana, XIII. 
5. Harre, 'Images', 265f., 277-9; 'Constructive', 39. 
6. See Harre, 'Constructive', 22. 
7. Harre refers to Pettit, Tlu Concept of Structuralism, chapter 4. 
8. Black, Models, 238. 
9. Harre, 'Metaphysics', 84fr. 
III.2.3 
1. These authors (Ramsey, Ferré, and Barbour) have influenced others: 
see, e.g., Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, chapter 6. 
III.2.3.1 
1. Ramsey, ModeL· and Mystery, 47ίΓ.; Ramsey, Christian Discourse, 29, 54, 
60. See also Ramsey, Religious Language, esp. chapter 2. See further: 
Pater, Taalanalytische Perspektieven op Godsdienst en Kunst, Π—55; and Gill, 
Ian Ramsey, chapters 4 and 5 
2. Ramsey, ModeL·, 2,9. 
3. Ramsey, Models, 10. 
4. Ramsey, ModeL·, 13f. A second condition concerns the verification, 
which differs in the two cases. 
5. Ramsey, Models, 50. 
6. Ramsey, Models, 51 f. 
7. Ramsey, ModeL·, 54. 
8. Ramsey, 'Talking about God', 222 n. 2. 
9. See Ramsey, Religious Language, 19f. 
10. Ferré, 'Mapping the I.ogic of Models in Science and Theology'; Ferré, 
Basic Modem Philosophy of Religion; Ferré, 'Metaphor, Models and 
Religion'. 
11. Ferré, 'Metaphors', 333; see also 330. 
12. Barbour, Myth, ModeL· and Paradigms. 
13. Barbour, 42-5. 
14. Barbour, 12. 
15. Barbour, 13. 
III.2.3.2 
1. Ramsey, ModeL·, 61. 
2. Ramsey, Religious Language, 53, 62. 
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3. Ramsey, Models, 60. 
4. Ramsey, Modeb, 61. 
5. Ramsey, Modeb, 62. 
6. Ramsey, Modeb, 63. 
7. Barbour, 171 and 4*-70 (esp. 69). 
8. Barbour, 49-70 (esp. 68f). He refers to Ramsey (and Evans) for self-
involvement, and to Ferré for the metaphysical models. 
9. Ferré, 'Mapping', 79; see also 60-63. 
10. Ferré, 'Mapping', 81 f, 92ff; see also 64Г. 
11. Ferré, 'Metaphors', 341. 
12. Ferré,'Mapping', 92. 
13. Ferré, 'Mapping', 91 ; see also 81. 
14. Ferré, 'Mapping', 91. 
15. Ferré, 'Mapping', 85. 
16. Ramsey, Modeb, 62. 
17. See Ramsey, Christian Discourse; and Religious Language. 
18. See final chapter. 
19. If the remarks about 'religious language' are not intended to be about 
theology, but about religious language in the sense just mentioned, it is 
not clear why religious language should then be compared to scientific 
language. 
20. Ferré, 'Mapping', 77-9. See also his qualification that biblical parables 
are models, and his statement that 'for Christians, of course, the models 
of the Old Testament — however helpful or even essential — all take 
second place to what they believe to be the supremely reliable model 
for God, Jesus of Nazareth' (78). This seems to contradict his later 
argument that theology uses only conceptual models (80). 
21. Ferré, 'Mapping', 75ff. 
22. Ferré, 'Mapping', 89. 
23. Ferré, 'Mapping', 74. See also 75: 'If we continue to understand by 
"model" that which provides epistemologica! vividness and immediacy 
to the theory by ofTering as an interpretation of the abstract or 
unfamiliar theory-structure . . . ' . See further 83. 
24. Ferré, 'Mapping', 54-74. 
25. Ferré, 'Mapping', 81. 
26. See, however, Ferré, 'Mapping', 65. 
27. Auer, 'Die Bedeutung der "Modell-idee" für die "HilsbegrifTe" des 
katholischen Dogmas'. See also his 'Das "Leib-Modell" und der 
"Kirchenbegriff' der Katholischen Kirche: Ein Betrag zum 
Verständnis der Kirche und ihre Aemter'. 
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III.3.1 
1. See Busa (ed.), Index Thomisticus, sectio secunda, concordantia prima, 
vol. 13,946-51. 
2. See, e.g., In IVSent., d.17, q.l, а.1с;5ГІ-ІІ, q.33, a.l, as 1. 
3. Deverit.,q.lO,diJ, 10; In I Sent., d.34, q.3. 
4. Manthey, Die Sprachphilosophie des hl. Thomas von Aquin; Mclnemy, The 
Logit of Analogy; Mclnerny, Studies in Analogy, esp. chapters 1 and 2; 
Pinborg, Dit Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mittelalter, esp. chapter 1 ; 
Pinborg, 'Textsemantische Probleme in der Sprachtheorie und Logik 
des Mittelalters'; Es, Spreken over God, 7-44. See also Burrell, Aquinas, 
1-11. 
5. 'Dicendum quod in quolibet nomine est duo considerare: scilicet id a 
quo imponitur nomen, quod dicitur qualitas nominis, et id cui 
imponitur, quod dicitur substantia nominis. Et nomen, proprie 
loquendo, dicitur significare Ibrmam sive qualitatem a qua imponitur 
nomen; dicitur vero supponere pro eo cui imponitur' (In III Sent., d.6, 
q.l, a.3). See Mclnemy, Logic, 54fFfor a discussion of the 'id a quo'. 
6. Mclnemy, Logic, 51-4; Pinborg, Entwicklung, 30-45. 
7. See Mclnemy, L·gic, 49ff; Studies. 73ff; Burrell, 8-10. 
8. Mclnemy, Logic, 65f; Pinborg, 'Probleme', 138. See Manthey, 84-6 for 
more elaborate distinctions. 
9. 'Ad secundum dicendum quod aliter dividetur aequivocum, analogum 
et univocum. Aequivocum enim dividetur secundum res significatas, 
univocum vero dividetur secundum differentias: sed analogum 
dividetur secundum diversos modos' (In I Sent., d.22, q.l, a.3; see also 
STI.q.lS.a.S). 
10. See ST I, q.13, a. 10c. The formulation 'things are said to be 
named' expresses the point that the discussion of analogy, univocity, 
and equivocity form part of the discussion of how we name things, and 
do not belong to the discussion of how things are: i.e., problems 
concerning analogy, etc., are logical problems. Mclnemy, Logic, 68, 71, 
75, 77. See also his introduction to Studies. See further McCabe, 'Note 
on "Analogy" '; Es, 8. 
11. InIVMetaph.,lecl. 1, n. 535; InXI Metaph.,l<xl. 3, n. 2197. 
12. Mclnemy, Logic, 74. 
13. SecST, I,q.l3,a.5anda.6. 
14. SCG, IV, 49; see also QD: De unione verbi, a.2, ad 4. 
15. See Mclnemy, L·gic, esp. 147-53; Studies, chapter 1 and 77f. 
16. In IISent., d.13, q.l, a.2; see also £7', I, q.67, a.l. See Mclnemy, Logic, 
147-9 for analysis and commentary. 
17. See, e.g., InIISent., d.16, q.l, a.2, ad 5; InISent.,d3\, q.3, a.l, ad 2. 
18. See Mclnemy, Studies, 82-4 for the possible relationship between 
metaphor and analogy, but this is accomplished by a change of 
meaning of'metaphor'. Es, who treats metaphors as a kind of analogy 
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in his analysis of Aquinas's view, can only do this because he fails to 
thematize the diflerence between sigmficatw and suppostilo. 
19. Mclnerny, L·^, 65. 
20. See, e.g., In VII Elbe, lect. 6 (commentary on 1149b 30). 
III.3.2 
1. Corbin, Le chemin de la théologie chez Thomas d'Aquin will be used as the 
principal guide for these analyses. Corbin's overall conclusion accords 
with the results in other fields of research on Aquinas. As Pesch writes: 
'In the middle ages Greek thought did not divert the course of 
theology into that of a science, but on the contrary theology used Greek 
thought as an implement or tool, making it follow its own course. 
Anyone who thinks differently falls behind the present level of research 
. . . Aristotle's philosophy, and with it the Aristotelian model of 
scientific knowledge, provided theologians of the 13th century with 
ready new tools, by which the saving events, and the reality of those 
saving events - of which faith alone knows, not Greek philosophy -
could be better "read off' (mtus legere) as Anselm was able to do. Again, 
Anselm's intellectus fida was precisely the 13th century's scientific 
understanding of faith, fruit of the same endeavour and the same 
rational courage, but with dilferent, Augustinian means.' ('Um den 
Plan der Summa Theologiae', 429f.) 
III.3.2.1 
1. See: Chenu, Introduction à l'étude de Samt Thomas d'Aquin, 223-40; Chenu, 
La Théologie au douzième siècle, 223-398; Chenu, La théologie comme science 
au XlIIe siècle; Köpf, Du Anfinge der theologischen Wissenschaftstheone im 
ISJahrhundert. Weisheipl, Fnar Thomas d'Aquino, 49ίΓ argues for 1252-6 
as Aquinas's baccalaureus years: see Rassegna 9 (1974), 292 for a 
comment on 1254-6. 
2. Mandonnet and Moos (edd.), Scriptum super ¿¿¿nu Sententiarum Magislri 
Petri Lombardi. For a commentary on the fint quaestio, see Corbin, 
113-290. 
3. In I Sent., Prol., q.l., a.5, ad3. 
4. See also In I Sent., Prol., q.l, a.5, ad 4. 
5. In I Sent., d.ll, q.l, a.l; In I Sent., d.34, q.3, a.l; In III Sent., d.ll in 
expos, textus; De Vent., q.22, a. 11 ad 8m; Super loann., 12, lect. 8. 
6. On Lombard's remark 'sed ex tropicis locutionibus non est recta 
argumentationis processie', Aquinas comments: 'cuius ratio est quia 
non sunt simpliciter verae sed secundum quid' (In III Sent., d.ll, in 
expos, textus). 
7. See Chenu, XlIIe siècle, 44 for some kind of reconciliation. See also 
Corbin, 280fr. 
8. See Chenu's remark: 'In his commentary on the Sentences (1254), St 
Thomas brings the theory of literary modes back into his reckoning; 
but he situates and measures the various elements of this theory on the 
epistemologica! principle according to which a science obtains its rules 
and method from its specific object.' (XlIIe siècle, 42.) 
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9. 'We may describe the work of the medieval theologians of the 12th and 
13th centuries as the progressive transition from dialectics to science, at 
once adding that, insofar as this transition progressed, technically and 
historically, it involved a change of level - a change of a fundamental 
kind; for the transition was one from dialectics, the modest liberal art of 
the trivium, which was only a technique of verbal and conceptual 
processing, to a philosophy of the spirit which, over and above its 
rational organization and formulation, comprises a knowledge of the 
world and of man.' (Chenu, ХШе siècle, 18.) See also his XIU siècle, 
chapter 15 for the development in the 12th century. See further 
Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages, esp. chapter 5, for the 
consequences that this greater specialization had for the reading of 
Scripture. On p. 280 she draws attention to the difference between 
Paris and Oxford. See also Corbin, 283-90. 
10. Chenu, ХШе siècle, 25; Köpf, 13-26. 
11. 'Sed ad defensionem fidei et inventionem veritatis in quaestionibus ex 
principiis fidei oportet argumentis uti.' Concerning this response, 
Chenu remarks: 'All speculative theology will take this route, truly an 
"invention" based on the principles of faith' {ХШе siècle, 43). 
12. See Corbin, 113-273. 
13. 'Utrum praeter physicas disciplinas alia doctrina sit homini necessaria.' 
14. 'Contemplatio autem Dei est duplex.' 
15. See Chenu, ХШе ñecle, esp. chapters 1 and 2. 
16. Corbin uses the plural, but Aquinas the singular. (Corbin, 144.) 
17. See Corbin, 179-90. 
18. See Corbin, 180-83. The anonymous reviewer of Corbin's book in the 
Rassegna di letteratura Thmmstica 9 (1974) argues that a.3, qa. 1 is the point 
of reference. This does not appear correct, for the quaestio on the sacra 
doctrina as scientia is presupposed in the discussion whether the scientia is 
a practical or a speculative scientia. 
19. See Corbin, 193,200,233,237. 
20. 'Plenius comprehendat... quodammodo intelligit.' 
21. See Corbin, 219-29 for an outline: see also 838{Г. 
22. See Corbin, 23 If. 
23. See Corbin, 233 
24. See Corbin, 236-9. 
25. See Corbin, 287f. 
III.3.2.2 
1. See Corbin, 681-903 for the analysis which follows. 
2. 'Conveniens est Sacrae Scripturae divina et spiritualia sub similitudine 
corporalium tradere . . . Unde convenienter in Sacra Scriptura nobis 
spiritualia sub metaphoris corporalium.' 
3. ST, I,q.l,a.9,ad2m. 
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4. Aquinas twice uses 'Sacra Scriptura' in the previous articles: ST, I, 
q.l., a.2, ad 2m; ST, I, q.l, a.8c. But these uses do not constitute a 
counter-argument. In the first case the identity is not exclusive. The 
emphasis is on revelation which is the basis of Sacra Scriptura and/or 
sacra doctrina. That 'Sacra Scriptura' is mentioned separately is due to 
the objection which is concerned with the examples from Scripture. In 
the second case, the way in which Scripture argues is taken as the 
example for the argumentation in the sacra doctrina, which is the topic 
under discussion. Corbin does not discuss these passages explicitly, 
and in the case of a.8c he translates 'Sacra Scriptura' as 'science 
sacrée', although he adds in a footnote that he does not follow those 
manuscripts that read 'sacra doctrina' (81 If). The Blackfriars trans-
lation does not acknowledge the transition from Sacra Scriptura to 
disputamos. 
5. 'Quia igitur Sacra Scriptura considérât aliqua secundum quod sunt 
divinitus revelata, secundum quod dictum est, omnia quaecumque 
sunt divinitus revelabilia communicant in una ratione formali objecti 
huiusscientiae.' (ST, I, q.l, а.Зс.) 
6. See Corbin, 706-09. 
7. See Corbin, 694. 
8. As (e.g.) in his commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate: see Corbin, 
373—85 and 713-17. See also 202-05 for a commentary on a section of In 
I Sent., Prol. a.3, qa. 2 sol., in which the notion of the scientia subaltérnala 
ocurs. See Köpf, 145-50, who also refers to further literature. 
9. See Corbin, 717-20 and 836ίΓ; see also note 1 of section 3.2 above. 
10. 'Et hoc ipsum quod sic utitur eis non est propter defectum vel 
insuflicientiam eius, sed propter defectum intellectus nostri; qui ex eis 
quae per naturalem rationem ex qua procedunt aliae scientiae 
cognoscuntur, facilius manuducitur in ea quae sunt supra rationem 
quae in hac scientia traduntur.' (ST, I, q.l, a.5, ad 2m.) See Corbin, 
738—43. See also Schillebeeckx, Openbaring en Theologie, 82f. 
11. Corbin refere to Congar's article 'Théologie', 382. (Corbin, 814f.) 
12. See Corbin, 815f; see also Schillebeeckx, 99-105. Schillebeeckx 
remarks: 'In other words, the syllogism is raised to the level of a 
psychological activity, when in fact it only acts as a logical check on 
reasoning as a psychological activity. Human knowledge comes into 
contact with reality only in and through a knowledge in which 
experience and conceptuality form a unity. If the concept is isolated 
from experience, then one is excluded by the fact itself from reality.' 
(Openbaring, 103.) 
13. See Schillebeeckx, Openbaring, 100-02; Corbin, 812f. 
14. 'Quandam coaptationem aliquarum partium distinctarum.' (ST, 
Il-II.q.l.a.öc.) 
15. 'Unde et credibilia fidei Christianae dicuntur per artículos distingui 
inquantum in quasdam partes dividantur habentes aliquam 
coaptationem ad invicem.' (ST, II-II,q.l,a.6c.) 
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16. ST, II—II, q.l, a.7c. Or as Aquinas puts it in a text in De Ventate (q.l4, 
a. 12c) to which Schillebeeckx refers (Openbaring, 100), a process of 
plurification occurs in the way that faith is expressed. See also ST, 
I I - I I , q.l, a.5, ad 2m, where Aquinas refers back to the very first 
quaestio of the Summa. 
17. ST, I, q.79 and qq.84-9; In Post. Analyt., Lib. II, lect. XX. 
18. ST, I,q.79,a.8c. 
19. See Corbin, 840; see also note 1 of section 3.2 above. 
20. See ST, I I-II , q.l, a.9, ad 1m. 
21. See Lubac, Exegese Médiévale, II, chapter 9 (esp. 272-302), for Aquinas' 
view of the theory of the senses and for the various interpretations of 
the relevant texts. See Corbin, 867-74. 
22. See Corbin, 856Г, 860. 
23. See^r, II-II , q.l, a.9, ad 1m. 
III.3.3 
1. Corbin, 857-67 (esp. 857-60). 
2. Corbin, 857; see also ST, I, q. 13, a.6c. 
3. Corbin, 857Г. 
4. For a recent discussion, see Burrell, see also Mclnemy, L·gic and 
Studies. 
5. 'Unde ea quae in uno loco Scripturae traduntur sub metaphoris in aliis 
locis expressius exponuntur.' (ST, I, q. 1, a.9, ad 2m.) 
6. Corbin, 863. He refers to In loann., chapter 1, lect. 1,41. 
7. See, e.g., Aquinas's discussion of memory in his In Post. Analyt., Lib. II, 
lect. XX. 
8. See the sed contra: 'Tradere au tem aliquid sub similitudine est 
metaphoricam'. 
9. Mclnemy, Studies, 83. 
10. A reconstruction may lead to a new view of the question of analogical 
knowledge about God, but any statement about this requires not only a 
thorough analysis of Aquinas's theoretical comments, but also of the 
way in which he works. See Burrell, 55. 
11. ST, I I - I I , q.l, a.9, ad 1m (Blackfriars translation). 
12. Corbin, 879f. 
13. Corbin, 720, 726,880; see also note 1 of section 3.2 above. 
14. See, e.g., ST, II-II, q.l, a.7, a.9, a.10. See also Gilby, 'Doctrinal 
Development'. 
Notes to Chapter IV 
IV.1.1 
1. See Ladrière, 'Le discours théologique et le symbole'; see also Ricoeur, 
376ff. 
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IV.1.2 
1. Since this discussion is invoked to clarify the paraphrase of metaphors, 
only points relevant to this particular problem are mentioned. 
2. See Hempel and Oppenheim, 'Studies in the Logic of Explanation'; 
and see Wright, Explanation and Understanding, 11 for a somewhat 
different formulation. Puntel, 'Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie' 
points out that there are some problems with the term txplanandum as 
used in the outline of the theory. The conclusion of a deduction is not 
an exphcandum, as suggested by the theory, but the explicatum. (281 ). 
3. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation: 'A scientific explanation may 
be regarded as an answer to a why question such as "why do the 
planets move in elliptical orbits with the sun at one focus?" . . . "why 
did Hitler go to war against Russia?"' (334f). These questions, all of 
the form 'why is it the case that />?, are called 'explanation-seeking 
why-questions' by Hempel, who contrasts them with 'reason-seeking 
why-questions (epistemic questions) which ask for the ground to belief 
that p. The answers to these two types of question is different: to the 
first it is 'an explanation of a presumptive empirical phenomenon', to 
the second a validation or justification of grounds in support of a 
statement. 
4. Wright, 59; see also 55-60. 
5. Wright, 27: 'Broadly speaking, what the subsumption-theoretical 
model is to causal explanation and explanation in the natural sciences, 
the practical syllogism is to teleologica! explanations and explanations 
in history and the social sciences.' 
6. Melden, quoted by Wright, 195 n. 14. Wright argues for this view via 
verification, 107-17. 
7. Wright, 121. 
8. Wright, 118f. 
9. Wright, 124. 
10. Wright, 124. 
11. Wright, 135. 
12. Wright, 134. 
13. See the views of Aristotle and Aquinas (set out in Chapter III above). 
14. Pannenberg, Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie, 142f. See Puntel's remark 
(n. 2) that the obscurity which gives rise to the explanation is not 
sufficiently recognised by the use otexplanandum. 
15. Pannenbeig, 149-52. 
16. Pannenberg, 154f. 
17. There are differences as well, of course, and not only in emphasis. Von 
Wright does not appear as concerned about rejection of the division, 
and Pannenberg (151) makes some critical remarks concerning 
intentionality. 
18. See Grijs, 'Didache en Theologie'. 
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19. See Harre, 'Metaphysics', 841Г. 
20. Gilkey, chapters 3 and 4. 
21. For what follows, see Kamlah, esp. chapter 3, 70-116 ('Erste Bausteine 
der wissenschaftlichen Aussagen'). See also the discussion in the 
context of the theory of metaphor in chapter II (2.2) above. 
22. Kamlah, 70-80. 
23. Kamlah, 101, 104. 
24. Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, 12. 
25. Swinburne, 38. 
26. Swinburne, 39. 
27. Swinburne, 39ίΓ. 
28. Swinburne, 45-9. 
IV.2 
1. Congar, Sainte Eglise, 21-44 ('Peut-on définir l'Eglise? Destin et valeur 
de quatre notions qui s'offrent à le faire'); Holbôck, 'Das Mysterium der 
Kirche in dogmatischer Sicht'; Semmelroth, Du Kirche als Ursakrament; 
Semmelroth, 'De Kerk'; Koster, 'Ekklesiologie'; Koster, 'Leitbild'; 
Schmaus, Dogmatik; Schmaus, Glaube; Dulles. See also Valeske, 25-9. 
2. Congar, Sainte Eglise, 21. 
3. William of Ockham is said to have been the first to make the distinction: 
'Definitio autem dupliciter accipitur. Quaedam est definido exprimens 
quid rei, quaedam est definitio exprimens quid nominis.' (Summa tonus 
logicae, Pars I, с XXVI; quoted by Menne, 'Definition'.) See 
Robinson, Definition, 12-148 for further distinctions and a discussion of 
nominal definition. 
4. Congar, Sainte Eglise, 42. For his first argument Congar refers to 
Journet, L'Eglise du Verbe Incarné, II, 49f. But Journet is there talking 
about 'names': 'synonyms for the name "Church" ' (49), and 'the word 
'Church" which signifies summons or convocation' (50). Later Journet 
discusses the 'main definitions of "Church"' and deals with 'the 
constitutive elements of the nature of the Church' (580fl). 
5. Commer, Die Kirche im ihren Leben und Wesen Dargestellt, 9f (chapter 1: 
'Vom Wesen der Kirche'). See also 65ίΓ. 
6. Commer, Die Kirche, 9f. See also 65ίΓ. 
7. Commer, 'Das Leben der Kirche. Grundlegung', 173. 
8. See Koster, 'Ekklesiologie', 244—7, who refers to Temus and Feckes 
and shows their dependence on Commer. 
9. Holbôck, 214. 
10. Holbôck, 215f. 
11. Holbôck, 216f: he refers to Semmelroth, Ich Glaube an die Kirche. 35. 
12. Schmaus, Dogmatik, 40f; Glaube, 9. See also Semmelroth, 'De Kerk', 
452. 
13. Dulles, 15. 
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14. Dulles, 14. 
15. Similar elements can be found in the work of other theologians. See, 
e.g., Adam, 'Ekklesiologie im Werden?', esp. 150, 166; Betz, 98; 
Beumer, 'Die Kirche', 257f; Bolf, Dit Kirche als Sakrament im Horizont der 
Welterfahrung, 38 (BoiT refers both to Vatican II and to Pope Paul's 
encyclical, Ecdesiam Stum); Bouyer, 'Où en est la théologie', 314; Kress, 
'The Church as Communio' 131 ; Malmberg, 48. 
16. 'Ad deiîniendam describendamque hanc veram Christi ecclesiam quae 
sancta, catholica, apostolica Romana Ecclesia est, nihil nobilius, nihil 
praestantius, nihil denique divinius invenitur sententia ilia qua eadem 
nuncupatur "mysticum Jesu Christi corpus" ' (η. 13, p. 15). 
17. Holböck,216. 
18. Semmelroth, Ursakrament, 27f. See also Schmaus' solution (in Glaubt) 
discussed in chapter 1.2.1 above. 
19. Congar, Sainte Eglise, 42. See also Fenton, 'Mystici corporis and the 
Definition of the Church'. 
20. Hamer, on the other hand, who calls the pope's declaration the 'axis' of 
the whole encyclical, does not question the possibility of a definition; 
nor, in a chapter devoted to the definition of the church, does he 
discuss arguments concerning the mystery-character of the church. In 
his view, the four requirements that a definition of the church has to 
fulfil are all concerned with 'content', and these are met by 'the church 
is the mystical body of Christ'. But he acknowledges that the first two 
of his requirements - continuity with the Old Covenant, and move-
ment towards the kingdom of God - are not explicitly expressed by this 
definition. (L'Eglise est um communion, 87-100, esp. 95-8.) See also, 
Lialine, who also does not question the possibility of a definition. 
21. Koster, 'Ekklesiologie', 244-55; see also his 'Leitbild', 193, where he 
says that time is not yet ripe for a theological determination of the 
church. 
22. Koster, 'Ekklesiologie', 245f. 
23. Koster, 'Ekklesiologie', 247. 
24. Koster, 'Ekklesiologie', 253-5. 
25. Koster, 'Ekklesiologie', 254; see also 255. 
26. Koster, 'Ekklesiologie', 253. 
27. Koster, 'Ekklesiologie', 201, 241-3,260-63. 
IV.2.2 
1. Wittgenstein, Zettel, 331. 
2. Since the other aspect of the conventionality of language — the aspect of 
the human activity stressed - is less important in this context, it is not 
mentioned explicitly here. 
3. Just, 'Definitionen in der Theologie' appears incorrect in his argument 
and to oversimplify the issue. 
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4. For what follows, see: Robinson, 149-92; Abelson, 'Definition'; 
Hospers, An Introduction to Phtlosopktcal Analysts, 18-67; Brummer, 
Wijsgerige Begripsanalyse, 65-84. 
5. Hornby (ed.), ТЪе Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary ofCurrent English. 
6. Robinson distinguishes two further meanings of analysis: one mostly 
used in mathematics and logic, and one referring to the translation of 
symbols into symbols (188f). 
7. Robinson, 171. 
8. Robinson (162) and Hospers (27Í) disagree about the value of the 
specification of the cause as a valid answer. 
9. For these rules, see: Robinson, 140-48; and Abelson, 322f. 
10. See Abelson, 322. 
IV.2.3 
1. See, e.g., the discussion of Beardsley's view in Chapter II.3.2 above. 
This formulation does not, of course, exclude the discussion about 
which of the characteristics are defining characteristics, and which are 
accompanying characteristics. 
2. Koster, 'Ekklesiologie', 246. 
3. For what follows, see: Bochenski, The Logie of Religion, 89-117; and 
Katz, 'The language and logic of "mystery" in Christology'. 
4. Katz, 242f. 
5. Holböck, 214 quotes Braun, Handlexicon der Katholische Dogmata, 217: 'A 
truth revealed by God whose sense, even in the terms in which it was 
revealed, remains cut off from human understanding'. See also 
Scheeben, Die Mysterien des Christentums, 445: 'A [unity] so sublime and 
so full of mystery that no human understanding can achieve a glimmering, 
let alone a grasp, of i t . . . This applies too to that particular mystery 
which surpasses all human meaning and conception, and from which 
we must conclude that we can never think deeply enough about the 
essence and signification of the church'. Katz, 252 remarks that one 
does not usually find a consistent use of the first alternative. 
6. See Scheeben, 445; see also Commer, Die Kirche, 68ίΓ. 
7. Congar, Sainte Eglise, 42f. 
8. Scheeben, 9. 
9. Scheeben, 8: 'The essence of anything and everything does not lie open 
before.our eyes'. 
10. In Paul's letters the connection between 'mystery' and revelation and 
preaching is clear: 1 Cor 2:6-16 (see also 4:1); Rom 16:25f; Eph 1:9; 
3:3-5; 6:19; Col 1:7, 26-8; 4:3-4. See also: Lubac, Paradoxe et Mystère de 
l'Eglise, 30-59; and Barauna (esp. Rigeaux, 'Het Mysterie van de Kerk 
in het licht van de Bijbel'; and Smulders, 'De Kerk als sacrament van 
het heil'). 
11. Smulders, 379. 
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12. Smulders, 378. 
13. Küng, Congar, and O'Hanlon, Council Speeches qf Vatican II, 15f. Dulles, 
26, quotes this remark, and continues by drawing the methodological 
consequences already noted. 
14. Dulles, 7Г; Mühlen, Una Mystica, 13f. 
15. Koster,'Ekklesiologie', 247. 
16. Ramsey, Models, chapter 1. 
17. Mühlen, Una Mystica, 11Γ. See also the remarks of G. Phillips 
mentioned in n. 16 to section 2.2 of Chapter I above. See further 
IJsseling, 144—57 for the reactions of philosophers. 
18. The insistence on a number of metaphors is understood in terms of 
complementarity, which seems to be the most obvious view, and which 
implies that the metaphors are not too different, as there is no special 
feature about the application of very different predicates to a subject. 
See also Barbour, chapter 5; and Ramsey, chapter 3. 
19. See the criticism of Metz (section 1.3.3 of Chapter III above). 
IV.3 
1. Schmaus, Glaube, 10; Dogmatik, 48; 'Verhältnis', 27. 
2. Schmaus, 'Verhältnis', 27; see also Dogmatik, 204. 
3. Congar, 'People ofGod', 16. 
4. Dulles, 8. 
5. Dulles, 185. Dulles's scepticism about finding a super-model is founded 
on his view of the mystery-character of the church, but apparently also 
derives from his understanding of model. In model-theory there is no 
decisive argument for a kind of necessary pluralism: on the contrary, 
the realism of models forms the driving force behind the search for a 
perfect model (Hesse). As argued earlier, the mystery of the church 
does not provide an argument either. 
6. Dulles, 185. 
7. Dulles, 187. 
8. Dulles, 68. See also his remarks about its attractions to theologians, 
and his defence of'sacrament' (68Í). 
9. Semmelroth, 'Einheit', 319ff. 
10. Semmelroth,'Einheit', 321-3. 
11. Semmelroth, 'Einheit', 323-5. 
12. Semmelroth,'Einheit', 326. 
13. 'Symbolum esse rei sacrae et invisibilis gratiae formarn visibilem' (D-S 
1639). 
14. Holböck, 220-24. On 221 f he makes his remark about 'bride of Christ', 
quoting Tromp, but provides no argument for his verdict. 
15. Holböck, 221 ; he again quotes Tromp. 
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16. Holböck, 224: 'Die Kirche ist jene christusförmige, hierarchisch 
geordnete, universelle Gemeinschaft, die durch, mit und in Christus in 
der Einheit des Heiligen Geistes Gott der Vater alle Ehre und 
Verherrlichung, den Menschen und der Welt aber die Wahrheit und 
das Heil zu vermittlen hat'. 
17. For the translation of'Gemeinschaft' by 'society', see p. 224, where 
Holböck translates 'societas' by 'Gemeinschaft'. See also 225. 
18. The rest of the article devotes little attention to 'people of God'. 
Holböck's argument against the use of metaphors in a definition is an 
inconsistent element in his argumentation as a whole. On the one 
hand, he denies the possibility of a definition and of concepts, and 
allows only a 'circumscription' by means of images; and, on the other, 
he criticizes descriptions using images - i.e., instances of just such 
'circumscriptions' - because they use images, and proposes a quasi-
définition without images. As argued earlier, the appeal to the rule 
about images is not valid in its generality, and as such is not a valid 
criticism of the synthesis view. Moreover, the qualification of 
metaphors as 'only sensible circumscriptions of rational concepts' ('nur 
sinncnfallige Umschreibungen verstandnismässiger Begriffe', 223) 
undermines the whole previous argument that the mystery can only be 
expressed in images and metaphors. 
19. Mühlen, Una Mystica, 17. 
20. Mühlen, Um Afystica, 72f. 
21. For a criticism of their arguments insofar as they concern the content of 
'people of God' and 'body of Christ', see Chapter I, sections 2.1 and 2.3 
above, where similar arguments are discussed. 
22. Aymans, 332; see also 331. See further BofT, 4If, who says that it is 
precisely the task of theology to penetrate the images of the church in 
order to disclose the internal linking principle. BolT does not discuss 
explicitly the methodological problems involved in the use of images 
and metaphors, but refers to Semmelroth's 'Einheit' and to Mühlen. 
23. Mystici Corporis, η. 14, 24, 58 (see also 35, 51, 57), where this process of 
analysis can be seen. 
24. Hamer, esp. 97f. 
25. Koster,'Leitbild', 175fr. 
26. Luneau, I, 11-21; and II, 13-30. See Chapter I, section 2.1.2 above. 
27. See Chapter I, section 2.2 above. See also Semmelroth, 'Einheit', 
324-6, who contrasts 'sacrament' with 'concept of church', and then 
refers to 'people of God' and 'body of Christ', where previously he has 
used 'images', etc. 
28. See the analysis of Lumen Gentium in Chapter I, section 1.1 above. 
29. Mystia Corporis, η. 25ίΓ. 
30. Koster, 'Ekklesiologie', 239-41, 207; see also his remark about the 
codex of 1918, 206. See further 'Leitbild', 180-4, and his discussion of 
'bride' and 'family'. 
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31. Valeske, 245; Keller, 131^t. But Koster is not the only one: see Keller, 
85-136; Keller concludes that, certainly up to the middle of this 
century, most attempts to use 'people of God' in ecclesiology employ 
the term under the term understood as soaelas ( 1350-
32. Especially revealing is Przywara's criticism (131) of Schecbcn: in 
common with the 'mystical body' theologians of about 1940, Scheeben 
starts from mystical body, whereas, according to Przywara, the proper 
starting-point is the church. 
33. See also the rather limited ways in which Holböck and Semmelroth 
('Einheit') understand 'people of God'; or Miihlen's conclusion that 
'people of God' looms in the background of Bellarmine's definition 
because he discusses structure. 
34. Dulles, despite his use of'sacrament', does not belong to this category. 
His scepticism about finding a super-model is not the only factor that 
determines the harmonizing process: the other factor is the way in 
which he classifies his material. Dulles does not take seriously the 
formal methodological claims which Semmelroth makes when he 
proposes 'sacrament'. It is not Semmelroth's intention to understand 
'sacrament' as a rival to 'mystical body' or 'people of God' (or as a rival 
to 'servant' and 'herald', to use two of Dulles' own models). 
Semmelroth's claim may be incorrect, but Dulles does not show this to 
be the case; nor does he discuss this possibility. 
A similar point arises when Dulles discusses the church as mystical 
communion. Following a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages 
of 'people of God' and 'body of Christ', he concludes that 'both 
illuminate from different angles the notion of the church as a 
communion or community' (51). Since he calls 'people of God' and 
'body of Christ' models, this conclusion suggests that 'community' is a 
super-model, or at least a more basic notion. And in the evaluation 
( 179fl) there are elements which can be seen as some kind of differentia-
tion between the models: his own preference for 'sacrament', and his 
exclusion of 'institution' as a primary model. But these various 
elements and suggestions are not developed further. 
IV.4 
1. See, e.g., Congar, L'Eglise, 269ΙΓ. 
2. See, e.g., Keller, 83ίΓ, esp. 187fFfor the period. 
3. Semmelroth, 'Die Kirche als Sakrament des Heils', 309f; see also 328. 
4. Semmelroth, Ursakrament, 328f. 
5. 'Sacrament' can be understood in different ways, or with different 
emphases. For the development over the last two centuries, see 
Bernards, 'Zur Lehre von der Kirche als Sakrament'. See also Boff, 
182-375, who analyzes the use of 'the church as sacrament' in the 
official teachings of the church (from the First Vatican Council to the 
Second) and in the works of theologians since Scheeben. In 
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Semmelroth's understanding there seems to be a shift from an 
emphasis on the combination of visible-invisible to an emphasis on the 
sacrament as sign or instrument: in both cases, however, the criticism is 
valid. 
6. BofT, 45f, where he indicates that he will develop this basic statement in 
future works. 
7. Βο(Γ, 17fr. 
8. BofT, 28Π". 
9. BofT, 43; see 42^t for the other conditions. 
10. Miihlen's comment that Bellarmine's definition is dominated by a 
metaphor is also applicable to his own formula, which is dominated by 
una mystica persona. Another difficulty with his view is that 'many' is too 
vague to establish a specifically ecclesiological approach (see below). 
Mühlen has to maintain this vagueness, since 'many' refers to Christ 
and us. 
11. See Przywara, 123, who cites Pelz, Der Christ als Christus. See also 
Valeske, 160fr(esp. 165-7) for the literature. See further Mühlen, Una 
Mystica, 173fr. 
] 2. This implies that the way in which Congar uses the distinction between 
ecclesia congregans and ecclesia congregata cannot be accepted 
('Wesenseigenschaften', 458-77). The starting-point of the outline also 
calls into question the usefulness of the distinction itself. 
13. See я. 13 to Chapter I, section 1.3 above; see also Metz's criticism of 
certain views of history (Chapter III, section 1.2 above). 
14. See, e.g., the way in which the Uneamenta for the special synod of the 
Dutch bishops (January 1980) uses 'communio'. 
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STELLINGEN The Concept of Church 
1. Bg het schryven van de geschiedenis van Vaticanum II 
zal, gezien de ambivalentie van Lumen Gentium én de 
post-conciliaire ontwikkelingen, de rol van de 'be-
middelende theologen' minder positief beoordeeld 
moeten worden, (chapter I) 
contra Ьц . Tavard, G., The Pilgrim Church 
London 19Ь7, 3*1-35 
2. Het onderscheid tussen de metaforische betekenis van 
een woord en het metaforische gebruik van woorden in 
een zin is fundamenteel voor een adequate metafoor­
theorie. (chapter II) 
3· De plaats van de ecclesiologie m het geheel van de 
theologie en de interne structuur van de ecclesio­
logie worden bepaald door het gegeven dat de mensen 
mensen zijn en niet God. (chapter IV) 
k. Een cruciale test voor een coherente en adequate 
ecclesiologie is de manier waarop de heiligheid 
van de kerk behandeld wordt. 
5- In de ontwikkeling van de ecclesiologie impliceert 
de Lex Ecclesiae Fundamentalls een beslissende stap 
terug naar een incoherente visie op de kerk. 
6. Methodologisch gezien ligt voor de actuele theologie 
het verschil tussen de sensus fidei en de consensus 
fidelium hierin dat de eerste onmisbaar is, terwijl 
de laatste onbruikbaar is. 
7. Het is te betreuren dat J.H.Newman nog steeds niet 
is uitgeroepen tot 'doctoi ecclesiae' . 
. De quaestiones 3-12 van het prima pars van Thomas' 
Summa Theologiae ¿ijn voor elke theolo(o)g(e) een 
behartigenbwaardige oefening in bescheidenheid. 
(vgl. Burrell, D., Aquinas. God and Action. 
London 1979, 3-55 ν 
9. Voor de analyse van de veranderingen die de laatste 
jaren hebben plaats gevonden in de visie op en de 
praktijk van het bidden is de tegenstelling 'onmid­
dellijk - middellijk' toegepast op 'vroeger - nu' 
een misleidend instrument. 
10. De voortdurende praktijk om kandidaten voor het 
priesterschap eerst tot diaken te wijden botst met 
de poging om wat betreft het diakonaat aan te slui­
ten bij de eerste eeuwen en het een eigen en zelf­
standige plaats te geven. 
11. Het ' responsonsch beamen' dat door Schillebeeckx 
wordt gebruikt kan niet vertaald worden met het 
twentse 'jao-jao'. 
(Schillebeeckx, E., Gerechtigheid en Liefde. Genade 


